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CONTENTS

ARTICLES

Simon of Faversham's Sophisma: "Universale est intentio".	TETSUO YOKOYAMA 1
Taxation of Italians by the French Crown (1311-1363)	JOHN B. HENNEMAN, JR. 15
Henry IV, the Commons and Tax- ation	ALAN ROGERS 44
Aquinas — Existential Permanence and Flux	JOSEPH OWENS, C.Ss.R. 71
A New Way to God: Henry of Ghent (II)	ANTON C. PEGIS 93
Theory of Composition in Medieval Poetry and Geoffrey of Vin- sauf's <i>Poetria Nova</i>	DOUGLAS KELLY 117
Imagery in the <i>Knight's Tale</i> and the <i>Miller's Tale</i>	CHRISTOPHER DEAN 149
<i>Parce Continuis</i> : Some Textual and Interpretive Notes	BRIAN STOCK 164
Repertorium Mertonense	JAMES A. WEISHEIPL, O.P. 174
Fragmentation of Farms and Fields in the Chiltern Hills. Thir- teenth Century and Later .	DAVID RODEN 225
Francesc Eiximenis on Royal Of- ficials. A View of Fourteenth Century Aragon	JILL R. WEBSTER 239
The Life of Guy of Merton by Rainald of Merton	MARVIN L. COLKER 250
The Sin of Brunetto Latini	RICHARD KAY 262
Four Commentaries on the <i>De Con- solatione Philosophiae</i> in MS Heiligenkreuz 130	NICHOLAS M. HARING, S.A.C. 287
<i>Patientia</i> in the B-Text of "Piers Plowman"	ELISABETH M. ORSTEN 317

MEDIAEVALIA

Caedmon: A Traditional Christian Poet	DONALD W. FRITZ 334
The Ointment in Chrétien's <i>Yvain</i> .	ROBERT G. COOK 338
The Sound of Laughter in <i>Sir Gawain and the Green Knight</i>	EDWARD TROSTLE JONES 343
A Provisional Bibliography of Ores- me's Writings: A Supplement- ary Note	ALBERT D. MENUT 346

Simon of Faversham's Sophisma: "Universale Est Intentio"

TETSUO YOKOYAMA*

PROFESSOR Carmelo Ottaviano edited the *Quaestiones super libros praedicamentorum* of Simon of Faversham in 1930.¹ A year later he also edited Quaestiones III-V of Simon's *Quaestiones libri Porphyrii* which is contained in the MS C.161.Inf. of the Bibl. Ambrosiana in Milan, in an article "Le opere di Simone di Faversham e la sua posizione nel problema degli universali."² Father Franz Pelster remarks on this edition:

In der Universalienlehre verwirft Simon den extremen Realismus, bietet aber durch seine starke Betonung des esse intentionale vielleicht ein Element, das zu Aureoli und zum Nominalismus hinüberführt.³

Ottaviano presented a list of Simon's works as an *elenco completo* in the introduction to his edition of Simon's *Quaestiones super libros Praedicamentorum*. M. Grabmann made many important additions to this list.⁴ He indicates Codex Lat. Monacensis 3852 (Memb. misc. in quarto, S. XIV et XI, 69 fol.⁵) which contains, besides the works of Siger de Courtrai edited by G. Wallerand, a series of *Sophismata* (*Sophisma* is, according to Grabmann, "eine Literaturgattung der Artistenfacultät, welche den literarischen Niederschlag der Disputationstätigkeit innerhalb der Artistenfacultät darstellt und mit der Quodlibetalienliteratur der theologischen Fakultät grosse Ähnlichkeit besitzt"). The name "Simon Anglicus," i.e. Simon of Faversham, appears among the authors of these *Sophismata*.

* This is a posthumous article. Following a sojourn of study and research in Europe, Professor Tetsuo Yokoyama returned to Japan where he died one month later on July 25, 1967. With his wife's consent we are publishing this article which had already been accepted. Some necessary revisions and corrections are the work of Rev. E. A. Synan of our Faculty and of the Editor.

¹ *Le Quaestiones super libros Praedicamentorum di Simon di Faversham dal ms. Ambrosiano C. 161, Inf.*, in *Memorie della Reale Accademia dei Lincei*, ser. 6, vol. 3, fasc. 4 (Rome, 1930).

² *Archivio di filosofia*, 1 (1931), 15-29.

³ *Scholastik*, 7 (1932), 451 ff.

⁴ *Die Aristoteleskommentare des Simon von Faversham, handschriftliche Mitteilungen*, in *Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Munich, 1933).

His *sophisma* is found on fol. 48^r-49^r and carries the title *Universale est intentio* which is here edited. On this *Sophisma* Grabmann remarks:⁵

Dieses Sophisma des Simon von Faversham beleuchtet so die erkenntnispsychologische Seite des Universalienproblems und ist eine wichtige Ergänzung zu den Darlegungen dieses Scholastikers in seinen Aristoteleskommentaren, vor allem in seinem Isagogekommentar der Mailänder Handschrift, über dessen Universalienlehre Ottaviano gehandelt hat.⁶

About Simon's life we have the following data coming from the investigations of Powicke, Little, Pelster and Emden.⁷ He must have been born about 1240, probably in the little town in Kent, which gave him his name. He taught in Oxford around the year 1300 and was chancellor of the University between January, 1304 and February, 1306. (If so, he must have been a contemporary at Oxford of Duns Scotus and Thomas Sutton). In order to defend his right to Reculver in Kent, he left England for Avignon and died there, or on his way there, sometime between May 24 and July 19, 1306.

Among his works which are listed by Grabmann the *Quaestiones super tertium De Anima* also have been edited by D. Sharp,⁸ besides these two *Quaestiones* edited by Ottaviano.

In this edition the following critical signs have been employed:

< > = editor's addition; [] = editor's deletion.

⁵ Cf. *Catalogus Codicum latinorum Bibliothecae Regiae Monacensis*, Tomi I, Pars II (Munich, 1894).

⁶ Grabmann, *op. cit.*, 13.

⁷ F. M. Powicke, "Master Simon of Faversham," *Mélanges d'histoire du moyen âge offerts à M. Ferdinand Lot* (Paris, 1925), 649 ff.; A. G. Little and F. Pelster, *Oxford Theology and Theologians* (Oxford, 1934), 262 ff.

⁸ *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 9 (1934), 307-368.

TEXT

<U>NIVERSALE EST INTENTIO. Circa istud sophisma tria quaerebantur circa ipsum universale. Primum est: quid sit causa activa ipsius universalitatis, utrum, videlicet, intellectus agens agat universalitatem in rebus. Secundum de causa eius materiali: utrum, videlicet, actu universale sit in intellectu vel in re extra. Tertium est de causa eius formali, scilicet: utrum universale, quantum ad id quod est, sit substantia vel accidens.

<I De intellectu agente>

De primo arguitur quod intellectus agens non agat universalitatem in rebus.¹

<1> Quoniam actu universale est actu intellectum; sed res per operationem intellectus agentis non sunt actu intellectae, sed per receptionem intellectus possibilis; ergo, nec res sunt actu universales per intellectum agentem.

<2> Item: universale est unum in multis; sed res per intellectum agentem non est una in multis ut abstracta a multis; ergo, nec per eum est universalis.

Oppositum patet per Aristotelem secundo *de Anima* et Commentatorem ibidem,² qui dicit quod intellectus agens agit universalitatem in rebus.

Dicebatur ad problema, quod intellectus agens agit universalitatem in rebus, quoniam intellectus agens comparatur ad ipsa intelligibilia sicut lumen ad colores; sed lumen facit colores, qui sunt potentia visibiles, esse actu visibiles; ideo, similiter, intellectus agens facit ea quae sunt potentia intelligibilia actu intellecta. Facit autem intellectum actu, in quantum cognitionem agit in intellectum possibilem, et³ quia universale in actu non est aliud quam cognitio rei, quae est in ipso intellectu, ideo dicendum est quod intellectus agens agit universale.

<3> Contra hoc arguebatur primo quod res materiales de se sunt actu intelligibiles, quia intellectus non est maioris virtutis in intelligendo quam sit primum agens in agendo; sed primum agens non potest agere substantiam materiale aliquam sine determinata quantitate, hoc implicaret enim contradictionem; ergo, intellectus non potest intelligere substantiam materiale sine determinatis accidentibus. Res igitur sub determinatis accidentibus sunt de se intelligibiles, et per consequens non est necessarium ponere intellectum agentem ad hoc quod potentia intelligibilia fiant intellecta.

<4> Item, arguitur quod intellectus agens non agat cognitionem rei in intellectum possibilem, quoniam si ageret sic, hoc non esset nisi abstrahendo; sed probatio quod intellectus agens non abstrahit, quia omne <actu abstractum est> actu intellectum; ergo, omne actu abstrahens⁴ est actu intellectus; sed intellectus agens non intelligit; ergo, nec abstrahit.

<5> Item, arguitur quod intellectus agens non recte comparatur⁵ lumini. Quia lumen non dat ipsis coloribus formam et quidditatem per quam possit movere

¹ Cf. <AD ARGUMENTA>, below, n. 44.

² Cap. 5, 417b21 seq.; Averroes, *Sum.* IV, cap. 1, com. 60, *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois commentariis* (Venice, 1562-1574), Sup. II, f. 80E seq.

³ et] eo

⁴ abstrahens] abstrahentem

⁵ comparatur] operatur

visum. Ideo de se sunt visibiles actu, quia color est de se visibilis vel per se, ut ostendit Commentator secundo *de Anima*,⁶ sed intellectus agens dat fantasmatis formam et speciem per quam possunt movere intellectum possibilem, quia per se non movent, quia materiale non est activum in inmateriale; ergo, intellectus agens non recte⁷ comparatur lumini.

<6> Item, arguitur quod universale in actu non est ipsa cognitio rei, quoniam actu universale est actu cognitum; sed quod est actu cognitum non est ipsa cognitio, sicut causatum non est ipsa causalitas; ergo, similiter quod est actu universale non est actu cognitio rei.

<7> Item, universale est praedicabile de multis; si ergo cognitio rei non est actu praedicabile de pluribus (quia Sortes non est sua cognitio nec Plato et sic de aliis), ergo cognitio rei non est actu illud quod est actu universale.

<8> Item, arguitur quod quidditas, secundum se considerata, sit actu universalis, quia obiectum alicuius virtutis actu apprehenditur ab illa virtute; sed quidditas rei secundum se est obiectum intellectus; ergo, quidditas rei est quod actu apprehenditur ab intellectu. Secundum quod actu apprehenditur ab intellectu est actu universale, quia sicut aliquid est actu singulare dum sentitur, sic aliquid est actu universale dum intelligitur; ergo, quidditas rei, secundum se considerata, est actu universale.

<9> Item, arguitur sic: Cuius est potentia eius est actus. Si ergo quidditas rei, antequam intelligatur, est universalis in potentia; ergo, cum intelligitur, est universalis in actu; ergo, universale in actu non est [cognitio rei existens in anima.

<10> Item, arguitur quod intellectus agens non agat universale, quia si intellectus agens agat universale, cum universale non sit per se existens, tunc oportet quod subsistat in aliquo alio. Aut ergo est in intellectu possibili, aut in intellectu agente, aut in ipsis fantasmatibus. Sed ipsum, cum agit, non statim est in intellectu possibili, quia actio intellectus agentis praecedit receptionem intellectus possibilis. Item, nec est in intellectu agente, quia tunc intellectus agens reciperet; quod non est verum. Nec est in fantasmatibus particularibus.⁸ Ergo, non est possibile quod intellectus agens agat universale.

Plura alia argumenta fiunt ad partem istam, sed omnia redeunt in idem cum hiis quae dicta sunt.

<II De intellectu possibili>

Deinde respondebatur: Arguitur quod non est aliquid actu universale per intellectum agentem, sed per intellectum possibilem, quia propria operatio intellectus agentis est abstrahere solum quidditatem rei a principiis individuantibus. Ista autem natura, sic abstracta, est obiectum intellectus possibilis, qui primo intelligit istam naturam absolute, deinde comparat ipsam ad supposita a quibus abstrahit, et in comparando sic naturam ad supposita causat in ea intentionem universalitatis. Et ita, illud in actu non est universale antequam in actu intellectum.

Contra ista ita arguitur: Si intellectus simul comparat naturam intellectam ad supposita, aut ergo comparat eam ad supposita ut unum sunt, aut secundum quod multa sunt. Si dicas quod simul comparat eam ad supposita ut unum sunt, tunc non comparat eam ad supposita, quia supposita, secundum quod unum sunt,

⁶ Sum. IV, cap. 3, com. 66, *op. cit.*, f. 84B

⁷ non recte] notabiliter?

⁸ particularibus] particularia

non habent rationem suppositi. Si dicatur quod simul eam ad supposita ut multa sunt, tunc intellectus simul intelligit ea ad quae comparat. Sequitur quod intellectus simul per hoc <quod> comparat naturam istam ad supposita non agit intentionem universalitatis.

Item, si intellectus in illa natura quam intelligit, tunc cum intelligit, agat in ea intentionem universalitatis, aut ergo in eodem instanti intelligit illam naturam et agit in ea intentionem universalis, aut in (fol. 48^a-48^b) alio. Si in eodem instanti, tunc in eodem intelligit multa simul, scilicet naturam rei et intentionem universalitatis quam agit in illa natura. Si in alio instanti, hoc est inconueniens, quia tunc intelligit in aliqua re, dum eam non intelligit, agit et intentionem universalitatis; quod⁹ non potest esse, quia si ita esset, tunc intentio generis non erit <magis> animali quam homini; ergo, intellectus in ista natura, quam intelligit, nullo modo agit universalitatis intentionem.

Item, secundum Commentatorem, septimo *Metaphysicae*,¹⁰ universalia rerum sunt collata a fantasmatibus particularibus ab intellectu considerante et faciente¹¹ ea intentionem unam. Cuius ergo est colligere intentionem unam ex multis particularibus, eius est agere actu universale; sed intellectus agentis est colligere intentionem unam ex multis particularibus, hoc autem non contingit, nisi per abstractionem a multis abstrahat, quod est proprium intellectus agentis; ergo, ipsius est agere universale in actu.

Ad primum,¹² cum dicebatur quod intellectus illam naturam, in qua agit intentionem universalitatis, comparat simul ad supposita, et secundum quod sunt unum et secundum quod sunt multa; quia per hoc quod intellectus comparat illam naturam ad supposita, secundum quod sunt unum, attribuit ei[s] universalitatem, et per hoc <quod> comparat eam ad supposita, secundum quod sunt multa, attribuit ei[s] communitatem cum alio; <cum> alicui rei attribuitur universalitas et communitas, iam ipsa est actu universalis.

Contra hoc arguitur: Si intellectus aliquam naturam simul comparat ad supposita, secundum quod unum sunt et etiam ut multa, tunc intellectus simul intelligit aliqua ut unum et non unum.

Ad hoc dicebatur quod non est inconueniens, si intelligat aliqua ut unum et multa, dummodo tamen hoc sit respectu diversorum. Unde intellectus non aliter potest intelligere supposita ut unum et multa sed respectu diversorum, ut unum respectu illius naturae quae intellecta est, et ut multa in quantum habent <esse> in materia extra.

Contra hoc arguitur: Si intellectus simul apprehendit supposita ut unum et multa respectu diversorum, tunc oportet quod intellectus illa diversa simul intelligat. Aut ergo intelligit simul illa diversa ut diversa sunt, aut ut unum. Non est dicere quod simul intelligat illa diversa ut unum, quia tunc intellectus respectu illorum non posset apprehendere supposita ut unum et multa. Nec est dicere quod ille intellectus apprehendat illa diversa ut diversa; quia si sic, hoc erit per diversas species intelligibiles; sed intellectus non potest simul formari diversis speciebus intelligibilibus secundum idem corpus: secundum idem non potest colorari diversis coloribus; ergo, intellectus simul non potest intelligere diversa ut

⁹ quod] quia

¹⁰ Cf. XII *Metaphys.*, Sum. I, cap. 1, com. 4, *op. cit.*, Vol. 8, f. 292rD

¹¹ faciente] sumente

¹² Cf. Contra ista ita arguitur, above

diversa. Quare, respectu diversorum, non simul apprehendit aliqua ut unum et multa.

Secundo arguitur: Intellectus, cum sit simplex et indivisibilis, ad quodcumque se dimittat, totaliter se convertit. Cum non possit totaliter se convertere ad diversa, oportet quidquid simul apprehendit sit aliquid unum. Nunc autem unum et multa non sunt aliquid unum, immo differentiae oppositae dividentes ipsum ens, ergo, intellectus simul non apprehendit aliqua ut unum et multa, sive respectu eiusdem aut sive respectu diversorum.

Ad primum istorum dicebatur quod intellectus simul potest intelligere diversa ut diversa, quia omnis virtus ponens differentias inter aliqua duo simul apprehendit¹³ utrumque illorum; ut patet de sensitiva, similiter de intellectiva.

Contra illud arguitur quod, licet intellectus posset simul intelligere differentiam inter aliqua duo, tamen non potest simul intelligere unitatem quae est inter aliqua et cum hoc differentiam quae est inter duo aliqua; sed si intellectus apprehendat supposita ut unum et multa respectu diversorum, tunc continget quod dictum est: oportet quod intellectus comparet supposita ad naturam intellectam, in qua supposita accipiuntur ut unum et idem; quod comparet supposita inter se invicem secundum esse quod habent in materia extra (sic enim comparat ut multa sunt); ergo, intellectus simul non potest apprehendere supposita ut unum et multa respectu diversorum.

Et hoc idem arguitur sic: Sicut dicit Philosophus tertio *de Anima*,¹⁴ intellectus in indivisibili tempore non intelligit longitudinem, nisi per id quod facit longitudinem esse unam; ergo, intellectus simul non intelligit aliquid, nisi secundum quod est indivisibile unum. Simul ergo non intelligit aliqua ut diversa sunt; ergo, multo fortius nec aliqua ut sunt unum et multa.

Haec fuerunt argumenta de esse et natura universalis. Parum habemus ab Aristotele traditum nisi quod ipse accipit improbando opiniones philosophorum qui ponebant universalis esse quasdam naturas per se subsistentes praeter singularem. Et ideo, si sic esset universale, tunc in esse suo non dependeret ab anima. Ex quo igitur, viri excellentes in philosophia visi sunt esse contrarii in modo accipiendi universalis. Ideo melius est nobis de proposito dubitare quam aliquid per certitudinem asserere, procedendo per modum inquisitionis.

<III Quid sit dicendum ad problema>

Considerandum est ergo primo quod natura rei secundum se nec est universalis nec particularis. Si enim secundum se esset universalis, tunc non posset esse una nec plurificata; et sic natura humana non esset tota in Sorte, nec natura equina tota in Brunello. Similiter, si secundum se esset particularis, tunc non posset esse plures. Cum ergo natura rei sit una in uno et plures¹⁵ in pluribus, sequitur quod natura rei secundum se nec est universalis nec particularis, sed ipsa est particularis secundum esse quod habet in materia extra, cui ut sic coniuncta sunt principia individuantia, et est universalis secundum esse quod habet in anima.

Quod autem naturae¹⁶ rei secundum esse quod habet in anima solum conveniat ratio universalis, patet per Commentatorem tertio *de Anima*,¹⁷ qui dicit quod

¹³ apprehendit] intelligit

¹⁵ plures] plura

¹⁷ Sum. I, cap. 3, com. 18, *op. cit.*, f. 161vF

¹⁴ Cap. 6, 430b6 seq.

¹⁶ naturae] natura

nullus 'homo' habet esse extra animam quoniam, si haberet, non indigeremus ponere intellectum agentem. Et alibi, supra eundem tertium, dicit sic: Si universalis sunt tantum intellecta, non sic entia sed sic intellecta, ac si diceret quod res universaliter intelligitur sed non universaliter existit. Ergo natura rei, licet sit illud quod est extra animam, quantum autem ad esse suum universale non est nisi in anima. Et hoc declaratur sic: De ratione universalis est unitas et communitas. Propter quod dicit Philosophus.¹⁸ Universale est unum in multis et propter hoc praeter¹⁹ multa. Ex eo enim quod est unum in multis sibi debetur communitas; quia est praeter multa, sibi inest unitas. Non autem naturae rei secundum se [non] inest communitas, quia tunc non posset inveniri in singulari. Nam quidquid (fol. 48^b-48^{va}) est, singulariter erit; nec in eo invenitur communitas aliqua; ergo communitas inest sibi ex quodam alio; hoc autem non est nisi ab intellectu. Et ideo, quod natura rei sit universalis, hoc habet ab intellectu.

<IV De intellectu agente et de intellectu possibili>

Sed tunc restat dubitatio principalis: Utrum, videlicet, intellectus, qui agit universale, sit intellectus agens vel possibilis. Ad cuius dissolutionem sciendum est quod secundum Avicennam²⁰ agens dicitur quatuor modis: perficiens, disponens, adiuvans, consilians. Perficiens dico illud quod ducit formam in complementum rei. Disponens vero non inducit formam, sed praeparat et disponit ad introductionem formae. Dico ergo quod intellectus agens agit universale tamquam disponens, sed intellectus possibilis agit universale tamquam perficiens; ita quod ratio universalitatis dispositive est ab intellectu agente, completive autem ab intellectu possibili. Et quia ratio universalitatis est ab intellectu agente, ideo dicit Commentator, tertio *de Anima*,²¹ quod formae apprehensivae imaginatione non possunt per se movere intellectum possibilem et trahere ipsum de potentia ad actum quoniam, si ita esset, tunc nulla esset differentia inter universale et individuum. Et subdit: Necessarium est igitur alium motorem esse, qui facit eas actu movere^{21a} et hoc non est aliud nisi intellectus agens.

Apparet ergo ex parte intellectus quod, si non esset intellectus agens, non esset differentia inter individuum et universale; propter quod intellectus agens saltem dispositive agit universalitatem in rebus. Sed per quem modum videtur sic: Fantasmata hoc modo se habent ad intellectum sicut colores ad visum, ut dicitur tertio *de Anima*.²² Et ideo, sicut visus non videt nisi ad praesentiam coloris, sic nec intellectus intelligit nisi ad praesentiam fantasmatis. Sed praesentia fantasmatis non sufficit. Nam, sicut ad actionem videndi requiritur lumen extrinsecum, quod facit colores qui sunt potentia visibiles esse actu visibiles, vel ut verius loquimur, quod facit medium esse actu lucidum quod possit ad hoc inmutari a coloribus; sic ad actum illuminandi requiritur lumen quoddam extrinsecum per quod potentia intelligibilia facit actu intelligibilia. Hoc autem est intellectus agens. Et ideo figurative dicit Philosophus in tertio *de Anima*²³ quod intellectus agens est

¹⁸ Cf. *Anal. Post.* L. II, cap. 18, 100a7-8; *Met.*, L. VII, cap. 13, 1038b9 seq.

¹⁹ praeter] nota

²⁰ *Sufficientia*, L. I, cap. 10, *Avicennae Opera* (Venice, 1508), f. 19a

²¹ Sum. I, cap. 3, com. 18, *op. cit.*, f. 161rC-161vD

^{21a} movere] moveri

²² Cf. cap. 7, 431a14-15

²³ Cap. 5, 430a15

habitus ut lumen, quia sicut lumen facit ad comprehensionem colorum, sic intellectus agens ad comprehensionem intelligibilium. Et sicut²⁴ visus mediante lumine exteriori videt corpus coloratum secundum quod coloratum solum, sic anima nostra ad praesentiam fantasmatis et intellectus agentis comprehendit naturam rei sine omni accidente; ita quod intellectus agens non est nisi quaedam virtus particularis in anima nostra, per quam anima distincte potest comprehendere praeter esse illud quod non est de ratione sua. Quidditas vero, sic abstracta ab omni eo, quod sibi accidit, et maxime a plenariis fantasmatis individualibus²⁵ virtute intellectus agentis, sic <est> in propinqua dispositione ad hoc quod sit actu universalis.

Illo autem modo intellectus agens saltem dispositive agit universalitatem in rebus. Sed universale quantum ad rationem eius completivam est ab intellectu possibili, et non ab agente, quod patet ex duobus. Primo sic: Nam intellectus agens, cum agat abstrahendo, manifestum est quod causa actionis suae est aliqua natura abstracta, utrum sit naturae aut rei, secundum hoc solum quod abstracta, non est actu universalis quia ipsa, ut abstracta est, non habet respectum ad supposita, ut postea magis videbitur. Et ideo natura rei, inquantum ad ipsam terminatur absolute actio intellectus agentis, non est actu et complete universalis.

Hoc similiter declaratur ex alio: In universali secundum actum est duo considerare, scilicet, intensionem universalitatis et naturam subiectam intensionem. Intentio autem universalitatis, cum non sit praesentia fantasmatum, causatur ex aliqua proprietate reali. Et ideo contingit quod anima diversas intensiones logicales attribuit diversis rebus secundum diversas proprietates rerum. Ex quo arguitur sic: Cuius non est considerare proprietates rerum, eius non est agere completivam rationem universalis; sed intellectus agentis non est considerare res nec proprietates rerum, quia intellectus agens non cognoscit. Propter quod dicit Commentator²⁶ quod intellectus agens non est intellectus qui²⁷ cognoscat sed qui²⁸ efficit ut possit intelligere. Et ideo intellectus agentis non est agere completivam rationem universalis.

Apparet, igitur, ex praedictis quod [non] natura rei, ex solo quod abstracta est, non est actu universalis, sed ipsa [est] actio et dat formis imaginatis virtutem per quam possunt agere intellectum possibilem, <et> dat ipsi virtutem per quam possit recipere; et hic, quid recipere, nihil aliud est quam transferre. Et ad hoc respiciens Commentator, tertio *de Anima*²⁹, dicit quod abstrahere nihil aliud est quam intensiones imaginatas³⁰ facere in actu, quae prius erant in potentia, et intelligere³¹ nihil aliud est quam recipere has intensiones. Si, ergo, abstrahere est propria operatio intellectus agentis, manifestum est quod operatione³² intellectus agentis aliquid fit actu intelligibile, sed nondum fit actu universale, et totum hoc patet ex praedictis.

Restat, ergo, quod universale, quantum ad rationem eius completivam, fiat ab intellectu principali, quod patet sic: De ratione universalis completiva sunt duo, scilicet: unitas et universalitas. Nunc autem natura rei nec est una nec communis, nisi per solam operationem intellectus et eius considerationem. Ipsa enim

²⁴ sicut] sic

²⁵ individualibus + ipsa de licet et Avicenna? Probably some words are missing here.

²⁶ Cf. *De Anima*, L. III, Sum. I, cap. 3, com. 19, *op. cit.*, 160vE ff.

²⁷ qui] quod

²⁸ qui] quod

²⁹ Sum. I, cap. 3, com. 18, *op. cit.*, f. 161vE

³⁰ imaginatas] imaginantis

³¹ intelligere] intellectus

³² operatione] operationi

est una in quantum consideratur abstracta, et est communis in quantum consideratur ut dicitur de pluribus, non diminuta in illis quantum est de se; (fol. 48^{va}-48^{vb}) unde, eadem natura, quae abstractivè intelligendo secundum esse est in particularibus. Et ideo intellectus illam naturam accipit, ut est de pluribus praedicabilis praedicatione dicente: Hoc est hoc. Ergo natura rei non est actu universalis, nisi cum est actu abstracta et actu considerata ab intellectu.

Et hoc patet per Themestium, supra tertium *de Anima*,³³ ubi dicit quod universalis sunt conceptus quidam quos anima in seipsa thesaurizat et colligit. Ergo ratio universalis non attribuitur alicui rei, nisi cum est actu intellecta. Sed addendum quod <ad hoc quod> natura rei fit actu universalis non sufficit quod fit actu intellecta; sed cum natura rei apprehenditur ab intellectu per comparisonem ad supposita, et intellectus considerat quod supposita in illa natura rei convenient, ita quod quantum ad naturam illam unum suppositum ab alio non differt; tunc intellectus agens agit in ea intentionem universalitatis et accipit ipsam ut aliquid praedicabile de pluribus; quod si intellectus apprehendit ipsam de pluribus differentibus specie solum praedicabilem, attribuit sibi intentionem generis; si autem de pluribus differentibus numero solum praedicabilem, attribuit ei intentionem speciei, et sic de aliis.

Quod autem talis comparatio naturae ad supposita ut sunt similia et convenientia in natura illa requiratur ad completam rationem illius, patet per Boethium supra *Praedicamenta*,³⁴ ubi dicit quod 'genus et species non' est 'uno singulari' intellecto 'sed ex omnibus singularibus mentis' concepta 'ratione'. Hoc idem vult Lincolniensis supra primum *Posteriorum*,³⁵ ubi dicit quod cum demonstratione tria sint: magnitudo, figura et color; ratio, magnitudinem³⁶ a colore, colorem a figura, et haec omnia dividit a corpore, quousque perveniat³⁷ ad cognitionem corporis absolute. Sed ideo ad hoc non vult ibi universale antequam abstractum fuerit a multis et consideratum ab intellectu ut unum et idem in multis repertum.

Considerandum est etiam de intentione Commentatoris, supra XII *Metaphysicae*,³⁸ qui dicit quod 'universalis apud Aristotelem sunt collecta a particularibus ab intellectu, qui concipit inter ea similitudinem et facit eam unam intentionem.'

Et Themestius, supra prooemium *de Anima*,³⁹ dicit quod genus est conceptus quidam sine hypostasi ex tenui similitudine singularium collectus.

Hoc ergo est quasi communis intentio omnium expositorum quod per comparisonem naturae intellectae ad supposita [quod] illa natura actu est universalis. Sic ergo patet ex dictis quid requiratur ad completam rationem universalis, scilicet quod sit actu abstractum et quod sit actu intellectum et quod sit ad aliud comparatum.

³³ Verbeke, G., *Thémistius, Commentaire sur le Traité de l'âme d'Aristote* (Louvain-Paris, 1957), 130, ll. 95-96.

³⁴ PL 64, 183C

³⁵ Robert Grosseteste, *In posteriorum analeticorum librum*, I, cap. 14 (81a38-b9) (Venice, 1514), fol. 17r a: "ratio vero ... dividit colorem a magnitudine et figura et corpore et iterum figuram et magnitudinem a corpore ... et ita per divisionem et abstractionem perventi in cognitionem corporis subiective deferentis magnitudinem et figuram et colorem."

³⁶ magnitudinem] magnitudine

³⁷ perveniat] perveniant

³⁸ Sum. I, cap. 1, com. 4, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, f. 292D

³⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 8-9, ll. 22-23

Sed tunc incidit dubitatio: Cum natura rei sit indivisibilis temporis, <utrum> in eodem sit actu abstracta et actu intellecta.

Et dicendum est quod sic; quia videmus in naturalibus quod in eodem instanti, cum materia est summe disposita ad introductionem alicuius figurae, inducitur forma. Aliter⁴⁰ saltem esset ponere materiam sine formam. Manifestum est enim quod, <quando> materia est summe disposita ad aliquam formam, [quod] tunc in materia non manet forma contraria. Nunc autem cum natura rei est actu abstracta, est summe disposita ad hoc quod fit intellecta, et ideo, in eodem indivisibili tempore, est actu abstracta et actu intellecta.

Item, videmus in naturalibus quod agens non agit formam per se, nec materiam per se, sed agit formam in materia secundum totum aggregatum ex utraque.⁴¹ Nunc autem natura abstracta comparatur sicut forma ad materiam. Et ideo intellectus agens simul agit aggregatum quoddam ex illa natura et intellectu possibili, ita quod simul virtute intellectus agentis illa natura abstrahitur et intelligitur ab intellectu possibili. Et intellectus agens in abstrahendo a materia naturam simul tempore, simul agit eam in intellectu possibili. Sic ergo manifestum est ex dictis quod natura rei simul et actu abstracta et actu intellecta.

Sed ulterius est utrum prius actu intellecta quam sit comparata ad supposita.

Dico quod sic. Cuius declaratio est haec: Intellectus simul non potest intelligere aliqua quorum [ut] non sit una ratio intelligendi; sed eius quod est absolutum, et etiam eius quod est comparatum, non est una ratio intelligendi. Nam 'absolutum' et 'comparatum' sunt primae differentiae distinguentes substantiam ab accidente, et istorum non est aliqua ratio una, ut est alibi declaratum. Oportet, ergo, quod intellectus prius intelligat eam <absolute quam> comparative ad aliud, sic etiam in re prius absolutum quam comparatum, et hoc manifeste in nobis experimur. Non enim statim cum intelligimus naturam hominis, apprehendimus eam ut praedicabilem de pluribus est. Nec mirum, quia cum absolute apprehendimus naturam hominis, non apprehendimus aliquid accidens eius; esse autem praedicabile de pluribus est accidens naturae humanae; ideo, etc.

Sed ulterius, cum natura rei prius sit actu intellecta quam ad aliud comparata, aliquis dubitaret utrum simul cum est actu comparata ad supposita sit actu universalis.

Et dico: Simul cum intellectus naturam rei comparat ad supposita, hoc modo quod eam apprehendit ut communem pluribus, attribuit sibi intensionem universalitatis. Sed ante istam comparisonem praeexigitur alia comparatio, quae est suppositorum inter se. Nam intellectus primo considerat quomodo supposita ad se invicem conveniunt et quomodo inter se differunt. Et tunc intellectus comparans naturam aliquam ad supposita, quantum ad hoc quod conveniunt, agit in ea intensionem universalis; ita quod, simul cum natura rei comparatur ad supposita secundum quod sunt aliquid unum, ipsa sit actu universalis; et sibi attribuitur ratio praedicandi de pluribus.

<V De universali et de re extra animam>

Sed tunc forte dubitaret aliquis. Si enim universale secundum quod hoc sit in intellectu et singulare sit extra, nihil autem quod separatum est ab alio praedicatur in quid de eo et essentialiter; ideo, non videtur tunc quod universalis possint praedicari de singularibus.

⁴⁰ Aliter] Ita

⁴¹ utraque] utroque

Ad hoc dicendum quod universale includit duo: scilicet, intencionem universalitatis et naturam subiectam intencioni. Intentio universalitatis est (fol. 48^vb-49^ra) conceptus quidam in anima, [in] attributus ipsis rebus. Huiusmodi autem conceptus dicitur esse genus vel species et huiusmodi, quae non habent esse nisi per animam. Unde in ea sunt sicut in causa efficiente, sed in re intellecta, inquantum intellecta, est sicut in subiecto. Ista autem intenciones non praedicantur de ipsis singularibus, (quoniam⁴² non dicimus quod Sortes sit species vel universale), sed praedicantur de natura rei, ut intellecta est. Unde dicimus quod homo est species, animal est genus.

<VI De universali: substantia vel accidens>

Uterius, quia eadem est natura secundum substantiam quae est in intellectu per suam speciem et quae est in singularibus per suam substantiam, ideo intellectus illam naturam, quam intelligit, accipit ut praedicabilem de singularibus in quid, ita tamen, quod illa natura non praedicatur essentialiter in quid de singularibus sub ea ratione qua est intellecta. Nam ista praedicatio est accidentaliter: 'Sortes est homo intellectus.' Sub ea ratione absolute considerata praedicatur etiam accidens. Et sic natura, quae praedicatur, est in singularibus sicut in subiecto, in intellectu, autem, sicut in termino, et cum praedicatur de singularibus habet ordinem ad ipsum intellectum; et pro tanto dicuntur res, quae praedicantur de pluribus, esse in intellectu. Sed sunt in re extra sicut in subiecto. Unde verum est dicere quod numquam natura rei praedicaretur de pluribus, nisi esset actu intellecta; quia, cum praedicari est actus rationis, nihilominus tamen, sub illa ratione qua est intellecta, <non> praedicatur de pluribus, sed sub illa ratione qua est natura particularis et substantia.

Sic, ergo, ex brevibus apparet quomodo differentia est, nam universale, quantum ad intencionem universalem, in anima est sicut in subiecto, et illo modo non est in singularibus, neque praedicatur de ipsis. Universale autem, quantum ad rem subiectam intencioni universalitatis, in re est sicut in subiecto, et de singularibus praedicatur in quid. Verum est <quod>, cum ipsa praedicatur de singularibus, est intellecta; sed non praedicatur sub ea ratione qua intellecta. Ideo natura rei, ut de se, nec est determinata ad esse in anima, nec ad esse extra animam de quo praedicatur.

Ex praedictis, quinque manifesta sunt in generibus: Primum est quod universale dispositive est ab intellectu agente. Secundum est quod est complete ab intellectu possibili. Tertium est quod, quamvis res sit actu intellecta, tamen non est actu universalis antequam ad supposita comparetur. Quartum⁴³ est quod natura rei est prius intellecta quam sit ad supposita comparata. Quintum est quod simul ad supposita comparata ipsa sit universalis. Ad habendum igitur naturam complete universalis requiritur quod natura rei sit actu abstracta, actu intellecta, actu comparata ad supposita, hoc modo quod secundum se sit una in illis, et secundum iudicium animae, tamen, plurificata cum secundum se extra non. Et sic patet quid sit dicendum ad problema.

⁴² quoniam] qui

⁴³ Quartum] Quarta

<VII Responsa ad argumenta principalia>⁴⁴

Nunc, ad rationes in opposito: quando dicitur actu universale est actu in intellectu, dico quod verum est. Et cum dicitur: res per operationem intellectus agentis non sunt actu intellectae, concedo quod per solam operationem intellectus agentis non sunt actu intellectae et similiter non sunt actu universales.

AD ALIUD concedo maiorem. Ad minorem, cum dicitur quod res non est in multis per intellectum agentem, ideo abstracta a multis; dico quod statim quando res est abstracta, ipsa est una in multis quantum est de se. Ideo concedo quod per intellectum agentem res est abstracta a multis et una in multis, sed tamen non est communis ad multa antequam sit actu intellecta et actu comparata ad supposita, et quod⁴⁵ hoc fit per intellectum possibilem. Et ideo concedo conclusionem, scilicet quod res per intellectum agentem non est actu universalis et complete.

AD TERTIAM RATIONEM, cum dicitur intellectus non est maioris virtutis in intelligendo quam primum agens in agendo, propter dissolutionem rationis advertendum est quod potentia primi agentis non se extendit ad aliquid quod implicat contradictoria. Quia esse, quod implicat contradictoria, est prohibitum esse, et de eius ratione est non esse. Ad nihil autem tale, quod de sua ratione est prohibitum esse, se extendit virtus alicuius agentis; et propter hoc potentia primi agentis non se extendit ad hoc quod est facere hominem esse hominem et non hominem simul. Ista tamen impotentialitas non accidit a parte agentis primi, quia, scilicet, primum agens non possit agere, sed quia illud non potest agi.

Dico ergo ad minorem quod intellectus non est maioris⁴⁶ virtutis in intelligendo quam sit primum agens in agendo, et hoc si consideremus potentiam primi agentis absolutam. Si tamen consideremus ad hoc quod multa sunt impossibilia quae possunt intelligi et tamen ipsa sunt prohibita esse de sua ratione, sic dico quod intellectus multa potest intelligere quae non potest primum agens agere. Sed ista impotentia oportet [non] attendi non ex parte agentis primi, sed ex parte eius quod non potest fieri. Sufficit ergo dicere ad maiorem quod intellectus non sit maioris virtutis in intelligendo aliquid quam sit primum agens in agendo, nisi ipsum sit tale quod implicet contradictionem; et cum dicitur in minori quod primum agens non potest agere substantiam materialem sine determinata quantitate, quia hoc implicat contradictionem; et ideo concedo quod intellectus intelligendo non potest hoc agere quod substantia materialis in re existat sine determinata quantitate; nihilominus intellectus potest seorsum considerare substantiam materialem non considerando quantitatem sub qua existit.

AD ALIAM, cum arguitur quod intellectus agens non abstrahit, dicendum quod sic: Cum enim dicitur quod esse actu abstractum est esse actu intellectum, concedo. Et cum concluditur: Ergo et esse actu abstrahens est actu intellectus, dico quod necesse est ponere secundum substantiam <idem> esse quod abstrahit et intelligit; sed secundum aliam virtutem abstrahit et intelligit. Unde intellectus agens abstrahit secundum quod agens, intelligit autem secundum quod intellectus. Sicut enim intellectus agens et intellectus separabilia sunt secundum virtutem,⁴⁷ ita et secundum operationem; ita quod huic toti aggregato quod est intellectus agens de-

⁴⁴ Cf. <Argumenta de primo>, above, n. 1 to text

⁴⁵ quod] quid

⁴⁶ maioris] minoris

⁴⁷ virtutem] substantiam

bentur simul istae (fol. 49^a-49^b) duae operationes scilicet intelligere et abstrahere, abstrahere inquantum agens, intelligere autem <in>quantum intellectus; et ita quod anima per hoc quod est possibilis recipit et per hoc quod est intellectus intelligit.

Et hoc est quod Commentaror dicit supra tertium *de Anima*.⁴⁸ Haec sunt verba sua: 'Necesse est' ut 'haec tres differentiae sint in anima. Oportet enim quod in ea sit intellectus, qui est intellectus per hoc quod in eo recipitur omne'; unde idem est intellectus possibilis, et intellectus qui est 'intellectus⁴⁹ secundum quod ipsum facit intelligere omne' et iste est intellectus agens, et intellectus qui est intellectus 'secundum quod intelligit omne.'

Dicatur ad rationem sic: Omne actu abstrahens est actu intellectus. Dico quod verum est non secundum idem. Et cum dicitur in minori: Intellectus agens non intelligit, dico quod immo, sicut dictum est. Unde non sequitur conclusio intenta, scilicet quod intellectus agens non abstrahit. Sed illud sequitur quod intellectus agens non secundum idem abstrahit et intelligit, nam abstrahit in eo quod agens, intelligit autem in eo quod intellectus.

AD QUINTAM⁵⁰ cum arguitur quod intellectus non recte comparatur lumini, quia lumen non dat corporibus virtutem etc.; dicendum quod pro tanto intellectus agens comparatur lumini, quia sicut visus non videt nisi medio existente luminato, sic intellectus noster non intelligit nisi cum natura aliqua sit actu abstracta lumine intellectus agentis. Quantum ad illud quod tangitur in ratione supradicta intellectus agens non recte comparatur⁵¹ lumini.

AD SEXTAM ET AD SEPTIMAM, quae probabant simul quod universale in actu non est ipsa cognitio rei, concedo. Hoc enim proprie loquendo est actu universale quod est in intellectu et actu comparatum ad suppositum tamquam praedicabile de ipso. Ideo ipsa rei cognitio non est actu universale, nisi extendendo nomen universalis.

AD OCTAVAM, quae probat quod quidditas rei secundum se considerata est actu universale, respondendum est: Cum arguitur: 'Quod actu intelligitur est actu universale,' dico quod non est verum nisi ipsis addatur quia quod actu intelligitur et actu habet supposita est actu universale. Et tu dicis: Aliquid est actu singulare dum sentitur, ergo a simili aliquid est universale dum intelligitur. Dico quod non est simile. Sensus enim, licet recipiat speciem rei singularis et absque materia, non tamen recipit absque conditionibus materiae. Species enim rei singularis percipitur in sensu sub esse hic et nunc, et quia res efficitur singulare per principia individuancia quae sunt hic et nunc: id⁵² quod recipitur in sensu, in singularibus est. Et quod recipitur in intellectu est quidditas rei absolutae. Hoc enim per se est obiectum intellectus, ut dicitur tertio *de Anima*;⁵³ ubi dicit Philosophus quod sensus discernit carnem, intellectus autem esse carnis et quidditatem. Quidditas ergo rei secundum se considerata est obiectum intellectus. Sed quidditas, cum sic considerata, non est actu universalis. Ideo plus requiritur, ut ostensum est. Et ideo, licet illud quod sentitur sit singulare, tamen illud quod intelligitur non est universale necessario, sed tantum⁵⁴ in potentia.

⁴⁸ Cf. Sum. I, cap. 3, com. 18, *op. cit.*, f. 161 AB

⁵⁰ quintam] quartam

⁵² id] ad

⁵⁴ sed tantum] et

⁴⁹ intellectus] intelligere

⁵¹ comparatur] operatur

⁵³ Cap. 4, 429b14-16

RATIONEM NONAM concedo, quia probat quod natura rei sit actu universalis per operationem intellectus.

AD DECIMAM dico quod patet solutio per praedicta, quia probat quod intellectus agens non agit universale complete sed dispositive; et hoc est concessum in praemissis.

Haec dicta sunt dubitative per modum inquisitionis.

Explicit sophisma determinatum a magistro Simone, Anglico.

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Taxation of Italians by the French Crown (1311-1363)*

JOHN B. HENNEMAN, JR.

IT is well-known that businessmen from Italy played a predominant role in international trade and banking during the Middle Ages. Largely made possible by superior business techniques,¹ this position of leadership was achieved in the face of difficult communications and widespread objections to usury. Another obstacle was the perpetual insecurity faced by prosperous aliens in foreign lands. Even when supposedly protected by treaties or privileges, Italians were vulnerable to capricious extortion and mistreatment, particularly in countries such as France, where the outlook of government was more "feudal" and less "capitalistic" than in the towns of Italy.

* The following abbreviations will be used throughout in the notes:

- AN: *Archives Nationales*, Paris
BN: *Bibliothèque Nationale*, Paris
AD: *Archives Départementales*
AM: *Archives Municipales Communales*
NAF: *Nouvelles Acquisitions Françaises*
BEC: *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes*
Ord: *Ordonnances des roys de France de la troisième race, recueillies par ordre chronologique* (various editors), 21 vols. (Paris, 1723-1849)
HL: C. Devic and J. Vaissete, *Histoire générale de Languedoc avec des notes et les pièces justificatives*, new edition, ed. A. Molinier et al., 16 vols. (Toulouse, 1872-1904)
JT Ch. IV: J. Viard (ed.), *Les journaux du trésor de Charles IV le Bel* (Paris, 1917)
JT Ph. VI: J. Viard (ed.), *Les journaux du trésor de Philippe VI de Valois suivis de l'ordinarium thesauri de 1338-1339* (Paris, 1899)
Mignon: C. V. Langlois (ed.), *Inventaire d'anciens comptes royaux dressé par Robert Mignon* (Paris, 1899).

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¹ R. S. Lopez, "Italian Leadership in the Mediaeval Business World," *Journal of Economic History*, 8 (1948), 63-68; R. de Roover, *The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, 1397-1494* (Norton Library edition, New York, 1966), 1-2, hereafter cited as *Rise and Decline*.

During the first two-thirds of the fourteenth century, two developments profoundly affected the position of Italian merchants and bankers in France. First, the long period of general prosperity was gradually succeeded by a depression which inevitably involved the many business interests of the Italians.² Secondly, the French crown found itself engaged in costly military ventures without a tax system capable of financing protracted wars. As the royal government struggled to develop adequate financial resources it was forced to adopt various unpopular fiscal expedients. Quite naturally the crown began to exploit foreign businessmen, whose wealth might be tapped with a minimum of political risk. With the period characterized by both rising government expenses and general economic difficulty, French fiscal policy towards the Italians is of particular interest. It illustrates some methods of royal financing and the impact of these methods on Europe's leading businessmen.

In general we may distinguish three main types of tax paid by Italians in fourteenth century France, although they were described by a variety of terms. The first of these may be classified as customs duties, for it was under Philip IV (1285-1314) that the royal customs service developed. The customs were normally export taxes taking the form of a license to carry out of the kingdom certain products whose export had earlier been prohibited. These were not, strictly speaking, taxes on Italians, but because the latter largely controlled the export trade they paid the great bulk of these duties and also served frequently as tax farmers and customs collectors. Italians paid other taxes purely because of their nationality, more or less regular payments which permitted them to reside in the kingdom and conduct their business under royal protection. The third, least regular, and largest type of levy to which they were subject was the occasional extortion by the crown from those engaged in money-lending. Generally based upon the enforcement of the usury laws, this sort of tax could be an outright confiscation of property or credits or might be disguised by such names as "fine", "loan", or "gift".

These taxes based on the usury laws were different from the others because of the serious moral stigma attached to lending money at interest. It is not possible here to review the extensive literature on usury in the Middle Ages. Suffice it to say, the question is complex. Ecclesiastical and secular authorities sometimes agreed and sometimes did not. There

² M. Postan and E. E. Rich (eds.), *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, 2 (Cambridge, 1952), 191 ff. (M. Postan) and 338 ff. (R. S. Lopez); E. Perroy, "Les crises au xiv^e siècle," *Annales: Economies, sociétés, civilisations*, 4 (1949), 167-182; R. S. Lopez and H. A. Miskimin, "The Economic Depression of the Renaissance," *Economic History Review*, 14 (1961-62), 408-425.

were different criteria for Christian and Jew, native and foreigner, transactions involving great risk and those which did not. Above all there was a practical distinction between overt and concealed interest which tended to work to the advantage of large companies engaged in international trade as well as money-lending.³ In France, where usury remained illegal for centuries, we find a gradual relaxation in the definition of the term. St. Louis had defined usury as "whatever exceeds the principal";⁴ while Philip IV and his successors began to tolerate interest rates of 15-20% after 1311, subject to various conditions.⁵ However usury may have been defined at any given time, enforcement of the laws never was continuous because the crown lacked adequate administrative machinery and some important interests perpetually needed easy credit. This fact made the usury prohibition a useful fiscal device, for periodic enforcement could yield the king large fines. The perpetual existence of a lucrative business conducted outside the law constituted a curious form of "capital" for the monarchy, a resource on which it could fall back upon when circumstances rendered regular revenues insufficient.

Although exactions based on usury were especially irregular, all taxes paid by Italians were subject to capricious changes. As exporters, as aliens, and as money-lenders, the Italians were vulnerable whenever the French government was forced to seek a fiscal expedient.

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³ For a good recent short summary of the usury problem, see De Roover, *Rise and Decline*, 10-14, and notes. His earlier work, *Money, Banking and Credit in Mediaeval Bruges* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), is essential for understanding the Italians as money-lenders throughout Europe. In making a careful distinction among three categories of mediaeval bankers, de Roover applies the term "lombard" to a sort of pawnbroker who extended short-term loans at interest. These persons were manifestly usurers and like the Jews their position was precarious (*ibid.*, 99-100). The large merchant banking houses, concealing interest more effectively, enjoyed a more privileged position. De Roover also points out (*ibid.*, 346) that "Lombard" might also mean any Italian merchant, and he urges a distinction between "lombard" and "Lombard." The documents used in this article often employ rather general expression like "Italians and Lombard usurers," and do not permit so clear a distinction. The French crown did not restrict itself to pawnbrokers when extorting money from "usurers." Late in 1330, for instance, an Italian *compagnia* based in Pistoia was among those victimized. See R. S. Lopez and I. W. Raymond (eds.), *Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World* (New York, 1955), 194, hereafter cited as *Medieval Trade*. In these pages, therefore, the term "Lombard" will be used to mean any Italian whose business included the lending of money.

⁴ *Ord.* 1, 53-54 (1230): *Usuras autem intelligimus quidquid ist ultra sortem*. The editor notes that another manuscript version of this text has *extra* instead of *ultra*.

⁵ *Ord.* 1, 484-487, cited below, note 46.

The customs duties in fourteenth century France were of three main types. The oldest, a system of licenses to export wool, later known as *haut passage*, has been studied elsewhere.⁶ In force since the early days of Philip IV's reign, it began to decline in value after 1320, as Italian merchants made increasing use of the direct sea-route in shipping English wool to the Mediterranean and thus by-passed French territory.⁷ Still worth 8000 *livres parisis* annually in 1331, the *haut passage* had an estimated value of only 2000 pounds in 1344, despite administrative reforms in 1342 which aimed at making the levy more efficient.⁸

The late Capetian kings restricted export of other products besides wool, and the Ports and Passages administration acquired growing efficiency under Pierre de Chalon.⁹ The improved administrative machinery facilitated the introduction of a new general export tax under Charles IV at the end of 1324, following a stringent restriction of exports the summer before. Known as the *droit de rêve*, it was an *ad valorem* duty of four *deniers* per pound (1 2/3%) on most products, with a special rate schedule on certain commodities like wine. The ordinance establishing this levy affected all exporters, not merely Italians, and doubtless they found it preferable to the strict export prohibition enacted earlier.¹⁰ What is

⁶ A. Vuitry, *Études sur le régime financier de la France avant la Révolution de 1789*, nouv. sér., 1 (Paris, 1878), 120-135, hereafter cited as *Régime financier*; J. R. Strayer and C. H. Taylor, *Studies in Early French Taxation* (Cambridge, Mass., 1939), 14-17 (hereafter cited as *French Taxation*); J. Viard, editor's introduction to *JT Ch. IV*; J. L. Moreau de Beaumont, *Mémoire concernant les impositions et droits en Europe*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1787-89), 3, 353, hereafter cited as *Mémoire*; and especially G. Bigwood, "La politique de la laine en France sous les règnes de Philippe le Bel et de ses fils," *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, 15 (1935), 79-102, 429-457; 16 (1936), 95-118, hereafter cited as "Politique de la laine." Bigwood's tables for the 1320's (*ibid.*, 450-451) show that only 1% of the tax in those years was paid by non-Italians, striking evidence of the degree to which this duty amounted in practice to a tax on Italians.

⁷ Bigwood, "Politique de la laine," 452. There are over seventy entries in *JT Ch. IV* between no. 250 and no. 10183 indicating payment of this tax. The great majority of these specify that the wool in question is of English origin.

⁸ On the declining value of the farm see H. Moranvillé, "Rapports à Philippe VI de Valois sur ses finances," *BEC*, 48 (1887), 387. After being governed for two decades by the licensing system established in *Ord.*, 11, 478-481 (28 February, 1321), the *haut passage* was revised in 1342 (*AD Hérault A 4*, fols. 183v-184; *AN PP 117*, p. 473), when regular rates were established for English and Burgundian wool, the latter being assessed twice as much.

⁹ J. R. Strayer, "Pierre de Chalon and the Origin of the French Customs Service," *Festschrift Percy Ernst Schramm zu seinem siebzigsten Geburtstag von Schülern und Freunden zugeeignet* (Wiesbaden, 1964), 334 ff.

¹⁰ The relevant ordinances on the *droit de rêve* are *Ord.*, 1, 783-784; 2, 148-149; 11, 487-492. See also the discussion of L. L. Borrelli de Serres, *Recherches sur divers services publics du XIII^e au XVII^e siècle* (Paris, 1895-1905), 2, 451, hereafter cited as *Recherches*. Both Vuitry (*Régime financier*, 1, 133-135) and Bigwood ("Politique de la laine," 85) regard the tax arrangement as a concession to the merchants who had suffered from the complete prohibition of exports in June.

particularly interesting about this tax, however, is that it seems to have been a war measure. Enacted when the crown was urgently seeking money to finance a new conflict with England, it was referred to as a subsidy,¹¹ discontinued in some areas when peace came in June, 1325,¹² and re-established everywhere by the end of that year when a new war occurred in Flanders.¹³ Since it was not, strictly speaking, a war subsidy, the crown kept collecting it in the peaceful years after 1329, but cancelled it in 1333, probably hoping to cultivate public opinion while seeking a feudal aid.¹⁴ The *droit de rêve* was back in force soon after the outbreak of the Hundred Years' War and was justified as a war measure as late as 1340.¹⁵ Thereafter it remained a permanent part of the royal tax structure, although its value declined from 60,000 to 40,000 *livres tournois*

¹¹ *JT Ch. IV*, no. 7293, describes this export tax as a war subsidy and Viard (*ibid.*, xxi) certainly regarded it as a war measure. In *Mignon*, no. 1730-88 are listed many accounts for 1325 with the war subsidy and the export tax intermingled under a single heading in such a way as to suggest strongly that Mignon believed both to be established for support of the war.

¹² AM Montpellier G-6, no. 3407-08; *Mignon*, no. 1736, 1448. In some areas of northern France the export tax continued to be collected through the whole year (*Mignon*, no. 1734, 1761), and this seems also to have been true for Paris (*JT Ch. IV*, no. 7279, 7293, 7438, 7775, 8070, 8387, 9151, etc.).

¹³ *Mignon*, no. 1748, for instance, indicates resumption of collection in the bailiwicks of Chaumont and Macon and the seneschalsy of Carcassonne on 12 December 1325. Some weeks earlier, Charles IV had agreed to help the count of Flanders put down a revolt which had smoldered in the county for two years. See C. V. Langlois, in E. Lavissee (ed.), *Histoire de France* (Paris, 1900-11), 3, pt. 2, 310.

¹⁴ There are many documents indicating the cancellation of the 4 d./l. export tax in early March, 1333, among them AM Alès I-S 23, no. 1; BN Doat 8, fols. 147-149v; *HL*, 10, cols. 725-726. These do not indicate clearly why the tax was cancelled, but it is perhaps no coincidence that several other important fiscal developments were taking place at about the same time. The king was trying to levy a feudal aid, which has been discussed briefly by Molinier in *HL*, 9, 469, note 3, and J. Viard, "Les ressources extraordinaires de la royauté sous Philippe VI de Valois," *Revue des questions historiques*, 44 (1888), 171-175. Late in March the three Estates were summoned to an assembly at Orleans to discuss the coinage. See R. Cazelles, *La société politique et la crise de la royauté sous Philippe de Valois* (Paris, 1958), 128, hereafter cited as *Société politique*. Following this assembly the crown ordered moderate debasement of the coinage and liberalized the usury law (below, note 70). These different events must surely have been connected with one another.

¹⁵ Evidence of the tax in Normandy during 1338-39 may be found in L. Delisle (ed.), *Actes normands de la chambre des comptes sous Philippe de Valois* (Rouen, 1871), 184-186, 210-211. Foreign merchants at Harfleur were excused from paying it (*Ord.*, 2, 135) in 1339. Early in 1340 (AD Hérault A 4, fols. 90v-91v, 130r-v) the export tax is again mentioned, this time as a levy for the needs of the war. It was most probably reinstated in 1337 when the war began and when the government undertook various fiscal expedients. In May, 1337, royal officers in Languedoc were exercising some control over exports (BN Doat 52, fol. 245r-v) and perhaps they resumed collecting the *droit de rêve* about this time.

between 1332 and 1344.¹⁶ In 1369 it was incorporated into a 12 d./l. (5%) *imposition foraine* on goods exported from those parts of the kingdom paying the royal *aides* on domestic sales.¹⁷

Another tax on foreign trade which directly affected some Italians was neither permanent nor, strictly speaking, a royal tax at all. It arose from letters of marque issued against certain Italian communities for acts of piracy and was but one aspect of the continuously bitter competition among all seaports in the western Mediterranean, French Sicilian, Genoese and Aragonese. In response to complaints of his subjects in Languedoc, Philip VI issued letters of marque empowering Frenchmen to recover 60,000 l.t. from inhabitants of the Genoese port of Savona, and following consultation with his barons and prelates in 1333 he ordered the seneschals in lower Languedoc to seize the property of those accused of preying on French trade.¹⁸ In 1335 the crown undertook to recover commercial losses now estimated at 115,886 l.t. by instituting a special duty of 3 d./l. (1 1/4%) on all goods imported or exported by Genoese merchants. Limited to one group of Italians, this levy differed from other customs duties in affecting imports as well as exports. Although established by the king, the tax was intended merely to settle a private

¹⁶ Moranvillé, "Rapports à Philippe VI ...," *BEC* 1887, 387, indicates the decline in the value of the farm. Both 1332 and 1344 were years of sound money. In 1342, when the coinage was seriously debased, the Soderini of Florence paid nearly 45,000 l.t. to farm the tax in the two southern seneshalsies of Beaucaire and Carcassonne alone (AD Hérault A 4, fols. 192v-195). This figure however, was equal only to about 12,000 l.t. in the reformed currency of 1344. Other documents relating to the farm of this export tax between 1342 and 1351, are BN *Coll. Languedoc* 84, fol. 270r, BN *ms. fr.* 25698, no. 104, 111-113; and AN P 2292, p. 299. Throughout this period, Harfleur remained a free port where merchants of all nationalities were under special royal safeguard and exempt from the export duty (AN JJ 68, no. 126).

¹⁷ Vuitry, *Régime financier*, 2, 157. For references to the *rève* and *imposition foraine* under Charles VI see M. Rey, *Le domaine du roi et les finances extraordinaires sous Charles VI, 1388-1413* (Paris, 1965), 54-55, 177-178, 233.

¹⁸ The Mediterranean maritime cities regularly accused each other of piracy, and in 1310 Genoa had levied a 3 d./l. *droit de rève* on Montpellier merchants in retaliation for such acts. In Paris the *Parlement* frequently heard piracy cases. See *Actes du Parlement de Paris, 1^{re} sér.* (ed. E. Boutaric, Paris, 1864-67), 2, no. 7195-96, and *2^e sér.* (ed. H. Furgeot, Paris, 1920-60), 1, no. 2190 (hereafter cited as *Parl. Paris*). By 1328 Montpellier claimed to have lost 200,000 pounds because of piracy. See J. Berthélé and F. Castets (eds.), *Archives de la ville de Montpellier, inventaires et documents: Inventaire du Grand Chartrier*, I (Montpellier, 1895-99), no. 3869 (Armoire H. Cassette 6). This valuable collection and a supplementary volume edited by O. de Dainville (Montpellier, 1955) are hereafter cited as *Montpellier: Grand Chartrier*. For the letters of marque against Savona and the royal consultations and orders of 1333, see *ibid.*, no. 1558-60 (C-20); Furgeot, *Parl. Paris*, 1, no. 232, 414; BN Doat 52, fols. 192v-196v; *Ord.*, 3, 239; and A. Germain, *Histoire de la commerce de Montpellier antérieurement à l'ouverture du port de Cette*, Montpellier, 1861, 1, *Pièce justificative* no. 102 (hereafter cited as *Commerce*).

claim for damages which had necessitated government action because foreigners were involved. From the receipts, the merchants of Narbonne were to be reimbursed 5000 l.t. each year.¹⁹ In the long run, however, this duty amounted to a royal tax because it was subject to diplomatic negotiations with Genoa, and the Genoese possessed naval strength which the French needed when the Hundred Years' War broke out.²⁰ The levy of 3 d./l. continued in effect until 1351, when 75,000 l.t. (debased money) remained to be collected. In that year it was finally cancelled when the Genoese paid 40,000 gold florins to the French government.²¹ This sum went into the royal account at the treasury,²² and in view of the strain placed on royal finances by military defeat and the Black Death in the later 1340's, it is unlikely that the merchants of Languedoc ever recovered their losses.

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Two other taxes were collected from Italians purely because they were foreigners doing business in the kingdom. Evidently inaugurated by Philip IV, these became annual payments by 1320, representing a kind of *modus vivendi* whereby Italians would have certain specified privileges and the king certain regular revenues. In the fall of 1295 Philip IV had required that all Italian merchants living in designated privileged areas — the Champagne fairs, the town of Nîmes, or the province of Narbonne — pay one *denier* per pound (0.4%) on each sale of merchandise, and half that amount on every exchange contract.²³ Payable by both buyer and seller, this tax became known as the *boîte aux Lombards*, and may be seen as a license to do business. It continued without change for twenty years.

In the period 1315-20, however, a series of political problems, both foreign and domestic, placed the crown in a very difficult financial

¹⁹ AN JJ 69, no. 7; JJ 71, no. 21; Germain, *Commerce*, 1, P.J. no. 107, 112; *JT. Ph.* VI, no. 1863 and note of Viard. See also Furgeot, *Parl. Paris*, 1, no. 1004, for the order to enforce this. The legal principles involved in the issuance of letters of marque are discussed by R. de Mas-Latrie, "Du droit de Marque ou droit de Représailles au moyen âge," *BEC*, 27 (1866), 529-577.

²⁰ Furgeot, *Parl. Paris*, 1, no. 1743; Germain, *Commerce*, 1, P.J. no. 113; AN JJ 71, no. 21. On the French concessions to Genoese naval commanders and the local reaction in Languedoc, see also Germain, *Commerce*, 1, P.J. no. 116-118; BN *ms. fr.* 20691, p. 788; AN JJ 71, no. 149.

²¹ AN JJ 80, no. 502, published in *Ord.*, 4, 89.

²² H. Moranvillé, "Extraits des journaux du trésor," *BEC*, 49 (1888), 186.

²³ *Ord.*, 1, 326 and notes. See also the rather brief discussions in Borrelli de Serres, *Recherches*, 2, 458; Strayer, *French Taxation*, 11 (and notes); and Viard, *JT Ch. IV*, xxii.

position and the royal need for money led to sharp increases in the taxation of Italians. In an ordinance of 9 July 1315,²⁴ Louis X doubled the *botte aux Lombards* to 2 d./l. on sales and purchases of goods in the privileged areas. As in 1295 the tax would enable these merchants to live and trade under royal protection, escaping other taxes and impositions. Contracts between them were not to be challenged as usurious, and provision was made for the elimination of fraud and the taxing of certain special contracts. All transactions outside the privileged areas were to be taxed at the higher rate of 4 d./l. (1 2/3%) on sales and one *denier* on each exchange contract (as apparently they had been for some time already).²⁵ Italians not living in the privileged regions were required to reside in Paris, St. Omer, or La Rochelle.

The *botte aux Lombards* applied only to Italian merchants, who acquired important privileges if they met certain residence requirements and paid this tax. Shortly before increasing its rates, Louis X had turned his attention to other Italians in the kingdom. These also had been able to obtain privileges in the past by negotiating a *finance* with royal officers. Now, in 1315, they were subjected to a regular tax, geared to residence in the kingdom, not business activity. It amounted to a forced purchase of *lettres de bourgeoisie* in each of the succeeding ten years. To receive this privilege, Italians living in France were to pay annually 5% of the value of their property (100 *sous* for every 100 pounds as the documents express it). This tax would confer the same rights as the *botte aux Lombards* conferred on merchants in the privileged areas, and the only Italians excused from paying were those who had already acquired bourgeois privileges by direct *finance* with Louis X since his accession.²⁶ Evidently the king's orders were poorly enforced or evaded by the Italians, perhaps when the government was distracted by the sudden death of Louis X and the ensuing succession dispute in 1316. In any case, Philip V issued a stern

²⁴ *Ord.*, 1, 584-586. A slightly different version has been published by C. Piton, *Les Lombards en France et à Paris*, 1 (Paris, 1892), 233-240, hereafter cited as *Lombards*.

²⁵ A text published by Piton, *ibid.*, 240-242, indicates the existence of a 4 d./l. rate at Paris in June of 1314. In 1338, Venetians were excused from paying at this rate (AN JJ 68, no. 26), which appears to have remained constant throughout this period.

²⁶ *Ord.*, 1, 582-584. This mandate refers to the *botte aux Lombards* as the *double denier* being paid by Italian merchants at the fairs. Since it was not until a week later that Louis increased that tax to 2 d./l., this reference must be to the old rate of 1 d./l. which was "double" in the sense of being payable by both buyer and seller. Throughout this period, references to the *botte aux Lombards* were often ambiguous as to its rate (see below, note 31). For examples of special transactions with Italians seeking privileges, see AN JJ 53, no. 187; JJ 64 A, no. 61, 442, 691; JJ 56, no. 165.

new mandate on 14 February 1317, denouncing *diversis fraudibus et maliciis*, dispatching commissioners to collect the 5% tax or some substitute *finance*, and ordering Italians who were guilty to arrange payment before the king's court by 24 June.²⁷ Although the tax was again described as being for ten years only, it became permanent, being farmed for 22,500 l.t. in 1330, and appearing in various documents of the following generation.²⁸

As originally established, this 5% property assessment should have been payable only by those Italians not already subject to the *boîte aux Lombards* since both payments were for similar privileges, including exemption from other taxation. Very early, however, the two appear to have overlapped. Louis X assigned to his cousin Louis of Clermont the royal income from Italians, and when the king died, his brother Philip confirmed this arrangement. From an ensuing controversy between Philip V and the Italians at the Champagne fairs we learn that Louis X had extended the 5% property tax to these merchants and that they had avoided it by agreeing to pay an additional 3 d./l. (1 1/4%) on sales and 6 d. on exchange transactions, over and above the *boîte aux Lombards*. The proceeds from their taxes were to go to Louis of Clermont until he had received the sum promised by the late king.²⁹ This arrangement seems to have been of short duration and must have lapsed as soon as Clermont received his money. After 1317 we hear only of the *boîte aux Lombards* and the 5% property tax, with both apparently affecting all resident Italians who bought and sold goods or made exchange contracts, subject always to the possibility of a special *finance* with the crown.

The history of the *boîte aux Lombards* in the reign of Philip V (1316-22) is obscure and uncertain because of ambiguous wording in the documents. In September, 1317, the tax was farmed for four years at 11,000 l.t. annually and the king established various measures aimed at enforcing efficient collection.³⁰ This document, and most others referring to the tax under Philip V, call it the *deniers et maille*, quite possibly no more than an informal restatement of Louis X's 2 d./l. on sales and one *maille* or *obole* (1/2 d.) on exchange contracts. On the other hand, the same

²⁷ *Ord.*, 1, 630-631.

²⁸ The farm of 1330 (a year of sound money) is indicated in H. Moranvillé, "Notes de statistique douanière sous Philippe VI de Valois," *BEC*, 64 (1903), 569-573. Other references to the tax are in 1329 (Moranvillé, "Rapports à Philippe VI ...," *BEC*, 1887, 383), 1337 (*JT Ph. VI*, no. 305), 1338 (note of J. Viard in *AN AB* xix 2640), 1340 (*AD Hérault* A 4, fols. 89r-v, 154-156r), and 1343 (*AN JJ* 74, no. 248).

²⁹ *AN JJ* 53, no. 115; *BN ms. fr.* 16200, fols. 238r-241v. A court decision in 1322 (Boutaric, *Parl. Paris*, II, no. 6817), concerned a dispute arising from this tax during 1317.

³⁰ *Ord.*, 1, 650-652 (9 September 1317).

words often appear in documents of the first two Valois kings when the tax was definitely 1 1/2 d./l. (0.6%) on sales of goods (the terms *denier et maille* and *trois oboles* being used somewhat interchangeably). In short it remains unclear whether Philip V retained his brother's rate for the *boîte aux Lombards* or reduced it by 25% when he farmed it in 1317.³¹

The tax was definitely lower under Charles IV, who acceded to the throne soon after expiration of the four-year farm of 1317. Charles reduced the *boîte aux Lombards* to 1 d./l. on sales,³² perhaps in return for numerous gifts received from Italians in 1322 on the occasion of his "joyous accession." These amounted to 3134 l.t. and other gifts in November, 1323, totalled 5320 l.t.³³

By 1330, however, the Italians again were paying at a higher rate — 1 1/2 d./l. on all transactions in the privileged areas.³⁴ The new increase doubtless occurred either in 1327 when an early peace forced cancellation of the crown's war subsidy, or in 1328-29 when Philip VI, whose position was not strong, had to seek revenue from sources that were safe politically.³⁵ After 1330 the rate stabilized and the *denier et maille* is mentioned in many documents of the succeeding decades.³⁶

³¹ The group of documents (*ibid.*) which announced the four-year farm of the tax ordered loss of bourgeois privileges for any who failed to pay. These texts specifically mention Louis X's enactment of 1315 (above, note 24) and thus ought to refer to a *boîte aux Lombards* of 2 d./l. However, all specific references to the rate are to *deniers et maille*, *denier et obole*, etc., and the same is true in a number of later documents (AN JJ 58, no. 333; *Ord.*, 1, 749-750; *JT Ch. IV*, no. 1433-34) as well as one of June, 1317 (AN JJ 54A, no. 442). Viard, in *JT Ch. IV*, xxviii, believed the rate was 1 1/2 d./l. under Philip V, and it is entirely possible that Philip did indeed reduce the tax before farming it in the autumn of 1317. For the levy of 1 1/2 d./l. under Philip VI and John II, see below, note 36.

³² *JT Ch. IV*, no. 4890, 7012-13, 7371, 7488, 7582-83, 8174, 8382.

³³ *Ibid.*, no. 63-87, 97, 114, 215, 341, 960-964, 1060, and 4094-4137. See the discussion by Viard, *ibid.*, xxvii-xxviii.

³⁴ Moranvillé, "Notes de statistique ...," *BEC*, 1903, 569-573, indicating that it was farmed for 12,500 l.t.

³⁵ In late March 1327, peace was made (AN K 41, no. 16), and a subsidy granted for the war by Paris and other towns was returned. See A. Hellot (ed.), "Chronique parisienne anonyme de 1316 à 1339," *Mémoires de la Société de l'histoire de Paris*, 11 (1885), 111, hereafter cited as "Chron. parisienne." Lacking extraordinary subsidies, the crown may have increased the *boîte aux Lombards* at this time. However, our only document mentioning Italians in 1327 (BN NAF 7373, fols. 297-298) seems to be describing one isolated case of royal extortion, as 10,000 pounds were taken from Lombards in the bailiwick of Mâcon. Raised to the throne by the great magnates and representing a new dynasty, Philip VI had to exercise fiscal caution, even when collecting the subsidy for his successful Flemish campaign of 1328. For the royal use of fiscal expedients to augment revenues in 1327-29, see J. Henneman, "Enquêteurs-Réformateurs and Fiscal Officers in Fourteenth Century France," *Traditio*, 24 (1968), hereafter cited as "Enquêteurs."

³⁶ We encounter this tax subsequently in the following years: 1332 (Furgeot, *Parl. Paris*, 1,

The surviving register of Treasury Journals for the reign of Charles IV is complete for the first four years of that reign. We find in it no mention of the 5% property tax on Italians but a number of references to a tax of one *denier* per pound and many more to "*finances* of Italians" or "*finances* for the *boîte aux Lombards*".³⁷ Evidently these *finances* were payments made by Italians (individuals or companies) in lieu of one or both of the two regular taxes they owed, for these entries do not mention usury. The payments made in 1323, mostly in January and November, covered varying periods of time — some for one year, still more for two or two and one-half years.³⁸ Only very small sums were involved. The total given for forty entries recorded for 14 November 1323 is only 1353 l.p.³⁹ This group of payments evidently brought up to date all such *finances* by Italians through 1323, for the next payments recorded are in January, 1325 and are explicitly stated to cover the year ending at Christmas 1324. With these entries the transactions described as *financiae Ytalicorum* undergo a radical transformation. Where the earlier entries indicate fines for two years or more in most cases, those of January 1325 cover but a single year, yet the amounts paid were impressive: generally 500 or 750 pounds *parisis*. There are seventy-three entries for January alone and no less than 169 more for the period from August to the end of 1324.⁴⁰ Totalling these entries, Viard found that sums collected in the months of September, October, and November, 1325 alone were four times the total collections recorded for the years 1322-24 and much more than the combined annual farm of the two regular taxes on Italians.⁴¹ Quite obviously the fine to

no. 579); 1336 (AN JJ 70, no. 7); 1339 (AD Hérault A 4, fols. 172-175); BN NAF 7389, fols. 252v); 1340 (AD Hérault A 4, fols. 102-104); 1345 (AD Hérault A 4, fols. 236r-240v); 1349 (AN PP 117, fols. 629-630); 1352 (Moranvillé, "Extraits ...," *BEC*, 1888, 180); 1357 (AN PP 117, pp. 734; AD Hérault A 4, fols. 333v-335v); 1363 (AN JJ 93, no. 213); and 1368 (AN P 2294, pp. 679-680).

³⁷ Among those described specifically as *finances* for 1 d./l. *busta Ytalicorum* (the *boîte aux Lombards*) are *JT Ch. IV*, no. 7371, 7488, 7582-83, 8174, and 8382. Scores of other entries mentioning Italian *finances* are indicated below, notes 38-40.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, no. 2312-14, 2325-27, 2334, 2337-41, 2346-48, 2353-54, 2364-65, and 2448 for January, 1323, after only two entries (no. 104, 804) for 1322. Forty more *finances* are recorded for November, 1323 (no. 4054-93).

³⁹ *Ibid.*, no. 4054-4093.

⁴⁰ For January, *ibid.*, no. 6651-53, and seventy other entries through 6988. Collections later in the year begin with no. 8392 and end with no. 9378.

⁴¹ The 5% tax and the *boîte aux Lombards* were farmed for 22,500 l.t. and 12,500 l.t. respectively in 1330 (Moranvillé, "Notes de statistique ...," *BEC*, 1903, 569-573), Viard (*JT Ch. IV*, xxviii) computed total collections of 48,840 l.p. (61,050 l.t.) from Italians in the short period of September-November, 1325. For the entire period 1322-24 he found only 11,435 l.p. from Italians recorded in the Treasury Journals.

avoid one or two troublesome but regular assessments had given way to a major extortion. Once again, the action must have been dictated by serious royal financial needs, for war with England had broken out in Gascony during 1324 and the king had encountered grave difficulty in raising money for troops.⁴²

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These large *finances* paid by Italians in 1325 bring us to the third and most interesting type of exaction which the French crown demanded of them in this period — the large occasional extortions. These went under various names and were generally (though not invariably) justified by the accusation that the Italians had violated the usury ordinances. Already vulnerable as foreigners, they were doubly so as money-lenders. Louis IX and Philip III had both issued ordinances against "Lombards, Cahorsins, and foreign usurers,"⁴³ while Philip IV had extorted money from them in 1291-92, 1303-04, and perhaps again in 1309.⁴⁴ Extensive documentation on this subject becomes available only in 1311, when Philip IV needed to deal with a chronic shortage of funds while simultaneously bolstering his image as the zealous defender of Catholic morality. Dramatic action against usury might be consistent with both objectives.⁴⁵

In July, 1311, Philip attacked usury in a curious ordinance which actually tolerated higher interest rates than previous royal enactments — at the Champagne fairs 2 1/2% from one fair to the next (15% *per annum*) and outside the fairs 4 d./l. per month (or 20% *per annum*). Those

⁴² Although the crown sought troops in 1324 only in regions close to Gascony there was strong opposition from such places as Périgueux and Limoges. See BN Doat 243, fols. 14r-20v; J. N. Moreau, *Mémoire sur la constitution politique de la ville et cité de Périgueux avec recueil des titres et autres pièces justificatives* (Paris, 1775), 2, 195-209.

⁴³ *Ord.*, 1, 96 (1269); 298-300 (1274).

⁴⁴ Strayer, *French Taxation*, 17-18 and notes, has very briefly summarized these earlier actions. The extortion of 1309-10 is sparsely documented, and we may infer that it was not a major seizure, both because a large confiscation was attempted soon afterwards (see below) and because Philip IV was devoting his major effort in 1309-10 to the collection of a feudal aid. Other general summaries of royal relations with Italian money-lenders in the fourteenth century are found in studies devoted mainly to royal credit transactions: A. Bearwood, *Alien Merchants in England, 1350-1377* (Cambridge, Mass., 1931); E. B. and M. M. Fryde, "Public Credit" *Cambridge Economic History of Europe* (ed. M. Postan *et al.*), 3 (Cambridge, England, 1963), 430 ff.

⁴⁵ In a forthcoming study of royal finance under Philip IV and his two older sons, Prof. Elizabeth Brown will expound the interesting thesis that Philip was deeply concerned with the moral implications of his fiscal policies. It is her view that the usury legislation of 1311-12 was carefully timed with respect to the church council at Vienne.

who charged in excess of these rates, however, were threatened with severe penalties.⁴⁶ From a document of mid-September we learn that Philip had ordered all Italian usurers to leave the kingdom by November, 1311, paying the king what they owed him before they left.⁴⁷ Unquestionably the crown wished only to collect a fine, for the Italian money-lenders were too valuable to be expelled completely. In mid-November Philip required Italians who were under arrest and demanded a hearing to appear in the immediate future before a royal court.⁴⁸ It was there that they probably arranged to pay whatever *finance* the government demanded, for by the end of January, 1312, a new usury ordinance included a clause permitting the Italians previously expelled to reside in the kingdom subject to certain conditions. The usury legislation of the previous July was reiterated in this enactment and there was an added injunction that royal monetary ordinances should be scrupulously obeyed.⁴⁹ Late in 1312 the king issued the final ordinance in this series, indicating his intention to prohibit *all* usury, not merely *excessive* usury as some had apparently believed.⁵⁰

These enactments of 1311-12 illustrate one method by which the crown might levy a tax on money-lenders suspected of usury violations. The usury law was re-enacted; the Italians were declared to have violated it; and then, under the threat of imprisonment or deportation they were compelled to pay a large sum. Beyond the royal ordinances just discussed there remains little evidence regarding the seizure of 1311-12. Financial records are fragmentary,⁵¹ and there is no trace of

⁴⁶ *Ord.*, 1, 484-487.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 489-490. No doubt this expulsion order occurred between the July and September ordinances which have survived. A likely date is 22 August when Philip IV re-expelled certain Jews who had practiced usury after re-entering the kingdom (*ibid.*, 488). The original expulsion of Jews in 1306 is described by Strayer, *French Taxation*, 18. It seems very unlikely that Philip ever contemplated carrying out such drastic action with respect to Italian usurers.

⁴⁸ *Ord.*, 1, 490-491.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 494-496.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 508-509. It is not entirely clear what the king meant by this order. Presumably he merely wished to stress the maximum legal interest rates previously set forth, but perhaps he had decided to revoke the 20% interest allowable outside the fairs. When we next hear of interest permitted outside the fairs (1330, below, note 64) the legal maximum was only 5%.

⁵¹ Strayer, *French Taxation*, 17, note 52, cites one document, in *Bibliothèque de Rouen*, ms. 33400, fols. 29v-30v. Another undated fragmentary account from the same collection has been published by R. Fawtier, *Comptes royaux 1285-1314* (*Documents financiers*, 3, Paris, 1953-56), pt. 2, beginning no. 22518. Indicating a seizure of Italian property in the Beaucaire district which produced over 5300 pounds, it may well refer to the confiscation of 1311-12. Amounts taken ranged from 13% to 22% and payments varied from 20 to 400 l.t.

formal judicial proceedings, prosecution of usurers other than Italians and Jews, or any effort to recover usurious loans from the borrowers. It would seem then that this extortion was directed solely at alien money-lenders who exceeded the legal maximum interest rate. It was not part of any root-and-branch assault on usury in the kingdom.

The accession of Louis X in an atmosphere of rebellion and unrest found the Italians vulnerable once again to royal fiscal measures. We have seen that Louis instituted the 5% property tax in 1315 and at the same time raised the rates of the *boîte aux Lombards*. It was perhaps not practicable to attempt another sizeable extortion so soon after that of 1311-12, but numerous Italian companies were required to pay some sort of fine at the end of 1314. Some of these payments were sharply higher than those which would be offered at another "joyous accession" in 1322.⁵² Although the Italians were not singled out as usurers in 1315, Louis X did attempt to raise additional money for his war in Flanders by a general enforcement of the usury prohibition. Affecting Frenchmen as well as foreigners, it was associated with the negotiation of the war subsidy in 1315.⁵³ Unlike 1311, it was to be general throughout the kingdom, and the crown's zealous commissioners aroused resentment in Quercy, where they were accused of molesting legitimate merchants as well as manifest usurers.⁵⁴

It was apparently not until 1324 and 1325 that the Italians were again subjected to extraordinary payments besides their regular taxes. When war broke out in Gascony, Charles IV was very cautious about seeking a war subsidy from his subjects and such limited efforts as he made in 1324 encountered resistance.⁵⁵ To meet his rising expenses he turned

⁵² The *finances* collected at the end of 1314 are cited by Strayer, *French Taxation*, 17-18, note 52, after some of Menant's treasury journal excerpts in *Bibliothèque de Rouen*, ms. 33400, fols. 29r-30v. Individual payments ranged as high as 743 l.t. and clearly produced more money for the crown than the "gift" to Charles IV in 1322 which consisted of several dozen payments totalling 3134 pounds (above, note 33).

⁵³ The instructions given to the subsidy commissioners in 1315 are found in J. Petit, *et al.*, *Essai de restitution des plus anciens mémoires de la Chambre des Comptes de Paris*, Paris, 1899, 211-213. Evidence that subsidy payments and fines for usury and monetary violations were collected together is in *Mignon*, no. 1645-47, 1650, 1654-55, 1658, 1660, 1668, 1688-89, 1691-92. For the implications of this policy, see Henneman, "Enquêteurs."

⁵⁴ A letter of Louis X in AM Cajarc, *ser.* CC *Supp.*, ordered royal officers to proceed only against manifest usurers. Cf. E. Albe, "Cahors: Inventaire raisonné et analytique des archives municipales," pt. 2, *Bulletin de la Société des Études littéraires, scientifiques et artistiques du Lot*, 41 (1920), no. 274-275. See also G. La Coste, *Histoire générale de la province de Quercy*, Cahors, 1873-1876, II, pp. 462-463.

⁵⁵ Above, note 42.

to the Italians, and the Treasury Journals indicate that they made several different sorts of contributions during the next two years. The first of these was apparently a forced loan. It was not unusual for the crown to borrow periodically from Italian merchant bankers, but beginning in September 1324 the Treasury Journals record a different kind of entry — the receipt of many small sums described as loans *in subsidio guerrarum Vasconie* (or some slight variation of these words). The bulk of these appear before the end of 1324 and the great majority of the entries indicate that the lender was an Italian.⁵⁶ These loans, received early in the war, appear to represent a stop-gap measure intended to produce some revenue during the winter truce, before the collection of a general war subsidy was possible.

These were but one of several contributions which the Italians in France had to make to support Charles IV's war with England. At the end of 1324, those in the export trade were hit by the establishment of the 4 d./l. *droit de rève*, already described as a war measure.⁵⁷ Then in January, 1325, and again later in the year, there occurred those drastic increases in the *financiae Ytalicorum* which had been so modest earlier in the reign.⁵⁸ There is no evidence that this extortion was tied to the prosecution of usury or that there were any threats of arrest or deportation, but some sort of pressure was obviously used to extract such large sums. It was also in January that the king launched his effort to collect a subsidy from the whole kingdom, and as in 1315 the commissioners sent to negotiate this tax were assigned additional powers including the investigation and punishment of usurers.⁵⁹ Hence a general enforcement of the usury laws was part of the royal fiscal effort in 1325.

Besides the "loan" of 1324-25 and the two large payments in 1325 described as "finances," the Treasury Journals record one further contribution made by the Italians. Between March 22 and the end of May,

⁵⁶ In *JT Ch. IV* there are fifty-three entries between no. 5833 and 6230 which record such loans in the last quarter of 1324. A score of other entries between no. 7281 and 8984 are for loans during 1325. Of more than seventy entries all told, forty-five specify that the lender is an Italian while the rest identify him merely as a bourgeois of some French town. It is probable that most of these were in fact Italians having royal bourgeois privileges.

⁵⁷ Above, notes 11-13.

⁵⁸ Above, notes 37-41.

⁵⁹ For 1315, see above, note 53. In 1325, commissioners were dispatched to negotiate a war subsidy under letters of commission dated 18 January: *HL*, X, cols. 632-634; *AN JJ* 64, no. 55; *BN NAF* 7600 (Fontanieu 67), fols. 153v-156. Two days later, new letters assigned sweeping additional powers, including investigation of usury and collection of various fines: *BN Coll. Languedoc* 83, fol. 177r-v; *AN JJ* 64, no. 560. Again the usury investigation created an outcry in Quercy: *BN Doat* 119, fol. 57.

1325, we find numerous "gifts" by Italians. These, like the earlier "loans," were *in subsidio guerrarum*.⁶⁰

Thus in time of war or political unrest, when the government needed to augment revenues with a minimum of political risk, the alien merchants and money-lenders were vulnerable to a variety of exactions, often sudden in nature and involving large amounts. Yet the position of foreigners seems to have been even more precarious in time of peace, for then the king could not demand from his subjects any subsidy or extraordinary aid based on military service. The peacetime years of 1305-1313 had witnessed the more ruthless and spectacular fiscal expedients of Philip the Fair, among these the threatened expulsion of the Lombards in 1311-12.⁶¹ A similar period of peace occurred between 1329 and 1336, when Philip VI followed some of the precedents established by his uncle a generation before. In 1330-31 the crown undertook the most sizeable extortion from Italians to be attempted up to this time.

The king instituted proceedings on 8 November 1330, when Lombards throughout the kingdom were arrested,⁶² and a usually reliable chronicler states that they were held captive for three weeks before being released.⁶³ They were required to put up bond and report to Paris on a certain day. It appears from the correspondence of one Italian firm that interest of more than 5% outside the Champagne fairs was now being called usury.⁶⁴ So strict a definition of the term must have rendered illegal virtually all money-lending in France except at the fairs. We may speculate that many more outstanding loans violated the usury laws in 1330-31 than in 1311. The Italians themselves were fined a large sum, although the total amount involved is not certain. In 1332 a *finance* of 120,000 l.p. was being apportioned among them, 80% of which was payable by Italians living in places other than the Champagne fairs.⁶⁵ The higher interest rates permitted at the fairs obviously meant that fewer usury violations occurred there.⁶⁶

⁶⁰ *JT Ch. IV*, fifty-five entries between no. 7180 and 7780.

⁶¹ Langlois, in Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, 2, pt. 2, 180-229; Strayer, *French Taxation*, 17-18, 77 ff.

⁶² Lopez and Raymond, *Medieval Trade*, no. 194.

⁶³ "Chron. parisienne," *loc. cit.*, 143.

⁶⁴ Lopez and Raymond, *Medieval Trade*, no. 194, and editors' notes.

⁶⁵ AN PP 117, an inventory of Chamber of Accounts documents, many of which are now lost, 443-444. This *finance* had been made with the *gens du roi* and was apportioned in June, 1332, among "Italians of the province of Lombardy." The same inventory, p. 418, describes a payment of 18,000 pounds in 1331 which was apportioned among Sienese and other Italians.

⁶⁶ At the fairs 15% *per annum* remained the legal rate (as in *Ord.*, 1), 484-487, cited above, note 46.

In 1331, however, the crown was not content merely to fine the Italians themselves. Such a fine could tap their liquid assets but not the large sums owed to them by countless borrowers. Therefore Philip VI and his advisers now extended to Italians an expedient used by Philip IV in dealing with the Jews. All debts owing to Lombards were declared to be cancelled because as usurious contracts they were illegal. Those who had borrowed money at interest were excused from paying the interest. The principal, however, they were to repay, not to their Italian creditors at the appointed time, but to the crown immediately.⁶⁷ To the debtors, who were supposedly being relieved from the "oppressions" of extortionate loan sharks, this ordinance must have been a very dubious blessing. Although spared the payment of high interest rates, they now had to repay their loans more promptly than anticipated, and to royal usury commissioners who must have been more formidable creditors than alien money-lenders carrying on an illegal business.

At first the commissioners were to require all debtors to declare under oath how much of their debt was interest and how much principal. We may well imagine that excessively large amounts were declared to be interest and therefore not payable. On 12 January 1331 the government issued new instructions, to the effect that the commissioners were to regard three-quarters of the debt as the principal and collect this sum. In an effort, perhaps, to reduce debtor protests, this new ordinance also deferred payment of the principal to the crown for four months.⁶⁸ In fact, the collections probably extended over a much longer period, for the commissioners do not seem to have been recalled until 1333 or later.⁶⁹ By that year the king probably concluded that he had collected as much as he could from this latest enforcement of the usury laws. Not only

⁶⁷ *Ord.*, 2, 59-61, describes this enactment which has since been lost.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* The same document is copied in "Chron. parisienne," 143-144. Cf. Vuitry, *Régime financier*, 1, 484-485.

⁶⁹ Usury investigations, begun as early as September, 1330 in Rouergue (BN Doat 146, fol. 214), were extended to the whole kingdom by the royal order of 2 May 1331 (AN JJ 79B, no. 39), and the prosecution was in no way restricted to Italians. There is evidence of continuing pursuit of usurers in Furgeot, *Parl. Paris*, I, no. 476, 814, 1075-78, 1087, and AN JJ 66, no. 1471. Late in 1331 the king required that all foreign merchants establish residence at the Champagne fairs or leave the country within three months unless they ceased the practice of usury (*Ord.*, 2, 73). Meanwhile (late January, 1331) Philip extended the debt confiscation to those owing money to Jews (Montpellier: *Grand Chartier*, no. 1218 [C-9]). Only in April, 1333, were commissioners "on the matter of Jews" recalled (*ibid.*, no. 3341-42 [G-5]), and royal pursuit of debtors to the Italians may have ended about the same time, since nothing more is heard of this confiscation. As late as 1334, however, Italians in Languedoc were under scrutiny for possible usury (*ibid.*, no. 1219-20 [C-9]).

were debt collections apparently halted, but money-lending at interest up to 21 2/3% *per annum* (1 *denier* per pound per week) was permitted. This authorization occurred at the same time that the 4 d./l. export tax was cancelled and the king was attempting to debase the coinage and levy an aid for the knighting of his eldest son. It is possible that liberalization of the usury laws was intended to win the support of the disgruntled debtor classes.⁷⁰

Having largely exhausted the Italians as a source of extraordinary peacetime revenues, Philip VI had to try other fiscal expedients during the remaining years of peace. By 1337, however, France was again in conflict with England, in what would prove to be the initial phase of the Hundred Years' War. The crown could again demand a war subsidy from the kingdom, but once again supplementary sources of revenue were soon needed. As early as April 1337, commissioners were actively investigating usury violations in Languedoc, perhaps as the prelude to subsidy negotiations, as in 1315 and 1325.⁷¹ Their activities may also have been intended to lay the groundwork for a new extortion from the Italians, for on 19 May "Lombard usurers" were ordered imprisoned. It is not clear whether they themselves were fined, but there was certainly a new confiscation of debts owing to them, as in 1331. Debtors were again to declare the amount of their debts and pay the principal to the crown. They were forbidden to repay their Italian creditors under pain of having to pay a like amount to the king.⁷² This last provision suggests that many debtors preferred to maintain their credit standing and reduce the principal payable to the crown by reaching some accommodation with their creditors. In any case it is clear that the device employed in 1331 had proved so lucrative that the government was ready to try it again. Borrowers contracting usurious loans were now as vulnerable as the usurers themselves, although alienation of the debtor classes was sometimes politically unwise. Coming at the very outbreak of hostilities

⁷⁰ Following an assembly of the three Estates in late March, 1333, the crown issued letters which, among other things, ordered moderate debasement of the silver coinage, instituted certain reforms, and authorized the lending of money at interest up to 21 2/3% (*Ord.*, 2, 83-88; 12, 16-18; AN P 2291, pp. 87-101). From "Chron. parisienne," *loc. cit.*, 151, we infer that the permission to charge interest was regarded as quite noteworthy. It has been pointed out above, note 14, that these acts coincided with a number of other important fiscal developments, and it seems possible to conclude that the right to lend at interest and the cancellation of the export tax were royal concessions to those who were now being asked to pay a feudal aid and acquiesce in coinage debasement.

⁷¹ Germain, *Commerce*, P.J. no. 112; Piton, *Lombards*, 1, 37, note 1. For 1315 and 1325 see above, notes 53 and 59 respectively.

⁷² *Ord.*, 12, 35-36; Vuitry, *Régime financier*, 1, 485-486.

with England, this confiscation of debts must be regarded as a fiscal measure, notwithstanding Vuitry's unexplained assertion to the contrary.⁷³

Periodic seizure of the principal of usurious loans seems by this time to have become established policy. The same step was repeated in 1340, a year notable for the first significant military action of the war and an unusually wide variety of royal fiscal measures.⁷⁴ At the beginning of June money-lenders were arrested and the king cancelled all debts owed to Lombards, Jews, and other "*outremontains* usurers." As in 1337, the principal was to be paid to the crown, and anyone repaying his creditor would be fined an equivalent sum by the king.⁷⁵ Details are lacking as to what sums may have been collected by the government, but returns may have been disappointing since only three years had elapsed since the last confiscation. Not for seven years would borrowers again be tapped for funds. In the meantime, royal extortions from the Lombards continued, but the crown had to content itself with such smaller sums as could be gained from the Italians themselves.

Towards the end of 1341 Florentines in the kingdom were told to pay the king a "subsidy," perhaps similar to the "gifts" or "loans" in *subsidio guerrarum*, which had been collected by Charles IV.⁷⁶ In 1345, the royal efforts to obtain a general war subsidy encountered usually stiff opposition, especially in Languedoc, because a truce had been in effect. When the truce terminated in the spring of that year, the inability of the French to support an effective army led to serious English inroads in Languedoc.⁷⁷ The crown was not slow to realize that money was urgently needed and that was considerable opposition to taxation. As early as 30 April 1345 the government began a new exploitation of the Italians. Local officials were told to have the Lombards assemble "to hear certain things which the *gens des comptes* wish to set forth."⁷⁸ On 27 May, Philip VI issued

⁷³ *Régime financier*, 1, 486.

⁷⁴ See J. Henneman, "Financing the Hundred Years' War: Royal Taxation in France in 1340," *Speculum*, 42 (1967), 275-298, hereafter cited as "Financing."

⁷⁵ *Ord.*, 2, 143-145; BN NAF 7389, fol. 276r; AD Hérault A 4, fol. 122r-v. See also Cazelles, *Société politique*, 279. As in 1331, the debts owed to Jews as well as those owed to Italians were subject to this seizure.

⁷⁶ AN PP 117, p. 472, which is merely an inventory, is our only source for this "subsidy." Given two confiscations of debts in the preceding five years, rather little could have been expected or realized from Italians at this time. The singling out of Florentines is interesting in the light of the celebrated failure of major Florentine banking houses which occurred a few years later.

⁷⁷ BN *Coll. Languedoc* 84, fol.s 290r-300v; *HL*, IX, 572 and notes; M. Bertrand, *Étude sur les chroniques de Froissart: Guerre de Guienne, 1345-1346* (Bordeaux, 1870), *passim*, especially 20-187.

⁷⁸ Mentioned by Cazelles, *Société politique*, 279, and copied by Viard in AN AB xix 2639, these orders are in a manuscript in *Bibliothèque de Rouen*, ms. 33402, fol. 19r.

some additional instructions on the subject⁷⁹ and by 14 June the seneschal of Beaucaire had received orders to assign additional persons to the commission for bringing Lombard usurers into court.⁸⁰ It would seem that the usurers themselves were fined, with no effort to confiscate debts owed to them. Once again, some sort of "gift" or forced loan was probably the royal objective.

It was in 1347 that the government next undertook to confiscate debts to usurers as well as to extort money from the Italians themselves. The extortion begun at this time is unusually well-documented and is of great interest because of its long duration. It was not finally terminated until late in 1363, and as such it represents the most ambitious effort at consistent enforcement of the usury laws hitherto attempted. As always, royal policy was determined by the crown's fiscal necessities, and such developments as the Black Death in 1348 and the subsequent capture of the king at Poitiers in 1356 no doubt influenced the decision to pursue the debtors of usurers for so long a period. Many of the transactions made with these debtors were recorded in the royal chancery registers, and prolonged enforcement led to protests by the Estates General which further augment our documentation.

Despite the more abundant evidence, some uncertainties remain concerning the confiscation begun in 1347. It has long been supposed that this action commenced at the end of the year, when a royal ordinance called for the confiscation of the principal of all debts owed to Lombards.⁸¹ This assumption is supported by a subsequent ordinance which indicates that the seizure of debts followed an *arrêt* of the *Parlement* on 6 December 1347. However, no surviving document records this act or any other judicial action in the latter part of the year,⁸² and the ordinance

⁷⁹ Germain, *Commerce*, 2, P.J. no. 126. This document is an order not to molest or persecute the Lombards as a result of the summons cited in the last note. It seems that its purpose was merely to apply pressure, perhaps to get a loan from them.

⁸⁰ *Montpellier: Grand Chartrier*, no. 1127 (C-2). The commissioners are mentioned as late as August, 1346 (AN PP 117, p. 601) but the reference is only to their salaries and therefore not proof that they were still active. Cazelles, *Société politique*, p. 270, note 10, has noted the reference of a chronicler to an extortion from Italians in 1346, but see below, note 88.

⁸¹ *Ord.*, 2, 418-420. A brief recent study devoted to this subject is A. L. Funk, "Confiscation of Lombard Debts in France, 1347-1358," *Medievalia et Humanistica*, 7 (1952), 51-55, hereafter cited as "Lombard Debts."

⁸² *Ord.*, 3, 645, from the text in AN JJ 94, no. 7, and dated 19 November 1363. Vuitry, *Régime financier*, 1, 486, evidently had this document in mind when he referred to an ordinance of 15 November 1353. His inaccurate dating and failure to cite a source hindered Funk, who was unable to locate this ordinance ("Lombard Debts," *loc. cit.*, 52). In any case, the *arrêt* of the *Parlement* mentioned here cannot be located. Secousse, in editing vol. 3 of the *Ordonnances*

of 28 December did not mark the commencement of the extortion. At the most it merely generalized a policy which had already been put into effect on a more limited basis, for persons owing money to usurers had actually been paying *finances* to the crown for nine months.

It now appears that the first royal measures against usurious loans in 1347 took place as early as mid-February. On the twelfth, Philip VI secretly ordered his bailiffs and seneshals to arrest Italian money-lenders, seize their property, and cancel their loans.⁸³ Eight days later, they were ordered banished from the kingdom, evidently in order to set the stage for a large fine, following the precedent of 1311-12.⁸⁴ Soon the crown began to collect the principal of debts owed to usurers, but there is reason to believe that only the credits of certain Italian companies were singled out at this time. The Scarampi and two other companies were accused of "excesses,"⁸⁵ and the great bulk of the early collections came from their debtors.⁸⁶

On 19 March, there did occur an *arrêt* of the *Parlement*, the only surviving evidence of formal judicial action against Italians in 1347. This curiously worded document commenced with a colorful account of how usurers "oppressed" the king's subjects, and went on to state that both nobles and non-nobles had been victimized in this way. This usury, it was stated, prevented "the said nobles and others" from aiding the king in his wars. Debts owing to "those who seem culpable" were to be confiscated. Although the text specified no particular company, merely

suggested in a note to this ordinance that the date given for the *arrêt* is somewhat illegible in the original, but a reading of AN JJ 94, no. 7, leaves no doubt that 6 December 1347 is correct. Furgeot's inventory of the *Parlement's* civil judgments (in this case, the appropriate registers are AN X 1a 11 and 12) gives no trace of this decision. Similarly, there is no document dealing with Italians in late 1347 in the register of criminal judgments, AN X 2a 5. The act of March, 1347, cited below, note 87, remains the only text of this type in 1347 which I have been able to locate.

⁸³ Cazelles, *Société politique*, 279; *HL*, IX, 602.

⁸⁴ BN *m. fr.* 7222, p. 103. The banishment order was followed by an extortion from Italians, evidently after the manner of 1311: Furgeot, *Parl. Paris*, 2, no. 7764; AN JJ 68, no. 160, 262, 339. As in 1330-31, this seizure of property was independent of what might be recovered from debtors. What is not entirely clear is whether a few companies (below, notes 85-86) actually were banished and their property fully confiscated.

⁸⁵ Notes of J. Viard, AN AB xix 2640. In *JT Ph.* VI, no. 653, one finds an assignment of fines on the property taken from these companies.

⁸⁶ Most of those collections recorded in AN JJ 76 during March and April, 1347 (nos. 18, 70, 72, 78, 80, 72, 86, 90, 123-24, 132, 144, 146, 149-51, 157, 176, 209, 357, 359-60, 365, 402-04), were from debtors of the Scarampi. Some of these persons, moreover, made their initial declarations of indebtedness prior to the judicial decision cited in the next note (examples are AN JJ 76, nos. 90, 150, 151).

"several Lombard usurers, Italians, and *outremontains*,"⁸⁷ it implies that some Italians, rather than all, were the objects of this action.

Most striking, however, is the impression that the crown was particularly interested in squeezing money from the nobility. The timing of this decision is significant, for in March of 1347 the French government was struggling to recover from the disastrous defeat at Crécy and was about to launch a series of assemblies aimed at obtaining men and money for raising the siege of Calais.⁸⁸ Having finally fought the pitched battle they had wished for, only to suffer ignominious defeat, the nobles were likely scapegoats for the Crécy debacle.⁸⁹ The subsidy negotiations of 1347 gave evidence of an unenthusiastic response on the part of nobles and in the winter of 1347-48 subsidy grants by the towns were made subject to the condition that all privileged persons contribute. From these developments one infers a growing suspicion that the nobility were unwilling to pay their share for the defense of the kingdom.⁹⁰ The word-

⁸⁷ AN X 2a 5, fol. 97r. Usury here was defined as interest in excess of 15%, the traditional figure allowed at the Champagne fairs (above, note 66) and confirmed in Philip VI's fair regulations of 1344 and 1349 (*Ord.*, 2, 200-207, 308-315).

⁸⁸ P. Varin (ed.), *Archives administratives de la ville de Reims* (Paris, 1843), 2, 1145, 1151-1154 (hereafter cited as *Reims*); BN *ms. fr.* 25698, no. 160bis; *Ord.*, 2, 262-263; and Viard's extract from AM Arras AA 2, no. 52, copied in AN AB xix 2638, are the principal documents regarding the subsidy-raising effort in northern France during the spring of 1347. Discussed by Vuitry, *Régime financier*, 2, 27-28, these texts inform us of three bailiwick assemblies held in the regions nearest to Calais. The summons of Reims to one of these assemblies was issued on 18 March, the day before the act of the *Parlement* cited in the last note. For a contemporary opinion linking the seizures of Lombard property to the relief of Calais, see *Chronique de Richard Lescot, moine de Saint-Denis (1328-1334). Continuation de cette chronique (1344-1364)* (ed. Lemoine), Paris, 1896, 74-75. This is the chronicle mentioned above, note 80, in connection with a citation of Cazelles. Under the date 1346 (evidently old style), this chronicle states that Philip VI used the *ingentes pecunias* extorted from the Lombards "to succour the town of Calais." Subsequently, some property of Italians was assigned to bourgeois of Calais who had been forced to leave after the English capture of the town (AN JJ 77, no. 169, 178, 292).

⁸⁹ Cazelles, *Société politique*, 399, notes that the French military disasters of 1346 and 1356 can be regarded also as social phenomena with severe effects on the noble class. Concerning scapegoats for Crécy, see his comments, *ibid.*, pp. 178 ff. E. Perroy, *The Hundred Years War* (English ed., tr. W. B. Wells, London, 1951), notes (119) that chroniclers blamed the defeat on the rash charges of the French knights, and (120) that Philip VI subsequently lost confidence in his army. A growing impatience with the nobility would come to a head after the second great French defeat at Poitiers ten years later. See the comments and citations of R. Delachenal, *Histoire de Charles V*, 1, Paris, 1909, 247-248. Something of the same popular criticism must have been voiced after Crécy.

⁹⁰ See Varin, *Reims*, 2, 1124; Vuitry, *Régime financier*, 2, 27-28; J. Henneman, "The Black Death and Royal Taxation in France, 1347-1351," *Speculum*, 43 (1968), hereafter cited as "Black Death," and the documents cited above, note 88.

ing of the *Parlement's* decision in March, 1347 suggests that the nobles had made the exactions of usurers an excuse for evading subsidy requests, and that the king was determined to eliminate the basis for such an argument and collect some money from them while they were politically vulnerable.⁹¹

The *arrêt* of the *Parlement* was followed nine days later by letters ordering royal commissioners to collect sums owed to the Lombards.⁹² Such collection required considerable bargaining with debtors, who arranged to pay the crown in specified installments as much of the principal as the commissioners were able to squeeze from them. Actual payments were usually so much less than the total amount of the debt that interest alone probably does not account for the difference.⁹³ Given the crown's difficult fiscal and military position in the spring of 1347, it is probable that Philip VI was prepared to accept a reduced amount in order to collect it quickly.

A curious feature of this confiscation of debts is the fact that numerous transactions with debtors were registered with royal confirmation in the *Trésor des chartes*. Whether complete *finances* or down payments on larger

⁹¹ AN X 2a 5, fol. 97r. Cazelles, *Société politique*, pp. 396-399, suggests that these measures against usurers were aimed partly at easing the nobles' financial burden. However plausible, this view does not sufficiently consider the fact that confiscation of debts owed to usurers imposed grave hardship on the debtors themselves (see Funk, "Lombard Debts"). These confiscations of the Lombards' receivables forced debtors to make immediate repayment. Often this was extremely difficult, and some nobles who declared their debts in 1347 were unable to pay the crown anything for several years (AN JJ 81, no. 371). Philip VI needed money and certainly seems to have invoked the usury laws to gain access to sums currently in the hands of the nobility.

⁹² Among the documents which include copies of these commissions are AN JJ 76, no. 18; JJ 81, nos. 22, 335.

⁹³ A few examples will indicate the ratio of payment to the total declared: AN JJ 76, no. 160 (60 l. paid to the crown out of 110 l. owed to a Lombard); no. 209 (124 l. paid out of 960 l. owed); no. 317 (40 l. paid out of 220 l. owed); no. 359 (one-quarter paid to the crown). From a slightly later date, we may notice AN JJ 82, no. 167 (133 florins finally paid out of 450 owed). See also the examples cited by Cazelles, *Société politique*, 279, note 12. Cazelles argues that the discrepancy between the amount paid and the total debt represents interest, which could accumulate sizeably when a loan was not repaid for several years (*ibid.*, 279, 397). Doubtless this is true in some cases; one debtor who finally promised the crown 80 *écus* in October, 1359 had incurred his debt to Lombards more than twenty years earlier (BN *ms. fr.* 6739, fol. 1v). It is unlikely, however, that interest often amounted to half the total debt. In 1331 the crown assumed that three-quarters of a debt would be principal (above, note 68), in 1347 the principal was estimated at 60% of the total debt (below, note 96) and in 1356 the government was trying to collect two-thirds (*Montpellier: Grand Chartier*, no. 2569 [E-8]). When as often happened, the crown accepted a payment of less than one-third of the total debt, it must have been taking less than the full principal in order to collect quickly.

sums, many of the payments recorded in these chancery registers were arranged rather quickly, in March or April of 1347.⁹⁴ Persons permitted to pay less than the full principal in return for promptness would naturally be most anxious to gain written royal confirmation to protect themselves against future demands that they pay the rest of the debt. The fact that so many *finances* were registered in the chancery is interesting in another way. Two-thirds of these transactions were concluded prior to the ordinance of 28 December 1347, and the overwhelming majority of these involved nobles.⁹⁵ This class, always solicitous of its rights, was in a better position to demand the protection that royal letters of confirmation afforded. At the same time, these entries offer further evidence that noble debtors were a particular target during most of 1347.

When at last the king issued his ordinance of 28 December, he could only have been generalizing the measures previously enacted. Where earlier prosecutions may have been largely confined to a particular class of debtors or a particular group of Italian creditors, the confiscation was now applied throughout the kingdom. Seven years having elapsed since the last such confiscation, the government expected to gain an extremely large sum. The ordinance would be renewed by John II in 1350 and 1353.⁹⁶ The continuing exactions represent the most sustained action against usurious loans thus far attempted in France. At the time the ordinance was issued, the Estates General had just been in session. This assembly, which demanded changes in the royal administration and in the coinage but also promised a sizeable subsidy to the crown, must have agreed to the forthcoming enactment on Lombard debts.⁹⁷ Such ac-

⁹⁴ Of the payments so registered during the years 1347 and 1348, about half the entries deal with full or partial payment prior to the end of April, 1347. The twenty-six entries for this period found in AN JJ 76 have been cited above, note 86. Others are AN JJ 68, nos. 160, 262, 339, 343; JJ 77, nos. 140, 215, 225, 298, 428; and JJ 81, nos. 22, 88.

⁹⁵ Transactions involving noble debtors, for the year 1347 only, are AN JJ 76, nos. 72, 78, 80, 82, 86, 90, 103, 123, 124, 132, 144, 146, 149-151, 157, 160, 184, 192, 207, 209, 234, 312, 317, 357, 359, 402-405; JJ 77, nos. 140, 142, 149, 175, 215, 225, 309; and JJ 81, nos. 88, 455. The numbers of transactions registered in the *Trésor des chartes* dropped sharply after 1347, but nobles continued to be prominent among those debtors who made *compositions* with the crown in 1348 (AN JJ 76, nos. 3, 19, 242; JJ 77, nos. 170, 174, 198, 232, 242; JJ 81, no. 435) and in subsequent years (AN JJ 81, no. 371; JJ 84, nos. 274, 389). In all, about seventy transactions were registered at the chancery in 1347-48. In perhaps fifteen cases the social class of the debtor is not clear, but where it can be determined, the vast majority were nobles.

⁹⁶ The government estimated that outstanding debts totalled two million pounds of which the principal was 1,200,000 pounds (Funk, *Lombard Debts*, 52, citing *Ord.*, 2, 418-420). For John II's renewals of the ordinance see *Ord.*, 2, 523-524; IV, pp. 80-82; AN P 2292, pp. 479-482.

⁹⁷ On these Estates and their significance see Henneman, "Black Death"; and Cazelles, *Société politique*, 216-229. The sources dealing with the tax grants of 1347-48 do not mention

quiescence was in sharp contrast to the opposition which later assemblies would express.

Yet already, in 1347, documents indicate that the measures against usurers created hardships when they were applied. When some Italians presented a royal charter which they hoped would protect their assets from seizure, the king's council decided that it was not valid.⁹⁸ In August, the *juge mage* of Beaucaire ordered cancellation of all usurious contracts entered into by poor people during a recent grain shortage.⁹⁹ This local measure offers further evidence that a general cancellation of usurious contracts had not been ordered earlier in the year. Debtors affected by the enactments of February and March were particularly embarrassed if their income was seasonal in character. Those deriving their wealth from viniculture had to be granted a delay, paying half the money on 1 October and half on 2 February 1348, but other persons were expected to pay immediately.¹⁰⁰ That some preferred secret arrangements with their Italian creditors is suggested by the stern injunction in the December ordinance that nobody "compose" with the Lombards.¹⁰¹

In the years after 1348 the collection of Lombard debts continued,¹⁰² but by the middle 1350's there began to be serious opposition. The Estates of 1355 were hostile to the methods of royal commissioners and imposed a limitation on the measures against debtors.¹⁰³ The growing opposition from this time onwards has been well documented by A. L. Funk, who has pointed out the hardships suffered by debtors,¹⁰⁴ and has suggested an additional reason for the discontent, namely the fact that the proceeds from this tax were diverted from the treasury to the king's

Lombard debts but the ordinance of 28 December must have been issued with the knowledge and concurrence of the assembly. It is unknown how such concurrence may have been obtained but perhaps a factor was the attitude of the bourgeoisie, whose influence, in Cazelles' opinion, was strong in this assembly.

⁹⁸ AN P 2292, pp. 23-25; BN *ms. fr.* 9146, fol. 96r-v.

⁹⁹ AD Hérault A 4, fols. 248-249.

¹⁰⁰ NB NAF 7606, fols. 457-458. In practice, other exceptions were permitted, as in the case of a woman who was allowed to continue using for one year some land which had been seized for a debt owed to a Lombard (Furgeot, *Parl. Paris*, 2, no. 8778).

¹⁰¹ *Ord.*, 2, 418-420. Cf. *Montpellier: Grand Chartrier*, no. 2585 (E-8).

¹⁰² For 1349-50 there are twenty-nine entries in *JT Ph. VI* between nos. 2473 and 5052. For 1353, see Moranvillé, "Extrait ...," *BEC*, 1888, p. 199. Transactions with debtors recorded in the chancery registers include AN JJ 76, nos. 3, 18-20, 70, and 242; JJ 77, nos. 170, 174, 198, 209, 232, 242, 260, 288; JJ 78, nos. 173, 182, 290, 221; JJ 80, no. 546; JJ 81, nos. 22, 114, 121, 157, 335, 371, 435, 856; JJ 84, nos. 274, 289; JJ 85, no. 153; JJ 89, no. 145bis. A number of these were late payments or final installments of debts declared in 1347-48.

¹⁰³ Funk, "Lombard Debts," 54; *Ord.*, 3, 19-37, art. 17.

¹⁰⁴ Funk, "Lombard Debts," 53-55.

household accounts. The alleged wasteful luxury of the royal family met with increasing criticism from the Estates in the later 1350's.¹⁰⁵

Of the assemblies in this period, the Estates of early 1357 were probably most strongly under the influence of the king's more radical opponents, Robert le Coq and Etienne Marcel. The great March ordinance issued at the behest of this assembly included a brief suspension of collection of the debts owed to Lombards.¹⁰⁶ No further action occurred until a year later when the Estates succeeded in obtaining an end to all collections.¹⁰⁷ Not long after this order the Dauphin escaped the tutelage of the hostile Estates and convened a more friendly assembly of his own at Compiègne.¹⁰⁸ Meeting in May, 1358, this body gave its support to the Dauphin, but among the reforms promised in return was the permanent recall of the commissioners assigned to collect from debtors.¹⁰⁹ Thus two assemblies in the same year, one unfriendly to the crown and the other friendly, had each indicated opposition to the royal confiscation of debts. Between them they had induced the Dauphin to halt proceedings which had been underway for over eleven years, an unusually long period.

The enactments of 1358 should have been the end of the matter, and indeed one is tempted to question how much remained to be squeezed from the unfortunate debtors. It nevertheless appears that by 1362 the collections were again in progress. On 5 October 1362, Jean de Rampillon was named receiver general of *finances* payable to the crown by reason of debts owed to Lombards.¹¹⁰ There is no evidence that any new seizure of debts had been ordered and among Rampillon's responsibilities was the collection of *finances* agreed to in 1356 and 1357 but never paid. In short, his mission seems to have been a continuation of the same exaction inaugurated in 1347. His account, rendered in September, 1363, begins with 182 entries concerning *finances* made in 1356-57. Their total value far exceeded the new *finances* belonging to 1362-63.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 53 and note 15.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 54-55. This suspension (*Ord.*, 3, 124-126, art. 50) was until 17 April.

¹⁰⁷ Funk, "Lombard Debts," 55.

¹⁰⁸ Delachenal, *Charles V*, 1, 388 ff.

¹⁰⁹ Funk, "Lombard Debts," 55. Following the assembly an ordinance of twenty-eight articles was issued (*Ord.*, 3, 219-232). Of these Art. 7 recalled the commissioners on the debtors of Lombards while art. 8 recalled the *réformateurs* concerned with usury in general.

¹¹⁰ BN *ms. fr.* 6739, fol. 1r-v. Another reference to renewed activity by commissioners on this matter is AN P 2294, p. 461.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, fols. 1v-15v, 41r. Of the *finances* dating back to 1356-57, 171 debtors finally paid 4193 *céus*, while twenty-one others paid small amounts in various currencies. These receipts came to nearly five times the total collected from new *finances* of 1362-63. Evidently there re-

There is no clear evidence as to why (or when) the matter of Lombard debts was reopened. Doubtless the action came after the treaty of Brétigny and concerned in some way the ransom of John II. In 1360, when a large down payment on the ransom was being collected hurriedly, the crown squeezed a large sum from Jews in the kingdom and may possibly have resumed collection of debts to usurers at the same time.¹¹² Subsequently a sweeping fiscal ordinance stabilized the coinage and established certain regular taxes aimed at meeting the ransom payments.¹¹³ This ordinance cancelled all other taxes, but in 1362 the king declared that such cancellation did not extend to unpaid arrears of former taxes.¹¹⁴ It is likely that sums still outstanding from debtors were included among these arrears, for Jean de Rampillon was commissioned later in the same year and collected mainly sums that had been promised in the 1350's.

Opposition, however, had by no means diminished, and in the fall of 1363 the crown again cancelled its action against debtors. This order was appended as an extra article to an ordinance dealing primarily with Jews, and it was apparently not executed.¹¹⁵ Within weeks a growing wave of protest against the continued collection of debts led John II to issue a special ordinance repeating the earlier command and enlarging upon it. It was this document which specifically stated that the action being taken against debtors proceeded from an *arrêt* of the *Parlement* on 6 December 1347.¹¹⁶ After sixteen years the great confiscation was finally ended, although one last exception was made on 5 December 1363. Some of the revenue from this tax had been assigned to the duchess of Normandy and it was stipulated that *compositions* previously made with her representatives must still be honored.¹¹⁷

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* *

Up to 1314 the Italians in France had been very lightly taxed. The 1 d./l. *boîte aux Lombards* was hardly burdensome, even though a higher

mained little for the government to extort. Two Italians who had already had to pay 30,000 florins were excused in February, 1363, from paying a small remaining debt (AN JJ 93, no. 162).

¹¹² The Dauphin's measures regarding Jews were confirmed by John II in a series of ordinances issued in March, 1361 (AN JJ 89, no. 663-666).

¹¹³ *Ord.*, 3, 433 ff. (5 December, 1360).

¹¹⁴ AN P 2294, pp. 303-304 (5 March, 1362).

¹¹⁵ AN JJ 95, no. 29; AN P 2294, pp. 417-420; BN NAF 7612, fols. 332 ff.

¹¹⁶ *Ord.*, 3, 645 (cited above, note 82).

¹¹⁷ *Ord.*, 3, 647. This assignment to the duchess of Normandy had been in effect at least since 1360 (AN PP 117, pp. 808-809).

rate was instituted outside those regions where the Italians had privileges. Wool exports were subject to licenses and money-lenders were vulnerable to massive fines when they violated the usury laws. In general, however, Philip IV's fiscal policy cannot have posed a serious impediment to business activity, nor can the Italians have furnished a very large proportion of the crown's extraordinary revenue.

Towards the end of Philip's reign, however, there arose military, fiscal and political problems which would afflict the monarchy for several decades and necessitate various fiscal expedients. These included expansion of the customs levies, increases in the *boîte aux Lombards*, and establishment of the 5% property tax.

The large extortions directed against Italian money-lenders were the most spectacular of all the royal fiscal expedients in this era of makeshift financing. They were also by far the most serious from the point of view of the Italians themselves. The circumstances of these extortions varied. Those of 1311 and 1331 were peacetime measures adopted when no war subsidies were available. Those of 1325 and 1337 occurred at the beginnings of wars, when subsidies were under negotiation but were encountering the resistance which always seemed to occur after several years of peace. Those of 1340 and 1347 coincided with the English sieges of Tournai and Calais respectively, when a particularly costly French military effort was demanded.

These changing circumstances are interesting because they reveal the conditions under which the crown might act against the Italians. The fundamental difference among the large extortions, however, involved their scope. Prior to 1330, the government periodically forced usurers to pay a large sum, perhaps one or two hundred thousand pounds as a fine. Thereafter, however, the extortions became confiscations of capital assets, a vastly more serious matter, involving (in 1347) over a million pounds. On at least two occasions (1331 and 1347) these seizures were superimposed upon the traditional large fine.

The failure of Frenchmen, especially the nobles, to accept a tax burden which would support the cost of war and government in the fourteenth century may have forced Philip VI to pursue his aggressive policy towards the Italians. It was nevertheless an unfortunate policy from the political, fiscal, and economic point of view. Confiscation of usurious debts seriously embarrassed the debtor classes, including politically influential nobles and municipal governments who could no longer regard enforcement of the usury laws as a reform. Periodic prosecution of "Lombard usurers," once a politically safe source of emergency funds for the crown, now aroused hostility and was denounced by the Estates. As the extortion policy was becoming a political liability it was also

losing value as a fiscal device because of excessive exploitation. No longer content with occasional fines, the king after 1330 began confiscating the capital which had made those fines possible. The government thus was sacrificing the long-term fiscal possibilities afforded by illegal money-lending in order to realize a large short-term gain. This policy must also have injured the financial position of many royal subjects by seriously restricting credit at a time of declining purchasing power and economic contraction.

An Italian merchant residing at the Champagne fairs in 1311 was subject to the extremely small tax of 1 d./l. on each of his transactions, but was otherwise free of taxation unless he exported wool. Twenty years later a merchant similarly situated would have to pay 1 1/2 d./l. on each domestic transaction, 4 d./l. on the value of goods exported, and a 5% annual property tax to secure bourgeois privileges. His tax burden had thus increased significantly but was still not extremely heavy and would remain stable during the next three decades, despite the increasing fiscal difficulties of the monarchy. For money-lenders, however, it was a different matter, particularly after the disastrous confiscations of receivables began in 1331. The prolonged extortion of 1347-63, coinciding with the Black Death and serious military and political disturbances in France, must have destroyed the money-lending business of most Lombards in the kingdom.¹¹⁸ We can thus conclude that French fiscal policy in this period proved harrassing but not crippling to the Italians as merchants, while it dealt a severe blow to those whose business was the lending of money, as well as to their customers.

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¹¹⁸ In this connection it is interesting that Wolff, in studying Toulouse in the period after 1350, found no Lombards. Money-lending activities in that town were in the hands of Jews and domestic money-changers. See P. Wolff, *Commerces et marchands de Toulouse (vers 1350 - vers 1450)* (Paris, 1954), 397.

Henry IV, the Commons and Taxation

ALAN ROGERS

THE controversies between the king and his parliaments during the reign of Henry IV have long been recognised as some of the most severe of all those of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The record in itself is impressive for a short period of thirteen and a half years. In 1401 the commons conducted an extreme attack on the king's administration especially his household, and criticised his liberality.¹ In 1402, further criticisms of excessive royal generosity were heard from the commons. In 1404, at the insistence of the lower house, the king dismissed a number of members from the royal households, and the parliamentary lay subsidy was placed in the hands of specially appointed war treasurers. The breakdown in national finances which this arrangement created resulted in a further parliament later in the same year when modifications more favourable to the king were made, but criticism was still very strong. In 1406, an unprecedentedly long parliamentary session witnessed the commons resisting all demands of the king for a grant until certain reforms had been made in the council and administration. In 1407, there were severe criticisms of the king's financial burdens and impecuniosity, while as late as 1410 the commons were vociferous in their complaints. At no other period, except perhaps during Richard II's minority, was there such persistent criticism from parliament as bitter as in these early years of the fifteenth century.²

The causes of this prolonged outburst of opposition are not hard to find. Henry IV's frequent recourse to parliament for financial aid may be considered one of the major contributing factors. Political considerations may have played their part in the summons of the 1401 parliament,³ but

¹ *Rot[uli] Parl[iamentorum]* (London, Record Commission, 1767-77), 3, 471, 478; cf. A. L. Brown, "Commons and Council in Reign of Henry IV," *English Historical Review*, 79 (1964), 2-9.

² Some further evidence may be drawn from the parliamentary sessions. In 9 years, 1377-1386, 14 (highly critical) parliaments were held at an average length of 37 days; the average per year was 57 days. In 10 years, 1388-98, 10 parliaments were held, averaging 35 days per parliament and per year. In 12 years, 1399-1411, only 8 parliaments were held, but they averaged 68 days each, a yearly average of 45 days. In other words, the effect of fewer but longer parliaments was almost as great as during the early years of Richard II's reign.

³ I have dealt with this crisis in detail in "The Political Crisis of 1401," *Nottingham Medieval Studies*, 12 (1968), 85-96.

even in this case and in all the other summons of parliaments during the reign the economic motive predominated. Henry's pressing need for money is well known. The charges on his government were excessively heavy, recurrent and concurrent; the second parliament of 1404 when granting a subsidy spoke of the king's expenses in the east and west Marches of Scotland, in Wales and in Ireland, at sea and at Calais, in resisting the alliance of the Welsh, Scots, French and Bretons, in recovering Guienne, and generally in the defence of the realm.⁴ Other burdens included the costs of the usurpation of Richard II's throne, both in the initial expenses and in the importunity of Henry of Bolingbroke's supporters.⁵ At the same time England was faced with a severe short-term cut-back in the wool trade,⁶ perhaps caused by the unsettled conditions following the revolution of 1399. The yield thus from the customs seems to have been substantially reduced, although only temporarily. A further contributory factor was apparently a serious loss in efficiency in revenue collecting which accounted for a considerable decline in revenue from some sources.⁷ But above all, the revolution must have given a great shock to the government's credit; and in circumstances like these, the medieval system of exchequer finance, based as it was so heavily on assignment and thus on credit, was unable to help. There are clear indications in the king's repeated demands for money and in the increasing complaints about non-payment for royal purveyance⁸ that what the king needed was ready cash; and the medieval

⁴ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 546.

⁵ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 454. For initial expenses of about £11,000, borne by the wardrobe, see P[ublic] R[ecord] O[ffice], Exch. LTR, Memoranda Rolls, E368/175, Status et Visus, Pasche m.11; for the rewards of the Percies after 1399, see J. M. W. Bean, "Henry IV and the Percies," *History*, 44 (1959), 212-227.

⁶ The figures in the various tables in M. Carus-Wilson and O. Coleman, *England's Export Trade, 1275-1547* (Oxford, 1963), show something of the extent of this; cf. also *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 523, where the commons alleged that the customs were *si sodeynment amesnusez* (1404); but this charge was made as early as January 1391, *ibid.*, 3, 284.

⁷ A. Steel, *Receipt of the Exchequer* (Cambridge, 1954), 107. Because less revenue was passing through the Exchequer of Receipt does not of course necessarily mean that less was being collected. The receipt rolls only indicate the size of exchequer business; more could be drained away at source. Nevertheless, there is other evidence for the "dislocation" at this time. The average yield of the duchy of Lancaster under Henry IV was less than £1500 p.a.; under Henry V it was over £3000 p.a., PRO, DL28/4/1-8; *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 24 (1951), 142. Comparisons of the lay subsidies in 1403 and 1413 reveal the same point, PRO, Exchequer of Receipt, Receipt Rolls, E401/627, 630, 631, 658, 660, and below, note 37.

⁸ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 473, 507, 587, 592, 609, etc.; *Ann[ales Henrici]* (Rolls Series, London, 1866), 337, 388; *Eul[ogium Historiarum]* (Rolls Series, London, 1863), 3, 389, 405; C. M. Fraser, "Some Durham Documents," *B.I.H.R.*, 34 (1961), 194, 198; *Cal[endar of] Pat[ent] Rolls, 1409-13*, 226, 318, etc.

exchequer, which was always primarily an accounting department, was never geared to cope with such demands over a sustained period. Henry to a large extent created his own financial problems.

Henry IV's costs were thus very high, while his revenue, especially in cash, was low. His constant demands for money thus necessitated frequent parliaments. Despite the fact that (at least theoretically) the French war was temporarily in abeyance, the king's requests for taxes, both lay and clerical, were very heavy, as heavy in fact as during the years of the active prosecution of the war. The frequent collection of the lay subsidies and the resulting unpopularity of the government led parliament to seek new ways of levying subsidies, the land and income taxes of 1404 and 1411.⁹

Nevertheless, the king's reiterated demands for money, heavy as they were, cannot provide a full answer to the problem of the intransigence of the commons under Henry IV. It is clear that parliament at this time was undergoing certain changes. After 1401, it was no longer the great arena in which the controversies between the king and rival factions of magnates were fought out, as in the 1380's and the 1390's.¹⁰ Rather the emphasis lies on the commons, whose complaints of the financial maladministration of the realm, recurrent throughout the fourteenth century, now rose to a climax. Left leaderless by magnate faction and rebellion outside parliament, more dependant than at any other time upon themselves, the commons showed a new burst of energy and initiative which led Stubbs to speak of the "Lancastrian experiment."¹¹ Most of their venom was directed against the excessive costs of government accompanied by too-frequent demands for taxes and their maladministration, and at the heart of the struggle lay the king's household.

The significance of these struggles has not been clearly recognised. Stubbs said of them that "the extravagance of the court was really only a minor cause of public distress;" while more recently J. E. A. Jolliffe dismissed them as "repeated dissensions upon minor issues, mainly upon the spending of the revenue and especially that part of it which goes for the royal household."¹² But the scale of the controversy was scarcely minor; it

⁹ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 546-7, 635. Cf. also the king's attempts to raise other taxes from the lords in 1400, *P[roceedings and] O[r]dinances of the P[ri]vy C[ouncil]*, ed. N. H. Nicolas (London, 1834-37), 1, 104; and 1405, *Hist[oria] Angl[icana]* (Rolls Series, London, 1864), 2, 268.

¹⁰ The struggles between the prince of Wales' faction and the court party at the end of the reign were not conducted in parliament to any large extent.

¹¹ W. Stubbs, *Constitutional History of England* (5th ed., Oxford, 1896), 3, 5. The minority of Richard II, however, provides some close parallels of persistent commons' criticism, as also do, to some extent, the years 1339-48 and, of course, 1371-76.

¹² J. E. A. Jolliffe, *Constitutional History of Medieval England* (London, 1954), 432; Stubbs, *op. cit.*, 2, 588. Elsewhere he says (*ibid.* 2, 584), "it remains a most puzzling fact that the household

is clear that a major constitutional struggle was in progress. The parliamentary disputes in the early years of the fifteenth century can only be explained satisfactorily on the assumption that the commons were aware that some vital issue was at stake. Nor is that issue hard to find: it was precisely over the use to which parliamentary taxation was to be put.

To the commons, parliamentary taxation was an exceptional grant, made in the king's great necessity with the consent of his subjects, and as such was to be expended on those purposes for which it had been granted. Here lay the distinction between ordinary revenue (whether regular or casual) and extraordinary revenue. No-one denied the king's right in national emergencies to demand money from his subjects; and, like other forms of assistance, such as loans, benevolences and military service, it was the duty of the subject to respond to this exercise of the royal prerogative.¹³

Such a demand had to be justified, the emergency agreed with parliament, and this was usually treated as a question of defence involving foreign war.¹⁴ Part of the justification, in the eyes of parliament, was the traditional duty of the king to go in person to the defence of the realm. Both king and subjects had mutual responsibilities in time of emergency — the one to lead, the other to support. This royal obligation formed part of the pronouncement explaining the reasons for the summons of the parliament and the demand for taxation on several occasions throughout the period. In 1384 and again in 1385 the king promised *personaliter se transferre*. In 1386 the king *avoit pris purpos de passer la Meer en propre persone ove son Roiale poair a grever et guerroyer ses Einemys es parties de dela*; while in 1395 parliament was called to consider the *Passage du Roi vers Irland*. Such journeys might be for waging war or for making peace. Thus the commons in making grants specified on occasion that these were made on condition that the king went in person abroad. In January 1404 the king urged that he had frequently put himself in peril on behalf of the nation, and again in 1407, *en toutz cases de necessitee il voet travailler en sa propre persone*.¹⁵ It was this royal

outlay of the sovereign was the point which ... formed the subject of national outcry and discontent."

¹³ E. F. Jacob, *Fifteenth Century* (Oxford, 1961), 77-8; G. L. Harriss, "Aids, Loans and Benevolences," *Historical Journal*, 6 (1963), 1-19. Cf. *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 184 (1384): *quilibet de eodem Regno animam tenetur assumere ferventiorum eidem Domino Regi in tanta Regni et Reipublice Necessitate, cum corpore et bonis libentius adjuvare cum meliorem sibi nequeat impendere responsuram*. Refusal could only be on the grounds that it would destroy the subjects' estate by adding to extreme poverty; see Harriss, *Historical Journal*, 6 (1963), 17. Cf. *Rot. Parl.*, 2, 364 (1377).

¹⁴ G. L. Harriss, "Parliamentary Taxation and the Origins of Appropriation of Supply in England, 1207-1340," *Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin pour l'Histoire comparative des Institutions*, vol. 24 (1966), 165-179.

¹⁵ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 184, 203, 215, 285-6, 329, 454, 608.

responsibility which gave the commons a voice in detailed arrangements for the defence of the realm.

Once however the emergency had been established and the royal responsibility agreed, the aim of the commons was to ensure that the aid granted was not appropriated to other uses. The constant emphasis both in and out of parliament throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that the king was "to live of his own"¹⁶ was more than a complaint against frequent taxes; it was also a demand that parliamentary taxes should not be diverted from their primary purpose, the extraordinary needs of the realm, mainly war and defence.¹⁷ Ordinary revenue was to be devoted to the ordinary costs of the royal government and household; any taxes granted by the laity in parliament or the clergy in convocation were to be devoted to their special purposes. On occasion it could be agreed that the king might need an occasional aid to supplement his ordinary revenue; in 1390, one quarter of the parliamentary wool customs was apparently appropriated to the current needs of the king, while the rest was devoted to the war.¹⁸ Nevertheless the climate of opinion was firmly that taxes in parliament were exceptional grants for exceptional purposes and were to be used for such purposes alone. Throughout these two centuries, parliament was very insistent that taxes which they granted should be used only to meet the emergency for which they had been granted: "*Et si les Guerres* (said the commons in 1373) *cessont en le second an, touz les Grauntz et Charges avant nomez soient annullez.*"¹⁹

The consistent efforts of parliament to prevent misappropriation of supplies must be distinguished from the question of redress of grievances

¹⁶ As early as 1332, *Rot. Parl.*, 2, 66; cf. G. L. Harriss, "The Commons Petitions of 1340," *English Historical Review*, 78 (1963), 647.

¹⁷ Cf., e.g., Hoccleve, *Regement of Princes* (Early English Text Soc., 72, 1897), 159:

Naght speke I ageyn eides uttirly,
In sum cas they ben good and necessarie;
But whan they goon to custumablely,
The peple it makith for to curse and warie:
And if they ben despended in contrarie
Of that they graunted of the peple were,
The more grucchen they the cost to bere.

Rot. Parl., 3, 419, speaks of the king living of his own and not taxing his people; this is part of the process of deposition against Richard II.

¹⁸ The evidence for this comes from Walsingham (*Hist. Angl.*, 2, 196), who conflates the two parliaments of this year. There is no sign in *Rot. Parl.*, 2, 262-3, 279.

¹⁹ *Rot. Parl.*, 2, 317; cf. also *ibid.*, 2, 128, 133 (1340-1), 252: *que les Deniers sourdantz de meisme le Subside soient sauvement gardez pur la dite Guerre, sanz ceo qils soient mys en autre oepe* (1353), 364 (1377); 3, 7 (1377), 56 (1379), 151 (1383), 262-3 (Jan. 1390).

before grants were made. In this, parliament was attempting to use its powers of consent to taxation as a weapon to gain new ground; and during the early years of the fifteenth century, no advance was made in this respect. In 1401, the king sharply threw out a demand for redress before supplies,²⁰ and nothing further was heard of it for the rest of the reign. Nor is the matter clarified by the use of the term "appropriation of supplies."²¹ The commons were rarely able to make grants successfully with conditions attached to them, unless the conditions were offered first by the king.²² Rather they were seeking some assurances that the taxes to which they assented would be expended on the objects for which they had been requested. Their aim was to prevent misappropriation rather than to make conditions.

This struggle was not of course unique to England; it was also a feature of contemporary French politics.²³ Nor as we have seen was it a new phenomenon in English politics at the beginning of the fifteenth century. Indeed, from 1340 onwards, the clamour of the commons against misappropriation had grown increasingly insistent. The minority of Richard II was a time of exceptional parliamentary activity.²⁴ But the peace policy of Richard II resulted in a greater urgency in the commons' demands that parliamentary taxes were granted for extraordinary purposes only. By means of a series of truces, England was at peace with France from 1389 until 1415;²⁵ nevertheless the king's demands for taxation for the defence of

²⁰ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 458. The judges in 1387 condemned redress of grievances, *ibid.*, 3, 233. For earlier examples, see *ibid.*, 1, 443-5 (1309); 2, 201 (1348), etc.

²¹ Dr. Harriss, *op. cit.* in note 14, retains the term "appropriation," but qualifies it by speaking of "appropriation not on the initiative of the estates who granted the aid, but by the crown as an essential part of its justification of the necessity," p. 172. Since this is not how the term is generally understood, I prefer to abandon it altogether. I regret that I was unable to see Dr. Harriss' valuable paper until this article was completed.

²² *Rot. Parl.*, 2, 131, 133-4; 3, 151, 279; 4, 276; cf. 301. The case of 1348 (*ibid.*, 2, 148) when the commons attached the condition (among others) that the king should either win the war or make peace is one exception; it amounts to a plea to end taxation by spending the grants effectively.

²³ Cf. P. S. Lewis, "France in the Fifteenth Century," *Europe in the Late Middle Ages*, ed. J. R. Hale, J. R. L. Highfield and B. Smalley (London, 1965), 281-2. The discussion in D. Hay, *Europe in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries* (London, 1966), 100-111, 159-162, is valuable. See E. Perroy, *Hundred Years War* (London, 1951), 220-4, 232-3, etc.

²⁴ See, e.g. Stubbs, *Constit. Hist.*, 2, 596; T. F. Tout, *Chapters in English Administrative History* (Manchester, 1920-33), 3, 333-394. Some of the evidence lies off the parliament roll: thus in 1384 the commons made the grant conditional upon a personal royal campaign to France, *Polychronicon Ranulphi Higden* (Rolls Series, London, 1886), 9, 52; cf. *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 185.

²⁵ There was of course persistent fighting, especially in the reign of Henry, e.g. in Gascony from 1405-7, and more generally, 1411-12, caused by constant breaches of the truce. See Perroy, *op. cit.*, 217-8, 230-1.

the realm and for its common profit persisted. The result was that these years of Anglo-French rapprochement saw a critical stage in the relations between king and commons.

The years 1389-97 have traditionally been regarded as a period of harmony between king and parliament.²⁶ But on closer examination it is clear that relations were not always peaceful. In March 1390, the commons granted the customs for the defence of the realm merely for the following nine months; their demand *que un Tresorer soit ordeine en cest present Parlement pur garder les ditz Subsidies a loeps de Guerres et qils ne soient despenduz mes tant soulement en la Defense du Roialme* must be read in the light of the changes in the existing officers which took place at this time rather than as a demand for a special appointment. More important was the commons' demand *que y soit un Contrerollour de contreroller les ditz Despenses, come ils voillent respondre a proschein Parlement*.²⁷ Later in the same year parliament was called to renew the customs and to make a grant in case the negotiations with Scotland and France failed. Only the customs were renewed (for three years), *en eide de Defense et Salvation du Roialme... sanz estre despenduz en autre condition*. A proviso was attached that the Staple was to be removed to England by 9 January 1391 and was to be kept there during the three years; if not, *qadonques mesmes les Subsidies cessent... sanz james delors estre levez*. In November 1391, when one and a half lay subsidies were granted, further conditions were attached: in reply to the king's assurances of good government, one half subsidy was granted *pur honorer son Estat et viage en sa propre persone en les parties de France pur les Trewees ou final Pees affermer...*; if the king did not go in person, the subsidy *demurgent en la garde de Tresorer dengleterre*. The whole subsidy was then granted *pur son Roial Viage*, any surplus to be used for the defence of the realm, *solonc les hautes sens et discretion de Roi... et des Seignurs de son Counseill sanz estre despenduz en autre oepe*. If the king did not go, or if peace or a truce was concluded, it was not to be levied; the treasurer of England was to be charged in parliament by the king himself that the whole grant was not to be spent in any other way at all, *come il vorra respondre a la Commune de Roialme de Empeschement de ceo en proschein Parlement. Et que ce soit entre de recorde en Roule de Parlement*. In January 1393, in support of a plea for money, whether the land had war, truce or peace, the king promised further good government so as to discharge the commons

²⁶ Stubbs, *op. cit.*, 2, 506-13; Tout, *op. cit.*, 3, 473-9; A. Steel, *Richard II* (Cambridge, 1948), 180-216.

²⁷ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 262-3; Tout, *op. cit.*, 3, 460; *Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1391-6*, 9. Cf. note 18 above. The commons were clearly aware on this occasion that such a short-term grant would necessitate another summons of parliament. For special war treasurers in 1385, see *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 204, apparently connected with Gaunt's Spanish journey.

from impositions or tallages in time to come; therefore *entrelessantz toutes maneres conditions*, the commons granted the customs for a further three years, provided that part of the tunnage and poundage *soit rebatuz* if a truce or peace were made and the king did not go overseas or to Scotland in person. Half a lay subsidy was granted for defence *et pur les Coustages et Charges du Roi et du Roialme et pur honorer la persone du Roi*. If the king proposed firmly to go to Ireland *pur y guerrier et conquerre ses Enemys*, a further half subsidy was to become due; but if the king did not go, then this half was to remain with the treasurer of England, to be answered for by him as he was charged in parliament. Finally, if open war broke out with France and the king led an expedition to France or Scotland, then that subsidy in the treasury might be used together with a third half subsidy to be raised; but if the king did not go in person, then the third half subsidy was not to be levied. All these conditions were to be enrolled on the parliament roll. In January 1394, the increased rates of tunnage and poundage were confirmed, on condition that if peace were made, the increases were to be removed within fifteen days. The commons further agreed that the last of the half subsidies agreed in the previous year *soit mys en disposition de... Roi et de son Conseill pur estre despenduz sur les busoigns du Roialme, soit il Pees, Trieves ou Guerre*. In January 1395, two half subsidies were granted for the Irish expedition, with safeguards against future exactions for Irish affairs; this was not to become a precedent. In January 1397, after the humiliation of the commons in the Haxey affair, the wool customs were renewed for a further five years and the tunnage and poundage for three years subject to the condition that they were not to be levied thereafter without the authority of parliament.²⁸

This activity of the commons cannot be regarded as merely formal, an appeasement by the commons of their constituents; the insistence on rendering account in the next parliament, although in fact never apparently enforced, is evidence that the commons regarded that body as the guardian of the interests of the people. Thus all this activity throws into greater relief the parliamentary grant made to Richard II at Shrewsbury early in 1398—the customs for life and one and a half lay subsidies, without any conditions whatsoever.²⁹ To obtain these favourable terms, the king had to intimidate parliament. The political importance of the commons is evidenced by Richard II's efforts to overwhelm them in 1397-8. The political stature of the commons was increasing.

It is with this background that the story of the struggles of Henry IV

²⁸ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 279, 285-6, 301-2, 314, 330, 340.

²⁹ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 368-9.

and his parliaments becomes intelligible. The king's need for money was very great. Despite the technical peace, the reign was constantly disturbed by revolts and uprisings, by Scottish hostilities, as well as by the running sore of the Welsh rebellion. Henry faced not merely the normal burdens of government at a time of falling revenue but considerably increased demands for ready money to pay for the involuntary campaigns of the first nine years of the reign. And probably nearly as much as one half of the heavy costs of Henry's campaigns was not incurred in war against foreign enemies. Thus continually the king had to justify to parliament his appeal for aid in terms which were at best marginal, at worst no longer customary. It is somewhat ironical that Henry was too uncertain of his position to ask parliament for aid for the only "foreign" war which he waged in person, against Scotland in 1400.³⁰ The demands presented to parliament by the king's servants in their opening speeches made great play of all sorts of military activities as justifying the summons of parliament and the granting of extraordinary aids. Herein lay the causes of the clash — the king's recurrent needs no longer clearly fell into the category of "extraordinary" expenditure which had been worked out in the fourteenth century as justifying such taxes. Such taxes were being demanded more and more regularly. Nor were the commons satisfied that the taxes, once granted, were being used for the purposes for which they were given. The commons were in fact generous but at the same time they were deeply disturbed at what they considered was misappropriation of the supplies which they voted.

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The evidence as to how in fact parliamentary taxes were being used during the early part of the reign is not easily available. There are some formal allocations of revenues for specific purposes. The customs, for instance, were more generally than not assigned for military purposes — to the Percies for the Marches of Scotland, or to Calais.³¹ Nevertheless on occasion they continued to be used for annuities not associated with military ends, and the commons struggled to insist that these signs of royal favour which presumed on future parliamentary grants should be withdrawn; the practice however persisted throughout the reign.³² The customs

³⁰ *P.O.P.C.*, 1, 104.

³¹ *Cal[endar of] Close Rolls, 1402-5*, 107; "Calais sous les Anglais," J. L. Kirby, *Revue du Nord*, 37 (1955).

³² *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 457; *Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1401-5*, 383; *ibid.*, 1405-9, 411, 453-4, etc.; PRO, Customs Accounts, E122/8/10, etc.

however lay on the periphery of the struggle; at the centre was the lay subsidy of the tenth (for towns and ancient royal demesne) and fifteenth (for rural England) which was the normal form of parliamentary subsidy demanded and granted.

An analysis of the exchequer assignments made on the lay subsidy granted by the parliament of September 1402 is instructive. The grant was made on 25 November 1402, of one tenth and fifteenth to be collected in three instalments, one half on 2 February 1403, a quarter on 24 June 1403 and the final quarter on 11 November 1404. The collectors were appointed on 5 December 1402. The first assignments on the first half were made on 7 December, while the first cash from this half was recorded on 15 January.³³ Guy Mone, bishop of St. Davids, was treasurer at the time of the grant, and the assignments made on the lay subsidy during his tenure of office (i.e. up to 9 September 1403) were as follows:³⁴

First half of tenth

Military: (Thomas of Lancaster, George Dunbar earl of March, Sir Robert Umfraville, the earl of Westmorland and the duke of York for Gascony	£1196.13.9.
Household departments (mainly queen, £180)	268. 8.1.
Fees and annuities (especially the justices)	207. 7.8.
Repayment of loan (probably military)	100. 0.0.

Second half, first payment: due 24 June; first assignment 1 March; no cash recorded.³⁵

Military (the earl of Westmorland, duke of York for Gascony)	320. 0. 0.
Embassies	469. 5.0.
Household departments (mainly wardrobe)	1592.14.0.
Queen	179. 0.0.

³³ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 492-3; *Cal[endar of] Fine Rolls, 1399-1405*, 186-191; PRO, E401/627. An earlier assignment, under 13 November, on the first payment of the second half of the lay subsidy, *anno quarto*, is clearly a later insertion over an erasure; the grant had not been made by this date. The roll is difficult to interpret, as almost every entry has *sol'*, in addition to those with the more usual assignment marginals. Nor is the contemporary issue roll much help; for most of this term, the phrase *per assignacionem* is dropped in favour of a statement of the source of the payment. We still do not know a great deal about the exchequer in the later middle ages, but it is clear that the marginals on the receipt rolls are often unreliable. See below, note 37.

³⁴ Drawn from PRO E401/627, 630, 631. The receipt roll for the Easter 1402 term (E401/630) is not complete.

³⁵ The receipt roll ends on 30 May; some cash receipts may have been made after that date.

Second half, second payment: due 11 November; first assignment 21 May; first cash recorded, 3 October.³⁶

Creditor of household	105. 3. 10
Justice's fee	40. 0. 0.

Under William lord Roos, treasurer from 9 September 1403, assignments on the second payment of the second half ran as follows:

Military (earls of Westmorland and Rutland, Thomas of Lancaster, John of Lancaster)	2343. 8. 6.
Loans repaid	90.14. 8.
Household departments	899. 7. 9.
Queen	896.15.1½.
Fees and annuities	322.15. 4.

The figures are somewhat difficult to interpret.³⁷ For instance some of the sums credited to William Loveney, keeper of the great wardrobe, were for debts within the offices of armourer and pavilioner and thus may be regarded as military expenditure. Nevertheless, it is still clear that a considerable portion of the lay subsidy was being expended by means of assignments on what might be classed "ordinary" costs of government. Of the cash payments, which formed the bulk of the recorded receipts from this lay subsidy, we can say nothing. Although there is some evidence that the exchequer kept cash funds appropriated to specific purposes,³⁸ regular notes to this effect are absent.

This is not an isolated case. The wardrobe drew assignments on the lay subsidy in the Easter term 1401 amounting to £1238.8.11. Although this was only a small part of the total assignments received by the wardrobe in this term (£6131.9.4.), it was still clearly a large sum.³⁹ Throughout

³⁶ It was clearly being collected early, for it was not due until Martinmas (11 Nov.). Attempts to prevent early collection were made in 1410, *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 635.

³⁷ Some of the entries on E401/627, amounting to £698, are marked with the words *sol* and *Elmeton*. Although identical in form to assignment marginals on this roll, their true nature is revealed by the words later on the roll: *In manibus Elmeton* (an exchequer clerk).

A comparison with Henry V's first lay subsidy is instructive. Granted on 9 June 1413, *Rot. Parl.*, 4, 6, specifically for defence, collectors for it were appointed on 5 July, *Cal. Fine Rolls*, 1413-22, 25-9, and payments were due to commence on 11 Nov. On 14 and 23 November, the whole of the receipts consisted of cash from the lay subsidy, no other business being recorded. Large cash receipts were recorded also on 9 December and thereafter the lay subsidy featured in the normal way among other receipts. Virtually no assignments are recorded on these rolls, and none at all on the lay subsidy, PRO, E401/658, 660. This may represent increased exchequer efficiency.

³⁸ Cf. PRO, E403/567, 13 July, payments by Henry Somer, an exchequer official from forfeited goods; *ibid.*, 569, 4 and 13 Dec., temporalities of vacant sees administered by Henry Hareburgh; etc. The demand for audit of accounts clearly implies separate funds in the exchequer.

³⁹ PRO, E401/622; there is no contemporary issue roll to assess wardrobe receipts in cash.

the whole reign, the wool customs and tunnage and poundage provided the bulk of the exchequer assignments to the household; indeed, in 1401 the latter customs were explicitly reserved for the household.⁴⁰ After 1403 the queen regularly drew part of her dower of 10,000 marks from exchequer assignments, including the lay subsidy; it may well have been the size of the queen's liveries from the lay subsidy which caused a good deal of the strong feeling among the commons in the parliament of January 1404.⁴¹ Until this parliament it would seem that Henry IV, in accordance with long established precedents, regarded every source of revenue as available for his government. Very heavy assignments in favour of the wardrobe were drawn, for instance, from the clerical tenths in the years 1401 and 1402-4, a total of over £3000 in the single term, Michaelmas 1403-4. It has been suggested, with regard to his use of seals, that Henry IV ruled his kingdom much as a magnate ruled his estates;⁴² the same may have been true in the early stages of the reign with regard to the finances of the realm. In January 1404, he pleaded that he needed parliamentary taxes as he did not wish to lose his royal estates. It is clear from the record of this same parliament that the king regarded *les... Charges supporter pur lostell du Roy et autrement* as well as the costs of the defence of the realm and the safety of the sea as adequate grounds for asking the commons for a parliamentary subsidy.⁴³ And in 1406, in a remarkable programme which was presented to parliament on his behalf, he requested for his own necessities an extra wool custom, a cloth subsidy and £5000 p.a. from the existing wool customs and tunnage and poundage which had been granted previously for the wars, notwithstanding any conditions attached to the subsidy at the time of its grant; any surplus was to be used for the war.⁴⁴ Henry IV's view of parliamentary taxation or of the "necessity" which justified it does not seem to have been the same as that of the commons.

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The royal household lay at the heart of the struggle. It was the largest non-military spending department in the government. The problem under Henry IV was not one of the king seeking extra funds in order to develop

⁴⁰ *Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1399-1401*, 489-90. Sources of assignments to the wardrobe are listed in a table below.

⁴¹ Cf. Fraser in *B.I.H.R.*, 34 (1961). Much of the attack was directed against the queen's household.

⁴² A. L. Brown, "Authorization of Letters under the Great Seal," *B.I.H.R.*, 37 (1964), 154.

⁴³ *Eul.*, 3, 399; *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 523.

⁴⁴ *P.O.P.C.*, 1, 283-6.

his household into a major agency of administration as in the previous century; the problem was a more general one, of how to pay for a costly court at a time of other heavy expenditure, dwindling revenue and financial dislocation. By the end of the fourteenth century, even without the additional problems of Henry IV's reign, the ordinary and casual revenues no longer sufficed to meet the day to day needs of government. The problem of meeting the costs of the household thus became one of the use of parliamentary taxation.

The costs of the royal household from 1396 to 1406 ran at a very high level — outrageously high for a time of peace according to contemporary political opinion.⁴⁵ For the last ten years of Richard II's reign, the three wardrobes alone averaged over £40,000 p.a., and the chamber received an average of more than £6000 p. a. from the exchequer. During the last three years of the reign, the total (including the chamber) rose to over £56,000 p.a.⁴⁶ During Henry's first eighteen months, the three wardrobes spent at the rate of £55,000 p.a. and the chamber received from the exchequer alone over £6,000 as well as large sums from other sources.⁴⁷ The average expenses of the three wardrobes from 1399 to 1406 was only just under £40,000 p.a., despite severe and permanent reductions in the great wardrobe's expenses from 1404.⁴⁸ Chamber receipts from the exchequer for this period averaged at least £3,400 p.a. In addition to this, there were the satellite royal households, the costs of the return of queen Isabella to France, the marriages of the king's daughters Blanche and Philippa, together with their households, the four royal sons each with their own military

⁴⁵ Tout, *op. cit.*, 4, 46. Cf. Haxey's petition, 1397, *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 339. The use of the term "outrageous" at this time is interesting, as Jacob, *Fifteenth Century*, 76, has noted. In 1399, outrageous royal grants were to be restrained; in January 1404, the costs of government were *molit outrageouses*; in October 1404, royal grants were once more outrageous, while in 1406 the king was to modify his household so as to avoid outrageous and excessive expenses in it, *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 433, 523, 548, 579. The phrase, "outrageous and excessive expenses," found its way into special pardons given to household departmental officers in May 1402 to excuse their accounts; it no doubt originated in their petitions for pardon, PRO, E159/178, *Brevia directa baronibus*, Pasche m. 16, 17d, 13d, 12d; Trinity m. 3, etc. It would seem to have been used even in the exchequer: in 1400 Norbury wrote of outrageous charges on the revenue, and Allertorpe wrote much the same to the king in 1401/2 (not 1410), D. M. Legge (ed.), *Anglo-Norman Letters and Petitions* (Anglo-Norman Text Soc., 1941), 396, 418. For a later example in a similar context, cf. Hoccleve, *Minor Poems* (Early English Text Soc., 61, 1892), 62. In 1380, the parliament had complained of outrageous costs of government, and in 1381 of outrageous royal grants, a further indication that the precedents of these years were in mind in the parliaments of 1404-6, *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 89, 100.

⁴⁶ Figures derived from Tout, *op. cit.*, 6, 98-101, 108-9; 4, 322-4, and PRO, E 364/30H, 32H.

⁴⁷ PRO, E361/7, rot. 1-1d; E361/5, rot. 9; E364/34H; E403/564, 567, 569.

⁴⁸ Derived from enrolled accounts, PRO, E361/7; E361/5-6; E364/34H, 35G, 36G, 40A, 43F.

and domestic establishment, and from 1403 the queen's separate household with her large endowment.⁴⁹ The total costs of the private sector of government expenditure under Henry IV were very high indeed. It is unlikely that his court reflected adequately the magnificence which alone would justify such expenditure except in time of war.⁵⁰

The expenditure could however be justified in terms of military activity. Some of Richard II's heavy costs during his last ten years were due to the Irish expeditions.⁵¹ But under Henry IV there are few signs that the king's household was used to finance military campaigns. It paid for the invasion force of 1399: but although it was extensively engaged in the Scottish campaign of 1400, payments were made by John Curson, treasurer for war.⁵² Thereafter there are no signs of *vadia guerre* in the wardrobe accounts until 1405 when the interrupted Welsh campaign and the journey to the north to suppress the Scrope rebellion were largely financed through the wardrobe. Henry's household was not in general the military agency it had been earlier and was to become later under his son.⁵³

This is seen clearly by Henry's highest known *dieta* figures in 1402-3. This was one of the most hectic years of the whole reign, culminating in Hotspur's revolt in July. We are fortunate in possessing the *particule compoti* for this year to show that these heavy expenses were incurred more in peaceful pursuits than in the projected Scottish and actual Shrewsbury and Welsh campaigns.⁵⁴ The daily average for the whole year was just over £61. During the six weeks of the parliament, October-November 1402, diet ran at £60; in the three weeks of the Shrewsbury campaign, it was at £50. Even during the journey north to deal with Northumberland and then back to Wales (27 July-30 September 1403), the average rose only to £55.4.⁵⁵

⁴⁹ *Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1401-5*, 213; PRO, E101/406/10; *Archaeologia*, 67 (1915-16), 163-188. The total costs for the return of Isabella were well over £10,000, *P.O.P.C.*, 1, 154; PRO, E364/36E; PRO, E403/564-571.

⁵⁰ There were a few complaints of lack of worthiness in the royal household, e.g. *Eul.*, 3, 397; *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 577.

⁵¹ Tout, *op. cit.*, 3, 486-95; 4, 222-3. But Richard's highest costs came in 1396-7, between the two royal expeditions.

⁵² PRO, KR, Mem. Rolls, E159/179, Brevia directa baronibus, Trinity m. 8; E403/564, 20 March; E101/42/28; 43/3; E404/16/354.

⁵³ PRO, E159/182, Brevia directa baronibus, Mich. m. 1d; E361/7, rot. 10-15d; Tout, *op. cit.*, 4, 152, 225.

⁵⁴ PRO, E101/404/21. For background, see Bean, *History*, 44, 221-7; J. H. Wylie, *Henry IV* (London, 1884-98), 1, 337-78; *P.O.P.C.*, 1, 206-7. Diet is calculated consumption, not actual costs; hence credit transactions, which inevitably accompanied a campaign, would not account for lower figures.

⁵⁵ This figure would give an annual total of just £20,000, lower than under Henry's predecessor. Richard II's diet in 1396-7 was £32,300 p.a.; the average for 1395-9 was £27,480, cf. Tout, *op. cit.*, 6, 98-101.

This increase reflects not so much the acquisition of additional troops but the catching up of the staffs of various household departments with the energetic king. It was not the military contingent which caused the high costs in the household but the heavy expenses incurred by the king's marriage and the coronation of his new queen, together with the burden of new and extra household staff. February alone (in which both major events fell) had a daily average of £126; and the weeks of March and April (omitting the feast of St. George) show an average of £57.5 against an average of £49.2 in January before the marriage. The differences are not sufficient to demonstrate more than the negative point, that the great cost of diet in 1402-3 was not caused by the increased military activity of the year.

Thus the commons saw the lay subsidy being used largely to support a non-military household⁵⁶ while other arrangements were made to support the prince of Wales in the Welsh war, Thomas of Lancaster in Ireland, John of Lancaster in the north and other forces in other spheres of military activity.⁵⁷ The costs of the king's household remained high after 1399, too high for political safety in view of the strong complaints made against the excessive costs of Richard II's household. For Richard's usurper not to have reduced household costs after 1399 was neither economically nor politically wise; for him to have maintained them and to have reduced the military activity of the household was disastrous. Under Henry IV, the complaints against the king's household were not directed so much against the use of the household members, as in the previous reign, as against its outrageous costs. To the commons it must have seemed that the king was regarding the parliamentary taxation as a regular source of income rather than an exceptional grant for exceptional circumstances.

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There is of course no hint of this in the speeches which introduced the commons of each parliament to the king's great needs. In every case throughout the reign, the emphasis lay on the military aspects rather than on the other causes of royal poverty. In 1401, the necessity was caused by the great costs and expenses at the king's coming into the realm, the Scottish expedition and the Welsh revolt, by the costs of the return of queen Isabella

⁵⁶ This is not to say that the personnel of Henry's household was less military, only that it was not used as an institution to finance and organise campaigns on the same scale as before 1399.

⁵⁷ *Report on the Dignity of a Peer*, 5, 126, 128; *Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1399-1401*, 114, 507; *ibid.*, 1401-5, 212, 216; *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 426-8, 569; *P.O.P.C.*, 1, 154, 176-8, 313-8; *Ann.* 361; PRO, E404/18/561; E403/571, 9 Dec.; *Rotuli Scotie* (London, Record Commission, 1814-9), 2, 164.

and the revived threat to Guienne, as well as the Irish war; the many other great charges which had to be sustained for the defence of the king and his realm will be *declarez plus en especial as toutz lestates du Roialme quant il bosoignera*. Thereafter the list of military expenses becomes the recurrent theme — Scotland, Wales, Ireland and France (Calais and Guienne), as well as the sea. In January 1404, the Shrewsbury rebellion was added to the list; in October 1404, relations with Brittany were also included.⁵⁸ The king's need for money was created by the complicated military situation of these years, despite the technical peace, according to the royal view presented to parliament.

But the royal demand for money was complicated by the very fact of continuing truces, and this also is reflected in the pronunciations to parliament during the period. In the parliaments between 1384 and 1390, the government openly asked for an aid; after outlining the major costs of the war, it is stated *que le Roi ne poet en null manere porter les Coustages et Charges necessairs celle partie, come bien est conuz, sanz eide de ses Seignurs et Communes* (1389 and 1390); or *quod aliquod Subsidium dicto Domino Regi pro Guerra et Defensione huiusmodi concedi necessario oportebit* (1385); *y faut de necessite que ascun sufficante Aide soit ordeine et grante a cest Parlement pur defense et salvacion du Roialme encontre les Enemys...* (1386). But the request to the commons in the parliaments between 1391 and January 1397 was couched in different terms; parliament is to advise or ordain *coment et de quoy la dite Guerre* (if it arise) *purra estre maintenuz a meindre charge du poeple* (1391). The same phrase is used in 1393 and in 1397, while in 1394 it is again requested that parliament should consider *coment les Eides et Charges busoignables celle partie* (i.e. defence *pur les Extremitées du Roialme*) *purront meutz estre eu et supportez a greindre eide et profit du Roy et du Roialme et meyndre charge du poeple*. In 1395 it is asserted that *toutz ses liges* owe aid to their king *nient seulement de bouche ne de lange mais en eovre et en veritee et de leur biens et substance*, the nearest to a demand for taxation that the pronunciation approached.⁵⁹

The change was largely brought about by the peace negotiations and the successive truces with France from 1389. And the same tone persisted throughout the parliaments of Henry IV. No aid was demanded in 1399, but in 1401 the king was forced to call a parliament to relieve his financial necessities. Even then, *il nest pas lentention ne volonte du Roy de charger son poeple autrement que la besoigne et la necessite requiergent*, and parliament was asked *ent facent tielx aide, ordenance et purveance que purroit estre sufficientz pur la*

⁵⁸ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 454, 484, 522, 545.

⁵⁹ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 184, 203, 215, 257, 277, 284, 300, 309, 329, 337. The parliament of September 1388 is not recorded *ibid.* For the parliament of February 1388, cf. 228, and A. Rogers, "Parliamentary Appeals of Treason in the Reign of Richard II," *American Journal of Legal History*, 8 (1964), 101-8.

salvation de mesme nostre Seignur le Roy de et tout son Roialme. Again in 1402, the purpose of parliament was that the king should *avoir lour bon aide, conseil et advis celle partie*. In 1404, parliament was twice asked to ordain for good government and defence, and in 1406, the king asked for advice and *bone et sage conseil*; he will then *bon ordre et communication se preigne*, [and] *la meillour et plus brief appointment se prendra es choses que sont necessairement a purvoire*. In 1407, the approach was more direct: the various spheres of war *embosoignent des biens, et sur ce [il] leur pria de eux prendre le plus pres pur luy aider a cest foitz*. In 1410, the king once more asked for advice, but in 1411, his demand was for *cordiall relevation du Roy en son necessitee et en cas nient purveu discrete et hastif Provision*.⁶⁰

It would thus seem that in time of peace, even when that peace was very disturbed, the king's demands for aid were restricted to outlining his extreme necessities and asking parliament for advice and ordinance. It was of course clearly understood that parliament was called to extend the grant of the customs and to grant a lay subsidy. But the form in which the demand was presented was clearly important.

Nor could the commons in fact deny the need which faced Henry IV. Throughout the reign, only one challenge to the king's plea of necessity seems to have been made. There was no denying that the defence of the realm was in a parlous state. But when in November 1407 the commons rehearsed the many great mischiefs which had come to the realm, especially the failure to defend the coasts and to suppress the Welsh revolt, they avowed that they were not in any way obliged to sustain such wars. The main responsibility ought to fall on those magnates who had lands in the disturbed areas. These should reside on their estates and resist the rebels; and the commons petitioned that the king should discharge them from any obligation in this respect. The royal reply was merely to take note of the petition.⁶¹ But apart from this hesitation over whether the defence of the realm included what could be regarded as the suppression of an internal revolt and border duties, the commons were obliged to agree to the king's necessity and make the grants.

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The activities of the commons throughout the reign were thus directed to the problem of making sure that parliamentary taxes were in fact used solely for the purposes for which they had been granted. Nevertheless

⁶⁰ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 415, 454, 485, 522, 545, 567, 608, 622, 647. I suggest *aide* in 1402 has not the specific sense of a money grant.

⁶¹ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 610.

parliament was very hesitant to take action. The house of commons was the main outlet for criticism; the council was the main agency for remedy. It is quite clear that the commons pinned their hopes on a reformed council. Thus in 1401, 1404, twice in 1406 and again in 1410, new nominated councils were demanded, councils which would ordain remedy on behalf of the whole realm.⁶² However, there were certain actions which the commons could take to try to prevent misappropriation, and throughout the parliaments of the reign most of these were in fact attempted.

The first of these processes was the stipulation of the purpose of the grant. In 1401, the grant was *pur Defens et bone Governance de votre dite Roialme*, but thereafter the commons reserved parliamentary taxes solely for defence.⁶³ From 1402, it became customary to add to the record of the grant a proviso that the grant was not to be taken as a precedent for levying any tax for the wars in Scotland, Wales, Calais, Guienne or Ireland, nor for the safety of the sea, save by the will of the lords and commons, and by a new grant made in full parliament. In January 1404, the tax was granted specifically *pur les Guerres et pur la Defense du Roialme*.⁶⁴ In October 1404 when a land subsidy was granted, the customs renewed and a double tenth and fifteenth assented to, they were explicitly stated to be for the defence of the realm, and it was reiterated that they were granted on condition that all of these be expended on defence. Once again the grant was not to be a precedent for taking an aid for any of these causes save by the will of the lords and commons, and by a new grant made in full parliament. In the parliament of 1406, in the interim grant made in June, it was demanded that the subsidy granted at Coventry two years earlier should be used solely for the defence of the realm; while the final grant made in December was to be spent for the defence of the realm and the safe-guard of the sea and not for any other purpose. In 1407, after the controversy over the procedure of making parliamentary grants, the commons granted one and a half lay subsidies together with the customs; the first drafts on these were to be for the defence of the sea. In 1410, three-quarters of the wool customs were assigned solely to Calais, while the lay subsidy and half lay subsidy granted together with the customs and subsidies were all specifically for the defence of the realm. The same was true of the wool customs and tunnage and poundage granted in 1411, although the land tax granted in this parliament was stated to be entirely at the king's

⁶² *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 530 (1404); 572-3, 585 (1406); 632 (1410); for 1401, see A. L. Brown, *English Historical Review*, 79, 5. Cf. *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 221 for 1386, and *ibid.*, 609, "the commons, having confidence in the great sense and discretion of the lords of the council,..."

⁶³ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 455. The same phrase is used in June 1406, *ibid.*, 578.

⁶⁴ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 493, 529, 547. A similar proviso was attached in 1395 with regard to Ireland, another in 1397 for the life grant of the customs, *ibid.*, 330, 492.

free disposal.⁶⁵ On occasion the commons went further than merely specifying the purpose of the tax. In October 1404, the grant was to be voided if the king and council had not made provision for the safeguard of the sea, Guienne, north and south Wales, the Scottish Marches and generally for the defence of the realm by early the following year. In June 1406 the interim grant was to be voided if the lords of the council were dismissed, and in December the commons are alleged to have demanded a pledge that the council would refund the tax of it should be misspent.⁶⁶ This latter demand was apparently rejected; and although the former condition was accepted, it could hardly have been effective, for there was no machinery to enforce it.

At the same time, the commons seem to have realised that some extraordinary methods must be used to reduce the king's burden of indebtedness and thus to enable him to resume more normal dealings with his subjects. Up to 1406, in the allocations made for the household, no extraordinary sources were used. But in January 1404, the king had been granted £12,000 from the land subsidy, to be received from the war treasurers.⁶⁷ In December 1406, the commons gave to the king £6,000 from the customs *pur estre disposez a vos comandement et pleisir*. In 1410, a sum of 20,000 marks drawn from the lay subsidy, the tunnage and poundage and the unassigned quarter of the customs and spread over two years was assigned to the king *a prendre et rescuever as termes suisditz pur ent disposer et faire a votre plesir*. These grants were carefully earmarked, mention of them being made both in the warrants for issue and on the issue rolls.⁶⁸

The commons did however take some steps to see how the taxes had been expended. The demand for audit of accounts made in 1341 and 1379 was now renewed, but it was clearly regarded as an innovation: kings are not wont to render account, it was alleged in 1406. The subject was first raised in January 1404. At Gloucester in 1407 the council offered the commons a view of the audited accounts of the last lay subsidy, but this was stated to be a matter of grace; the struggle in the 1406 parliament over auditing the accounts of the specially appointed war treasurers, had shown how tenuous was the commons' claim, despite the fact that these war treasurers had been appointed specifically on the condition that they would render account in the next parliament.⁶⁹

⁶⁵ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 546-7, 568, 578, 612, 627, 635, 648-9.

⁶⁶ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 546-7; *St. Albans' Chronicle, 1406-20*, ed. V. H. Galbraith (Oxford, 1937), 2-3.

⁶⁷ *Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1399-1401*, 245, 475, 504; *ibid.*, 1401-5, 205, 240, 396; *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 528; *Cal. Fine Rolls, 1399-1405*, 251-4.

⁶⁸ PRO, Warrants for Issue, E404/22/540, 563; 23/113, 176, 261; 27/173; *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 568, 635. The rest of the customs in 1410 were allocated to Calais, *ibid.*, 3, 627; *P.O.P.C.*, 1, 331.

⁶⁹ *Rot. Parl.*, 2, 128; 3, 56, 546, 577-8, 609; *Eul.*, 3, 409; Stubbs, *Constitutional History*, 3, 55-6.

In the control of expenditure, the commons in general relied on the exchequer. They may indeed have welcomed the system of assignment by which control could be exercised most easily over the spending of any particular source of revenue. But the commons were also concerned over the methods of authorising exchequer issues, and the struggle in 1406 over the control of the seals was largely aimed at giving the new council control over the spending of the taxes. The Bill which was conceded in May 1406 and the articles of December placed control of the exchequer warrants for issues firmly in the hands of the council. In 1410 a further attempt at controlling warrants was made.⁷⁰

There were occasions however when the commons went further and expressed mistrust of the exchequer's ability to withstand pressure from the king. In the January 1404 parliament, four treasurers of war were appointed to collect and to expend the new land tax, "so that the money coming in should be put on the wars and to no other use." This action resulted in a complete breakdown of government finances, and a more moderate procedure was followed in the parliament later that year whereby the exchequer resumed the collecting of the revenue but the two new war treasurers controlled its issue under even more stringent regulations than in January 1404; it was to be treason to divert the parliamentary taxes from the war effort.⁷¹ In 1406, the appointment of the merchants to safeguard the sea with a direct endowment from the customs and subsidies was intended to be a practical gesture to get some effective action taken for the defence of the realm; it was only indirectly an attempt to prevent misappropriation. But the placing of effective control over the expending of the lay subsidy in the hands of the council at the end of that parliament had the same intention as the appointment of war treasurers earlier. Parliamentary taxes were to be used for the war alone; the costs of the government, including the household, were to be met from the "revenues of the realm alone."⁷²

But apart from this defensive action, the commons during the reign of Henry IV went on the attack. As we have seen, one of the biggest drains on the exchequer was the king's household. The heavy costs of meeting rebellions and foreign wars involved an inability of the household to pay its way, and the commons were very concerned at this. It was explicitly stated in November 1404 that the king's debts were not to be paid out of

⁷⁰ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 572-3, 625; cf. Brown, *English Historical Review*, 79, 16-24 for a full discussion.

⁷¹ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 528-9, 546; in January it was however agreed that sums might be used to combat rebellions. *P.O.P.C.*, 1, 269-70. I hope to deal with this crisis year in detail in a forthcoming work on Henry IV's reign.

⁷² *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 527, 569-71.

the war subsidies,⁷³ but clearly something had to be done to enable the king to live of his own.

The first line of attack, one familiar to much of the previous century, was to restrain royal improvidence, especially in the grants of annuities, and even to try to recover some of the alienated royal estates. In 1399 there were criticisms of the outrageous and excessive royal grants; no grants were to be made without the advice of the council. A resumption of crown lands was urged and an attack was launched on those about the king who bought or received grants from the king.⁷⁴ Petitions against royal grants featured in most parliaments of the reign. In 1401, the regulations of 1399 were reiterated; in 1402, alienations of casualties were regarded as against the king's own interests. The bitterly hostile parliament of January 1404 was outspoken against royal grants, especially annuities, while later in the year the council suspended all annuities for one year.⁷⁵ In the October parliament, 1404, an act of resumption was passed, the proceeds of which were to be used primarily for the king's household and then for the queen's dower, the aim being to relieve parliamentary sources of income. Further attacks on the royal power of patronage occurred in the 1406 parliament and some attempt was made to modify the procedure of granting petitions. In 1407, the statute of 1402 was slightly amended, while in 1410, annuities were again suspended and another resumption was urged. The aim of all this is quite explicit — "The Comunes desiren that the Kyng shoulde leve upon his owne, as gode reson asketh."⁷⁶

It was quite clear however that such measures would be ineffective unless the costs of the royal household were reduced. The commons urged on many occasions that the household *soit modifie* and its expenses reduced. In 1400 the council emphasised the link between the military aspects and the royal household. In considering the *sauvacion de lestat du Roi et de son roiaume* in the face of threatened invasions, the king was urged *mettre son houstiel en bone gouvernance....* so as to relieve the people. In January 1404 the commons themselves asserted that the king's prodigality in his grants of castles,

⁷³ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 546.

⁷⁴ This may well have been caused by dispossession at the time of the revolution, cf. the hostile Dieulacres chronicle, "Deposition of Richard II," ed. M. V. Clarke and V. H. Galbraith, *Bulletin of John Rylands Library*, 14 (1930), 52: *rex Henricus multa multis promisit et a diversis dona juste data abstulit et aliis vispilonibus dedit*. Cp. *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 433, 438; *Chronicon Adae de Usk, 1377-1421*, ed. E. M. Thompson (London, 1904), 39.

⁷⁵ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 471, 478-9, 495, 502, 523-4; *Eul.*, 3, 399-400; *Cal. Close Rolls, 1402-5*, 347, 377, 382; cf. Wylie, *op. cit.*, 1, 462-3.

⁷⁶ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 547-9, 569, 612-3, 624-5; *Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1405-9*, 153; *Cal. Close Rolls, 1409-13*, 52; *P.O.P.C.*, 1, 350; Hoccleve, *Regement of Princes* (Early English Text Society, 1897), 68-9.

lordships, lands and annuities made unduly and indiscreetly *et par especial... les grandes Charges et Dispenses de l'ostel du Roy* were greatly damaging to the defence of the realm, and they demanded that the lords should make ordinance for the royal household *plaisant a Dieu et honneur et profit pur lestat du Roy et de son Roialme*. In 1406 the commons demanded that the royal household should be reduced *en eschuir de les outrageouses et excessives Despenses en ycell*; and later in the session the council was ordered to ordain *moderate governance* for the household.⁷⁷

Apart from complaining about the costs of the household and urging the council that the household *purroit estre mys en bone et moderate Governance*, the commons took action themselves on occasion. In January 1404, as a result of extreme criticism from the commons, the king agreed to include the great wardrobe expenses in his chamber *certum*,⁷⁸ and although this arrangement did not persist for long, from that year the average expenses of the great wardrobe were cut by three quarters for the rest of the reign.⁷⁹ In 1404 and again in 1406, members of the households of the king and queen were dismissed at the request of the commons. In January 1404 four of the minor members of the king's household were named as forbidden the court; since one of these was the king's confessor, it is clear that parliament was relying upon the precedent of 1381 when the commons were explicitly attempting to reduce the costs of the household. Of the others, the household connection of two of them is obscure and the third was a minor chamber esquire.⁸⁰ At the same time all aliens were expelled from the household by statute on the grounds of defence as well as economy, although a number of exceptions were named for the benefit of the queen. This was followed up by a more serious and effective attack on aliens in the second session of the long parliament of 1406; in this case 43 named aliens, most of them clearly associated with the queen's household, were ordered to leave the realm and many did so.⁸¹

Secondly the commons limited the wardrobe to a *certum* like the chamber;

⁷⁷ *P.O.P.C.*, 1, 107-111 295-6; *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 523-4, 525, 579.

⁷⁸ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 527, 529: *pur ses Chambre et Garderobe il se vorroit tenir pur content de le mettre tout en une somme...*; for the commons' criticism, see Fraser, *op. cit.*

⁷⁹ PRO, E361/5 and 6. Average annual expenses, 1399-1403, £11,124; 1403-1412 (no account for 1412-13), £2,600. Cf. under Richard II, average, 1394-99, £12,184. Great wardrobe expenses remained at the lower figure throughout the fifteenth century.

⁸⁰ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 525, 101; cf. Tout, *op. cit.*, 3, 381. Robert Mascall was confessor until 1404, *Cal. Pat. Rolls*, 1401-5, 11, 412. Cf. A. B. Emden, *Biographical Register to University of Oxford* (Oxford, 1957-9), *sub nom.* Richard Derham was master of King's Hall, Cambridge, and a royal envoy; cf. A. B. Emden, *Biographical Register to the University of Cambridge to 1500* (Cambridge, 1963), *sub nom.* The abbot of Dore seems to have had no household links. John Crosseby was an esquire of the chamber in 1402-3, PRO, E101/404/21, fol. 46.

⁸¹ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 527, 569, 571-2, 578; *Ann.*, 379, 419; PRO, PSO 1/1/43; 1/3/19.

and although the figure eventually arrived at was never strictly adhered to, it must have acted as some restraint upon the willingness of the exchequer to answer all the king's demands for money. During the crisis of the first parliament of 1404 the king agreed to an allocation of £12,100 p.a. for the wardrobe. This allocation was to come entirely from the ordinary revenues of the realm. In fact the final *certum* for the wardrobe, fixed at £16,000 p.a., was settled by the council in 1408 and ran through almost to the end of the reign. Further, in 1404 and again in 1406, the commons petitioned that the queen's dower might be secured from regular sources of revenue rather than from casualties; it is clear that the exchequer was having to meet large deficits each year by assignments. Other detailed regulations for the queen's household were drawn up in 1406⁸² to reduce the cost of her establishment to the nation.

But the most striking of all the commons' attempts to prevent misappropriation of parliamentary taxes to the household came late in the parliament of 1406 with the appointment of Sir John Tiptoft, the Speaker, as treasurer of the king's household. Throughout the fourteenth century, the commons' concern over taxation had on occasion resulted in ministerial changes, but rarely had the household itself been attacked. Nor was the treasurership of the household considered as an office of political importance. But by 1406 it was seen to be the key to the problem, and the office passed for the first time into lay hands. Further, it is quite clear that the new appointment was made to a large extent to satisfy the commons; for although Tiptoft was one of the king's chamber knights, he replaced Richard Kyngeston, an old friend and trusted servant of Henry and one who had been associated with a revived use of the household in 1405.⁸³

For the commons to bring pressure to bear at such a point was almost unprecedented. But only by controlling such an appointment could effective reforms be carried out. For while it is true that the ultimate cause of expense at court was the king's will, the treasurer of the household being merely a royal servant, nevertheless it is also clear that the treasurer could to a certain extent control all financial acts which passed through his hands and thus limit extravagance and "ordain remedy". And for the first time the treasurer of the household was made a member of the council charged to reform and provide for the king's household.

In fact, a great deal was achieved by Tiptoft and the council. A new programme seems to have been worked out and put into effect between 1406

⁸² *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 528-9, 548, 577, 588, cf. 632-3; *Cal. Pat. Rolls*, 1401-5, 396; *ibid.*, 1409-13, 35, 37, 151, 206; *P.O.P.C.*, 1, 342; 2, 11.

⁸³ J. S. Roskell, *The Commons and their Speakers in English Parliaments, 1376-1523* (Manchester, 1965), 147-8; R. L. Storey, "English Officers of State," *B.I.H.R.*, 31, 90; PRO, DL28/1/2, fol. 1d; *Derby Accounts* (Camden Society, Second Series), 52 (1894).

and 1408. The council considered the details of household finances and authorised the warrants. Household costs were substantially reduced after 1406; the average for the three wardrobes for the years 1406-13 was just over £20,000 p.a.⁸⁴ Reforms in personnel were made. But from the point of view of the constitutional struggle we have been tracing, the part of the new programme which was of great significance was that the wardrobe was put back on a military basis once more, first for the Calais expedition, later for Wales, and the king proposed to go in person to the war.⁸⁵ Although the commons in 1406 had reiterated the demand of 1404 that the household was to be supported by the ordinary revenues of the realm, no assignments for the wardrobe were made on ordinary or casual sources at all for the whole of 1407. From May 1407 large payments from the lay subsidy to the household were authorised by the council, £2,000 to the chamber and £5,000 to the wardrobe, and a further £3,000 from the customs — all expressly for the royal expedition to Wales. It may well have been these allocations which caused the commons' assertion in October 1407 that they were not bound to pay for the Welsh expedition. These payments were however extended in 1408 and in the year 1408-9, £4,500 was received by the wardrobe in assignments on the lay subsidy. No lay subsidy was collected during the first year of the prince of Wales' tenure of power, but in the second year, when a lay subsidy was collected, no assignments were made on it for the king's household. After the fall of the prince's administration, however, in the last terms of the reign, a few small assignments on the lay subsidy were made to the wardrobe, although the military character of the household had disappeared once more with the illness of the king.⁸⁶

It would thus seem that the king won the struggle, or at least that it went by default in the last few years of the reign. The outbreak of the French war may have contributed to this. The last parliamentary tax of the reign (1411, land tax) was placed entirely at the king's free disposal.⁸⁷ Henry V faced no opposition when he drew on the lay subsidy to support his household, now heavily engaged in the French war. But the struggle

⁸⁴ From figures in accounts cited above, note 48.

⁸⁵ *Cal. Close Rolls, 1405-9*, 222-3, 257, 259, 261; PRO, DL 42/16, fol. 85, 209, 221d-222; PRO, E404/22/485-7, warrants for exchequer payments to wardrobe *pro mora ipsius domini Regis in propria persono sua super salva custodia partium Wallie ... in defencionem regni Anglie*. The issue roll speaks of the king's *firmum propositum eundem versus partes Wallie*, E403/591, 1 June. The king never went, a fact which may account for the commons' unrest in 1407.

⁸⁶ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 586-7 (6), 610; PRO, E404/22/482, 486-7, 507; *ibid.*, 23/273-4; E403/597, 599; E401/647, 649, 656, 657: no receipt roll is available for the Easter term, 1412.

⁸⁷ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 648-9. It may be that this novel form of tax was devised here and in 1404 to overcome the obstacle of the by now usual assignment of the tenth and fifteenth to military purposes.

continued. In 1426, during the minority of Henry VI, the lords in parliament declared that a subsidy granted by the commons was to be collected and expended for the king's use, notwithstanding any condition in the grant, to which the commons retaliated by granting a subsidy on condition that "it ne no part thereof be beset ne dispendid to no othir use, but oonly in and for the defense of the seid roialme." In 1449-50, the commons again appointed war treasurers who were to pay the army.⁸⁸ In 1468, Edward IV linked all the aspects of this struggle in his own speech to parliament in which he promised "to lyve uppon my nowne and not to charge my Subgettes but in grete and urgent causes, concernying more the wele of theymself, and also the defence of theym and of this my Reame, rather than my nowne pleasir... and also shall, in tyme of nede, applie my persone for the wele and defence of you and of this my Reame, not sparing my body nor lyfe for eny jeopardde that mought happen to the same." The excessive costs and misappropriation of parliamentary taxes were not of course the only cause of opposition to the royal household in the fifteenth century, but they were the most frequent occasion of criticism by the commons.⁸⁹ The situation was only to undergo substantial alteration when later fifteenth century kings could manage to do without parliamentary taxes for long periods.

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The struggles thus of king and parliament in the reign of Henry IV were not over minor issues, but over the whole field of royal prerogative and parliamentary power of consent to taxation. The king may ask his realm for aid in time of necessity. While his subjects must grant the tax, provided the necessity is proven, parliament is under some obligation to its constituents to see that the tax is not abused. It is this which gives coherence to the activities of the commons during the reign. The causes of the clash do not lie so much in the difficulties created by defining the king's necessity in a time of peace or truce as in the activities of the king and government in using all royal sources of income for all purposes of government, and thus in breaking the conditions on which parliament originally voted the supplies. The commons did not regard the attaching of a condition "solely for defence" to the grant merely as a formality; in June 1406 they allowed the king to take a small part of the customs granted in the previous parliament for his own use, notwithstanding that it had been granted solely for defence; but if the new lords of the council were dismissed during the term

⁸⁸ PRO, E403/624, 11 May, 27 June, 18, 23 July; *Rot. Parl.*, 4, 301-2; *ibid.* 5, 172-4; cf. note in Taswell-Langmead's *English Constitutional History*, ed. T. F. T. Plucknett (11th ed., London, 1960), 186.

⁸⁹ *Rot. Parl.*, 5, 572; cf. *ibid.*, 5, 216 (1450); etc.; A. R. Myers, *Household of Edward IV* (Manchester, 1959), 5-13.

of the grant, then the conditions attached to the grant in the previous parliament were to have full force, "notwithstanding this present modification."⁹⁰

In resisting the king's efforts to use extraordinary taxes for all purposes of government, including a non-military royal household, the commons had three main lines of action open to them — to insist that the taxes were used for the purpose for which they were granted by exhortation, by attaching specific conditions to the grant, by demanding audited accounts or even by appointing their own financial officers; secondly, to insist that the king should live "of his own", by creating funds of ordinary revenue, by restraining royal liberality and by acts of resumption; and thirdly, to cut household costs, by fixing a *certum* and specific allocations, by making the king dismiss personnel, and eventually by appointing their own Speaker as the king's household treasurer. In each case, the commons were reluctant to take action; they relied on the exchequer to control spending or on the council to make ordinances. But in each case also, they were eventually forced to take the initiative, to appoint war treasurers, to insist on acts of resumption, to make a demonstration against some household members, to make the chief financial officer of the wardrobe into a political figure. The frequency of Henry IV's demands for money gave them their opportunity, and during the reign one of the more bitter constitutional struggles of the middle ages was fought out.

A final word must be added as to the significance of this struggle in the history of the medieval parliament. There was nothing "modern" in this clash between king and commons. Parliament was still regarded as an occasional state occasion, when the king was surrounded by his council and representatives of the whole "body" of the nation.⁹¹ Emphasis on the careful study of parliamentary precedents by the commons and the frequent re-election of representatives may blind us to the fact that the commons were not seeking a permanent place in the administration of the realm. Theirs was a more limited aim, an attempt to ensure that the existing rules were kept. It was not until the disastrous concepts of sovereignty associated with Jean Bodin gained currency in England that a new era in the history of parliament began — the age of Wentworth and Coke. Stubbs' judgment on the 1406 parliament, that it "seems almost to stand for an exponent of the most advanced principles of medieval constitutional life in England"⁹² must be read with the emphasis on the word *medieval*.

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⁹⁰ *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 578.

⁹¹ Cf. *Rot. Parl.*, 3, 608.

⁹² Stubbs, *op. cit.*, 3, 59.

APPENDIX

Exchequer assignments to the wardrobe, 1399-1413 (from PRO Receipt Rolls): to the nearest £

Ordinary revenue includes the farms of sheriffs, escheators, demesne lands, and issues of the hanaper, the mint, the petty customs and the ulnage.

Casualties include wardships, fines, forfeits, and profits from the alien priories and the temporalities of bishoprics.

	1399- 1400	1400- 1	1401- 2	1402- 3 ^a	1403- 4 ^a	1404- 5 ^b	1405- 6 ^c	1406- 7	1407- 8	1408- 9	1409- 10	1410- 11 ^c	1411- 12 ^c	1412- 13 ^c
Ordinary revenues	1974	1503	927	255	1990	2934	2168	357	582	2134	1638	1285	546	1153
Casualties	2883	4870	4932	3258	3081	1024	935	175	1862	1902	—	—	3	202
Clerical tenth	140	402	296	811	3136	109	273	63	—	2522	—	482	1967	291
Customs and tunnage														
and poundage	6420	3319	7719	7215	3373	1526	477	2412	5741	4400	13963	4170	2250	6014
Lay subsidy	7	1238	1045	1045	93	—	—	—	— ^d	4587	—	—	31	97

^a fragmentary.

^b only Easter term 1405 is sufficiently well recorded.

^c some entries are unreliable.

^d extensive payments in cash from lay subsidies.

^e only Michaelmas term.

Aquinas — Existential Permanence and Flux

JOSEPH OWENS, C.Ss.R.

I

QUOTED just in itself, without explicit indication of context, a statement of St Thomas Aquinas in the *Contra Gentiles* (I, 20, Procredit) may give the impression of a fixed and static character for existence in all creatures. The text reads: "Esse autem est aliquid fixum et quietum in ente." Taken alone it would suggest that no matter how fluid and changeable everything else in a being is, the existence of the being remains something definitely fixed, something permanent and stable in the manner of a terminus actually attained and now serenely at rest above the vicissitudes of lower levels.

However, the lone text needs to be balanced against some other relevant tenets of Aquinas in respect of existence.¹ These stress rather the variability of temporal existence. Instead of something fixed and stable, they tend to describe an actuality that is incessantly changing from past through present into the future.² Instead of something that has reached the terminal status expressed by the notion *quies*, the finally achieved perfection, they present temporal existence as inevitably imperfect, lacking what has already gone by of itself and what is yet to be of itself,³ and characterized by progressive sequence rather than by

¹ So: "The *subsistere* confers the stability and relative permanence of the created *ens* to which the statement 'esse est aliquid fixum et quietum in ente' refers; but it is the permanence and stability of an *ens* which, in order to be, must tend (through its powers and operations) to its own self-realization." G. B. Phelan, "The Being of Creatures," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 31 (1957), 125. Cf.: "In all things on earth the act of being (*esse*) is the consubstantial urge of nature, a restless, striving force, carrying each being (*ens*) onward, from within the depths of its own reality to its full self-achievement, i.e., fully to be what by its nature it is apt to become." Phelan, "The Existentialism of St. Thomas," *Proceedings*, 21 (1946), 35. The comparison with the Bergsonian flux is noted, *ibid.*, n. 20. Speaking of the aspect of goodness, St Thomas is able to say "eiusdem rationis sit tendere in finem, et in fine quodammodo quiescere; ... Haec autem duo inveniuntur competere ipsi esse." *De Ver.*, XXI, 2c. The meaning here, however, is that existence is the *object* of both tending and possessing.

² See texts below, nn. 29-35.

³ In *I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet, I, 195. A discussion may be found in my article "Diversity and Community of Being in St Thomas Aquinas," *Mediaeval Studies*, 22

rest.⁴ Moreover, the conception of existence as "something" stable in a being is enough to arouse a bit of suspicion, on account of the way existence is regularly distinguished from thing in the Thomistic writings. True, one has to think and speak of existence as "something," even where one expressly denies that it is a thing. Yet the combination of notions in "something fixed" and "something stable" seems difficult to accommodate very convincingly to the dynamic actuality of sensible things that is designated by the term *esse* in the sense of existence throughout the Thomistic texts.

Rather, is not the notion suggested by the above text, when taken in isolation, that of the Aristotelian form? Form for Aristotle is something definite and determined. It is the terminus of motion, and as such is in the state of immobility described by the metaphors of tranquility or repose (*êremia*, Latin *quies*): "when a thing is subject to motion its immobility is rest."⁵ In a philosophy in which being is ultimately identified with form, the assertion that the ultimate actuality of a being is fixed and at rest would ring perfectly true. The implied opposition would be that of the finally achieved form to the process of movement by which it was reached. Or, in things that are immobile, it would mean the real formal perfection that is incapable of ever perishing. In a word, the assertion fits neatly enough into a strictly Aristotelian setting, while on the other hand it seems to swing somewhat ajar of a notion of existence that takes time seriously.

What, then, does the context reveal about the bearing of this assertion? Does it show that the assertion is meant to be a tenet to which Aquinas himself is committed? Or is it dealt with merely as a tenet of someone else that happens for the moment to be under discussion? Certainly this consideration calls for an inquiry before any doctrinal exegesis can be undertaken. Likewise, concerning the extent to which St Thomas himself may be committed to the assertion, should not the context be probed for the type of existence that is in question? Is temporal existence meant, or eviternal existence, or divine existence, or existence in general? Once the meaning of the assertion in its own context has been determined, the further problem

(1960), 289-291. It is impossible for the parts to exist together: "ubicumque est prius et posterius, oportet intelligere partem priorem et posteriorem, et in nulla duratione partes priores et posteriores sunt simul; unde oportet quod quando est prius non sit posterius; et ideo oportet posterius de novo advenire, cum prius non fuerit." *In II Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, Solut.; II, 63.

⁴ "Illud enim quod habet potentiam non recipientem actum totum simul, mensuratur tempore: huiusmodi enim habet esse terminatum et quantum ad modum participandi, quia esse recipitur in aliqua potentia, et non est absolutum quantum ad partes durationis, quia habet prius et posterius." *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 2, a. 2, Solut.: I, 205. See also texts below, nn. 29, 34 and 42. The existence is closed (*terminatum*) specifically, but open in time.

⁵ *Ph.*, III 2, 202a4-5; Oxford tr. For other texts, see Bonitz, *Ind. Arist.*, 320b34-38.

of its relation to the general doctrine of Aquinas on existence can be approached. Finally, there is the bearing of the fixity or flux of existence, as it emerges from these investigations, upon the unchangeable or changing character of truth. This will be a problem that can hardly be avoided in the framework built up by the discussion. But the initial task will be to examine the assertion "Esse autem est aliquid fixum et quietum in ente" carefully in its own setting.

II

The assertion occurs in a chapter of the *Contra Gentiles* devoted to the demonstration that God is not a body. After giving his own reasons for this conclusion, Aquinas adds (*CG*, I, 20, Item inveniuntur) that arguments of the philosophers, taken from the eternity of motion, are found to sustain it. In the discussion of these, he finds himself obliged to examine the possibility of eternal duration for the heavens. He interprets Plato as meaning that the heavenly bodies are of themselves perishable, but through the infinite power of God acquire perpetuity of duration:

Ad hoc autem a quibusdam respondetur quod corpus caeleste secundum potentiam suam potest deficere, sed perpetuitatem durationis acquirit ab alio quod est potentiae infinitae. Et huic solutioni videtur attestari Plato qui de corporibus caelestibus Deum loquentem inducit in hunc modum: *Natura vestra estis dissolubilia, voluntate autem mea indissolubilia: ...*⁶

He recalls, however, that this answer to the problem has been rejected by Averroes on the ground that perpetuity of existence cannot be acquired from an external cause:

Nam impossibile est, secundum eum, quod id quod est de se possibile non esse, acquirat perpetuitatem essendi ab alio. Sequeretur enim quod corruptibile mutetur in incorruptibilitatem. Quod est impossibile secundum ipsum.⁷

The repetition in *secundum eum* and *secundum ipsum* would suggest an aim of St Thomas to dissociate himself from the unqualified tenet that a thing cannot acquire perpetuity of existence from an efficient cause. The tenet is clearly marked as that of Averroes. Elsewhere⁸ the view is regarded as

⁶ *CG*, I, 20, Ad hoc (Leonine manual no. 3). Cf. Plato, *Ti.*, 41AB.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Hanc autem. Cf. Averroes: "Permanencia igitur motus est ex alio, substantia autem ex se. Et ideo impossibile est invenire substantiam possibilem ex se, necessarium ex alio, quod est possibile in motu." In *XII Metaph.*, comm. 41 (Venice, 1547), fol. 324v2 (L). On the Scriptural issue involved for St Thomas, see below, n. 18.

⁸ "Avicenna namque posuit, quod quaelibet res praeter Deum habebat in se possibilitatem ad esse et non esse. Cum enim esse sit praeter essentiam cuiuslibet rei creatae, ipsa natura rei creatae per se considerata, possibilis est ad esse; necessitatem vero essendi non habet nisi ab alio,

"more reasonable" than the opposite stand of Avicenna, for whom all things except God had in themselves the possibility of losing existence. Yet in the present chapter of the *Contra Gentiles*, the Averroistic tenet is rejected as insufficient for coping with the immediate problem. The reason is taken from Aristotle:

Sciendum tamen quod haec responsio Commentatoris non est sufficiens. Quia, etsi detur quod in corpore caelesti non sit potentia quasi passiva ad esse, quae est potentia materiae, est tamen in eo potentia quasi activa, quae est virtus essendi: cum expresse Aristoteles dicat, in I *Caeli et Mundi*, quod caelum habet virtutem ut sit semper.⁹

Quite patently, St Thomas is envisaging in the heavenly bodies a quasi active or formal capability of existing forever, yet a capability that does not at all place in them a potentiality for substantial change. Contrary to Averroes, then, he is seeing in the heavenly body a capacity for perpetual existence, a capacity that can be actuated by an extrinsic efficient cause. Further, in contrast to the duration of motion, he is according the heavens a type of existence that is not subject to variation:

Motus autem secundum sui rationem quantitatem habet et extensionem: unde duratio eius infinita requirit quod potentia movens sit infinita. Esse autem non habet aliquam extensionem quantitatis: praecipue in re cuius esse est invariabile, sicut caelum. Et ideo non oportet quod virtus essendi sit infinita in corpore finito, licet in infinitum duret: quia non differt quod per illam virtutem aliquid duret in uno instanti vel tempore infinito, cum esse illud invariabile non attingatur a tempore nisi per accidens (*CG*, I, 20, Et ideo).

What conception of existence is involved in this reasoning? Is not existence regarded as having different types, one type of which is invariable while another type is variable? Though motion of its nature — *secundum sui rationem* — has quantity and extension, existence does not have any. In the context should not this mean that of its own nature existence does not have extension, but with the possibility that it may have extension on account of something added to it? Motion by its nature requires extension. No way of eliminating its extension seems envisaged.¹⁰ But while existence

... *Commentator* vero contrarium ponit, scilicet quod quaedam res creatae sunt in quarum natura non est possibilitas ad non esse, quia quod in sua natura habet possibilitatem ad non esse, non potest ab extrinseco acquirere sempiternitatem, ut scilicet sit per naturam suam sempiternum. Et haec quidem positio videtur rationabilior." *De Pot.*, V, 3c.

⁹ *CG*, I, 20, Sciendum (no. 3). Cf. Averroes: "Et debes scire quod istud corpus caeleste non indiget virtute movente semper in loco tantum, sed virtute largiente in se, et sua substantia permanentiam aeternam," *Sermo de Substantia Orbis*, c. 2 (Venice, 1573), fol. 6va (I).

¹⁰ "Invenitur autem in actu qui motus est, successio prioris et posterioris. Et haec duo, scilicet prius et posterius, secundum quod numerantur per animam, habent rationem mensurae

does not require quantitative extension, it is represented as excluding it not absolutely but rather with a qualification. The exclusion applies especially in a thing whose existence is invariable, for instance the heavens. Does not this way of thinking imply recognition of another type of existence that is variable? Does it not present existence as without quantitative extension in its own nature, but as having extension in some things and lacking it in others? The lack of quantitative extension is found not as the condition *tout court* of all existence, but as an appropriate condition that holds especially for existence that is invariable. The type of quantitative extension that is involved is made clear in the last lines of the above quotation. It is the kind that is spread out in time, the existence of temporal things. The invariable type of existence, on the other hand, as far as it itself is concerned, is not touched by time. Accordingly it is measured neither by a temporal instant nor by infinite time.

Does not this make a thoroughly consistent picture of existence as contrasted with motion? In its own nature existence is invariable. The characteristic of invariability will therefore have to be found where existence subsists as a nature. But in creatures existence does not enter into any nature. In point of fact, the existence first known by the human mind is measured by time. This kind of quantitative extension, however, does not belong to existence as such. Especially it is not found where existence, untouched by time, is invariable. Motion, on the other hand, is of its very nature measurable by time.

The context in the *Contra Gentiles* (I, 20, Quarta obiectio) then goes on to discuss a further objection to Aristotle's conclusion that what imparts motion through infinite time requires infinite power. Something like the sun, whose power is finite, can act upon subordinate things forever, since — according to ancient physics — its power is not lessened by that activity. This will hold for any movent that does not undergo alteration in imparting movement. — The answer to the objection is that every body insofar as it imparts motion is being moved by something else. Accordingly of itself it has the possibility to be moved and the possibility not to be moved, and the possibility to be moved perpetually by an incorporeal movent:

Sed corpus quod de se possibile est moveri et non moveri, movere et non movere, acquirere potest perpetuitatem motus ab aliquo. Quod oportet esse incorporeum. ... Et sic nihil prohibet secundum naturam corpus finitum, quod acquirit ab alio perpetuitatem in moveri, habere etiam perpetuitatem

per modum numeri, quae tempus est." *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 2, a. 1, Solut.; I, 467. Cf.: "... sicut enim tempus est numerus prioris et posterioris in motu, ita etiam aevum est unitas permanentiae actus qui est esse vel operatio creati, ..." *In II Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5m; II, 65. Cf. text above, n. 3.

in movere: nam et ipsum primum corpus caeleste, secundum naturam, potest perpetuo motu inferiora corpora caelestia revolvere, secundum quod sphaera movet sphaeram (*CG*, I, 20, *Procedit*).

In the framework of the ancient astronomy, then, the possibility that a finite heavenly body may acquire perpetuity of motion from an incorporeal movent is illustrated and established. But does this fit in with the tenet of Averroes that anything capable of non-existence is not able to receive perpetuity in existence from anything else? St Thomas, it will be remembered,¹¹ has just shown himself quite cool towards that tenet. The tenet in its absolute scope is clearly marked as one to which he himself does not adhere. Yet he seems anxious to show that even in the Averroistic setting there is no incompatibility in holding that a body capable of repose may receive from something else motion in perpetuity. In this connection the statement that occasioned the present paper occurs:

Nec est inconveniens secundum Commentatorem quod illud quod est de se in potentia moveri et non moveri, acquirat ab alio perpetuitatem motus, sicut ponebatur esse impossibile de perpetuitate essendi. Nam motus est quidam defluxus a movente in mobile: et ideo potest aliquod mobile acquirere ab alio perpetuitatem motus, quam non habet de se. Esse autem est aliquid fixum et quietum in ente: et ideo quod de se est in potentia ad non esse, non potest, ut ipse dicit, secundum viam naturae acquirere ab alio perpetuitatem essendi (*ibid.*).

What bearing does this context give to the notion "aliquid fixum et quietum in ente"? It places the notion directly in contrast with movement. *Fixum* implies something associated with immobility, *quietum* implies the opposite of motion.¹² In the contrast motion is described as a "defluxus

¹¹ See *supra*, nn. 7 and 9.

¹² *Fixus* is regularly associated by Aquinas with immobility. E.g., "fixe et immobiliter," *ST*, I, 64, 2c; "res fixas et permanentes," 104, 2c. Its habitual use to designate the fixed stars in contrast to the wandering planets, e.g., *ST*, I, 68, 4c, might be enough to suggest it in this meaning for the present context. It was already accepted in the discussion: "Corpus autem caeleste est quasi materia istius formae abstractae, quia est materia existens in actu. Et ideo non assimilatur materiae, nisi in hoc tantum, quia est materia fixa ad recipiendum formam. ... est in potentia forma in eo fixa, et dicitur subjectum, quia est fixa formae, ..." Averroes, *De Substantia Orbis*, c. 2; fol. 6va (GH). The "stans quieta" of the *Liber de Causis*, 30, is explained by St Thomas: "Primo quidem quia perpetuitas aeternalis est fixa, stans, immobilis; perpetuitas autem temporalis est fluens et mobilis, ..." *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Super Librum de Causis Expositio*, ed. H. D. Saffrey (Fribourg & Louvain, 1954), 136b and 139.15-17. "Fixa," as can be seen here, is used to express the same notion as "quieta." Cf. use of *fixa* and *fixio*, *ibid.*, 92-93.

Quies is regular as the opposite of movement. E.g., "opposita, quae sunt quies et motus," St Thomas, *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 21, Angeli-Pirotta, no. 2497; "ad quietem, quia motui eius contrariatur quies," *ibid.*, no. 2488; "cum perventum fuerit ad actum, motus quiescit," *CG*, I, 20,

a movente in mobile.” Of its nature it is a process that comes from the movent *into* the thing moved. The preposition “in” requires here the accusative case. Existence, on the other hand, as “aliquid fixum et quietum” is regarded merely as *in* its corresponding subject, and not as coming from anything else. It is “in ente,” with the ablative case, while motion is “in mobile,” with the accusative. Because motion is something that comes from a movent, the reasoning then goes, a mobile thing can acquire perpetuity of motion from something else even though it does not have it of itself. On the contrary, what is capable of non-existence cannot, on the strength of the above premise, as Averroes says, acquire perpetuity of existence from anything else.

How is this conclusion drawn? The meaning seems to be that motion is of its very nature the acquisition of new actuality from an efficient cause that is something other than the thing being moved. Naturally, if the external cause will keep exercising its efficiency forever, there is no problem in the perpetual movement of a body, even though of itself — that is, if the efficient cause would let it alone — it is able to come to a stop. On the other hand, existence is something that does not imply the influx of an external cause. It is something as it were settled and fixed, something not in process but in repose. This should mean that of its own nature existence is not to be regarded as an actuality coming from anything else. Rather, it is an independent fixture in the thing. It is to be gauged on the merits of the thing’s internal condition, not on the way the thing is handled by others. While the thing’s motion is dependent on the movent, its existence is entirely its own affair. Consequently if of itself a thing is capable on non-existence, the whole story has been told. In the natural course of events, external causes are not able to intervene in a way that would give the thing perpetual existence.¹³

Item nullus. It is likewise used regularly in this way in the Latin translation of Averroes, e.g., *De Subst. Orbis*, c. 5 (fol. 11r1), *In XII Metaph.*, comm. 41 (fol. 324v1).

The notion expressed by the two terms is contrast to movement, and is accordingly different from the concept *esse firmum*: “... accidentium quae habent esse firmum in natura, et quae sunt accidentia individui” (*In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, ad 4; I, 230); “firmitatem sui esse, ... sicut alia accidentia a suis subjectis” (*ibid.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5m; I, 72). Cf. “esse ratum et firmum,” *De Pot.*, III, 7, ad 7m.

¹³ This tenet lies in the background of the *Tertia via*, *ST*, I, 2, 3c. While in the present context the expression “secundum viam naturae” and its equivalents seem to be understood by St Thomas as opposed to the notion of supernatural intervention (see below, n. 18), the corresponding expressions in Averroes refer to the Aristotelian contrast of the natural with the violent — “neque naturaliter, neque secundum violentiam” (*In VIII Phys.*, comm. 82 (Venice, 1562), fol. 430r1G; cf. comm. 32, fol. 371rb) — or to the exigencies of the thing’s substantial nature: “Unde videmus Aristotelem opinari quod corpus caeleste non potest ex se, secundum suam

But does not this reasoning presuppose that everywhere existence is something uncaused by an external agent? Does it not look upon existence everywhere, even in things capable of non-existence, as a fixed and stable form aptly designated as a "something"? If so, it fits well enough into the Aristotelian framework of being, as continued in Averroes. St Thomas can then say easily enough that "secundum Commentatorem" there is no inconsistency in maintaining that in the course of nature a heavenly body can receive perpetuity of motion but not perpetuity of existence from something else. But does not St Thomas seem to mean more than that? Does he not seem to approve the latter part in concluding that as Averroes says — *ut ipse dixit* — a thing capable of non-existence cannot naturally acquire perpetuity of existence from anything else? And finally, what is the purpose of adding this rider to an argument that seemingly would be complete and satisfactory without it?

No answer to these questions is found in the immediate context. The discussion of the objection in regard to which they occur ends here. The *Contra Gentiles* at once goes on to consider another and different objection. The prededing context¹⁴ could allow the interpretation that motion is of its nature fluid, while existence of its nature is stable. Where existence is found as a nature, that is, where it subsists, it may be expected to show absolute contrast to the fluidity of motion. Likewise in eviternal things it should exhibit this contrast to motion, since motion is what is measured by time. But in temporal things, where existence flows from past through present to future, how can this contrast to motion be upheld? Yet for the force of argument, in the setting of Aquinas' own doctrine, the contrast would have to hold in the existence of material things. The presence of matter in their substance is what gives temporal things their capacity for non-existence,¹⁵ and precisely in regard to things that of themselves have

naturam recipere transmutationem, et quod causa eius est, quia non componitur ex materia et forma, et quod necessarium est ex se, non ex alio, ut Avicenna dixit." *In VIII Phys.*, comm. 83, fol. 432ra-b). Cf.: "nisi esset possibile ut natura eius transmutaretur." *In XII Metaph.* comm. 41, fol. 324v2 (K). "... ut id, quod non habet naturam essendi aeternum, acquirat aeternitatem ab alio. Et totum hoc est impossibile. Natura enim generabilis, et corruptibilis, non recipit aeternitatem ab alio." *De Subst. Orbis*, c. 1; fol. 5vb (K).

¹⁴ CG, I, 20, Et ideo. Cf. above, n. 10.

¹⁵ In the heavenly bodies no capability for substantial change was recognized: "... per hoc quod in materia non sit potentia ad aliam formam, sed tota materiae possibilitas ad unam formam terminetur; sicut est in corporibus caelestibus, in quibus non est formarum contrarietas." *De Pot.*, V, 3c. Otherwise, bodies are capable of non-existence: "Illae ergo solae res in sua natura possibilitatem habent ad non esse, in quibus est materia contrarietati subiecta. Aliis vero rebus secundum suam naturam competit necessitas essendi, possibilitate non essendi ab earum natura sublata." *Ibid.* On the immediate background in Avicenna and Averroes, see above, n. 8.

this capacity for non-existence the conclusion is drawn. They cannot in the course of nature acquire perpetuity of existence from anything else.

More seriously still, the force of the argument seems to reside in the consideration that motion is continually coming from an external efficient cause while existence is not. This is readily applicable to the heavenly bodies in an Aristotelian metaphysics, but hardly in the existential metaphysics of Aquinas. For Aquinas all existence that is not subsistent, and accordingly all eviternal and all temporal existence, is being continually imparted by the first efficient cause. Just as aptly as motion it may be regarded as a *defluxus* from an efficient cause into an effect.¹⁶ Is there any other discussion of the Averroistic contrast that will clarify Aquinas' personal attitude towards it?

A somewhat longer discussion of the topic does occur in the *Commentary on the Physics*.¹⁷ The position of Averroes is stated in its basic lines:

... impossibile est quod aliquid acquirat perpetuitatem essendi ab aliquo quia sequeretur quod id quod in se est corruptibile fieret aeternum. Sed perpetuitatem motus potest aliquid acquirere ab altero: eo quod motus est actus mobilis a movente (no. 2487).

The reason why something mobile can acquire perpetuity of movement from another emerges clearly enough from these words. Movement is an actuality that comes from a movent. If the movent keeps imparting the motion perpetually, it accounts for the unceasing duration. But why will not the same hold in regard to existence? Why could not an external cause keep imparting existence to the thing forever? The reason reported for the Averroistic tenet is that what in itself is perishable would become eternal. On Scriptural grounds¹⁸ the notion that something perishable can be made imperishable by divine omnipotence is a Christian belief, and accepted by Aquinas. Without qualification, the reason as given can hardly be convincing for him. Moreover, he is in general agreement with Averroes that while sublunar bodies are in themselves perishable, the heavenly bodies are not.¹⁹ Yet the whole bearing of the present discussion is on the heavenly bodies. Granted that the heavenly bodies did receive existence

¹⁶ So eviternal duration results from an *influxus*: "... recipiunt durationem ex influxu primi principii." *ST*, I, 10, 6c. In general, the action of an efficient cause on the passum may be called an *influxus*: "sicut id quod est in actu, agit in id quod est in potentia; et huiusmodi actio dicitur influxus." *Quodl.*, III, 7c.

¹⁷ In *VIII Phys.*, lect. 21, Angeli-Pirotta, nos. 2486-2498.

¹⁸ "... ut non excludamus omnipotentiam Dei per quam corruptibile hoc potest induere incorruptionem: quod nunc discutere ad propositum non pertinet." *Ibid.*, no. 2494. The Scriptural passage is *I Cor.*, 15, 53.

¹⁹ See above, n. 8.

from something else, and that the existence was perpetual, how would the conclusion follow for either Averroes or Aquinas that something perishable in itself would become eternal? The conclusion could not follow. Yet that is the consequence brought forward to show the impossibility of acquiring perpetual existence from an external agent. Is the basic force of the reason, then, to be found rather in the Aristotelian metaphysical view that the heavens are eternal and ingenerate, in the sense that they cannot receive existence at all? In this setting, the question of receiving perpetuity of existence from another could arise only in the case of sublunar bodies. It would seem meant to bypass the tenet that all created existence comes from a first cause.

This Aristotelian background seems in fact to be the operative consideration as the reason of Averroes is spelled out in the immediately following lines. The reason means that the heavenly bodies *do not need* to acquire perpetuity of existence from something else. Does not this presuppose that they are regarded as having it already, of themselves? The question of acquiring it, then, would be limited to things that are generated and are capable of perishing. No such capacity is present in the heavenly bodies:

Dicit ergo, quod in corpore caelesti, quantum est de se, non est aliqua potentia ad non esse, quia eius substantiae non est aliquid contrarium; sed in ipso est aliqua potentia ad quietem, quia motui eius contrariatur quies. Et inde est, quod non indiget acquirere perpetuitatem essendi ab alio, sed perpetuitatem motus ab alio acquirere indiget.²⁰

The last sentence states clearly enough that a heavenly body needs to acquire perpetuity of movement from something else, but not perpetuity of existence. The basis for the assertion about movement was that movement comes from something else. Is not the parallel presupposition, then, that the existence of the heavenly bodies does *not* come from something else? If St Thomas is understanding the situation in this way, do not his reports make an entirely consistent picture? He adds (nos. 2490-2491) some sharp criticisms of the Averroistic constitution of the heavenly bodies, and insists that even if one could admit this way of conceiving them they would still be potentialities for existence:

Omnis ergo substantia quae est post primam substantiam simplicem participat esse. Omne autem participans componitur ex participante et participato, et participans est in potentia ad participatum. Ergo substantia quantumcumque simplex post primam substantiam simplicem est potentia essendi (no. 2491).

²⁰ In *VIII Phys.*, lect. 21, no. 2488. Cf. Averroes: "... ipsum existens per se, absque eo quod aliud largiatur ipsi permanentiam, et aeternitatem, ..." *De Subst. Orbis*, c. 2; fol. 6vb (K).

This means unmistakably that the heavenly bodies receive their existence from the primary simple substance, God. St Thomas can allow no other way of understanding the existence of created things within the framework of his own metaphysical thought. For the purposes of argument he can grant for the moment the Averroistic notion of the constitution of the heavenly bodies,²¹ and still make the reservation from his own viewpoint that a celestial body is a potentiality for the reception of existence from something else. He insists that Averroes was a victim of deception by the multisignificant character of potentiality, for sometimes potentiality is open to opposites and at other times it is not: "Deceptus autem fuit *per aequivocationem potentiae*. Nam potentia quandoque se habet ad opposita. ... Non enim omnis potentia est oppositorum" (no. 2492). Does not this mean that Averroes is completely missing a type of potentiality that is present in the heavenly bodies? True, the heavenly bodies have no potentiality for non-existence. In that, Aquinas is in full agreement with Averroes against Avicenna.²² Yet because they receive their existence from God, they are potentialities for existence. Is not the implication here that to deny them potentiality to existence is to deny that they have received their existence from another? Does it not mean that the Averroistic tenet involves the non-creation of the heavenly bodies, that it regards them as existent of themselves while moved by another?

In point of fact, St Thomas alleges inconsistency in this tenet with the doctrine of Averroes as expressed elsewhere:

Omne enim quod non est suum esse participat esse a causa prima, quae est suum esse. Unde et ipse confitetur in libro *de Substantia Orbis*, quod Deus est causa caeli non solum quantum ad motum eius, sed etiam quantum ad substantiam ipsius; quod non est nisi quia ab eo habet esse. Non autem habet ab eo esse nisi perpetuum. Habet ergo perpetuitatem ab alio. Et in hoc etiam consonant verba eius, qui dicit in *V Metaphys.*, et supra in principio huius *Octavi*, quod quaedam sunt necessaria quae habent causam suae necessitatis.

Hoc ergo supposito, plana est solutio secundum intentionem *Alexandri*, quod sicut corpus caeleste habet moveri ab alio, ita et esse.²³

From this viewpoint, therefore, the reception of motion and the reception of existence are on the same footing. That is the conclusion Aquinas

²¹ "... dicit ipsum esse materiam actu existentem et formam eius dicit animam ipsius; ita tamen quod non constituatur in esse per formam, sed solum in moveri." St Thomas, *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 21, no. 2489. Cf. Averroes, *De Subst. Orbis*, cf. 2; fol. 7rb (E). The expression "materia existens in actu" may be seen in the text cited from the *De Subst. Orbis*, above, n. 12.

²² See texts above, nn. 8 and 15.

²³ *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 21, nos. 2495-2496. On Averroes' acceptance of "omnis res est corruptibilis praeter faciem eius," as taught by the Koran, see *De Subst. Orbis*, c. 7; fol. 14rb-v2.

approves, a conclusion that is the opposite of the Averroistic tenet here, yet, Aquinas claims, the conclusion required by the teaching of Averroes elsewhere. Again, St Thomas seems to be understanding the Averroistic tenet here as implying that just as the heavenly bodies cannot receive perpetuity of existence from another, they cannot receive existence itself from another. In a word, they are here regarded as independently existent. That is the implication of this viewpoint.

From other viewpoints, however, there are in a heavenly body differences between potentiality for motion and potentiality for existence. First, potentiality for motion is open to opposites, and even in the heavenly bodies to locations that are opposite (no. 2497), while potentiality for existence need not be potentiality for non-existence. More important for the present considerations, a further difference is that movement is of its very nature temporal, while existence, though it can be temporal, is so only insofar as it is conditioned by movement:

Nam motus secundum se cadit in tempore, esse vero non cadit in tempore, sed solum secundum quod subiacet motui. Si ergo sit aliquod esse quod non subiacet motui, illud esse nullo modo cadit sub tempore. Potentia ergo quae est ad moveri in tempore infinito respicit infinitatem temporis directe et per se; sed potentia quae est ad esse tempore infinito, si quidem illud esse sit transmutabile, respicit quantitatem temporis; et ideo maior virtus requiritur ad hoc quod aliquid duret in esse transmutabili maiori tempore. Sed potentia quae est respectu esse intransmutabilis, nullo modo respicit quantitatem temporis; unde magnitudo vel infinitas temporis nihil facit ad infinitatem vel magnitudinem potentiae respectu talis esse.²⁴

In the context of the present discussion, accordingly, there is full room for a type of existence that is changeable and conditioned by temporal extension. This should mean that it never remains fixed or still, but is always progressing towards the future. It is possible in the context, therefore, to hold that existence is of itself fixed and still, and yet as found in material things is incessantly changing.

How does this discussion of the same topic in the *Commentary on the Physics* affect the interpretation of the passage in the *Contra Gentiles*? First of all, it shows satisfactorily that St Thomas is not accepting the stand that the perpetual motion of the heavens is caused while their perpetual existence is not caused. This stand he unhesitatingly refuses to admit. But according

²⁴ In *VIII Phys.*, lect. 21, no. 2498. Cf.: cum esse illud invariabile non attingatur a tempore nisi per accidens." *CG*, I, 20, Et ideo (no. 3). This philosophical conception of the respective kinds of duration makes clear the rationale of the traditional Christian custom of praying for people long dead — there is no reason why a moment of time now or decades later should not be equally contemporary with an eviternal situation.

to Averroes, the text runs,²⁵ perpetuity of movement may be received from something else, though not perpetuity of existence. In contrast to existence, the motion as an influx from the movent is not possessed by the mobile thing on its own strength. Does not this contrast indicate that St Thomas is projecting his assertion into a setting in which the existent in question — here the heavenly body — has existence of itself? The text in the *Contra Gentiles* (I, 20, Procredit) runs: “perpetuitatem motus, quam non habet de se. Esse autem est aliquid fixum et quietum in ente...” Does not this contrast strongly suggest that instead of an influx that a thing does not have of itself, existence is something fixed and still that it does have of itself? If so, Aquinas is not giving any personal commitment to the assertion, but is merely continuing his report of Averroes’ reasoning. It is reasoning that fits neatly enough into the Aristotelian metaphysics, in which the heavens were ingenerate. Their motion, accordingly, would be an influx *into* them from an efficient cause. Their existence, in contrast, would be something fixed and stable *in* them, without coming from any external agent.

That Aquinas for the sake of argument is able to put himself into the position of his adversary for the moment has already been noted.²⁶ That he can so allow the position just considered is shown in the conclusion of the discussion in the *Commentary on the Physics*:

Dato ergo per impossibile, quod corpus caeleste non haberet esse ab alio, adhuc non potest ex perpetuitate ipsius concludi quod in eo esset virtus infinita.²⁷

If this is the case, why can he not in the *Contra Gentiles* be merely reporting a presupposition of the Averroistic reasoning when he calls existence something fixed and stable in the existent? The conclusion follows then, as Averroes says, that what of itself is capable of non-existence cannot acquire perpetuity of existence from another, in the course of nature: “et ideo quod de se est in potentia ad non esse, non potest, ut ipse dicit, secundum viam naturae acquirere ab alio perpetuitatem essendi” (*CG*, I, 20, Procredit).

In this interpretation the notion “aliquid fixum et quietum in ente” would express strict opposition to any “defluxus a movente.” Motion has to be caused by an outsider, existence does not have this requirement. So if a thing is of itself capable of non-existence, the influence of an outsider cannot change this condition. Unlike motion, which of its nature depends upon an efficient cause, existence as something fixed and settled rises above

²⁵ *CG*, I, 20, Procredit. Cf. *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 21, no. 2487, and Averroes text above, n. 7.

²⁶ Above, n. 21.

²⁷ *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 21, no. 2498. Cf. *CG*, I, 20, Et ideo.

any such dependence. It cannot in the natural order of things be made perpetual by the working of an external cause. The opposition here is clearly between the traditional Greek conceptions of becoming and being. Becoming is flux, being is the definitely fixed and permanent.

In its context, accordingly, the lone statement of St Thomas that existence is something fixed and stable allows itself to be read frankly as the presupposition of an Averroistic tenet. Yet one hesitates to believe that this is the whole story. Each of the premises in the above reasoning seems worded in a way that would make it acceptable to St Thomas himself. Would he have any hesitation in agreeing that existence is of its nature something eternally stable? Where existence is found as a nature, namely in God, it is something eternally unchangeable. Likewise is he not in full accord with the stand that a material element open to other forms makes a substance contingent, that is, capable of non-existence? He is able to maintain this as holding in the natural course of things, even with the reservation, irrelevant for the present consideration, that supernaturally a perishable body may be rendered imperishable.²⁸ But can these premises, in the sense in which he himself accepts them, justify the conclusion that there is no natural way in which existence can be imparted in perpetuity to a material thing in the sublunar world? If for St Thomas existence in all creatures has to be imparted just as motion has to be, why cannot a material thing, like the corpse of Lenin, be given perpetual existence through the activity of an efficient cause? In a word, is the Averroistic tenet defensible also in the framework of Aquinas' own metaphysical thought?

III

The answer to this question obviously calls for a glance at the overall metaphysical view of St Thomas in regard to the main issues at stake. In the *Commentary on the Sentences*, a discussion of the type of duration found in eternity uses the parallelism of movement as the actuality of the mobile thing, and existence as the actuality of the existent insofar as it is being: "Sicut autem motus est actus ipsius mobilis inquantum mobile est; ita esse est actu existentis, inquantum ens est." Immediately before this statement, a mobile thing was shown to vary in its existence as moment succeeds moment in time:

... sicut est idem mobile secundum substantiam in toto motu, variatum tamen secundum esse, sicut dicitur quod Socrates in foro est alter a seipso

²⁸ See above, n. 18.

in domo; ita nunc est etiam idem secundum substantiam in tota successione temporis, variatum tantum secundum esse, scilicet secundum rationem quam accepit prioris et posterioris.²⁹

Duration had already been shown to take place according as something is in actuality, and therefore differs in correspondence to the different ways in which a thing is actual:

Duratio autem omnis attenditur secundum quod aliquid est in actu: tamdiu enim res durare dicitur quamdiu in actu est, et nondum est in potentia. Esse autem in actu contingit dupliciter. Aut secundum hoc quod actus ille est incompletus, et potentiae permixtus, ratione cuius ulterius in actum procedit, et talis actus est motus; ... Aut secundum quod actus non est permixtus potentiae, nec additionem recipiens perfectionis; et talis actus est actus quietus et permanens.³⁰

The force of the adjective *quietus* becomes apparent from this text. It implies permanent actuality, in contrast to the flux of motion. It means that the actuality is not mixed with potentiality, that it is not incomplete, that it is not receiving any addition of perfection. But there are two ways in which a thing can be in this type of actuality:

Esse autem in tali actu contingit dupliciter. Vel ita quod ipsum esse actu, quod res habet, sit sibi acquisitum ab alio; et tunc res habens tale esse est potentialis respectu huius actus, quem tamen perfectum accepit. Vel esse actu est rei ex seipsa, ita quod est de ratione quidditatis suae; et tale esse est esse divinum, in quo non est aliqua potentialitas respectu huius actus.³¹

²⁹ In *I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 2, a. 2, Solut.; I, 470. In the Aristotelian source, *Ph.*, IV 11, 219b18-23, "the sophists assume that Coriscus' being in the Lyceum is a different thing from Coriscus' being in the market-place" (Oxford tr.). "Being" here quite obviously refers to the accident of place, for which the examples given in the *Categories*, 4, 2a1-2, are "in the Lyceum" and "in the market place." In St Thomas (*loc. cit.*), however, *esse* is here expressly pinpointed to the "actus existentis, inquantum ens est."

³⁰ In *I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 2, a. 1, Solut.; I, 466-467. Cf.: "... ad significandum quietem divini esse; illud enim dicimus possidere, quod quiete et plene habemus." *Ibid.*, d. 8, q. 2, a. 1, ad 6m; I, 203. "... et quia illi sunt in plena participatione aeternae lucis, et quietis, et aeternitatis, ideo decet caelum empyreum lucidum, immobile et incorruptibile esse." In *II Sent.*, d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, Solut.; II, 73.

In accord with the Aristotelian background, the actuality from which the discussion starts is movement. It is this actuality that is shown to be variable and successive in nature. It conditions the existence of temporal things correspondingly; see texts above, nn. 4 and 24, and below, n. 35. Cf.: "Quaedam autem sic recedunt a permanentia essendi, quod esse eorum est subiectum transmutationis, vel in transmutatione consistit; et huiusmodi mensurantur tempore, sicut omnis motus, et etiam esse omnium corruptibilem." *ST*, I, 10, 5c. See also *ST*, I, 9, 2, ad 3m; *De Ver.*, XXI, 4, ad 7m (text below, n. 45).

³¹ In *I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 2, a. 1, Solut.; I, 467. That the existence of God is "de ratione quidditatis suae" is protected in advance against the Cartesian notion of "causa sui." Though the term "cause" might be used in this connection, it can hardly meet with full approval: "Posset etiam

The duration corresponding to the divine being, the text goes on, is eternity. The duration corresponding to existence that is received into a potentiality as a perfect or complete actuality, is not eternity but eviternity.³² Even though a thing might have existence without beginning and without end, it still would not be eternal if the existence were received from an efficient cause.³³ Finally, the duration corresponding to existence conditioned by motion is time:

... tempus per se est mensura motus primi; unde esse rerum temporalium non mensuratur tempore nisi prout subiacet variationi ex motu caeli. Unde dicit Commentator, IV *Physic.*, quod sentimus tempus, secundum quod percipimus nos esse in esse variabili ex motu caeli.³⁴

dici, quamvis non ita bene, quod causa communiter accipitur pro omni eo quod est etiam prius secundum rationem: cum enim essentia divina secundum intellectum sit prius quam esse suum, et esse prius quam aeternitas, sicut mobile est prius motu, et motus prior tempore; dicitur ipse Deus esse causa suae aeternitatis secundum modum intelligendi, quamvis ipse sit sua aeternitas secundum rem." *Ibid.*, ad 1m; p. 468.

³² "Aeviternity" and "aeviternal" are obsolete words in English, while "aevum," though used, has never been naturalized; see *Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. "Eviternity," however, is recognized without qualification. This would seem to require, in technical discussion, the revival of the adjective "eviternal." The root notion of the Latin *aevum* is duration; see Ernout-Meillet, *Dict. Etym.*, s.v. On the medieval understanding of the term, cf.: "Et dicta aetas, quasi aevitas, id est similitudo aevi. Nam aevum est aetas perpetua, cuius neque initium neque extremum noscitur, quod Graeci vocant *αἰῶνας*; quod aliquando apud eos pro saeculo, aliquando pro aeterno ponitur." Isidore of Seville, *Etymol.*, V, 38, 4. Cf. "ab aevo dictus, id est ab antiquitate." *Ibid.*, IX, 5, 9.

³³ *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 2, a. 1, Solut.; I, 466. The distinction, as seen by St Thomas, is rooted in his metaphysical notion of existence. He is well aware that the distinction is not traditional: "non inveniuntur auctores antiqui multum curasse de differentia aevi et aeternitatis." *Ibid.*, ad 1m, p. 468. "... doctores parum loquuntur de differentia aevi et aeternitatis." *In II Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, Solut.; II, 64.

³⁴ *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4m; I, 469. The type of intellection by which the *esse variabile* is originally grasped is for St Thomas the activity of judgment, not that of conceptualization. As the apprehension or understanding that something exists, judgment is for him a synthesizing cognitive activity that knows by synthesizing and that synthesizes by knowing. It is accordingly a type of intellection that corresponds in structure to the ever changing synthesis in which the existence of temporal things consists. The Thomistic texts in this regard may be found gathered in my article "Diversity and Community of Being in St Thomas Aquinas," *Mediaeval Studies*, 22 (1960), 284-295. The importance of grasping that the fact that something exists is the existential actuality of the thing, the component that actuates the essence, can hardly be overstated. L. Sweeney, in *The Modern Schoolman*, 45 (1968), 146, states that the term *existence* "can stand for the component just mentioned, but it also can directly signify merely the fact that something does exist." Yet in both cases the term is standing for the same actuality. "That something does exist" expresses the actuality in the way it was originally grasped through judgment. Existential "component," existential actuality or perfection, and other notions signified by simple terms, express the same actuality as it is subsequently conceptualized by the intellect for purposes of discourse and communication. For another attempt to read a distinction between

St Thomas, in accord with the formulae established by the Aristotelian text, speaks regularly of time as the measure of motion. Yet, as can be seen from the above text, he understands this to imply that the existence of temporal things is measured by time, insofar as their existence is conditioned by the regular motion caused in sublunar things by the heavens. The reason can be seen in the way existence is determined and specified by the potentiality into which it is received:

... sicut esse, secundum rationem intelligendi, consequitur principia ipsius entis quasi causas; ita etiam mensura entis se habet ad mensuram essendi secundum rationem causae (*ibid.*, a. 2, ad 3m; I, 472).

Accordingly time measures existence insofar as existence varies through motion:

In materia autem prima secundum essentiam non est aliqua multitudo, sed solum secundum esse, et secundum hoc esse non est una in pluribus; unde nec tempus materiae secundum essentiam suam respondet, sed solum esse, secundum quod variatur per motum (*In II Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 2, Solut.; II, 67).

In this continuous variation the "now" that measures the existent³⁵ is always flowing:

... 'nunc' numquam intelligitur ut stans, sed semper ut fluens; non autem ut fluens a priori, nisi motus praecedat, sed in posterius; nec iterum in posterius, sed a priori, nisi motus sequatur. Unde si nunquam sequeretur vel praecederet motus, 'nunc' non esset 'nunc'; et hoc patet in motu particulari, qui sensibilibus incipit, cujus quodlibet momentum est fluens, ... (*ibid.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 5, ad 6m; II, 35).

What these passages make clear is that the notion *quietus* when applied to existence expresses the perfect and complete possession of an actuality, as in God and in the eternal beings. It is directly contrasted with temporal existence, existence conditioned by motion, going on to further perfection, but always incomplete and imperfect in itself. Temporal existence always lacks something of itself: "Esse autem nostrum habet aliquid sui extra se: deest enim aliquod quod jam de ipso praeteriit, et quod futurum est" (*In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, Solut.; I, 195). Against this background, is there any possibility that the statement of the *Contra Gentiles*, "esse autem est aliquid fixum et quietum in ente," should apply to temporal existence? Rather, is not its bearing restricted to existence that is invariable, as in the heavens?

"bare factuality" and "the actuality of all acts," see Vincent P. Branick, "The Unity of the Divine Ideas," *The New Scholasticism*, 42 (1968), 193.

³⁵ "Unde quaecumque mensura mensuretur esse alicujus rei, ipsi rei existenti respondet nunc ipsius durationis, quasi mensura." *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 2, a. 2, Solut.; I, 470-471.

Provision for this restricted application seems to have been made in the preceding context of the *Contra Gentiles*: "Esse autem non habet aliquam extensionem quantitatis: praecipue in re cuius esse est invariabile, sicut caelum" (I, 20, Et ideo). In contrast to motion, then, existence of its nature is something unchangeable. It is not of itself a flux, as is motion, and accordingly does not call for the quantitative extension of a flux. Where it is found in its own nature, in God, it is invariable and eternal. Where it is found in an imperishable nature, as in angels or the heavens, it follows the condition of that nature; it is invariable and eviternal. Is not this sufficient for the statement that existence does not have quantitative extension, understanding the statement to apply principally to eternal and eviternal beings? Does it not justify the unqualified assertion that existence is something fixed and stable in the existent? That is what existence in its own nature indicates. But it leaves room for another type of existence, existence conditioned by motion and measured by time. Existence, in a word, is participated in accord with the potentiality in which it is received. Where this potentiality is changeable, the existence itself will be subject to variation.

IV

But if for St Thomas truth is based upon existence,³⁶ how can there be any stable truth in temporal things? Will truth in them likewise have to be fluid, always changing, never remaining the same? Would not this ruin all possibility of rational discourse and of speech, as Plato showed in the *Parmenides* (135 BC)? Would it not be self-destructive as a positive, overall assertion? In point of fact the answer of Aquinas, given in the framework of existence that has just been studied, seems to go further than this in extending the changing nature of truth even to the eviternal order. In creatures, he asserts, there patently is no necessary truth:

Similiter de mutabilitate veritatis idem dicendum est quod de mutabilitate essendi; ut enim supra dictum est, simpliciter immutabile non est nisi esse divinum; unde simpliciter immutabilis veritas non est nisi una, scilicet divina. Esse autem aliarum rerum quarumdam dicitur mutabile mutatione variabilitatis, sicut est in contingentibus; et horum etiam veritas mutabilis est et contingens. Quorumdam vero esse est mutabile solum secundum vertibilitatem in nihil, si sibi relinqueretur; et horum veritas similiter mutabilis

³⁶ "Cum enim ratio veritatis in actione compleatur intellectus, et fundamentum habeat ipsum esse rei; iudicium de veritate sequitur iudicium de esse rei et de intellectu." *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 3, Solut.; I, 495. On stable truth in propositions, see *De Ver.*, I, 6, ad 2m and ad 4m.

est per vertibilitatem in nihil, si sibi relinqueretur. Unde patet quod nulla veritas est necessaria in creaturis.³⁷

Truth, this text maintains, follows the condition of the existence on which it is based. In contingent things, that is, sublunar things that have matter as a substantial principle, the existence is changeable in the sense of "variable." "Variable" in this context is contrasted with the type of change possible for eviternal things. It refers to existence that is conditioned by time and measured by motion, as has been already seen.³⁸

Even things that are necessary beings but have a cause of their necessity,³⁹ are unable to ground necessary truth. The inference from this would be that "necessary existence" applies only to existence that subsists. There existence itself is the nature. Other things, in spite of their status as necessary beings because they lack matter for change, do not have necessary existence. Their existence is changeable, in the sense just outlined. Correspondingly their truth is changeable, for it is grounded on their existence.

Nevertheless, the notions formed by the mind are imperishable and eternal:

Sicut enim dicimus de universalibus, quod sunt incorruptibilia et aeterna quia non corrumpuntur nisi per accidens, scilicet quantum ad esse quod habent, in alio, quod potest non esse; ita etiam est de veritate et falsitate, quod consideratae secundum intentiones suas, non accidunt eis corruptio per se, sed solum secundum esse quod habent in alio (*In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 3, ad 3m; I, 496-497).

The notions (*intentiones*) that the mind abstracts from variable things, then, may be regarded as imperishable and even as eternal. The same holds for truth and falsehood in general. They exist in a mind, and can lose that existence if the mind ceases to exist or stops thinking about them. But as universal, they rise above the limitations of temporal or eviternal existence. It is in that sense that they make possible rational discourse and speech. The essential determination of essence by form, then, allows full scope for truth as something fixed and stable in perishable things. The determining form is sufficient to ground universality and permanence in the midst of temporal flux.

From one point of view, then, truth in contingent things is historical. It is based upon existence that varies in time, and that accordingly gives it its historicity. From another standpoint, however, one always has to

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 495-496. On the notion "vertibilitas in nihil," see *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 3, a. 2, Solut.; I, 214.

³⁸ See above, nn. 29, 30, 34 and 35.

³⁹ See above, nn. 8 and 13.

philosophize above time. Any reasoning process, any rational discourse, any communication through speech, depends upon the universal. It is characterized by something that rises above the limitations of space and time. The ultimate reason for this is that a nature in its absolute consideration antecedes any created existence, real or cognitional.⁴⁰ Relations among concepts are no exception: "Ideo enim Socrates est rationalis, quia homo est rationalis, et non e converso; unde dato quod Socrates et Plato non essent, adhuc humanae naturae rationalitas competeret" (*Quodl.*, VIII, 1c). There is little difficulty in seeing how this doctrine can be extended to any conditionalized proposition. Every essence, in a word, determines its existence in a definite kind, no matter how flowing the existence may be.

V

To return to the interpretation of the statement that existence is something fixed and stable in the existent, the adhesion of St Thomas himself to it may now be probed in the light of the foregoing considerations. Clearly existence is for him something stable and unchangeable in its own nature, even though it is found as a nature only in God. Just as clearly he is in agreement with Averroes that anything of itself capable of non-existence cannot acquire perpetuity of existence from another, if the condition "in the course of nature" is added. But how can he make his own the inference that because existence is something fixed and stable a contingent thing cannot acquire perpetual existence from another?

The contrasted situation with motion is easy enough to understand. Motion is something that of its nature has to flow from another. If a substance has perpetual existence, as in the case of a heavenly body, what is there against its receiving motion perpetually from an external cause? Whether its perpetual existence is caused or uncaused, is beside the point for the moment. The proposition that it can receive perpetual motion from another is acceptable to both Aquinas and Averroes. Motion is of its nature a flux. There is nothing in its nature to keep it from going on forever. Accordingly there is no reason why it may not be received perpetually from a movent.

But does the fixity and stability of existence justify equally well in both thinkers the conclusion that anything with potentiality in itself for non-existence cannot receive existence perpetually from another? In the Aristotelian setting there is no problem. Being, in contrast to becoming,

⁴⁰ *Quodl.*, VIII, 1c. Cf. *ibid.*, ad 3m.

is caused by form.⁴¹ Form is something definite and terminal. It may readily be called fixed and stable. Where the form can be lost on account of the potentiality of the matter in which it inheres, the composite is able to lose its being. No further problem of existence arises in this context. The type of form is determined and stable in its exigencies for its appropriate matter. If the appropriate matter renders the composite capable of perishing, no external cause can change that condition of its nature. Knowledge of entropy or of atomic incineration was not needed to establish the conclusion that given all possible circumstances the matter would some time lose the one form and take on another. In the nature of things no efficient cause could prevent this. The position (*sicut ponebatur*) of Averroes, accordingly, was that nothing capable of non-existence could acquire perpetuity of existence from another.

In St Thomas, concomitantly, existence where not subsisting as a nature requires determination by the potentiality that receives it.⁴² Even though it is being imparted by an efficient cause, it retains the specification given it by the essence it actuates. If that is an essence with potentiality for substantial change, as in sublunar things, it stamps the condition of contingency upon the existence. In the natural course of things circumstances will come about in which the composite will perish. In nature there is no way of its receiving perpetuity of existence from the causes that conserve it. The provision about the course of nature (*secundum viam naturae*) leaves open for St Thomas the possibility that perishable things become imperishable in the supernatural order. With this safeguard, why can he not conclude, from his own conception of the stability of existence, that it is impossible, as Averroes says, for essentially perishable things to receive perpetual existence from an external cause?

The reason for mentioning the subject seems natural enough. In the preceding section (*CG*, I, 20, *Hanc autem*) Aquinas had been speaking of this position of Averroes, that what of itself has possibility for non-existence cannot acquire from another the perpetuity of existence. It was a recognized position, and Aquinas agreed with its insights even though his own conception of existence differed radically from that of Averroes. A moment later Aquinas has occasion to show that a thing can receive perpetuity of motion from something else. The parallelism with the doctrine found rejected shortly before, in the reasoning of Averroes, could hardly escape his mind. Hence the rider is added to make clear that the position of Averroes may still be respected along with the present tenet about motion.

⁴¹ See Aristotle, *Metaph.*, Z 17, 1041b26-28. Cf. 9, 1034a30-32.

⁴² "Unde non sic determinatur *esse* per aliud sicut *potentia* per *actum*, sed magis sicut *actus* per *potentiam*." *De Pot.*, VII, 2, ad 9m. Cf. above, n. 4.

Yet the Averroistic tenet is respected by St Thomas without the Averroistic presupposition that a heavenly body has no potentiality for existence, but only for location — “est enim in corpore caelesti, secundum Aristotelem, in VIII *Metaph.*, potentia ad ubi, sed non ad esse.”⁴³ Fully retaining his own conception of the heavenly substance as a potentiality for sharing in existence, as his longer discussion of the Averroistic tenet makes evident,⁴⁴ St Thomas is able to see a consequence following from the “fixed and stable” nature of existence in both ways of thinking. Just as in his use of the Aristotelian argument from motion to show the existence of separate substance, so here also he is able to see a skeleton form of reasoning that is valid in both contexts, no matter how much the existence parameter varies. Further, the “fixed and stable” nature of existence does not prevent it from being received into an essentially mobile substance, as in sublunar things. Here the existence is variable, and is unhesitatingly named *esse transmutabile* in the discussion of the Averroistic tenet.⁴⁵ Instead of being terminal, this type of existence is always imperfect and incomplete, always going on to more, always progressing from past through present into the future. “Esse autem est aliquid fixum et quietum in ente” describes well enough the nature of existence, and the essential determination of existence by form. But in the context in which it was asserted it leaves intact the temporal and ever flowing condition of the existence immediately encountered by the human kind in the things of the sensible world.

The meaning of the Thomistic passage, then, seems clear enough. There is no inconsistency in the position of Averroes. A thing capable of rest can receive perpetual motion, but a thing capable of non-existence cannot naturally receive perpetual existence. The reason is given. Motion of its nature is always open to continuation by the movent. Existence, on the contrary, is in its own nature something already determined. The suppressed premise is that where existence is received into a potentiality, it is determined by a form. Where the form determines a thing to be material and contingent, nothing on the level of nature can render its existence perpetual.

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⁴³ *CG*, I, 20, Hanc autem. Cf. *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 21, nos. 2496-2497.

⁴⁴ *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 21, nos. 2486-2498. See texts above, nn. 17-24.

⁴⁵ See text above, n. 24. Cf. “Unde secundum quod aliquod esse recedit a permanentia essendi et subditur transmutationi, secundum hoc recedit ab aeternitati et subditur tempori. Esse ergo rerum corruptibilium, quia est transmutabile, non mensuratur aeternitate, sed tempore. Tempus enim mensurat non solum quae transmutantur in actu, sed quae sunt transmutabilia. Unde non solum mensurat motum, sed etiam quietem, quae est eius quod natum est moveri, et non movetur.” *ST*, I, 10, 4, ad 3m. “Esse autem creaturae dicitur esse per quamdam similitudinem ad illud primum esse, cum habeat permixtionem eius quod est futurum esse vel fuisse, ratione mutabilitatis creaturae.” *De Ver.*, XXI, 4, ad 7m.

A New Way to God: Henry of Ghent (II)

ANTON C. PEGIS

I

IF Article 22 of the *Summa* of Henry of Ghent, written some ten years after St. Thomas' death, is a landmark in the history of natural theology, it is surely a perplexing one. The teaching in Article 22 is not perplexing because of the new doctrinal alliance it forges between St. Augustine and Avicenna, or between truth and the teaching of Avicenna; nor is it perplexing as a conservative theological reaction against the Averroistic insistence that the starting point of all proofs of God is the world of motion and therefore that physics, not metaphysics, is the science that proves the existence of God. What is perplexing is how much Henry rejects as inadequate, and what he does after his rejection. For in Article 22, Question 5, he rejects not only the Aristotelian way to God, but also the *a posteriori* ways followed by St. Augustine: he rejects, in other words, the argument from motion in the *Physics*, leading to a separate prime mover, and the arguments of St. Augustine leading to a supreme beauty in the *De Vera Religione* and to a supreme wisdom in the second book of the *De Libero Arbitrio*. Henry certainly acknowledges that these arguments are valid, indeed *irrefragabiliter* so; but as arguments for God *ex testificatione sensibilium* they have a serious shortcoming: they do not reach God in His uniqueness. This is the reason for the new — and Avicennian — proof of God, barely sketched in Question 5, proceeding, not *ex testificatione sensibilium*, but *ex propositionibus universalibus*.¹ The new proof is *a priori*, not *a posteriori*. If, like the proofs in Question 4, it is *ex sensibilibus creaturis*, it is not from the testimony of the *esse creaturae* to the *esse dei*; it is, within the transcendentals, from *ens hoc* and *bonum hoc* to *ens* and *bonum* taken absolutely, God.

How this metaphysical argumentation works — its *modus* — Henry of Ghent set aside for discussion in Article 25, dealing with the divine unity. But the presumed advantages and the historical origins of the new way to God — new, at least, in Christian theology as of the last two decades of the thirteenth century — are already visible in Article 22, Question 5.

¹ See A. C. Pegis, "Toward a New Way to God: Henry of Ghent" *Mediaeval Studies*, 30 (1968), 226-247.

The *a posteriori* arguments of Question 4 had proved that God exists, that it is necessary to say *Deus est*; the *a priori* argument of Question 5 proves that *Deus est esse*. The whole meaning of the divine transcendence is at stake in this difference. Had Aristotle proved more than that the separate prime mover was beyond the universe, and that several prime movers were possible? Have we, therefore, Henry wonders, a proper sense of *deus est* when the proposition is affirmed *a posteriori* from the sensible universe? Do we know thereby that God is one and, what is more decisive, that there is only one God? If not, how have we reached God in His true transcendence?

There is little doubt that, in turning away from *a posteriori* proofs of God, Henry's main purpose was to avoid the theology in Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. Intelligence — and Aristotle's supreme prime mover is an intelligence — is what nature and the heavens need in order to have an origin and a model. Even when it is true that he does not know the universe, it is equally true that Aristotle's supreme prime mover is unthinkable without the existence of the universe. As Article 25 will make clear, Henry is aware of the limitations of Aristotle's notion of God — aware, concerned and even fearful in the name of Christian theology. In enabling him, as he thought, to reach an absolute God in an absolute way, Avicenna's *Metaphysics* offered Henry a philosophical instrument by which to purify the Christian theology built by his immediate predecessors of the Aristotelian world-view and its limitations. And, writing between 1275 and 1290, and in the wake of the massive condemnation of 1277, Henry followed a perfectly understandable course in seeking to create a synthesis in which the Christian God was free of the world of Aristotle. Thomas Aquinas had freed Aristotle from Averroes and Avicenna, as well as from his own ancient setting, in order to make him a spokesman for philosophical truth within Christian theology. The success of the Thomistic undertaking depended on freeing the philosophy of Aristotle in general, and the *Physics* in particular, from their historical commitments and limitations; it depended on making Aristotelianism into a spokesman for a living philosophy in the thirteenth century. But, by following the reverse procedure and identifying philosophy as such with the work of the historical Aristotle, St. Thomas' contemporaries prepared the way for the rejection of Aristotle and of the Thomistic use of Aristotle.

What is genuinely puzzling in Henry of Ghent, however, is the precise and narrow ground on which, in relation to his predecessors, he has taken his stand as a Christian thinker. A proof of God which is *ex creaturis* but not *ex testificatione sensibilium* is a new Christian phenomenon. Similarly, a proof of God that proceeds *ex via propositionum universalium intelligibilium* becomes rather difficult to grasp when Henry carefully adds, in defense

of Avicenna against the criticism of Averroes, that we derive these universal notions *ex sensibilibus creaturis* and indeed that *non est nobis omnino via ad probandum ipsum [God] esse nisi ex sensibilibus, neque etiam ad cognoscendum ipsius naturam et essentiam*.² Or, as Henry says a little later on, his new proof “*licet non sit testificationis creaturarum, quod eleganter dicit Avicenna, ortum tamen sumit a creaturis*.”³ And if it be asked how the proof takes its origin from creatures, the much used text of the *De Trinitate* of St. Augustine contains for Henry the answer. Augustine well answered the question when he said in this text: “If, when you hear this good or that good, which can on other grounds be called not good, you are able to see without the things that are good by participation the good itself by participation in which they are good — for you also understand the good itself when you hear this or that good; if, then, you are able to remove these goods and see the good in itself, you will see God.”⁴ As the same Augustine said, in the same discussion (2.3), in an even more quoted text: “God is truth. When you hear that truth exists, do not ask what truth is. Shadows of corporeal images and clouds of phantasms appear before you, and they disturb the serenity that shone upon you in the first flash when I said ‘Truth exists’. Remain in that first flash of light, if you can, by whose ray you are touched when truth is spoken; if you cannot, fall back on these ordinary earthly things.” But the Augustinian text to which Henry of Ghent returns again and again in Articles 21 to 25 is the one that he places without interruption immediately after this quotation. “But why add more and more goods? Behold *this* good and *that* good. Take away the *this* and the *that*, and see the good itself if you can: you will thus see God, who is not good by another good, but rather the good of every good.”⁵

The interpretation of the Augustinian teaching in these texts is not in question here. A reading of the whole discussion (*De Trinitate*, VIII, 2.3-3.5) makes it clear that Augustine’s purpose is not to prove the existence of God, of the absolute Truth and Good, but to free himself if he can from corporeal images and to contemplate God in His pure transcendence. The language of the text is religious and even mystical, and should be read in the light of *Confessions*, VII, 10.16-18.24. However this may be, Henry of Ghent both locates the texts from the *De Trinitate* within the transcendentals of Avicenna and uses them to elaborate the teaching of Avicenna. Consider. There are three ways, Henry argues, in which we can know that

² Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, A. 22, Q. 5, (Paris, 1520), fol. 134rv (B).

³ *Ibid.*; fol. 135r (E).

⁴ St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VIII, 3.5 (PL 42, 950); quoted by Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, *ibid.* (fol. 134v [D]).

⁵ St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VIII, 2.3. and 3.4.; quoted by Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, *ibid.*

a thing actually exists: from its presence, from its essence or nature, and from the known dependence of the existence of other things on the thing whose existence is in question. We know that a fire exists by seeing it (first way); we know the nature of fire without seeing it present (second way); we know that a fire exists in the house because we see smoke coming out of the chimney (third way⁶). In the first way, the blessed know that God exists by seeing His essence. By his natural powers, however, man can in no way arrive at seeing the divine essence. The third way Henry does not consider, but it can be only the *a posteriori* way elaborated in Question 4. The second way is the critical one. If a being is such that its existence is included in its essence, then to know its essence is to know that this being exists. But only God is such a being and only God can be so known to exist. No creature can be known to exist by knowing its essence because the essence of a creature can be known without involving the knowledge that it exists — indeed we can know at the same time that it does not exist. God alone is such that essence and existence are identical in Him. To know His essence is to know that it is a necessary existence, so that we cannot know the divine essence and also know that it does not exist. The point, then, of the second way of knowing that God exists is that, since His essence is His existence, to know His essence is to know thereby that He exists.

Secundo modo nullam rem contingit scire esse in effectu nisi quidditas sua includat suum esse existentiae, quod contingit in solo deo quia in solo deo idem sunt essentia et esse, non solum essentiae sed etiam actualis existentiae, ut dictum est supra. Igitur isto modo cognoscendi nulla creatura potest sciri esse; contingit enim scire et cognoscere essentiam cuiuslibet creaturae non cognoscendo eam esse, immo cointelligendo eam non esse. Sed solum deum possibile est scire esse sciendo eius quidditatem et essentiam, quod scilicet talis sit quod in eo idem sunt essentia et esse, et per hoc scire ex eius essentia quod sit necessaria existentia, ita quod non sit possibile intelligere eius essentiam intelligendo cum hoc ipsam non existere in effectu, ut infra videbitur; et hoc possibile est hominem scire et cognoscere de deo ex puris naturalibus, ut infra videbitur. Unde patet quod per hunc modum deus cognoscitur esse cognoscendo eius essentiam quo ad hoc quod eius essentia includit ipsum esse. In ipso enim non differunt existentia et essentia, quod in visione nuda ipsius essentiae manifestissime contemplatur.⁷

This second way of knowing that God exists is the Avicennian way, i. e. *ex via propositionum universalium intelligibilium*, non *ex via testificationis sensibilium*. These universal propositions, Henry explains, have to do with *ens*, *unum*, *bonum*, which are the first notions of reality that we have. They are

⁶ Supplied from *Summa*, A. 22, Q. 1; fol. 130r (L).

⁷ *Summa*, A. 22, Q. 5; fol. 134v (C).

the first conceived by the intellect, and in them we can perceive *ens simpliciter* and *bonum* and *verum simpliciter*. But such an absolute being, good and true is something subsistent in itself and unparticipated; and what is such is existence itself (*ipsum esse*), the good itself, truth itself: it is God Himself, according to the teaching of St. Augustine. We thus rejoin the *De Trinitate*.

Hoc, ut credo, intellexit Avicenna cum dixit quod possit homo scire deum esse ex via propositionum universalium intelligibilium, non ex via testificationis sensibilium. Sunt autem propositiones illae universales de ente, uno, et bono, et primis rerum intentionibus quae primo concipiuntur ab intellectu, in quibus potest homo percipere ens simpliciter, bonum, aut verum simpliciter. Tale autem est necessario subsistens quid in se, non in alio participatum, et quod tale est ipsum esse est, ipsum bonum est, ipsa veritas est, ipse deus est, secundum quod dicit Augustinus VIII *De Trinitate*: *deus veritas est*.⁸

We here witness a new synthesis, managed jointly by Avicenna and Augustine, leading to God, not by the testimony of sensible things, but by way of the first conceptions of the mind. This new way is not absolutely different from the *a posteriori* way from sensible things, since, in taking its origin from the knowledge of the essence of the creature, it too is from creatures. For, in this way, we understand what is true and good absolutely from the truth and goodness of the creature. Indeed, if we abstract from this and that good and then understand what is true and good absolutely, not as found in this or that being but residing in itself, in this true and good we understand God:

Et ita cum secundum Avicennam et secundum rei veritatem conceptus quanto sunt simpliciores tanto sunt priores, et ideo unum, res et talia statim imprimuntur in anima prima impressione, quae non acquiritur ex aliis notioribus se; et secundum Augustinum intelligendo ens omnis entis et bonum simpliciter omnis boni, intelligitur deus: — ideo ex talibus conceptibus propositionum universalium contingit secundum Avicennam et Augustinum intelligere et scire deum esse non ex via testificationis sensibilium, quod proculdubio verum est. Est enim iste modus alius a via cognoscendi deum esse ex testificatione sensibilium, qua esse creaturae testificatur esse dei secundum quod apparuit in quaestione praecedenti. Non tamen est omnino iste alius modus a via cognoscendi deum esse per creaturas, quia iste modus ortum sumit a cognitione essentiae creaturae. Ex veritate enim et bonitate creaturae intelligimus verum et bonum simpliciter. Si enim, abstrahendo ab hoc bono et illo possumus intelligere ipsum bonum et verum simpliciter, non ut in hoc et in illo, sed ut stans, deum in hoc intelligimus.⁹

Avicenna and Augustine are agreed on a further point. They are agreed that we can scarcely follow the way to God from this good to the absolute

⁸ *Ibid.* (D).

⁹ *Ibid.* (DE).

good because our souls are weak. Our mind, as St. Augustine has said in the *De Ordine*,¹⁰ has busied itself with sensible things and finds it difficult to return to itself. We therefore need to ground our ascent to God in creatures, as Avicenna said, and to listen with St. Augustine to the *hoc bonum* in order to rise to the *bonum simpliciter*. But, as we have already heard, there is no doubt on the superiority of this way to God over the ways followed in Question 4. The superiority in question, as we likewise know, is that when in Question 4 we concluded that *Deus est*, we did not know that the predicate *est* was *de ratione subiecti*, whereas now in Question 5, in saying *Deus est*, we know in virtue of the way we have followed that in God there is an identity of essence and existence — that is, we know, in saying *Deus est*, that *Deus est esse*.¹¹

Yet what is a proof of God that proceeds from the essence of the creature, but not from its concrete actuality as a creature? And how does it work? How does Henry have the testimony of the *hoc bonum* and the *hoc verum* unless he listens to the testimony of sensible creatures? If, whoever may be his immediate adversary, Henry is not satisfied with the proof in the second book of the *De Libero Arbitrio* on the ground of its *a posteriori* procedure, within what world does he examine the *hoc bonum* in order to reach God? It seems to be the world of the Avicennian transcendentals, *ens*, *unum*, *verum*, which are first conceived by the intellect and have no notions prior to them. We know *ens*, we can then conceive *hoc ens* and reach *ens simpliciter*. So Henry says. But how does the argument proceed, and how is it possible?

II

Between Article 22, in which Henry of Ghent has announced and described his new proof of God, and Article 25, in which he intends to set it forth, there intervenes a discussion in Article 24, Question 6, that is the necessary link between them. Article 24 as a whole is concerned with our knowledge of the divine essence (*de quidditate dei in comparatione ad nostram notitiam*), and Question 6 deals with the view that we cannot know from creatures what God is (*circa sextum arguitur quod non contingit sciri ex creaturis quid est de deo*)¹². Henry's examination of this position immediately plunges us into the two ways in which sensible substances can lead to a knowledge of suprasensible realities.

¹⁰ St. Augustine, *De Ordine* I, 1.2-2.4 (PL 32, 993-996).

¹¹ Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, *ibid.*

¹² *Summa*, A. 24, Q. 6; foll. 141r (L)-143v (D).

Since some creatures are sensible and corporeal, writes Henry, and some are incorporeal and non-sensible, "the question concerning our knowledge of God from creatures has reference only to corporeal and sensible creatures, because of incorporeal and non-sensible creatures themselves we do not have any knowledge except from corporeal and sensible creatures." Now we can gather some knowledge of a supernatural and non-sensible substance from material and sensible substances in two ways. In one way, according as the material substance is movable and sensible, that is, according as it is a natural substance and belonging to the consideration of the natural philosopher; in a second way, according as it is purely and simply a being and a substance and belonging to the consideration of the metaphysician¹³. Henry's exploration of these two ways of studying material substances offers an important clarification of the meaning of his *a priori* way to God.

Question 6 of Article 24 contains two main points, namely the distinction between explaining sensible creatures physically and metaphysically (including how the explanation reaches God), and a rather detailed justification of the latter procedure. The *consideratio physici* is perfectly clear: "In the first way we obtain a knowledge *that* God exists from created sensible substances, as a result of comparing the caused to the cause, the movable to the mover. In this sense, the proof that God exists pertains to the physical and natural philosopher, and not to the metaphysician except in so far as he puts on the character of the physical philosopher by accepting what the physical philosopher has proved."¹⁴ No less clear is the metaphysical knowledge of God to which sensible creatures can lead us: "In a second way, on the other hand, we obtain from created sensible substances the knowledge both that God exists (by another way, as we explained above, than by an inference from creatures) and also what God is, if indeed in the present life we do obtain any knowledge of what He is."

¹³ "Dicendum ad hoc quod, cum sint quaedam creaturae sensibiles corporales, quaedam vero incorporales insensibiles, quaestio de cognitione dei in nobis ex creaturis non intelligitur nisi ex creaturis corporalibus sensibilibus, quia etiam de creaturis incorporalibus insensibilibus non habemus cognitionem aliquam nisi ex corporalibus sensibilibus. Secundum hunc ergo modum intelligendi quaestionem, sciendum quod ex substantiis materialibus sensibilibus dupliciter potest acquiri cognitio aliqua de substantia supernaturali insensibili. Uno modo, inquantum mobilis et sensibilis, hoc est, secundum quod est substantia naturalis et de consideratione physici; alio modo, secundum quod est ens et substantia simpliciter et de consideratione metaphysici" (*Summa, ibid.*; fol. 141 r [MN]).

¹⁴ "Primo modo ex substantiis sensibilibus creatis habetur cognitio de deo quia est, scilicet ex collatione causati ad causam, mobilis ad moventem, et sic probatio quia deus est per se pertinet ad physicum et naturalem philosophum et non ad metaphysicum nisi inquantum induit formam physici accipiendo probata a physico" (*Summa, ibid.*; fol. 141r [N]).

Henry adds how this takes place: "This takes place by way of eminence, through the abstraction from creatures of intentions that belong by analogy to creator and creatures. In this sense, to know from creatures that God exists and what He is belongs essentially to the metaphysician."¹⁵ Henry cites Averroes in confirmation of this view of the different ways in which the natural philosopher (the *physicus*) and the metaphysician (the *metaphysicus*) consider physical substances. The natural philosopher deals with the principles of body as something natural, whereas the metaphysician treats body purely and simply as substance. This difference in how sensible substance is considered, namely, as natural body and as substance, leads to a second difference, namely, the causal terms in which sensible substance is explained and accounted for. The natural philosopher arrives at prime matter, at natural forms and at a prime mover as his explanation of the world of natural bodies. The metaphysician, on the other hand, asks: what is the quiddity of substance? To which question Henry answers by quoting Averroes: "When we shall have known what the quiddity of sensible substance is, then we shall know the first cause of all beings". Or, as Averroes says in the same text, and Henry quotes, we shall then know "the first form of all beings and the last end."¹⁶

We have now to consider the procedure and the direction taken by the metaphysician. We know that the highest cause reached by the natural philosopher is the prime mover, whereas the highest cause reached by the metaphysician is what Henry, following Averroes, calls the first form and the last end of all beings. The starting point leading to this conclusion is the quiddity of sensible substance, and the argument is that when we know this quiddity "we shall know the first cause of all beings." Our problem is to know the nature of this argument. The remainder of Article 24, Question 6, throws some oblique but strong light on the problem.

¹⁵ "Secundo vero modo ex substantiis sensibilibus creatis habetur nostra cognitio de deo, et quia sit, alia scilicet via quam deductione ex creaturis, de qua sermo habitus est supra, et etiam quid sit, si qua cognitio de deo quid sit a nobis in praesenti habeatur. Et hoc fit via eminentiae per abstractionem a creaturis intentionum quae secundum analogiam communiter conveniunt creatori et creaturis. Et sic cognitio ex creaturis quia est et quid est per se pertinet ad metaphysicum" (*Ibid.*; fol. 141rv [N]). "Supra" refers, of course, to A. 22, Q. 5.

¹⁶ "Unde Commentator super principio VII *Metaphysicae*, assignans differentiam considerationis substantiae sensibilis a physico et metaphysico, dicit quod in naturalibus *perscrutatus est philosophus de principiis corporis secundum quod est naturale, hic vero secundum quod est substantia tantum. Et ista quaestio inducit ad sciendum primam formam omnium et ultimum finem, quoniam cum fuerit scitum quid sit quidditas huius substantiae sensibilis, tunc erit scita prima causa omnium entium. Illa vero quaestio in scientia naturali inducit ad sciendum primam materiam et formas naturales et primum motorem*" (*Ibid.*; fol. 141v [N]). For Averroes, see *In VII Metaph.*, t. c. 5 (ed. Venice, 1574, foll. 155v [M]-156r [A-C]). The italicized sentences in Henry's text are quoted, with minor changes, from Averroes.

Henry's own point in this discussion is to determine what we know about the divine essence from creatures. That is why he has distinguished, with Averroes, between the work of the natural philosopher and the work of the metaphysician in examining bodily substances. What the metaphysician does, as he understands it, will enable Henry to answer how we know from creatures the *quid est* of God.

There are two ways of knowing what God is, namely, distinctly and in a universal way. The first is possible to those who see the divine essence, and Henry denies vigorously that this can be done naturally by the creature under any circumstances. Let man climb as much as he likes toward the divine essence, he will never reach it from creatures as it is in itself. But the creature, though a *peregrina similitudo* of the divine nature, is like the divine nature in some of its substantial attributes, not indeed as they are in the divine nature, but as universal attributes shared in by the creature. The creature is not like the divine nature as it is in itself in the particular: there is an infinite gulf between the creature and the divine essence. But the creature is like the divine essence so far as the divine essence "is a *being, good, one, true, beautiful* and the like, which according to a certain analogical character are common to creator and creature." We do not know these notions as they are in God; we know them in their generality as attributes of the divine substance. Hence, the knowledge we have of the divine essence via such notions reaches it, not in its particular reality, but as known in some universal attribute than can be asserted of God from creatures.¹⁷

How we are to understand such a way to the knowledge of the divine essence, which respects its infinite transcendence and is only analogically common to God and creature, Henry now proceeds to explain. If we know being as it is found in the creature, how do we nevertheless transcend the creature and predicate being of God? In the answer to this question, we shall see how Henry incorporates the teaching of St. Augustine within his own theory of abstraction; at the same time we shall begin to wonder whether St. Augustine does not remain Henry's master. We shall even begin to wonder whether, in the new synthesis between Augustine and Avicenna, it is not Augustine who is carrying the day.

There are two ways in which a form can be abstracted from the subject that participates in it. One is as related to such a subject, the other is as completely separated from it. In the first way, we abstract the universal from the particular, as we abstract *good* from *this* or *that* good. This is the universal that, as Aristotle says, is one in many. In the second way, the

¹⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, A. 24, Q. 6; foll. 142v-143r (PQR).

abstraction separates the form completely from matter, as something subsisting in itself; for example, it separates the good from everything that participates in it, and the result is the good that is substantially and self-subsistently good. In the first of these two ways of abstracting, therefore, the abstracted form is understood as participated in by the creature; but in the second way it is understood as unparticipatedly existing in the creator.¹⁸

How do we make the transition from the first to the second way of abstracting a form from its subject? Henry uses the notion *good*, which is said analogically of creatures and God, to answer the question. We know *this good* by the sense in some sensible substance. We then abstract the *good* from the *this* and consider the good absolutely as a certain common and universal good, not this or that good. At this point we grasp the good as participated and as existing in many, in this and that good; and we now know the good itself as something universal and abstract. But on this knowledge, by which we first know the good as a universal, we build a secondary abstraction. We abstract the good from everything else completely, and we consider it absolutely, not as this or that, nor as belonging to this or that subject, but as belonging to no subject (which, Henry cannot refrain from hinting, is the self-subsisting good belonging to God alone). It is thus that, alongside the participated good of the creature, we know in a secondary way the essential good of the creator, not only in its excellence but also in that transcendence that totally removes it from creatures. And what is true of the abstraction of the good is likewise true of all the other attributes that belong in common to the creature and the creator. These can, in the way just explained, be known from the creature to be found in the creator.¹⁹

¹⁸ "Ad cuius intellectum sciendum quod duplex est abstractio formae per intellectum a supposito participante formam. Uno modo, ut relatae ad supposita; alio modo, ut absolutae a suppositis. Considerata primo modo est abstractio universalis a particulari, ut boni ab hoc bono et ab illo, quia secundum Philosophum universale est unum in multis. Secundo modo est abstractio formae omnino a materia consideratae, scilicet ut in se subsistentis, ut boni ab omni participante bonum, quod est substantialiter et in se subsistens bonum. Unde primo modo intelligitur forma ut est participata a creatura, secundo modo ut est inpartibilis existens in creatore" (*Ibid.*, [S]). For Aristotle's definition of a universal, see *De Interpretatione* I, 7. 17a39; *Metaphysics* V, 26. 1023b30; VII, 13, 1038b11.

¹⁹ "De quibus ipsum bonum communiter acceptum analogice dicitur. Unde sicut, cum cognoverimus sensu hoc bonum in substantia sensibili abstrahendo per intellectum bonum ab hoc, consideramus bonum primo simpliciter, ut est commune quoddam et universale bonum, non ut hoc neque ut illud sed tantum ut participatum et existens in multis, scilicet in hoc et in illo: sic cognoscendo primo per intellectum bonum ipsum et universale et abstractum, postmodum abstrahendo bonum per intellectum ab alio omnino et considerando ipsum ut bonum simpli-

This is how, then, by means of the general notions that are analogically predicable of creatures and God, we can in a way have some knowledge of the divine essence. According to Henry of Ghent, this knowledge has three degrees of generality and indistinctness, beginning with the most indistinct, in which the divine perfections are most identified with those of creatures, and ending with the recognition that all the perfections found in creatures must not only be freed of all creaturely limitations, but also be totally identified with one another in the divine essence posited in its full unity and transcendence. St. Augustine is the master of these three grades of knowing the divine essence, beginning with the text of the *De Trinitate* (VIII, 3.5) that invites us, if we can, to perceive in *bonum hoc* and *illud* the *bonum* by itself. *Bonum hoc* and *bonum* are given together, but the *hoc* is good by participation and otherwise a non-good. Could we perceive just the *bonum* in *bonum hoc*, we would perceive God. So far Augustine.

There are three distinct moments in this invitation to perceive the good, according to Henry of Ghent. We first understand *hoc bonum* in its full and indistinct identity with the creature that it is. The *hoc bonum* is the creature, yet, even so, the *hoc* in it belongs to the creature, but what is expressed by the *bonum* is common to creature and creator. If we now remove the *hoc* and *illud*, the *bonum* is less limited to the creature. It is analogically common to God and creature, and is indeed among those notions that the human intellect first conceives (e. g. *ens* and *unum*). This is the second moment. But though, in themselves, the notions of the good that is the creator and the good that is the creature are distinct, the intellect understands them confusedly and indistinctly together. It is at the third moment that the intellect goes on to distinguish the subsisting and self-existent good as not participated but as other than the goods that are good by participating in it. Now the good we are conceiving is entirely abstracted from any creaturely good and is the good of the creator. The general conclusion of this analysis is clear. "What is true of the concept of the good is likewise the case with the concept of being, the true, the beautiful, the just, and all the other notions (*intentionum*) which express something of worth and nobility in the creator and in creatures. In all of them we understand the character (*ratio*) of the first true, beautiful, just, and the like". In the first notions of the intellect we grasp together what belongs

citer, non ut hoc vel illud, neque ut huius vel illius, sed ut nullius omnino (quod est bonum in se subsistens solius creatoris), secundario iuxta bonum participatum creaturae cognoscimus bonum per essentiam ipsius creatoris, non tam via excellentiae quam via remotionis. Et sicut est de bono sic est de omnibus aliis attributis communiter convenientibus creaturae et creatori, quae per iam dictum modum possunt ex creaturis cognosci inesse creatori" (*Summa, ibid.*).

to God and to creatures. We grasp together the *bonum creatoris* and the *bonum creaturae*; and if we tend to judge in terms of the latter or to give it priority, the reason is that the bulkiness (*grossities*) of the created good casts a shadow in us over the notion of the uncreated good.²⁰

To the notion of the divine essence as the self-subsistent and unparticipated good (or being, etc.) the second grade adds the character of eminence or excellence. God is now seen as the most excellent and sublime essence and the emphasis is, not on what He shares with creatures (being, goodness, etc), but on the unique way the attributes predicated of Him belong to Him alone. The world of creatures suggests such a knowledge. Wise men, finding imperfection in creatures and knowing that everything imperfect must be reduced to something perfect, have transcended all creatures by means of their reason and discovered that, beyond creatures, there has to be posited a nature free of all defect, endowed with all nobility and perfection, whose name is God. All men have held God to be such a most excellent nature, although, not knowing in the particular what such a nature was, they have often fallen into idolatry and declared it to be what it was not. That is why, as Henry reminds us that he has already pointed out, the knowledge of creatures by means of the philosophical sciences is supremely necessary to Sacred Scripture. For this knowledge not only proves that God exists, it also tells men what God is not and what He is, so far as this can be known naturally. In saying this, Henry is not thinking of his own age. As his quotations show, he is thinking of St. Augustine.²¹

The third grade in our knowledge of the divine essence is, naturally, a final and maximum effort in determining how far creatures can take us in answering the question *quid sit deus*. We know God as the subsistent and unparticipated good (or being, etc.) in the first grade (*generalissime*, says Henry) and as uniquely the most excellent good in the second grade (*generalius*). We now reach the third grade (*generaliter*),²² in which we reduce all the general attributes that we have predicated of God to a single all-inclusive because most simple one. We do so by recognizing "that whatever is in God is His essence and that His essence is absolutely, in reality or in intention, nothing other than His being or His existence." This we know only by way of remotion. For, after the first two grades, all that remains for us to know is how all the perfections that we now know to be in God are in Him. The perfections that we know to be in God from

²⁰ *Ibid.* (STV).

²¹ *Ibid.* (VXY).

²² For the terminology, see *Summa, ibid.* (S).

creatures are there (in creatures) affected by diversity and composition, which are defects. These perfections are in God, however, with a supreme unity and simplicity.²³ Remotion is thus our last word in reaching the divine essence from creatures. As St. Augustine said, whatever creatures tell us is always less than God. Who, then, grasps God as He should be grasped? Yes, God is ineffable, for our speech cannot now say what the vision of His essence would say. Yet God is not entirely ineffable, and we should not say so, since we do have (as we have seen) a general knowledge of His essence from creatures.²⁴

III

The distinctive fruits of this doctrine, and particularly its Augustinian foundations, are nowhere more visible than in Henry's answer to the issue raised in Question 7.²⁵ Is the divine essence that which we first know from creatures? Henry's answer is affirmative, but to enforce it and yet do so within the empirical framework of the Aristotelian epistemology, he must manage to show how the Augustinian journey from the *bonum hoc* to the *bonum simpliciter* is unavoidably present within our knowledge.

The state of the question and its internal tensions are visible in the arguments *pro* and *contra*. For, it is argued *contra*, if creatures are the means through which we arrive at a knowledge of the divine essence, we know creatures before we know what God is. Moreover, we know what God is from creatures solely by means of a knowledge derived from the imagination and the sense. By the sense we first grasp sensible species, from which we abstract intelligible species, which are the means by which our intellect

²³ "Tertio modo, generali scilicet, cognoscit homo quid sit deus non solum in suis generalibus attributis, reducendo quicquid dignitatis et nobilitatis est in creaturis in deum simpliciter, ut in primo modo, neque sub quadam excellentia reducendo quicquid dignitatis et nobilitatis est in creaturis in deum in excellentia, ut in secundo modo, sed cognoscendo quid sit in eius primo attributo simplicissimo, reducendo scilicet omnia nobilitatis et dignitatis attributa eius in unum primum simplicissimum, scilicet per intellectum, quia quicquid in ipso est sit eius essentia et quod eius essentia nihil omnino sit aliud re vel intentione quam eius esse sive existentia, ut declaratum est supra. Et hoc ex creaturis de ipso habet cognosci sola via remotionis. Cum enim cognitum fuerit de ipso quid sit primo et secundo modo, nihil restat amplius ex creaturis de ipso cognoscendum nisi quomodo quaecunque cognoscuntur esse in ipso se habent in ipso; et hoc convincitur ex creaturis ex eo quod homo percipit quod illa quae sunt nobilitatis in creaturis sunt in eis per quandam diversitatem et compositionem, et quod hoc defectus est et imperfectionis. Notum enim est quia a deo removenda est omnino diversitas et compositio, et quod in ipso sunt per summam unitatem et simplicitatem" (*Ibid.* [Z]).

²⁴ *Ibid.*; fol. 143rv (Z).

²⁵ *Summa*, A. 24, Q. 7; foll. 143v-144v (E-K).

knows the quiddities of things. But what we know first by this sort of species is a material form, since such a species is of itself nothing other than the likeness (*ratio*) of a material form. If, then, the human intellect knows what God is from creatures, and His quiddity is purely an immaterial form, that quiddity cannot be known except at a secondary moment. The Aristotelian *contra* is thus posed. The Augustinian *pro* now follows. What do we mean by something being "first known" (*primo cognitum*)? We mean that by which other things are to be judged if they are to be known by the intellect. The intellect cannot judge that anything is *good* or *just* (or has any other of the perfections common to God and creatures) unless it knows the good and the just as such, which means knowing through them themselves and not through something else that they are such. This is what Augustine has taught in the *De Trinitate*, the *De Vera Religione*, the *Soliloquia* and indeed "wherever he speaks of this subject. But such a good and a just reality in none other than the good and just reality that is God Himself."²⁶

The conflict between Aristotle and St. Augustine could not be more sharply expressed. But it is entirely distinctive of Henry of Ghent that the conflict is for him the occasion of a synthesis. How, we ask, given the empiricist argument of the second objector, can Henry pursue his Augustinian effort to reach from the *bonum hoc* that he finds in creatures to a knowledge of the divine nature? For if with St. Augustine he finally recognizes that in His transcendence God is totally unreachable, still, with the same St. Augustine he finds the *bonum simpliciter* scarcely hidden in the *bonum hoc* of the creation. And how is this absolute good, which in its absoluteness finally escapes us, ever in our intellectual grasp in the material likeness that we draw from the world of bodies? Does not the way of remotion, we ask in our own turn, begin for Henry much later than Aristotelian empiricism could allow? Faced by the same question, and admitting that our intellectual knowledge was limited to the world of bodies, St. Thomas Aquinas had made the *via remotionis* the principle of his investigation of the divine essence; the result was the doctrine that the divine essence was in itself totally unknown to us: we know from creatures purely and simply that God exists, we know nothing about *quid sit deus*.²⁷ Henry of Ghent says this in the end, but not before he has explored the texts of St. Augustine,

²⁶ *Ibid.*; fol. 143v (E). I have deleted *quia* from the text.

²⁷ See, especially, St. Thomas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I, c. 14. On the Thomistic doctrine that the divine nature is wholly unknown to us, see A. C. Pegis, "Penitus Manet Ignotum", *Mediaeval Studies*, 27 (1965) 212-226. There are three principal Thomistic texts that plot the way in which, in the present life, man reaches and knows God: *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1; *Exp. super Librum Boethii de Trinitate*, q. 1, a. 2; *Sum Theol.*, I, q. 12, a. 12. A partly related text is *De Veritate*, q. 8, a. 1.

and especially *De Trinitate* VIII, 2.3-3.5, in pursuit of the absolute good that seems scarcely hidden in the particular goods of creation. How is this metaphysical construction (Henry's secondary abstraction) possible in the line of the epistemology of Aristotle? Question 7 contains the answer.

Henry distinguishes between a natural and a rational knowledge of God from creatures. The first is that knowledge of God which is immediately and naturally conceived by the mind with the first notions (*intentionibus*) of being. The second is the knowledge reached by rational or discursive reasoning. As far as discursive reasoning is concerned, the situation is perfectly clear. "What God is is not the first thing that man knows from creatures, but, quite the contrary, the last. Rather, what the creature itself is is first known and through it what God is, by way of eminence and remotion." In other words, the secondary abstraction of Question 6 is built (in a threefold gradation) on the primary abstraction of universals from particulars.²⁸ The situation of our natural knowledge is quite different. In our natural knowledge, what God is is what is first grasped by the intellect: *quid est deus est primum comprehensibile per intellectum*. We are speaking now of the knowledge that we have in the first intentions of being naturally conceived by the intellect, which are being, true, one, good. This knowledge belongs to the first and second grades set down by Henry in Question 6. The reason why God is what is first known in our natural knowledge stems from the nature of our knowledge. Beginning from the sense, our intellectual knowledge, as in the sense itself, begins from something indeterminate. The sense conceives its sensibles indeterminately before conceiving them determinately. We know a man at a distance to be a body before we know that it is an animal, an animal before knowing that it is a man, and a man before knowing that it is Socrates. So, too, the intellect. By nature, though not always in time, it first knows of anything that it is a being before knowing that it is this being, good before knowing that it is this good, a being before knowing that it is a substance. The intellect always grasps the more confused universals before grasping those that are more particular and determinate. In general: "The more an intelligible is indeterminate, the greater the priority with which our intellect naturally grasps it: *et sic universaliter quanto intelligibile magis est indeterminatum, tanto naturaliter prius ipsum intellectus noster intelligit*."²⁹

Indetermination is said privatively and negatively. *Hoc bonum* is completely determined in matter and subject. But the universal good is privatively undetermined: it is one in and of many, it is not this or that good. When

²⁸ Henry summarizes this whole doctrine in the present Q. 7, fol. 144r (F).

²⁹ *Ibid.* (G).

we understand the good absolutely and as subsistent, that is, not as this or that good, or belonging to this or that individual (because it is the unparticipated good), we are grasping a good whose nature is not to be determined. This is negative indetermination, and it is greater than privative indetermination. The situation then is this. Since it is always the case that our intellect naturally conceives the indeterminate before the determinate, whether the indeterminate is distinct or not distinct from the determinate, in grasping any good whatever our intellect "naturally co-understands in it by priority the good that is negatively undetermined — and this is the good that is God;" and what is true of the good applies to whatever else we grasp concerning God from creatures.³⁰ Absolutely speaking, then, concerning the most general manner of grasping what God is (this is applied by Henry to the first two grades), we say that "what God is is the first object to be grasped by the human intellect from creatures: *quid est deus est primum obiectum quod ab humano intellectu ex creaturis habet intelligi.*" The result is as astonishing as it is far-reaching: "Hence, nothing can be known in and from creatures — something true, good, beautiful, just, a being, one, or some determinate thing of this sort existing through matter or through a subject — unless we know by natural priority (though at times there may be simultaneity in duration) that which is the absolute and undetermined true, good, beautiful, being, one, and the like; so that, to wit, we find the beginning and the end of our knowledge in God: the beginning, with reference to our most general knowledge of God, the end, with reference to the particular and bare vision of Him. This means that God is the beginning and the end of all things in the order of cognitional being, just as He is their beginning and end in the order of their natural being; so that, just as nothing else can be perfectly known unless He is first perfectly known, so nothing (e. g. a man, something white, or any other thing whatever) can be known however imperfectly unless He is first known at least in the most general grade of knowledge. For nothing of this sort is known in the creature or grasped such as it is unless we first know it and grasp it under the intention of being and unity, and the other primary intentions; so that, that it is a being and something one, which are notions necessarily conceived of each and every thing in a first impression (involving at least a priority of nature), precedes the conception of anything among them as white or as a man. But when being is conceived, the first being is necessarily conceived, as we have said. In the same way, in conceiving this good we necessarily conceive the good absolutely and in it we conceive the good that belongs to God, or rather is God Himself, as was said above by

³⁰ *Ibid.* (H).

Augustine. So, too, in conceiving that which is a man or something white, I conceive being absolutely and in it the first being that is God. We must therefore affirm without reservation, according to what Augustine has determined, that in every knowledge by which something in conformity with truth is known in the creature (for example, when being, truth, goodness, or the like, is known, and this in the most general grade), we know something that belongs to God, that, namely, is something in Him and is God Himself."³¹

That this is, in principle, Augustinian teaching there is no doubt. As in Augustine, Anselm and Bonaventure, so in Henry of Ghent, God is holding creation fast in the visible light of His presence. But this is Augustinianism built as a second moment in a doctrine of abstraction, and who, if not Aristotle, is the original master of such a doctrine? How does Henry meet the Aristotelian objections to the position that he is here defending? It was objected, first, that since the divine essence was known from the creature as from a means, the creature as means had to be known first. The second objector had argued that species abstracted from phantasms enable us, first and primarily, to grasp only the quiddity of a material thing. If these objections are sound, they seem to limit the intellect to the world of bodies as its first and only direct object of knowledge — in which case

³¹ "Absolute ergo dicendum quod in generalissimo modo intelligendi quid est deus, quo ad primum et secundum eius gradum quid est deus est primum obiectum quod ad humano intellectu ex creaturis habet intelligi, ut nihil possit cognosci in creaturis et ex creaturis (quia verum, bonum, pulchrum, iustum, ens, unum, aut aliquid huiusmodi determinantum existens per materiam aut per suppositum) nisi naturaliter prius, licet quandoque simul duratione, cognito eo quod est simpliciter et indeterminatum verum, bonum, pulchrum, ens, unum et huiusmodi, ut scilicet in ipso deo sit principium et finis nostrae cognitionis: principium quo ad eius cognitionem generalissimam, finis quo ad eius nudam visionem particularem, ut sic sit principium et finis omnium rerum in esse cognitivo, sicut est principium et finis earum in esse naturae; et sicut nihil aliud potest perfecte cognosci nisi ipso prius perfecte cognito, sic nec aliquid potest cognosci quantumcunque imperfecte nisi ipso prius saltem in generalissimo gradu cognito, ut homo, aut album, aut quodcunque aliud. Nihil enim talium cognoscitur in creatura aut intelligitur ut tale nisi prius cognoscendo et intelligendo ipsum sub intentione entis et unius et ceterarum primarum intentionum, ut quod sit ens aut unum, quae necessario prima impressione saltem prioritate naturae concipiuntur de quolibet antequam concipiatur aliquid eorum, quia album aut quia homo. Concipiendo autem ens necessario concipitur primum et simpliciter ens, ut dictum est. Sicut enim concipiendo hoc bonum necessario concipitur bonum simpliciter et in illo bonum quod dei est, vel ipse deus est, ut dictum est per Augustinum supra, sic concipiendo hoc quod est homo vel album, concipio ens simpliciter et in illo primum ens quod deus est. Simpliciter ergo dicendum secundum determinationem Augustini quod in omni cognitione qua cognoscitur aliquid secundum veritatem in creatura, cognoscitur aliquid quod dei est, quod scilicet est quid in eo et ipse deus, ut entitas, veritas, bonitas, vel aliquid huiusmodi, et hoc modo generalissimo" (*Ibid.*).

we are somewhere near the Aristotelian position of St. Thomas Aquinas who had said that phantasms are the permanent object and hence foundation of our knowledge: "Phantasms are related to the intellect as the objects in which it sees all that it sees either by way of perfect representation or by way of negation."³² The formula is perfect for what it wishes to say.

Henry does not see things in this way. In reply to the first objector he says that one thing can be known from another either formally or materially: "A is the formal ground for knowing B when, as in the case of demonstration (in which conclusions are known from premises), by beginning with the knowledge of A the intellect acquires by discursiveness the knowledge of B. In this sense, we do not know from creatures what God is; on the contrary, "whatever truth about creatures we conceive through the intellect we conceive on the ground of the knowledge of the first truth, just as we know goodness in creatures only on the ground of the first goodness, of which the knowledge is naturally impressed on the mind, as we said above following Augustine." This is true at the most general grade of knowledge: we do not know the *bonum* in *bonum hoc* except because of the divine impression. But once we have crossed the first grade, we can deduce what God is from creatures by means of excellence and remotion.

Materially speaking, one thing is known from another when that by which the other is known is drawn from it. In this material sense, whatever we know about God we know from creatures, that is, from the intelligible species by which the intellect knows the intelligibles it abstracts from sensible things. Through the first intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm in the imagination the intellect first conceives its first intelligible concepts — those of being, one, true, good, and the other general concepts in their generality, that is, without distinguishing in them what belongs to the creator from what belongs to the creature. When, for example, we abstract from substance the being that is analogically common to substance and accident, without distinguishing within the concept of being what belongs to substance from what belongs to accident, or when among univocal notions we abstract such a common nature as *animal* from a donkey, without distinguishing in the notion what belongs to the donkey from what belongs to a horse, — when we do this, we have analogies of the indistinct-

³² "Ad quantum dicendum quod phantasma est principium nostrae cognitionis ut ex quo incipit intellectus operatio, non sicut transiens sed sicut permanens, ut quoddam fundamentum intellectualis operationis (sicut principia demonstrationis oportet manere in omni processu scientiae), cum phantasmata comparentur ad intellectum ut obiecta, in quibus inspicit omne quod inspicit vel secundum perfectam representationem vel per negationem" (St. Thomas, *Exp. Super Librum B. de Trinitate*, q. 6, a. 2, ad 5; ed. B. Decker [Leiden, 1955], 218). The punctuation of the text is due to the present writer.

tion in our first general concepts. But once, on the material basis of the species of sensible things, we have conceived the first and most general intentions, then, should we be called on to make judgments of truth that involve distinguishing what belongs to the creator from what belongs to the creature, the situation is this: we cannot perceive and judge that something is good unless we first have perceived the nature of the good taken absolutely. This absolute good we do not judge, we judge through it that something is a particular good, even though we do not distinguish between the absolute good by which we judge and the particular good that we judge. The reply to the objector, then, and its Augustinian roots are easily summarized: "Thus, in all concepts in which something is judged to be true, good, and the like, and generally in which something is perceived as true, good, beautiful, or the like, the first concepts in rank to be conceived are those of the first being, true and good, in which, as we have said, we know what God is by a most general knowledge."³³

The ground of our knowing what God is, therefore, is not creatures, but those first intentions or notions that the mind forms from its first abstracted intelligible species. These are the first and most general level of Henry's secondary abstraction. They are not only transcendentals abstracted from things, but also, and more mysteriously, a preformed meeting ground between the sovereign divine good and creaturely goods. As transcendentals, such notions as *being*, *true*, *good* come from creatures, but creatures are only materially the ground of our knowing what God is; they are not formally such a ground. Henry offers two examples of a formal ground, namely, demonstrations, whose conclusions are formally drawn from premises, and, generally, any instance in which the knowledge of one thing leads by discursive reasoning to the knowledge of another. But the transcendentals, once formed, somehow contain the divine presence, enabling the intellect to speak of the true and the good as it does. We ask: how can abstractions that are originally the likenesses of sensible things lead to such transcendental results? In the reply to the second objector Henry explains, once again, the transition from the empirical first moment of our knowledge to his secondary world of abstractions. There is, in fact, more in an intelligible species for Henry of Ghent than we have realized — indeed, what is more to the point, than St. Thomas had ever realized.

The abstracted intelligible species of a thing is more than the principle (*ratio*) by which the intellect forms the concept of the quiddity of that determinate thing, by which precisely the thing differs from another thing. It is also the principle of conceiving "all the common concepts up to the first

³³ Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, *ibid.*; fol. 144v (I).

and most common concept of being as being, which is likewise implicitly contained in every determinate concept." If this is true, the results are far-reaching. "If, then, we abstract any general concept (e. g. that of being, the true, or the good), which, as we have said, is indifferently common to what belongs to the creator and what belongs to the creature, it is clear that what is first understood in that concept cannot be what belongs to the creature, it must rather be what belongs to God." The reason for this reversed situation is not far to seek. "In the concept of a universal (for example, being as such), we cannot understand what belongs to the creature without understanding 'being in another', in the manner in which a universal is understood as being 'one in many'. But we cannot understand 'being in another' unless we first naturally understand being in a state of absolute abstraction, as not this or that, or belonging to this being or that: this is to understand being as subsisting in pure entity, which belongs only to God. Should a person take note of this fact and conceive being as subsisting in itself, he then grasps God in a distinct way." Henry enforces his point by addressing the reader directly. "When you understand any of the general intentions of things (e.g. being, true, good) in an absolute way, what you understand first is God, though you do not notice it, and as long as you stand in that absolute understanding, so long do you stand in the understanding of God. But if you determine in any way what you have conceived absolutely, you immediately drop into the understanding of some creature, as Augustine says in the eighth book of the *De Trinitate*." We are therefore led back again to *De Trinitate*, VIII, 2.3, which Henry once more quotes, not without some management. But even falling back into the daily world of creatures does not entirely prevent us from grasping God. "For in every concept of being, however determinate it may be, there is included the first concept of being taken absolutely, and in it there is included the concept of the first being, at least according to the first two grades of understanding the first being in the most general way, as we have already said."³⁴

IV

If we now reflect on the metaphysical road that Henry of Ghent has opened up in *Summa*, Article 24, Questions 6-7, we cannot but recognize that this discussion is a decisive model of the *a priori* method announced in Article 22, Question 5. From Questions 6-7 of Article 22, we know how Henry's metaphysical way to God proceeds, even though we still have only

³⁴ *Ibid.* (K).

an analytical description of the method involved, not a justification. We also know more clearly the difference between the worlds of the *physicus* and the *metaphysicus*; and especially we know that the alliance between St. Augustine and Avicenna has as one of its principal consequences — not to say objectives — to allow the doctrine of the divine illumination to shine through the realm of being, as known by man, at its most ultimate moment, the transcendentals.

By his procedure, the *physicus* reaches God as the prime mover, the supreme source of motion: *deus est* means to him that there is a supreme source of motion. The metaphysician, on the other hand, follows another way both in proving that God exists and in examining what He is. This other way was announced and explained in its general character in *Summa*, Article 22, Question 5. The method there adopted was *a priori* but still from creatures. It proceeded, within the transcendentals, which were names of perfections common to God and creatures, from (e. g.) the *bonum hoc*, that is, a particular kind of *bonum*, to the *bonum simpliciter*, the absolutely good. In Article 24, Question 6, where the knowledge of what God is is at stake, we travel the same way from the *bonum hoc* to the *bonum simpliciter*. We do so by considering the abstracted form, not as a universal predicable of many and belonging to many (this is the first way of abstraction), but as something absolute and without reference to the subject or the matter of the form. Hence arises the notion of an absolute good, which opens up for Henry of Ghent an intellectual journey to God seen more and more distinctly as the self-subsistent and unparticipated good (first grade), by comparison with creatures as the most excellent good (second grade), and, finally, the single and all-perfect and totally transcendent reality (third grade).

This metaphysical journey begins in the natural knowledge of the human intellect, constituted by its first, most indeterminate and most embracing notions. The intellect experiences in these notions structures and perspectives whose pressure it feels even when it does not advert to them. Creaturally though the content of its knowledge may be, the intellect nevertheless cannot judge anything to be true or good or one without doing so in the controlling priority of the absolute true, good, one. In this sense, God is the first object grasped by the intellect in its natural knowledge. Moreover, it is not from creatures (except materially speaking) that this divine primacy is reached and experienced by the intellect, or followed in judgments concerning truth, goodness, or any general perfections common to God and creatures; it is reached from its own naturally-present influence on the mind: *quicquid veritatis de creaturis per intellectum concipitur, formaliter concipitur ex ratione cognitionis primae veritatis, sicut non cognoscitur bonitas in*

*creaturis nisi ex ratione primae bonitatis, cuius cognitio est naturaliter menti impressa, ut dictum est supra secundum Augustinum.*³⁵

It is therefore correct to say that the new synthesis effected by Henry of Ghent enables the doctrine of the divine illumination to be distinctively visible in the world of empirically derived concepts. After the Aristotelian synthesis of St. Thomas Aquinas, Avicenna's metaphysical teaching made it possible for Henry to bypass the physical world of Aristotle, and to reach God from creatures, not by physical means, but along the illuminative highway that St. Bonaventure had already learned from St. Augustine and followed in his *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*. In a world seemingly ruled by Aristotelian notions and principles, Henry of Ghent nevertheless learned from Avicenna notions that enabled him to follow St. Augustine and even to do so on philosophical grounds — that is to say, on grounds that seemed to agree with Aristotelianism at the very moment of creating a deeply Platonic revolution within it.

But is a Platonizing Aristotelianism possible? That is the question that Henry of Ghent is not exactly alone in posing for the historian. The intelligible species or form that the intellect abstracts from the phantasm in the imagination is both a likeness of a material thing and a pure essence. Abstraction explains the origin of the likeness, while the intellect, living by nature in the light of God, explains the pure essence: the absolute truth and goodness that the intellect conceives and progressively sees in their eminence and unity are rooted, not in the world of physical things, but in the intellect's immediate openness to the divine light. And what is extraordinary about this result is not simply the return of Henry of Ghent to St. Augustine; it is that this return is effected on an Aristotelian empirical basis. When St. Thomas had followed the Aristotelian theory of knowledge, and especially its empiricism, he had eliminated the doctrine of a special divine presence within creatures and within knowledge, and he had argued that man reaches God, and knows Him, only as far as the world of physical bodies enables him to do so. Abstract knowledge had for St. Thomas no other content, and no other ground, than the being of the physical world. Hence there could be no purely metaphysical (e. i. non-empirical) ways to God, since all the ways were ultimately built on physical data. The Thomistic proofs of God can therefore be called mixed (i. e. at once physical and metaphysical) in the sense that, though they use and follow metaphysical principles and notions, their data remain realities in the physical world.

The metaphysical distance between St. Thomas and Henry of Ghent

³⁵ *Ibid.*; ad. 1; fol. 144v (I). The immediate reference of *supra* is the *Responsio* of Q. 7.

could not be greater than at this moment. Henry has a doctrinal position and an epistemological method that escape — and are intended to escape — the deeply empirical view of knowledge that Aristotle had established against Plato. Our earlier question, then, has an answer. Henry of Ghent can do in metaphysics what he cannot do by means of the testimony of sensible creatures: he can embark on an absolute journey from the essences of creatures to God in His transcendent unity.³⁶ He can do so because he has fused the Augustinian doctrine of the divine illumination with the Avicennian absolute essence. What St. Thomas himself had done is clear enough. He had rejected any doctrine of a special natural divine illumination.³⁷ As concerns Avicenna, we know from the *De Ente et Essentia* how he had explored the notion of the absolute essence and, while accepting it, had eliminated Avicenna's Platonism from the doctrine.³⁸ As St. Thomas saw things, any absolute essence (*humanity* or the more famous *equinity*) was neither one nor many, neither universal nor particular: it was just an absolute essence or, as Avicenna had put it, *ipsa equinitas non est aliquid nisi equinitas tantum*.³⁹ How, then, could one consider equinity except to say of it solely what belonged to it absolutely? It was, purely and simply, equinity. To St. Thomas this meant that nothing could be affirmed of the absolute essence except its absoluteness; which was, for the same St. Thomas, another way of saying that no existential affirmations could be made of the absolute essence and no existential inferences could be drawn from it. The absolute essence was not an existential *tertium quid* in relation to its existence in the intellect and its existence in material singulars: the absolute essence had no other existence than in the intellect and in singulars. Let us grant, in fact, that the absolute essence *man* need not exist in any particular singular or in the intellect: *verum est dicere quod homo inquantum est homo non habet quod sit in hoc singulari vel in illo aut in anima*. To St. Thomas this means that the absolute essence *man* abstracts from every mode of existence, but it does not cut itself off from them: *patet ergo quod natura hominis absolute considerata abstrahit a quolibet esse, ita tamen quod non fiat praecisio alicuius eorum*.⁴⁰ What is

³⁶ See A. C. Pegis, "Toward a New Way to God: Henry of Ghent", *Mediaeval Studies*, 30 (1968), 246-247.

³⁷ On the problem of the divine illumination in St. Thomas, see: *Summa Contra Gentiles*, III, cc. 46-47; *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 79, aa. 3-6; q. 84, a. 5; q. 88, a. 3; *De Spirit. Creat.*, a. 10 (especially ad 8); *De Anima*, q. 6.

³⁸ St. Thomas, *De Ente et Essentia*, c. 3; ed. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin (Le Saulchoir, Kain, Belgium, 1926), 23-29; English tr. A. Maurer, second revised edition (Toronto, 1968), 45-50. For Avicenna, see *Metaphysics*, Tr. V, cc. 1-2; (Venice, 1508), foll. 86va-87vb.

³⁹ Avicenna, *Metaph.*, Tr. V, c. 1; fol. 86va.

⁴⁰ St. Thomas, *De Ente et Essentia*, c. 3; ed. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, 26.

the absolute essence, therefore, except that which is universal in the intellect and singular in reality, and *nothing* else?

Had Henry of Ghent seen the absolute essence in this way, he would not have had the metaphysical outlook that he did and he would not have undertaken an *a priori* proof of the existence of God. But in the same text of the *Metaphysics* of Avicenna that describes the absolute essence there was a further point that held his attention and prevented him from following St. Thomas' transformation of Avicenna. Avicenna said that the absolute essence *equinity* "of itself is neither many nor one, nor is it an existent within sensible things or within the soul, nor is it something belonging to them potentially or actually, so that this is contained within the essence of equinity: *ipsa enim [equinitas] ex se nec est multa nec unum, nec est existens in his sensibilibus nec in anima, nec est aliquid horum potentia vel effectu, ita ut contineatur intra essentiam equinitatis.*"⁴¹ The message in these words, which seem to liberate essences both from the mind and from the confining realm of sensible things, opened the thought of Henry of Ghent to the world of essences in a way that St. Thomas had learned from Aristotle to refuse to acknowledge. This world of essences was to be the vehicle of the new Augustinianism of Henry of Ghent, indeed a triumphant Augustinianism in the face of Aristotle.

We have now to see how the Avicennian absolute essence, born in the world of experience but not of it, built the road that Henry of Ghent followed in his proof of the existence of God.

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⁴¹ Avicenna, *Metaph.*, *ibid.*

Theory of Composition in Medieval Narrative Poetry and Geoffrey of Vinsauf's *Poetria Nova*

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GEOFFREY of Vinsauf's *Poetria nova* was certainly the most widely used treatise on composition written in the Middle Ages. More than 57 manuscripts of the work have survived, as compared with five of Matthew of Vendôme's *Ars Versificatoria* and none, so far as we know, of Bernard Silvestris' *Summa*,¹ the two most influential medieval *poetriae* besides Geoffrey's. And Geoffrey's treatise was copied and, eventually, printed in whole or in excerpts down into the seventeenth and even eighteenth centuries.² Of course, the *Poetria nova* enjoyed wide circulation in part because it was written not only for the classroom, but for a larger public as well, as we may see by the dedication to Innocent III. Furthermore the broader scope of this treatise made it more useful as a compendium both for the writers in the schools and for the general literary public, and particularly for writers in the vernacular languages, who applied the principles of the arts of poetry to their own writing. Chaucer is the best known example of the influence of the *Poetria nova* on vernacular writers; and his allusion to that treatise and the use he makes of the instruction contained in it reveal how popular Geoffrey remained in the schools throughout the rest of the Middle Ages.³ But

¹ Max Manitius, *Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters*, 3 vols. (Munich, 1911-31), 3, 742; Edmond Faral, *Les Arts poétiques du XII^e et du XIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1924, 1958), pp. xiii-xiv, 13-14, 27-28. Franz Quadlbauer, *Die antike Theorie der genera dicendi im lateinischen Mittelalter*, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, 241, 2 (Graz, Vienna, Cologne, 1962), mentions two unpublished manuscripts that may contain Bernard's treatise; see pp. 273, § 87f, and 275, § 87q. Faral's edition is the source of the citations and references to the treatises of Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Matthew of Vendôme, and Eberhard the German; italicized words in the citations are changes in Faral's text proposed by W.B. Sedgwick, "Notes and Emendations on Faral's *Les Arts poétiques*," *Speculum*, 2 (1927), 331-343.

² Faral, *Les Arts poétiques*, 28.

³ *The Works of Geoffrey Chaucer*, ed. F. N. Robinson, 2d ed. (Boston, 1957), 7, vss. 3347-54 (p. 204). For bibliography on the problem of Chaucer and medieval poetics, see Dorothy Everett, "Some Reflections on Chaucer's 'Art Poetical,'" *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 36 (1950), 148, note 4; James J. Murphy, "A New Look at Chaucer and the Rhetoricians," *The Review of English Studies*, n. s. 15 (1964), 1, note 1. The following titles may be added to the list: Anthony C. Spearing, *Criticism and Medieval Poetry* (London, 1964), 47-54; Robert S. Haller, "Chaucer's *Squire's Tale* and the Use of Rhetoric," *Modern Philology*, 62 (1964-65), 285-295.

as Chaucer's words, and particularly the parody in The Nun's Priest's Tale of Geoffrey's use of apostrophe, seem to ridicule the instruction found in the *Poetria nova*, it has been generally assumed that Geoffrey's influence on "good" authors was minimal or even negative. Joined to this assumption is the widely held opinion that neither Geoffrey nor the other authors of arts of poetry had anything significant to say on the narrative composition of the poem. Both arguments led to the belief that the *poetriae* possess little real value for the study and interpretation of medieval poetry. The influence of Geoffrey's treatise seemed confined to the classroom, with all this notion suggests regarding stale, uninspired learning pounded into the heads of wretched schoolboys who, like Chaucer, came to despise or mock what they learned, or simply forgot it, or, worse still, became professors and carried on the same dull tradition.

However, a closer look at the *Poetria nova* and Geoffrey's other treatises shows that the evidence for his faults is incomplete and therefore unfairly censorious.⁴ For one thing, his treatment of composition is not so incomplete as was supposed. The instruction in the *Poetria nova* on the choice and arrangement of the *materia* checks any inclination the poet may have to be careless in the conception of his poem, and demands clarity and order in the basic plan. Nor should the subsequent disposition, amplification, and ornamentation of the poem be indulged in for their own sake. Rather Geoffrey insists that these steps in composition be subordinated to the original plan, and thus preserve its unity and balance. Careful composition according to such principles could inspire well-written poems, poems arranged and embellished by a thoughtful and sensitive choice from among the means of arrangement and embellishment proposed in the *Poetria nova*. It is the purpose of this paper to show how common Geoffrey's ideas on composition were among writers contemporary with and subsequent to him, and to show the relevance of this instruction to the interpretation of medieval narrative poetry, particularly narrative poetry written from the twelfth century on.

Geoffrey belonged to a literary movement that included writers in Latin and the vernacular; authors of various arts of poetry, of letter-writing, and of preaching; and teachers in a number of disciplines. Many of these writers were harshly attacked by such critics as John of Salisbury, particularly for their ideas regarding philosophy and logic.⁵ Yet they flourished in the

⁴ See my studies, "The Scope of the Treatment of Composition in the Twelfth- and Thirteenth-Century Arts of Poetry," *Speculum*, 41 (1966), 261-278; *Sens and Conjointure in the Chevalier de la Charrette* (The Hague, 1966), 88-94.

⁵ See Richard McKeon, "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," *Speculum*, 17 (1942), 25-29; Harry Caplan, "Classical Rhetoric and the Mediaeval Theory of Preaching," in Raymond F. Howes, ed.

twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and their influence on writing remained strong long after this time. To determine the nature and the extent of Geoffrey's influence, it would be best therefore to search among these writers. Many of them, no matter how far removed from Geoffrey's their fields may seem at first glance, do offer parallels, explanations, and illustrations of the instruction contained in the *Poetria nova*. We may arrange the discussion under three headings, corresponding to the main divisions of rhetoric — invention, disposition, ornamentation — found in the *Poetria nova* itself.

Before beginning, it would be well to stress the fact that we are concerned essentially with the prevalence of ideas on composition found in Geoffrey of Vinsauf, and not merely with the *direct* influence of his instruction. Indeed, if we can demonstrate that the ideas in the *Poetria nova* are expressed by others who did not know his writings or who did not closely imitate them, the argument for a common conception of composition in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries would acquire additional support, and we may be less reluctant to apply Geoffrey's instruction to the interpretation of medieval narrative verse.

INVENTION

The instruction in the *Poetria nova* regarding the conception and arrangement of the material of the poem is brief, but important. The presentation is divided into three main parts:

- I. Conception of the *materia* (vss. 43-59).
 - a. Method of the architect in planning the construction of a building: careful planning before actual construction (vss. 43-48).
 - b. Application of the architect's method to the construction of the poem: careful planning before taking up the pen to write (vss. 48-59).
- II. Subordination of subsequent disposition and ornamentation to the plan of the invented *materia* (vss. 60-70).
- III. Order in the poem (vss. 71-86).
 - a. General statement regarding the choice of beginning, middle, and conclusion (vss. 71-76).
 - b. Illustration: the careful plan of the *Poetria nova* itself (vss. 77-86).

The injunction to subordinate the subsequent steps in composition to the original plan is frequently expressed in the *Poetria nova*, as will be shown

Historical Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians (Ithaca, N. Y., 1961), 72-76; Karl Manitius, *Gunzo "Epistola ad Augienses" und Anselm von Besate "Rhetorimachia," Monumenta Germaniae historica: Quellen zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters*, 2 (Weimar, 1958), 75-76; J. W. H. Atkins, *English Literary Criticism: The Medieval Phase* (Cambridge, New York, 1943), 94.

below. Otherwise there is little additional discussion of invention in this treatise.

Geoffrey's *Documentum de modo et arte dictandi et versificandi* contains nothing corresponding precisely to vss. 43-86 in the *Poetria nova*. It skips over invention and begins with disposition according to natural and artificial order. Part of this may be due to the more elementary level of the *Documentum*, which was provided for schoolboys concerned mainly with elaborating in verse upon material given to them for purposes of exercise. This is obvious from a statement towards the end of the treatise: "Post praedicta est notandum quod difficile est materiam communem et usitatam convenienter et bene tractare" (p. 309, § 132). Geoffrey's opinion regarding the relative difficulty and value of composition based on *materia* taken from other authors was common among his contemporaries and doubtless accounts for the frequent allusions to *materia* that one finds in Latin and vernacular writing. How closely the poets might follow their source is illustrated by a passage from the Prologue to Vitalis of Blois' *Aulularia*, in which the author justifies making certain small changes in his version of the tale, and, at the same time, defends mixing the styles by the argument that he is only following his *materia*.

Qui releget Plautum mirabitur altera forsan
 Nomina personis quam mea scripta notant.
 Causa mea est facto: uult uerba domestica uersus;
 Grandia plus aequo nomina metra timent.
 Sic ego mutata decisaue nomina feci
 Posse pati uersus: res tamen una manet.
 Arguet hoc aliquis mea quod comedia fatum
 Nominet et stellas, atque amet alta nimis.
 Nesciuisse ferent humilemque ad grandia stulte
 Euasisse stilum. Crimina Plautus habet.
 Absoluar culpa: Plautum sequor. Et tamen ipsa
 Materie series exigit alta sibi.

(vss. 11-22)⁶

⁶ Vitalis of Blois, *Aulularia*, in Gustave Cohen, *La "Comédie" latine en France au XII^e siècle*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1931), 1, 74-75; *stilum* here refers to the three styles, each style being distinguished, at this time, by the *materia* rather than the means of embellishment. The mixing of styles was forbidden in the *poetriae*; see note 47 below. — So frequent are allusions to the *materia* in Latin and vernacular poems that it is unnecessary to cite here any more specific examples as proof. For French poems, see the examples given by Rubin Halpersohn, *Über die Einleitungen im altfranzösischen Kunstepos* (Berlin, 1911), 33-44; for German poems, see Bruno Boesch, *Die Kunstanschauung in der mittelhochdeutschen Dichtung* (Bern, Leipzig, 1936), 75-80 and 192-195. The practice is found in Latin imitations of Ovid, medieval Latin epic, saints' lives, and the medieval Latin "Comedy"; see Paul Lehmann, *Pseudo-antike Literatur des Mittelalters*, Studien der Bibliothek Warburg, 13 (Leipzig, Berlin, 1927; Darmstadt, 1964), 4-5; A. Boutemy, ed. "La Version parisienne du poème de Simon Chèvre d'Or sur la Guerre de Troie," *Scriptorium*, 1 (1946-47), vss. 493-508 (p. 227); Ernst Robert

For, Geoffrey continues in the place cited just above, "quanto difficilius, tanto laudabilius est bene tractare materiam talem, scilicet communem et usitatam, quam materiam aliam, scilicet novam et inusitatam." As Paul Lehmann has written, and as he has demonstrated in a number of his studies, "Die Geschichte aller mittelalterlichen Literatur, insbesondere die des lateinischen Schrifttums im Abendlande, ist für mehrere Jahrhunderte in hohem Masse eine Geschichte der Aufnahme, Verarbeitung und Nachahmung fremden Gutes."⁷

The earliest *romans* in French tend to conform to Geoffrey's restrictions, for they are based almost exclusively on known Latin sources. Principally between 1150 and 1170, there was a rapid succession of poems based on various accounts of the life of Alexander the Great, on Statius' *Thebais*, on Vergil's *Aeneid*, and on the story of the Trojan War by pseudo-Dares and pseudo-Dictys. Wace's *Brut*, which came out during the same period, is itself a reworking of the Latin chronicle of Geoffrey of Monmouth. Ovid and Latin adaptations of Ovid served as *materia* for the Old French poems *Pyrame et Thisbé* and *Narcisse* as well as for Chrétien de Troyes' *Philomena* and his other lost Ovidian poems. Here is the subject matter common both in compositional exercises in twelfth and thirteenth century schools,⁸ and in some important medieval Latin poems: Walter of Châtillon's *Alexandreis*, Simon Chèvre d'Or's *Ilias*, and Joseph of Exeter's *De bello trojano*.⁹ The

Curtius, "Der Archipoeta und der Stil mittellateinischer Dichtung," *Romanische Forschungen*, 54 (1940), 143; E. Faral, "Le Fabliau latin au moyen âge," *Romania*, 50 (1924), 380. Lehmann's study offers a useful introduction to the problems connected with imitations, falsifications, and misunderstandings of Classical and pseudo-Classical works during the Middle Ages. And he reveals how extensive copying and imitation of Classical models was in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries: "Für uns Mittellateiner ist die Betrachtung und Würdigung der seit dem 12. Jahrhundert stärker in Erscheinung tretenden Neigung, antike und pseudo-antike Erzählungen, Sentenzen oder auch nur Namen zu bringen, wichtig unter anderem deswegen, weil wir so manche Werke der Erzählungs- und der Erziehungsliteratur des späteren Mittelalters verstehen lernen" (p. 27).

⁷ *Die Parodie im Mittelalter*, 2d ed. (Stuttgart, 1963), 2.

⁸ See Faral, "Le Manuscrit 511 du 'Hunterian Museum' de Glasgow. Notes sur le mouvement poétique et l'histoire des études littéraires en France et en Angleterre entre les années 1150 et 1225", *Studi medievali*, 9 (1936), 21-22, 32-33, 34-35, 43-51, 114-117; *Recherches sur les sources latines des contes et romans courtois du moyen âge* (Paris, 1913), 4; Lehmann, *Pseudo-antike*, 2-15.

⁹ A number of authors dreamed of writing, or were asked to write, an epic poem in the grand manner, but they despaired of being able to complete such an undertaking; see Dietrich, "Pyramus and Thisbe," in Lehmann, *Pseudo-antike*, 37, vss. 27-38; Alphanus of Salerno, "Carmina," in Migne, PL 147, 1221B; *Die Gedichte des Archipoeta*, eds. Heinrich Watenphul and Heinrich Frefeld (Heidelberg, 1958), 57-58. This is of course a variety of the *Bescheidenheitstopos*; see Ernst Robert Curtius, "Dichtung und Rhetorik im Mittelalter," *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*, 16 (1938), 456-459 and 471-472. But a topos could reflect reality; it was no easy task to compose a long narrative poem, as Walter of Châtillon points out in the Prologue to the *Alexandreis*.

process did not work in reverse to any large extent however; that is, there are few Latin poems based on vernacular material. The Latin versions of the Arthurian legend, for example, are, apart from pseudo-historical chronicles like that of Geoffrey of Monmouth, insignificant in number;¹⁰ and Oriental material is confined largely to tales based on the *Historia septem sapientum* and similar collections.¹¹

But the vernacular authors soon began to seek new subjects, new *materia* to put into verse, forgetful of the admonition to confine themselves to traditional Latin sources, and doubtless influenced by their audiences' desire for new tales. The sudden and persistent popularity of a variety of Celtic and Eastern tales is one happy result of this tendency. We may observe it as early as Chrétien, who in *Cligés*, an essentially Byzantine tale with Arthurian trappings, mentions his now lost poem about Marc and Iseut alongside the adaptations from Ovid and the Arthurian romance *Erec et Enide*. The twelfth century poetess Marie de France justifies versifying new *matière* in her *Lais* by the argument that the older Classical material had been exhausted.

... començai a penser
D'aukune bone estoire faire
E de latin en romaunz traire;
Mais ne me fust guaires de pris:
Itant se sunt altre entremis.
De lais pensai, k'oï aveie.

.....

Plusors en ai oï conter,
Nes voil laisser ne oblier.
Rimez en ai e fait ditié.

("Prologue," vss. 28-33, 39-41)¹²

And in the next century Guillaume de Lorris even boasts of composing the *Roman de la Rose* with *matière* never used before.¹³ But the majority of vernacular authors seldom went so far in the choice of their *materia*. Like their mentors in the arts of poetry, they are careful to base their writing on some given *materia*, whether that *materia* is in Latin, French, or some other language accessible to them.

¹⁰ See Roger Sherman Loomis, ed. *Arthurian Literature in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1959), 472-479.

¹¹ Jean de Ghellinck, *L'Essor de la littérature latine au XII^e siècle*, 2 vols. (Brussels, 1946), 2, 37-38; F. J. E. Raby, *A History of Secular Latin Poetry in the Middle Ages*, 2d ed., 2 vols. (Oxford, 1957), 2, 54-55; G. Cohen, 1, 115-116, 157-159, 217-218; 2, 87-88.

¹² Ed. Jeanne Lods (Paris, 1959).

¹³ *Le Roman de la Rose*, ed. Ernest Langlois, 5 vols. (Paris, 1914-24), vss. 39 and 2066. This is a topos in medieval literature; see Curtius, *Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter*, 2d ed. (Bern, 1954), 95-96.

Following the injunction in the *Documentum* to use *materia* that has been frequently used before, Geoffrey gives a number of rules based upon his interpretation of some lines in Horace's *Art of Poetry*. These rules cover invention, disposition, amplification, and the three styles. Those of importance for invention are more specific than the instruction contained in the *Poetria nova*, and may therefore serve to elucidate certain special problems that come up in this phase of composition. The first rule has to do with changes to be made in the content or the order of the *materia*:

... ne sequamur vestigia verborum, et hoc est intelligendum quantum ad corpus materiae; quia, si ceteri qui tractant materiam communem prius hanc partem materiae verbis exprimunt, postmodum illam, tertio tertiam, et sic deinceps, nos non debemus haec vestigia verborum sequi, ut illam partem materiae quam praemittunt praemittamus, et sic deinceps, sed universitatem materiae speculantes ibi dicamus aliquid ubi dixerunt nihil, et ubi dixerunt aliquid, nos nihil; quod etiam prius, nos posterius, et e converso; et sic communia proprie dicemus. (pp. 309-310, § 134).

These changes would of course be made with due consideration for the unity and harmony of the *materia*, as Geoffrey stipulates in the *Poetria nova*. Two additional precepts are devoted to the beginning and end of the *materia*: each must fit properly into the rest of the poem.

1. "ne praemittamus tale principium quod sit nimis arrogans et superciliosum." (p. 310, § 136).
2. "ut bene incepta fine debito concludamus. Et sic vitabimus vitium quod dicitur 'magnus finis'." (p. 316, § 162).

These rules are clearly applications of the appeal in the *Poetria nova* for careful arrangement of all parts of the *materia* so that they coalesce perfectly in the completed work.

Circinus interior mentis praecircinet omne
Materiae spatium. Certus praelimitet ordo
Unde praeearripiat cursum stylus.

(vss. 55-57)¹⁴

Similarly, after explaining how the beginning, middle, and conclusion of the *materia* should be handled, Geoffrey generalizes in the following way:

Omni parte sui modus omnis carmen honoret,
Ne qua parte labet, ne quam patiatur eclipsim.

(vss. 75-76)

¹⁴ Chaucer echoes these lines in the *House of Fame*, vss. 523-528 and 1101-05; J. M. Manly, "Chaucer and the Rhetoricians," *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 12 (1926), 109, argues that these words are indicative of a turning point in Chaucer's conception of composition, that he is here moving away from the traditional methods taught by Geoffrey and the arts of poetry!

Geoffrey's conception is common in many respects before and after him. It is derived in the essentials from Horace's *Art of Poetry*, as we have seen in the *Documentum*, as well as from commentaries on Horace, as may be observed in Geoffrey's "medieval" interpretation of the three styles on the basis of the three classes of society: aristocratic, middle, and plebeian (p. 312, § 145). The core of his interpretation of composition is found in one line of Horace's *Art of Poetry*: "primo ne medium, medio ne discrepet imum" (vs. 152). The admonition is not unusual in the Middle Ages; for example:

Pulchriter inveniatur, inventaque narret honeste.
Fini principium sit par....

(vss. 90-91)¹⁵

Even the length of the *materia* made little difference in the application of Geoffrey's rules. In the *Documentum*, Geoffrey explains how to treat *materia* so brief that it consists of but one word: *lego* and *doceo*, taken as the subject of a poem or letter. This is of course an extreme example, used mainly as a convenient illustration for the classroom. Nevertheless, in the light of the choice of such simple *materia*, Conrad of Mure's instruction on composition takes on added significance, and may, within the framework of Geoffrey's theory of composition, be used as an illustration of the method found in both the *Documentum* and the *Poetria nova*.

Multiplex [narratio] est, in qua plura narrantur. ibi prosator debet uidere, qualiter diuersas orationes ordinet et coniungat: scilicet quid in primo, quid in medio, quid in fine decenter ordinetur.¹⁶

In conformity with the same principle, John of Garland warns prospective writers against the following faults in the plan of their *materia*:

1. "incongrua parcium ordinacio vel dispositio" (p. 919).¹⁷

¹⁵ Charles Fierville, "Notice et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque de Saint-Omer," *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale*, 31, 1 (1884), 135; for additional examples, see *Speculum*, 41, 276, note 58.

¹⁶ "Summa de arte prosandi," in Ludwig Rockinger, ed. *Briefsteller und Formelbücher des elften bis vierzehnten Jahrhunderts*, 2 vols., Burt Franklin Research and Source Works Series, 10 (New York, 1961), 468, reprinted from *Quellen und Erörterungen zur bayerischen und deutschen Geschichte*, 9, 1 (Munich, 1863); references to Conrad of Mure will be based on this edition. See also John of Garland, "Poetria magistri Johannis Anglici de arte prosayca metrica et rithmica," ed. Giovanni Mari, *Romanische Forschungen*, 13 (1902), 887; and Conrad of Hirsau, *Dialogus super auctores*, ed. G. Schepss (Würzburg, 1889), 64, lines 10-18. It is evident not only from the passage in Conrad of Mure, but also from Eberhard of Béthune's *Graecismus* that similar principles governed the choice and arrangement of different parts of the sentence and of different parts of the plot. Eberhard uses Horace's instruction in the *Art of Poetry* regarding faults in narrative structure to criticize bad syntax; see the *Graecismus*, ed. J. Wrobel (Breslau, 1887), 1-2.

¹⁷ *Romanische Forschungen*, 13; references to John of Garland will be based on this edition.

2. "incongrua materie variacio" by the introduction of comic elements into a serious subject, and vice-versa. (p. 921)
3. "Finis infelix" or "inconueniens operis conclusio." (p. 921)

Likewise, Conrad of Mure, in the place cited just above, gives the following rules:

1. "Narratio... uiciatur... ex nimia prolixitate..., id est dum quis propositum incipit a nimis remoto;" and
2. "cum ordo rei geste nequaquam per ordinem narratur."

Finally, the vernacular poets share the same conception of composition.

L'estoire d'Alixandre vos veul par vers traitier
 En romans qu'a gent laie doive auques porfitier;
 Mais tels ne set finer qui bien set commencer,
 Ne mostrer bele fin por s'ovraigne essaucier,
 Ains resamble l'ason en son versiefier,
 Qui biaux est quant il naist et mainte gent l'ont chier,
 Com plus croist, plus laidist et resamble avresier.

(Branch I, vss. 30-36)¹⁸

Gérard d'Amiens in *Escanor* speaks of following his *matière* and still arranging it in a way that makes the narrative more pleasing:

... des or voeil commencer
 a dire le conte tout outre
 enssi com la matere moustre.
 En escrit truis ci en ceste oevre,
 si con li contes le descuevre;

(vss. 58-62)

and:

Et qui bel commence et define,
 l'uevre en est plus bele et plus fine
 et de plus grant noblece asez.

(vss. 1-3)¹⁹

Another author affirms:

Molt voi de gent qui rimer voelent
 Et lor entente metre i soelent
 As biaux dis fere et controver,
 Mes molt se doit bien porpenser
 Qui s'entente a rimer velt metre
 Qu'il s'en sache bien entremetre

¹⁸ *The Medieval French 'Roman d'Alexandre': Version of Alexandre de Paris*, Elliott Monographs, 38 (Princeton, N. J., 1949), 155-156.

¹⁹ Ed. H. Michelant, in the *Bibliothek des litterarischen Vereins in Stuttgart*, 178 (Tübingen, 1886); cf. Loomis, *Arthurian Tradition and Chrétien de Troyes* (New York, 1949), 157.

Qu'il puist rimer en tel maniere
 Que par devant ne par derriere
 N'en soit gabez ne escharnis.

(vss. 12-17)²⁰

Similar statements are found in Middle High German poems of this time.²¹

Geoffrey's comparison of poetic composition with architectural planning, analogous to Horace's comparison of the work of poet and painter, is a commonplace before Geoffrey, and in a variety of contexts. Conrad of Hirsau likens Donatus' grammatical writings to the foundation of the house of learning upon which subsequent studies are built.²² Similarly, Hugh of Saint Victor writes of the composition of the Bible: "illud ad memoriam revocare non inutile est, quod in aedificiis fieri conspicitur, ubi primum quidem fundamentum ponitur, dehinc fabrica supraedificatur, ad ultimum consummato opere domus colore superducto vestitur."²³ And Brunetto Latini lifted Geoffrey's words directly out of the *Poetria nova* and translated them into French for *Li Livres dou tresor*:

Por quoi je di que quant tu vieus bien faire ton
 prologue, il te covient tot avant consirer ta matire
 et connoistre la nature dou fait et sa maniere.
 Fai donc a l'essample de celui ki vieut maisoner,
 car il ne cort pas a l'oeuvre hastivement, ains le
 mesure tot avant a la ligne de son cuer, et com-
 prent en sa memore trestot l'ordre et la figure
 de la maison. Et tu gardes que ta langue ne soit
 courans a parler, ne la mains a l'escrire, ne
 comence [ms. T: *commete*; cf. Geoffrey: "committe"]
 pas l'un ne l'autre a cours de fortune. Mais
 ton sens tiegne en sa main l'office de chascune,
 en tel maniere que la matire soit longuement a
 la balance de ton cuer. Et dedens lui pregne l'or-
 dre de sa voie et de sa fin, car a ce que les
 besoignes du siecle sont diverses, te covient a
 parler diversement, et a chascune selonc sa
 matire.²⁴

²⁰ *Floriant et Florete*, ed. Harry F. Williams, University of Michigan Publications in Language and Literature, 23 (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1947).

²¹ Boesch, 75-76.

²² *Dialogus*, 31, lines 19-20.

²³ *Didascalicon*, ed. Charles Henry Buttimer (Washington, D. C., 1939), 113; cf. also 116, and Hugh's amplification of the topos with reference to the Bible on 119-120.

²⁴ Ed. Francis J. Carmody, University of California Publications in Modern Philology, 22 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1948), 335, §§ 2-3. Brunetto uses the same image in *La Rettorica*, ed. Francesco Maggini (Florence, 1915), 51-53, especially xxviii, 2-3, and xxix, 3.

The image reappears in Middle High German poems in connection with composition.²⁵ The similarity between architectural planning and poetic composition is also a commonplace in Scholastic philosophy.²⁶

One may therefore conclude that medieval writers did have common ideas regarding poetic composition. Derived largely from an elaboration and, to a certain extent, a reinterpretation of certain passages in Horace's *Art of Poetry*, and metaphorically considered analogous to the planning and construction of a building, this conception of composition found its most thoroughgoing treatment in Geoffrey of Vinsauf's writings, and particularly in his *Poetria nova*. As a result the *Poetria nova* itself assumed an importance comparable to that enjoyed by certain theoretical writings of antiquity that had been handed down to the Middle Ages. Just as the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and Cicero's *De inventione* formed, respectively, the *rhetorica nova* and the *rhetorica vetus*, so the *Poetria nova* of Geoffrey was linked to the *poetria vetus* — Horace's *Art of Poetry* — as a standard treatise on poetics. Geoffrey's influence was thus extensive. We have seen it in Chaucer, in Brunetto Latini; indeed, we may well surmise that Dante was acquainted with the *Poetria nova* through Brunetto, and that its influence, direct or indirect, is not absent from the careful construction of the *Divine Comedy*.²⁷ But let us briefly consider a few striking examples of that influence in vernacular narrative poetry, and try to arrive at a more precise idea of its extent.

The invention of the *materia* which the poet will arrange and embellish in completing his work involves a number of steps. First, in almost all instances, there is a given source, but a source that may be in various states of refinement, from the finished poems of Ovid to the scattered fragments of popular tales that went into Arthurian romance. We may, for the sake of classification, use Matthew of Vendôme's convenient terminology to distinguish between the two principal kinds of source: *materia exsecuta* or *pertractata*, that is *materia* already in verse (*Ars versificatoria*, pp. 180-184, §§ 3-15), viz. the Ovidian tales; and *materia illibata*, or *materia* not yet in verse (pp. 184-187, §§ 16-31), viz. the various late Latin prose accounts of the life of Alexander or the Arthurian and Byzantine material. *Materia exsecuta* presented the poets with greater problems than *materia illibata*, according to Matthew and Geoffrey, because the poet must fashion from it as good a poem as the original, and yet one which is not a servile imitation.

²⁵ Hennig Brinkmann, *Zu Wesen und Form mittelalterlicher Dichtung* (Halle, 1928), 7, note 3; Boesch, 24-25.

²⁶ Brinkmann, 8-10.

²⁷ See Aristide Marigo, ed. *De vulgari eloquentia* (Florence, 1957), pp. xxxvii-xxxviii. Dante expressly counsels study of the *poetriae* in the *De vulgari eloquentia*, II, iv, 2, pp. 186-188; see also Marigo's notes, 188-189.

Rearrangement of the content, shift in emphasis through expansion, abbreviation, and ornamentation were the most common means employed in this form of composition. Simon Chèvre d'Or's various abbreviations of Vergil's *Aeneid* are illustrative of this method of composition. The basic *materia* should however be followed closely. Matthew says, for example: "Si exsecuta fuerit [materia], juxta tenorem poeticae narrationis erit procedendum" (p. 180, §3); only certain changes in style as well as additions to the content that improve or elaborate upon the meaning of the poem are acceptable.

Such close adherence to the *materia* is acknowledged by Benoît de Sainte-Maure in the *Roman de Troie*:

Ceste estoire n'est pas usee,
N'en guaires lieus nen est trovee:
Ja retraite ne fust ancote [in French !],
Mais Beneeiz de Sainte More
L'a contrové e fait e dit
E o sa main les moz escrit,
Ensi tailliez, ensi curez,
Ensi asis, ensi posez,
Que plus ne meins n'i a mestier.
Ci vueil l'estoire comencier:
Le latin sivrâ e la letre,
Nule autre rien n'i voudrai metre,
S'ensi non com jol truis escrit.
Ne di mie qu'aucun bon dit
N'i mete, se faire le sai,
Mais la matire en ensivrai.

(vss. 129-144)²⁸

The vernacular authors who based their narrative poems on Celtic rather than Latin sources may have found it easier to be original, but the problem of finding and arranging their *materia* in a satisfactory way was greater. The tales of wandering Breton story-tellers, or the books containing their tales, do not seem to have made the quest for clarity and order easy for writers accustomed from the schools to follow closely the *materia*. In this type of *materia* — *materia illibata* — confusion, contradiction, excessive variety, disorder, and fantastic personages and events were common. We may observe the difficulties reflected in the words of the authors themselves. Those who related the Tristan legend repeat, one after the other, the same complaint. Thomas d'Angleterre: "Seignurs, cest cunte est mult divers" (D 835);²⁹ Gottfried von Strassburg:

²⁸ *Le Roman de Troie*, ed. Léopold Constans, 6 vols. (Paris, 1904-12).

²⁹ *Les Fragments du roman de Tristan*, ed. Bartina H. Wind (Leyden, 1950).

Ich weiz wol, ir ist vil gewesen,
die von Tristande hant gelesen;
und ist ir doch niht vil gewesen,
die von im rehte haben gelesen.

(vss. 131-134)³⁰

Why? "sin [i. e. those who wrote before Gottfried, with the exception of Thomas] sprachen in der rihte niht" (vs. 149). Gottfried followed Thomas' poem, with occasional additions from other sources. One of these sources was Eilhart von Oberg's *Tristrant*. Eilhart used a lost French poem which belongs to a tradition different from that represented by Thomas and Gottfried. Yet the problem presented by the sources was no different:

nû saget lichte ein ander man,
ez sî andirs hîr umme komen:
daz habe wir alle wol vornomen,
daz man daz ungeliche saget:
Eilhart des gûten zûg habet,
daz ez recht alsus ergîng.

(vss. 9452-57)³¹

And Bérout, writing in French but in the same tradition as Eilhart:

Li conteor dient qu'Yvain
Firent nîer, qui sont vilain;
N'en sevent mie bien l'estoire,
Berox l'a mex en sen memoire,
Trop ert Tristran preuz et cortois
A ocirre gent de tes lois.

(vss. 1265-70)³²

This is the sort of difficulty spoken of by Chrétien de Troyes in the Prologue to *Erec et Enide*:

d'Erec, le fil Lac, est li contes,
que devant rois et devant contes
depecier et corronpre suelent
cil qui de conter vivre vuelent.

(vss. 19-22)³³

Chrétien applied himself to this material and made of it the "molt bele conjointure" (vs. 14) that we find in *Erec*. Thus, from his Breton *materia illibata*, Chrétien selected and arranged certain elements into a pleasing

³⁰ *Tristan und Isold*, ed. Friedrich Ranke (Berlin, 1930).

³¹ *Eilhart von Oberge*, ed. Franz Lichtenstein, *Quellen und Forschungen zur Sprach- und Culturgeschichte der germanischen Völker*, 19 (Strasbourg, 1877).

³² *Le Roman de Tristan*, ed. Ernest Muret, 4th ed. (Paris, 1957).

³³ Ed. Mario Roques (Paris, 1955).

and meaningful poem. The composition of the French and German Tristan poems was no different in the essentials.

But this process of extracting and unifying the *materia* to be used in the poem was not simple. Thomas d'Angleterre discusses the problem in a well known passage in his *Tristan*. After describing the diversity of his *matière*, he continues:

E pur ço l'uni par mes vers
E di en tant cum est mester
E le surplus voil relester.

(D 836-838)

Gottfried elaborates upon this process, indicating that his *materia* is in fact Thomas' poem, but that he also used other sources (vss. 155-159). Thereupon he applied to this material the careful scrutiny that Geoffrey demanded of writers, sifting and organizing it until he had fashioned a well-composed and meaningful poem.

und begunde mich des pinen,
daz ich in siner rihte
rihte dise tihte.

(vss. 160-162)

The initial stages and the conclusion of the process of invention are clearly described by Conrad of Mure when he distinguishes between *materia remota* and *materia propinqua*.

materia remota sunt rudes lapides et inexpliti, et ligna nondum dolata
nondum leuigata. set materia propinqua sunt lapides et ligna bene preparata,
ut in structura domus prout expedit componantur. (p. 441)

The choice, polishing up, and arranging of the different elements of the *materia*, taken together, constitute Geoffrey's first step in the composition of the narrative poem — it is the invention of the *materia* of the poem. After this has been accomplished, the poet may proceed to put the *materia* into words, that is, into verse. How this is done Geoffrey describes in the next two parts of the *Poetria nova*: disposition and ornamentation.

DISPOSITION

It is not necessary to go into this subject extensively here, since Faral and others have analyzed more than adequately Geoffrey's contribution. Briefly, disposition may be divided into two parts: the use of natural and artificial order, and the use of amplification and abbreviation. The two techniques should be carefully distinguished from invention. The poet decides first what the beginning, middle, and conclusion of his *materia* will be; this initial decision is invention. Next he decides in what order he will

present the different parts of the *materia* in the finished poem, that is, he decides what the final disposition of the poem will be.

Ordo bifurcat iter: tum limite nititur artis,
Tum sequitur stratam naturae.

(vss. 87-88)

Thus the natural order of the *materia* is maintained, or it is rearranged in an artificial and presumably more pleasing manner, or in a way that suits better the purposes of the author.

Similarly, once the poet has decided what in his *materia* needs to be stressed or elaborated upon, what needs to be toned down or shortened, he must know in what ways this may be accomplished. The means of amplification and abbreviation are his answer. Geoffrey's constant concern however is that the amplification and abbreviation be necessary or, in effect, "called for" by the *materia*, and that the specific means of amplification or abbreviation chosen be appropriate to the particular part of the *materia* in which it is to be used.

Non absque labore
Sunt passus utriusque viae: si vis bene duci,
Te certo committe duci; subscripta revolve:
Ipsa stylum ducent et utrimque docenda docebunt.

.....

Hominis manus interioris
Ducit ut amplificet vel curtet.

(vss. 209-212, 217-218)³⁴

Some of the faults of inappropriate amplification and abbreviation are specified in the *Documentum*.

1. "ne moremur ubi moram faciunt alii; sed, ubi moram faciunt, transeamus, ubi transeunt, moram faciamus." (p. 309, § 133) This has to do, Geoffrey explains, with the use of descriptions and digressions.
2. "ut de materia non transeamus ad talem articulum unde reverti nesciamus ad materiam." (p. 310, § 135) This is an inordinate digression.³⁵
3. "videamus, si velimus uti digressionem, ut ipsa digressio sit competens et ad rem pertinens, et ita vitabimus vitium illud quod dicitur incompetens digressio." (p. 314, § 156)
4. "obscura brevis." (p. 313, § 152)

The distinction between natural and artificial order was too common in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries for Geoffrey to be able to make any really significant contribution on the subject. Nevertheless, some authors admired Geoffrey's presentation of the subject enough to imitate closely

³⁴ See also vss. 455-460, 529-531, 557-561.

³⁵ Cf. *Poetria nova*, vss. 529-530; and *Speculum*, 41, 273, note 41.

or transcribe outright his instruction. John of Garland, Conrad of Mure, Bene of Florence, and Brunetto Latini prescribe essentially the same plan as Geoffrey.³⁶ Generally, all these treatises recommend the use of artificial order in preference to natural order, and the narrative poets of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries tended to follow their advice, particularly in the use of proverbs and exempla as introductions to the narrative. Artificial order as it appears in Vergil's *Aeneid*, the work most often cited as an illustration of the procedure, is rare. One good example, however, is the beginning of Chrétien's *Yvain*, in which the knight Calogrenant relates his adventures at the fountain of Broceliande to Guenevere and some other knights. Chrétien's arrangement is not unlike Vergil's, who has Aeneas describe before Dido and the Carthaginian court the destruction of Troy and his subsequent wanderings. Both poems precede the "flashback" with a certain amount of court activity. There is of course nothing in the *Yvain* corresponding to the storm and shipwreck in Book I of the *Aeneid*. The author of the Old French *Enéas* preserves the artificial order of Vergil's poem, and has Aeneas relate the Fall of Troy and his subsequent adventures (the latter considerably abbreviated) after his arrival at Carthage. But he reduces the significance of the procedure by prefixing to the poem a summary of the events during the siege and capture of Troy, and thus makes the order of the poem virtually natural. In the arrangement of the beginning of the Middle High German version, Heinrich von Veldeke follows the plan of the Old French poem.³⁷ John of Garland added the prologue to the variety of artificial

³⁶ For a summary of Geoffrey's and John of Garland's instruction, see Faral, *Arts poétiques*, 58-59. In Brunetto Latini, see *Trésor*, 327-329. Conrad of Mure gives a shorter list: natural and artificial order from the middle and from the end (441-442). Bene of Florence in the *Candelabrum* transcribes the same alternatives as Geoffrey. For statements regarding Bene's treatise, I have used a microfilm of the Bibl. Nat. lat. 15082; Bene's discussion of natural and artificial order is found on folio 111. It would be useful to have a critical edition of the *Candelabrum*, which contains so much of the instruction of the thirteenth century regarding the *dictamen*, poetry, and oratory. Bene knew Geoffrey's *Poetria nova*; see Charles Sears Baldwin, *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic* (New York, 1928), 217 and note 21. Since the *Candelabrum* is dated ca. 1220-23, it contains the earliest known allusion to Geoffrey's treatise, and antedates 1250, the date given by M. Manitius as the earliest allusion to Geoffrey's work (III, 755). One sees by this fact how quickly the *Poetria nova* became popular. On Bene and his work, see Baldwin, 213-223 (contains a summary of those parts of the *Candelabrum* influenced by Roman treatises on the *dictamen*, but not those influenced by Geoffrey and other French writers); A. Gaudenzi, "Sulla cronologia delle opere dei dettatori bolognesi da Buoncompagno a Bene di Lucca," *Bullettino dell'Istituto storico italiano*, 14 (1895), 150-162 (summary from a manuscript of the *Candelabrum*'s contents, 151-152); B. Hauréau, *Notices et extraits de quelques manuscrits latins de la Bibliothèque Nationale*, 6 vols. (Paris, 1890-93), 4, 259-262.

³⁷ This is not to say that Veldeke's poem is a servile imitation of French *matière*. There are significant differences in the composition of the two poems; see Marie-Luise Dittrich, *Die 'Eneide' Heinrichs von Veldeke. I. Teil: Quellenkritischer Vergleich mit dem Roman d'Eneas und Vergils Aeneis* (Wiesbaden, 1966).

beginnings proposed by Geoffrey; such a prologue should contain a summary of the narrative, that is the *materia* of the poem. Prologues of this sort are common in the medieval Latin "Comedy,"³⁸ and may also be found at the outset of Benoît de Sainte-Maure's *Troie* and Eilhart's *Tristrant*. These examples are of course not to be considered exhaustive, but rather illustrative of the application of principles taught in the arts of poetry.

Geoffrey proposed a convenient list of specific means of amplification and abbreviation, and his instruction was for this reason widely imitated. Geoffrey's *Poetria nova* may indeed contain the first systematic treatment of the subject, although earlier writers, and especially writers on poetics in the twelfth century, advocated expansion and abridgement of the *materia* or parts of the *materia* whenever they were called for.³⁹ But there seems to have been no systematic listing of acceptable ways of doing so before the *Poetria nova*. Faral has shown the resemblance between Geoffrey's lists and that contained in Eberhard the German's *Laborintus*.⁴⁰ Moreover, Brunetto Latini incorporated Geoffrey's instruction directly into his *Tresor*, as the following table shows.

Geoffrey of Vinsauf	Brunetto Latini
<i>interpretatio</i> or <i>expolitio</i>	"aornemens" (p. 330, § 1)
<i>circuitio</i> or <i>circumlocutio</i>	"tourn" (p. 330, § 2)
<i>collatio aperta</i> and <i>occulta</i>	"comparaison decouverte" and "coverte" (pp. 330-331, §§ 4-6)
<i>apostrophatio</i> or <i>exclamatio</i>	"clamour" (p. 331, § 7)
<i>prosopopeia</i>	"fainture" (p. 331, § 8)
<i>digressio</i>	"trespas" (p. 331, § 9)
<i>descriptio</i>	"demonstration" (pp. 331-332, §§ 10-11)
<i>oppositio</i> or <i>oppositum</i>	"adoublement" (p. 332, § 12)

And Brunetto concludes with a translation of Geoffrey's final remarks:

Sic surgit permulta seges de semine pauco:
Flumina magna trahunt ortus de fonte pusillo;
(vss. 687-688)

Or avés oii comment on puet acroistre ses dis, et sa
matere alongnier, car a poi de semence croist grans
blés et de petites fontaines naist grans flueves.
(p. 332, § 13)

³⁸ Faral, *Arts poétiques*, 59.

³⁹ See especially Curtius, *Europäische Literatur*, 483-484.

⁴⁰ *Arts poétiques*, 62.

Brunetto does not attempt to translate Geoffrey's flowery illustrations of each means of amplification. Either he gives no example at all, as in the case of *prosopopeia* — "Et c'est si entendable que li mestres ne s'entremet de mostrer aucun exemple de ce" (p. 330, § 8), — or chooses his own briefer and more prosaic examples. Under *apostrophatio*, for example, he abbreviates Geoffrey's apostrophe to Death (vss. 386-396: p. 331, § 7, lines 42-44) and to Nature (vss. 397-411: lines 44-45). On only one occasion does Brunetto translate carefully and at length into prose one of Geoffrey's illustrations; it is the description of the beautiful woman, called Iseut by Brunetto but left nameless in Geoffrey: vss. 564-595 [vss. 563 and 595-597 not included in the *Tresor*]: pp. 331-332, § 11, lines 69-88.⁴¹ Brunetto does not reproduce Geoffrey's instruction on abbreviation. He concludes the treatment of amplification by alluding to abbreviation, and then refers the reader to a later section of his book on rhetoric: "por ce est il drois et raisons que li mestres enseigne a abregier son conte quant il est trop grans et trop lons; et de ce mousterra il avant la u il dira du fet" (p. 332, § 13). This section is on pp. 353-354 (sec. xliii: "De conter le fet briement"), but the material in that section is derived entirely from Cicero's *De inventione*; there is nothing from Geoffrey. This is in fact to be expected; the means of abbreviation listed in the *Poetria nova* are not particularly appropriate to writing in French.⁴²

The success of the *Poetria nova* made Geoffrey's treatment of amplification and abbreviation authoritative. The evidence from Brunetto Latini, Eberhard the German, and Chaucer⁴³ supports this conclusion. At the time Geoffrey was writing, however, there was, apparently, still some uncertainty in his mind regarding the precise listing of the means of amplification; the list contained in the *Documentum* does not agree entirely with that found in the *Poetria nova*. And John of Garland's list resembles that found in the *Documentum* rather than that in the *Poetria nova*.⁴⁴

⁴¹ In addition to the passages cited above (notes 23 and 36), the following parts of the *Tresor* are based on Geoffrey's *Poetria nova*: X, §§ 1-3 (p. 327): vss. 1851-83; XII, § 2 (p. 330): vss. 210-217.

⁴² The means of abbreviation are: *emphasis*, *articulus*, ablative absolute, avoidance of repetition, *inuendo* (*intellectio*), *asyndeton*, fusion of a number of statements; see Faral, *Arts poétiques*, 85.

⁴³ As has been shown above, both Brunetto Latini and Chaucer were familiar with Geoffrey's apostrophe to Death upon the death of Richard the Lion Hearted; see *Tresor*, 331, § 7, lines 42-45; Chaucer, *The Nun's Priest's Tale*, VII, vss. 3347-49.

⁴⁴ For abbreviation, compare John of Garland, *Romanische Forschungen*, 13, 913-914, with Geoffrey, *Documentum*, 277-280, §§ 30-43; for amplification, John, 914-916, with Geoffrey, 271-277, §§ 2-29. Faral's table in *Arts poétiques*, 62, provides a convenient outline of the means of amplification proposed by the different arts of poetry. In spite of some differences, Faral argues: "On remarque... que le dénombrement des procédés concorde dans la plupart de ces textes avec celui qu'indique la *Poetria nova*."

The use of amplification and abbreviation by Latin and vernacular authors, and the relation of their use of them to the composition of their poems, has not been adequately studied. Several scholars have analyzed the presentation of the subject found in the arts of poetry and have illustrated their discussion with examples taken from contemporary Latin and vernacular writing.⁴⁵ And a few have studied the use made of some or all of the means of amplification in particular works.⁴⁶ We lack however systematic studies of individual narrative poems showing whether, and if so how, the use of amplification and abbreviation is related to the overall plan of the work. Geoffrey says that amplification should always be fitting and the type used appropriate. Given the widespread use of amplification and abbreviation in medieval poetry, this subject should offer fruitful ground for a number of independent studies.

⁴⁵ Brinkmann, 47-68; Faral, *Arts poétiques*, 61-85; Curtius, *Europäische Literatur*, 479-485; Leonid Arbusow, *Colores rhetorici*, 2d ed. (Göttingen, 1963), 21-29.

⁴⁶ Faral, *Recherches*, 307-388; Brinkmann, 103-184; Stanislaw Sawicki, *Gottfried von Strassburg und die Poetik des Mittelalters*, Germanische Studien, 124 (Berlin, 1932), 71-115; Traugott Naunin, *Der Einfluss der mittelalterlichen Rhetorik auf Chaucers Dichtung* (diss. Bonn, 1929), 24-30, and *passim*; Eugène Vinaver, in M. Dominica Legge, ed. *Le Roman de Balain* (Manchester, 1942), xiii-xxiii; Everett, *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 36, 139-148; Manfred Gsteiger, *Die Landschaftsschilderungen in den Romanen Chrestiens de Troyes* (Bern, 1958); Alice M. Colby, *The Portrait in Twelfth-Century French Literature* (Geneva, 1965). The only study I know of that examines the use of all forms of amplification and abbreviation in relation to the structure of the poem is Alan M. F. Gunn's *The Mirror of Love: A Reinterpretation of 'The Romance of the Rose'* (Lubbock, Texas, 1952). All other studies of the subject merely illustrate the methods employed in one particular work, or in a number of works, or analyze special examples by themselves; little or no effort is made to relate the use of amplification to the plan and intention of the poem, in the way that Gunn does. Gunn himself seems to think that, apart from the allegorical poem, the union between plot and amplification cannot be successful because of the incoherent *matière* the authors use (p.72, note 12). Obviously, the usual *matière* of vernacular literature — Arthurian or otherwise — was too varied to allow extensive use of amplification such as the far simpler narrative of the *Rose* permitted; or, to take another example, as in Latin narrative poetry like Matthew of Vendôme's *Tobias* (Migne, PL 205, 933-980), *Pyramus and Thisbe* (Lehmann, *Pseudo-antike*, 31-35), and *Milo* (Cohen, 1, 168-177). But the whole problem of the poet's *matière*, his choice and arrangement of it, is far from being resolved. It must however be resolved before statements like Gunn's can be taken seriously. To say that Arthurian romance is not composed like the *Rose* does not mean no other satisfactory manner of composition, including the use of amplification, was possible, and that the Arthurian works are therefore badly written. It is clear that amplification is not necessarily limited to one genre or form, or that allegorical tales are the only type suitable for its use. Amplification is used elsewhere than in narrative poetry, as, for example, in courtly lyric in France and Germany; see Roger Dragonetti, *La Technique poétique des trouvères dans la chanson courtoise* (Bruges, 1960), 194-303. The theorists applied it to letter-writing and the composition of sermons as well as to narrative poetry.

ORNAMENTATION

Geoffrey handles ornamentation under two principal headings: the two kinds of ornamentation (*ornatus facilis* and *difficilis*) and the three styles. The three styles as such are not discussed in the *Poetria nova*, but Geoffrey does take them up in the *Documentum* (pp. 312-323, §§ 145-151; pp. 315-316, §§ 157-161). Quadlbauer has studied the history of the three styles thoroughly enough to preclude our going into the subject here any more than to insist particularly upon the relation between the kind of style and the *materia* of the poem. Geoffrey is typical of his time in considering each of Vergil's main writings as representative of each of the three styles: the grand style in the *Aeneid*, the middle style in the *Georgics*, and the low style in the *Bucolics*. Geoffrey does not therefore understand the three styles as they were understood in antiquity. Rather the nature of the *materia*, the social order to which the persons represented belong and in which the events normally transpire determines the classification into grand, middle, and low.⁴⁷ This does not preclude stylistic differences due to the different vocabulary and sentence structure appropriate to narrative concerned with different classes of society;⁴⁸ nevertheless, these differences were incidental, and the subject matter distinguished in the last analysis one style from the other, not the means of embellishment appropriate to each style. Thus the variation of styles for the sake of variety, a practice encouraged in Roman rhetoric, is forbidden by Geoffrey as adamantly as he would doubtless have protested against the mixing of social classes. As a consequence the *vitia* associated with each style in Classical rhetoric could be extended to all three styles in Geoffrey's scheme. An author might be *aridum et exsangue* or *turgidum et inflatum* whether he wrote of knights and ladies, members of the middle class, or peasants. The relevance of this interpretation of the three styles to Geoffrey's conception of narrative composition is obvious. The

⁴⁷ See Quadlbauer, 90-91, § 44a; 104, § 44p: "Die künstlerische Einheit der Komposition, die die *As poetica* fordert, deutet Galfrid als Einheit des *stylus* (*materiae*) im Sinn von Uniformität, als Einheit also, die keine Variation verträgt, und gewinnt so aus Horaz die autoritative Fundierung seines Verbots der Variation des *stylus*. Variare *stylum* hiesse für ihn — die *styli* sind ja sprachlich dargebotene Stofftypen — die Stoffart wechseln, nicht zum Thema Gehöriges 'beimischen'."

⁴⁸ Quadlbauer, 94, § 44e; 97, § 44g1; 109, § 44w. Cf. also, on John of Garland, 123, § 46k. Erich Auerbach, *Literatursprache und Publikum in der lateinischen Spätantike und im Mittelalter* (Bern, 1958), discusses the influence of the Bible, representative of *sermo humilis*, on the development of the material conception of the three styles; see especially 25-53. See also Quadlbauer, 9, § 4; 19-20, § 14a-b.

materia fixes the type of persons, settings, social context; accordingly, the vocabulary, the means of expression chosen must fit the *materia*. Popular sources, for example, that mix the common and the aristocratic would have to be corrected in the initial phases of composition in order to prevent a mixing of styles. And indeed, in courtly literature, largely concerned with members of the aristocracy, the appearance of the lower classes is extremely rare, except when their appearance is necessitated by the requirements of aristocratic life: servants, messengers, farmers, etc. One striking exception in French literature is the herdsman in Chrétien's *Yvain*. Yet even this personage illustrates the "stylistic" difficulties presented by the introduction of such figures. A knight on a quest happens upon the herdsman, and asks him if he has heard of any "aventures" or "merveilles", since such encounters are typically what the questing knight is searching for. But the herdsman, who belongs to a different class of society, is not accustomed to such *matière*. The knight asks:

Or te pri et quier et demant,
se tu sez, que tu me consoille
ou d'aventure ou de mervoille.
— A ce, fet il [the herdsman], faudras
tu bien:
d'aventure ne sai je rien,
n'onques mes n'en oï parler.
(vss. 364-369)⁴⁹

The two do not speak the same language, for they come from different classes of society.

Geoffrey's most important contribution on the subject of style is the instruction about the two kinds of ornamentation: *ornatus facilis* and *ornatus difficilis*. The earliest systematic classification of the two *genera* is found in the *Poetria nova*, although there is reason to believe that Bernard Silvestris preceded Geoffrey in the lost *Summa*, and that he may even have invented the distinction;⁵⁰ the first indication of such a distinction dates further back,

⁴⁹ Ed. Mario Roques (Paris, 1960). A similar interpretation of the language of the aristocracy among the lower classes is found in *Aucassin et Nicolette*, ed. Mario Roques, 2d ed. (Paris, 1954), 19-20. Of course, the *chante-fable* is not, as a genre, on the same level as a *roman* such as *Yvain*, but resembles in subject matter the medieval Latin "Comedy". The "Comedy" required, as Geoffrey tells us, the middle or low style: "Res comica namque recusat/Arte laboratos sermones: sola requirit/Plana" (*Poetria nova*, vss. 1885-87). *Plana* "entspricht... dem mittleren und dem niedrigen Stil" (Quadlbauer, 99, §§ 44k), although it is as a term used to describe *ornatus facilis* more than any particular style; see Quadlbauer, 98-99, § 44k. See also the passage from the *Aulularia*, cited above p. 120, where Vitalis of Blois prefers mixing styles to changing his *materia*.

⁵⁰ Eberhard, *Laborintus*, vss. 595-598; *Speculum*, 41, 266, note 22; Quadlbauer, 106-109, § 44t-v.

however, and, as Quadlbauer has shown, may be found in the *scholia* to the *Ad Herennium*.⁵¹ Since the two kinds of ornamentation also appear in rudimentary form in the *artes dictandi*,⁵² and since Bernard's lost treatise was, like Geoffrey's *Documentum*, in part an *ars dictandi*, it may well be that Bernard was Geoffrey's source.

The instruction regarding the use of the two kinds of ornamentation reflects that given about disposition and amplification: subordination of the choice of tropes and figures to the requirements of the *materia*.

Mentis in arcano cum rem digesserit ordo,
 Materiam verbis veniat vestire poesis.
 Quando tamen servire venit, se praeparet aptam
 Obsequio dominae: caveat sibi, ne caput hirtis
 Crinibus, aut corpus pannosa veste, vel illa
 Ultima displiceant, aliunde nec inquinet illam
 Hanc poliens partem: pars si qua sedebit inepte,
 Tota trahet series ex illa parte pudorem:
 Fel modicum totum mel amaricat; unica menda
 Totalem faciem difformat. Cautius ergo
 Consule materiae, ne possit probra vereri.

(vss. 60-70)

This injunction is specifically applied to ornamentation later (vss. 737-764). In the less florid language of the *Documentum*: "Cogitandum... prius est de sententia quam cogitemus de verborum junctura. Mortua sunt enim verba si non incolumi nitantur sententia, quae quodam modo anima est verbi. Cum constiterit de sententia, procedendum est ad verba, diligentiam adhibendo, ut series verborum sit ornata" (p. 285, § 2). Geoffrey is even more explicit in his brief *Summa de coloribus rhetoricis*: "Considerandum est ita qualiter tractetur materia si de seriis vel de jocis. Si de seriis tractetur materia, aut utendum est facili oratione et ornata, aut oratione gravi..." (p. 321); and, further on: "Notandum est quod ex praedictis exornationibus quaedam quibusdam materiis sunt necessariae; materiae vero quae tractatur ex ira vel indignatione vel dolore vel amore vel odio vel insania, haec sunt necessariae: repetitio, articulus, exclamatio, conduplicatio, dubitatio, subjectio; in gravi vero materia, his utendum est difficultatibus: circuitione, translatione, significatione" (p. 325). Thus the figures and tropes appropriate to passion are distinguished from those suitable to weighty or more serious discourse. In all of these statements one principal concern is evident: the subordination of embellishment to the demands of the *materia* of the poem. It is also apparent from these statements that an author may

⁵¹ P. 58, § 27.

⁵² Arbusow, p. 18.

vary from one kind of ornamentation to the other, depending upon the different parts of his *materia*. Thus the admonition of Classical rhetoric to change from one style to the other finds a counterpart in Geoffrey's instruction regarding the *genera* of ornamentation.⁵³

Instruction on the use of tropes and figures is too extensive and varied in Geoffrey's time and thereafter to allow one to attribute too much influence to his particular treatment, except of course for the distinction between *ornatus facilis* and *ornatus difficilis*. Rather Geoffrey is important for carrying on and giving a convenient presentation to traditional knowledge of and instruction about ornamentation. There is no evidence that this instruction was followed exclusively by his successors in the schools; Eberhard the German did not repeat his scheme as he did on amplification, nor did John of Garland.⁵⁴

The poets of course made extensive use of figures and tropes, and evidence for this fact is not lacking.⁵⁵ The use of *ornatus facilis* and *ornatus difficilis* has been traced through a few authors, although in no case very thoroughly.⁵⁶ Gottfried von Strassburg's celebrated criticism of Wolfram von Eschenbach's composition is, it has been argued, at least in part a defense of one style against another. But the question is still unresolved,⁵⁷ and seems more

⁵³ Quadlbauer, 111, § 44y.

⁵⁴ See the comparative tables in Faral, *Arts poétiques*, 52-54. The usual source seems to have been, either directly or indirectly, the *Ad Herennium*; see Faral, 48. Matthew constitutes an exception to the rule; see Faral, 48; *Speculum*, 41, 265-266, and note 21.

⁵⁵ See the bibliography in Arbusow, 124-128, and Faral, *Arts poétiques*, xi, note 1. To these lists may be added: Everett, *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 36, 133-139; Valeria Bertolucci, "Commento retorico all'Ere e al Cligés," *Studi mediolatini e volgari*, 8 (1960), 9-51; Bertolucci, "La Retorica nel Tristano di Thomas," *Studi mediolatini e volgari*, 6-7 (1959), 25-61.

⁵⁶ Brinkmann, 98-102; Sawicki, pp. 115-149; Quadlbauer, 129 and 150-159. Boesch, 198-205, discusses the subject in connection with the important Middle High German poets; his remarks are useful, but must be corrected in the light of Quadlbauer's findings regarding the three styles and the two kinds of ornamentation as these were understood in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Note, for example, that Walther von der Vogelweide did not use the three styles in the way that they are described in the *Ad Herennium*; see Boesch, 199, and Quadlbauer, 157, § 59. In Matthew of Vendôme, a "golden" middle style is recommended in preference to the two extremes of high and low; see Quadlbauer, 74-79, §§ 37c-c5. Cf. the passage from Hugh of Trimberg's *Renner* cited by Brinkmann, 78: "swer tihten wil, der tihte alsô/daz weder ze nider noch ze hô/sînes sinnes flûge daz mittel halten,/sô wirt er wert beide jungen und alten." Matthew's preference for the middle style is not shared by Geoffrey, who recommends all three; see Quadlbauer, 95-96, § 44f. Auerbach, *Literatursprache*, 135-176, has argued that vernacular literature uses only the middle style (in the Classical sense, i.e. *ornatus facilis* in the Middle Ages — Auerbach does not take up the distinction *ornatus facilis* and *difficilis*) before Dante's time.

⁵⁷ Sawicki, 116, 130-131, 168-171; for recent bibliography on this question, see Gottfried Weber, *Gottfried von Strassburg* (Stuttgart, 1962), 15.

complicated than a disagreement regarding either style or ornamentation, as Geoffrey understood the terms. There is in any case no indication anywhere in the *poetriae* that one kind of ornamentation was considered intrinsically superior to the other.

It has been a commonplace in studies of the arts of poetry since Faral's edition that, in his words, "la composition n'a pas été le souci dominant des écrivains du moyen âge."⁵⁸ He accounts for this anomaly in part by the lack of instruction on narrative composition in the arts of poetry. "L'enseignement des arts poétiques, qui ne brille pas par l'envergure des conceptions, paraît avoir agi précisément par ce qu'il contenait de plus superficiel et de plus mécanique." By the latter words Faral means amplification and abbreviation, tropes and figures. But it is now apparent that Faral's statement, in so far as the arts of poetry are concerned, is either incorrect or in need of clarification, depending upon the particular poetic treatise under consideration. Some of the arts of poetry, in particular Matthew of Vendôme's *Ars versificatoria* and Eberhard the German's *Laborintus*, are more elementary and thus more limited in scope than the other treatises. The others, including Geoffrey of Vinsauf and John of Garland, do include, to a greater or lesser extent, all the steps in composition as it was understood in their time, that is the three steps common in traditional rhetoric: invention, disposition, ornamentation. Nor did the authors of the treatises consider ornamentation the most important task in writing, as Faral believed. Rather the invention of the *materia* is the first and foremost step in composition. Invention is of course not treated so extensively in the *Poetria nova* as it was in traditional rhetoric or in the *artes dictandi*. But this may be accounted for by the variety and diversity of *materia* subject to poetic treatment, and the limitless purposes that such *materia* could be made to serve. Here the author was left to grapple with his *materia* as best he could, with the general admonition to give it order, meaning, and clarity.⁵⁹ But the subsequent steps of disposition and ornamentation are controlled by the plan and purpose of the *materia*. Subordination of ornamentation to the plan and intention of the author is also demanded by Matthew of Vendôme; but Matthew does not include instruction on invention as such, since his treatise is designed for beginning students in composition and he therefore assumes that they will be working with *materia* already arranged and suitable for embellishment.⁶⁰ Still, Matthew's presentation illustrates the two points I have tried to make in this paper: Geoffrey's conception of

⁵⁸ *Arts poétiques*, 59-60. For similar opinions, see *Speculum*, 41, 261, note 2.

⁵⁹ Brinkmann, 46-47; Arbusow, 35.

⁶⁰ *Speculum*, 41, 267-268 and 274.

composition was widespread among twelfth and thirteenth century writers, and his conception demanded that disposition and ornamentation be subordinate to and to a large extent determined by the requirements of the subject matter and design of the poem.

These findings constitute of course only a first step towards a reconsideration of certain aspects of composition in medieval narrative poetry. But they do suggest what needs to be done in future studies of this form of writing. Careful analysis of structure, followed by a study of amplification and abbreviation and of ornamentation, should permit us better to understand and appreciate how the rules of the arts of poetry were applied, and how much freedom and originality the individual authors allowed themselves in using them. A relatively uncomplicated example from Chrétien's *Cligés* will serve to illustrate the type of problem one comes across in this sort of criticism — a consideration of the problems involved in analyzing the amplification and ornamentation used, say, in the monologues of Alexandre and Soredamors in the first part of the poem, which would be too long for this paper, would give a better indication of the difficulties and value of such investigations. *Cligés* is generally considered transitional in so far as Chrétien's use of description of persons and events is concerned. The more lavish descriptions in *Erec* give way after *Cligés* to description that seems, to modern taste, either more appropriate or more natural. In *Cligés* itself, Chrétien terminates the description of the marriage of Cligés' parents, Alexandre and Soredamors, so abruptly that the effect is rather displeasing:

A Guinesores sanz redot
Furent au los et a l'otroi
Mon seignor Gauvain et le roi
Le jor *faites* lor esposailles.
De la richesce, et des vitailles,
Et de la joie, et del deduit,
Ne savroit nus dire, ce cuit,
Tant qu'as noces plus n'en eüst.
Por tant qu'as plusors despleüst,
Ne vuel parole user ne perdre,
Qu'a mialz dire me vuel aerdre.

(vss. 2312-22)⁶¹

⁶¹ Italics represent changes made in conformity with Wendelin Foerster, ed. *Cliges* (Halle, 1884). That Chrétien weighed the advantages and disadvantages of particular descriptions before *Cligés* is apparent in *Erec*, vss. 5520-35. In *Perceval*, Chrétien concludes the description of a combat even more abruptly: "La bataille fu forz et dure./De plus deviser n'ai je cure;/Que painne gastee me sanble" (vss. 3927-29); Alfons Hilka, ed. *Der Percevalroman* (Halle, 1932). A few manuscripts add to the original version at this point; see *Der Percevalroman*, 457-474 and 790-791.

On the other hand, Chrétien insists later on introducing descriptions of Cligés and Fénice, although the latter are more stereotyped than a description of the wedding celebration need have been, and despite the disapproval that Chrétien clearly sought to circumvent by omitting an elaborate description of the wedding. The description of the beautiful Fénice comes first, and is, as usual in these cases, hyperbolic (vss. 2677-2705):

Bien sai, se m'an antremeisse
Et tot mon san i anpleasse,
Que tote ma poinne i gastasse,
Et ce seroit poinne gastee.

(vss. 2702-05)

This consideration did not, however, prevent Chrétien from making a try at it! Then he passes immediately to Cligés:

Por la biauté Clygés retreire
Vuel une description feire,
Don molt sera bries li passages.

(vss. 2721-23)

The passage takes up some twenty-five lines (vss. 2724-52). Chrétien is not the only important medieval writer to present us with such an anomaly. Gottfried von Strassburg refrains from describing the Morholt before the battle with Tristan, but does immediately thereafter draw for us a picture of Tristan that is longer than even the average medieval description of persons. For the Morholt there is but one line of true description (vs. 6501), whereas Tristan's takes up 187 lines (vss. 6534-6720)! Gottfried does take care to justify what he has done, and his words are revealing in the light of Geoffrey of Vinsauf's admonition that all amplification be appropriate. To describe the Morholt is unnecessary, since his courage, size, and strength are well known.

hie si des lobes von ime genuoc.
ich weiz wol, daz er kunde
do unde zaller stunde
ze kampfē und ouch ze vehete
nach ritteres rehte
sinem libe vil wol mite gan.
et hætes e so vil getan.

(vss. 6514-20)

But Tristan is as yet untried in earnest combat, and the odds are against him — Gottfried calls him "Der unversuohte Tristan ze notlichen dingen" (vss. 6534-35). Therefore, to make his coming victory over the Morholt more plausible, Gottfried elaborates upon his appearance, and the elaboration stresses Tristan's courage and strength — qualities that will stand him in good stead when he must do battle with his terrible opponent. Thus,

Gottfried, as if carried away by his enthusiasm, is unable to prevent himself from waxing eloquent about the young knight.

hi ! do er den [armor] an sich genam,
 wie lustic und wie lobesam
 er do dar inne wære,
 daz wære sagebære !
 wan daz aber ichz niht lengen wil;
 der rede der würde alze vil,
 ob ich ez allez wolte
 ergründen, alse ich solte.
 und sult ir doch wol wizzzen daz....
 (vss. 6561-69)

And Gottfried goes on with the description for almost 150 lines more ! With somewhat more finesse, Gottfried is accomplishing the same thing as Chrétien in *Cligés*. And both are applying the rule found in all the arts of poetry regarding appropriate description: "Vitium istud plerique frequenter incurrunt cum degrediuntur ad hanc vel ad illam rem describendam, in qua describenda sunt prompta et usitata, cum tamen ipsa descriptio parum vel nihil hic operetur ad materiam" (pp. 314-315, § 156; cf. *Poetria nova*, vss. 622-623). Clearly Chrétien did not avoid such description merely because it was becoming tedious to his audiences, although this fact doubtless influenced his thinking on the subject; otherwise he would not have continued to use lengthy stereotyped description later in *Cligés*, or, for that matter, in later poems such as *Yvain* and *Perceval*.⁶² Neither whimsy nor submission to the will of a fickle audience is at work here. And yet a simple reference to the instruction contained in the arts of poetry is not enough to resolve the problem. Rather a careful study of the relation of the descriptive amplification, or its omission, to the structure of each poem is the only way to appreciate each poet's intentions in the passages we have considered. And the procedure obviously applies to all instances of amplification and abbreviation and of ornamentation that appear in narrative poetry of Chrétien's and Gottfried's time.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, let us consider briefly two problems involving Chaucer's relation to Geoffrey of Vinsauf. First, Professor James J. Murphy has

⁶² See *Yvain*, vss. 1465-1510, where the stereotyped order is masked by a wealth of diverse details; *Der Percevalroman*, vss. 1795-1829. Miss Colby, in her study of portrait description in Chrétien and other twelfth century poems, has shown how the authors varied basic patterns of description from one work to the other. The same is true in Chaucer; see Naunin, 28-30.

argued in several recent articles⁶³ that there is little evidence that Chaucer either knew or was influenced by the *Poetria nova*. The allusion to the complaint over the death of Richard the Lion-Hearted in *The Nun's Priest's Tale* can, he points out, be traced to a reproduction of the passage in Trivet's *Annales*.⁶⁴ And Chaucer's use of the figures and tropes can be accounted for by his study of grammarians such as Alexander of Villedieu and Eberhard of Béthune, French poems, and Chaucer's own poetic imagination. Finally, there was no "rhetorical tradition" in fourteenth century England, nor any description of rhetoric in French authors Chaucer was familiar with, that would indicate he was acquainted with the traditional subject matter of rhetoric or of rhetorical poetics.⁶⁵

If, in fact, there was no "tradition" of rhetoric in England in Chaucer's time, there were certainly ancient and medieval treatises on rhetoric and poetics in contemporary libraries, as anyone who examines the catalogues of thirteenth and fourteenth century British libraries will realize. The

⁶³ Murphy, "John Gower's *Confessio Amantis* and the First Discussion of Rhetoric in the English Language," *Philological Quarterly*, 41 (1962), 401-411; "Rhetoric in Fourteenth-Century Oxford," *Medium Ævum*, 34 (1965), 1-20; and, most important, *The Review of English Studies*, n. s. 15, 1-20. For a general outline of the scope of rhetoric in the High and Late Middle Ages, see Murphy, "The Arts of Discourse, 1050-1400," *Mediaeval Studies*, 23 (1961), 194-205.

⁶⁴ F. Nicholai Triveti *De ordine frat. prædicatorum Annales*, ed. Thomas Hog (London, 1845), 161-163; see Murphy, *RES*, 15, 13-14. As Murphy points out, this passage was frequently copied by itself; see Faral, *Arts poétiques*, 19.

⁶⁵ Murphy supports this assertion by descriptions of rhetoric found in Froissart and Guillaume de Machaut, cited from R. B. Daniels, *Figures of Rhetoric in John Gower's English Works* (diss. Yale, 1934), 13-14. The evidence is misleading for two reasons. First, the two passages, taken out of context, do not give all of what either Froissart or Machaut meant to say on composition. Machaut is speaking not only of lyric verse forms, but also of ornamentation and thematic elaboration in brief poems: "Rhetorique versefier / Fait l'amant et metrefer, / Et si fait faire jolis vers, / Noviaus et de metre divers, / ... / Et li aourne son langage / Par maniere plaisant et sage, / Car Scens yest qui tout gouverne / En chambre, en sale et en taverne. / Dous Penser et bonne Esperence / Li font avoir douce Plaisence / Et li amenistrent matiere." (vss. 258-261, 268-274, in Guillaume de Machaut, *Poésies lyriques*, ed. V. Chichmaref, 2 vols. (Paris, [s.d.]), 1, 12). In the case of Froissart, the poet is receiving instruction limited to set, short forms such as those described in the passage cited by Murphy; however, Froissart goes on to discuss the arrangement of the short poems in the entire book, that is he discusses their disposition; see vss. 734-776, in *Œuvres de Froissart*, ed. M. A. Scheler, 4 vols. (Brussels, 1872), 3, 75-76. The second point that must be made to understand these passages is that "Rhetorique" as Machaut uses it above is not quite the same thing as traditional rhetoric, and the French poets, and presumably Chaucer, were aware of this fact. What both Froissart and Machaut mean by "Rhetorique" is vernacular versification, or what came to be called, among other things, the Second Rhetoric; this was distinguished from the First Rhetoric, or *poetria*, as illustrated by the *Poetria nova* itself. See E. Langlois, *Recueil d'arts de Seconde Rhétorique* (Paris, 1902), i-x. Murphy seems to be aware of this distinction, but fails to note that the First Rhetoric complemented and preceded the Second.

Poetria nova itself was often found in those libraries,⁶⁶ and thus it must have been known by those who were interested in literature and writing, as Chaucer was. Trivet himself attests to Geoffrey's fame: "Eo tempore magister Galfridus de Vinosalvo, qui ad papam Innocentium librum de arte Eloquentiae scripsit, *clarus* habetur."⁶⁷ As to the internal evidence for Chaucer's acquaintance with the *Poetria nova*, it is important to note that

⁶⁶ The following partial list will suffice to demonstrate this point: Glastonbury (1247-48), in T. W. Williams, *Somerset Mediaeval Libraries* (Bristol, 1897), 78; probably England (early 13th century), in J. Young and P. H. Aitken, *A Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of the Hunterian Museum in the University of Glasgow* (Glasgow, 1908), 417-419, and E. Faral, *Studi medievali*, 9, 24, 26, 38; Reading (14th century), in *Chronicon Abbatiae Ramesiensis*, ed. W. D. Macray, Rolls Series, 83 (London, 1886), 364 and perhaps 365; York (1372), in M. R. James, "The Catalogue of the Library of the Augustinian Friars at York," in *Fasciculus Ioanni Willis Clark dicatus* (Cambridge, 1909), 72; Dover (1389), in M. R. James, *The Ancient Libraries of Canterbury and Dover* (Cambridge, 1903), 487; Durham (1391), B. Botfield, *Catalogues of the Library of Durham Cathedral*, The Publications of the Surtees Society, 7 (London, 1838), 11; Peterborough (late 14th century), in M. R. James, *Lists of Manuscripts Formerly in Peterborough Abbey Library*, The Bibliographical Society's Transactions, Supplement 5 (Oxford, 1926), pp. 46 and 53; from an English MS (late 14th century), in *British Museum: Catalogue of Western Manuscripts in The Old Royal and King's Collections*, eds. G. F. Warner and J. P. Gilson (London, 1921), 1, 236. Works on both grammar and rhetoric, as well as poetics (especially Matthew of Vendôme's and John of Garland's writings) are also found in these and similar catalogues, as are other writings of Geoffrey of Vinsauf. As early as 1202, for example, some *versus* by Geoffrey are catalogued at Rochester; see W. B. Rye, "Catalogue of the Library of the Priory of St. Andrew, Rochester, A. D. 1202," *Archaeologia Cantiana*, 3 (1860), 57. Two wills granting books to the Almonry Library in London, which Chaucer may have used, do not, unfortunately, mention the *Poetria nova*, and there is no extant catalogue of the school library from the 14th century, nor of the St. Paul's library, which Almonry pupils sometimes used; see E. Rickert, "Chaucer at School," *Modern Philology*, 29, (1931-32), 257-274, and A. F. Leach, "St. Paul's School before Colet," *Archaeologia*, 62 (1910), 220-222. But it is significant that one will contained a "veterem poetriam" (*Modern Philology*, 29, 265), which suggests an awareness of the existence of a *Nova Poetria*; it would not be unreasonable, in the light of evidence from other British libraries, to suppose that Geoffrey's treatise was also at St. Paul's or the Almonry. We know that boys were sent there to learn to write in prose and verse; see *Modern Philology*, 29, 272; and, for the 12th century, *Archaeologia*, 52, 212-213. Furthermore, two books in one will may have been by Geoffrey: a *magnus liber equivocorum* and a *liber sinonomeorum* [sic] (see *Modern Philology*, 29, 267, note 5; 268, note 7); on this cf. as well Faral, *Arts poétiques*, 6 and 22. M. Manitius ascribes these works to Matthew of Vendôme, without discussing Faral's reservations regarding his authorship, and without mentioning the various attributions found in the catalogues (3, 746-747). For example, the York catalogue of 1372 mentions an *encheridion synomorum Galteri* and an *Encherideon* by Geoffrey, followed by a *liber equivocorum*; see James, in *Fasciculus Clark*, 72 and 67 respectively. It is clear, therefore, that Geoffrey's *Poetria nova* was found in medieval British libraries in the 13th and 14th centuries, and that Chaucer would have had no difficulty in obtaining access to it, if he did not have his own copy.

⁶⁷ P. 175 (italics mine); cf. also the variants: "in grammatica *clarus*; ...*illustris* habetur." If Trivet presents Geoffrey and his treatise "as if he did not expect his English audience to be familiar with him" (*RES*, 15, 14, note 4), why did he call Geoffrey *clarus*?

the textbooks on grammar do not suffice to explain his use of amplification. Amplification is partly a problem of disposition, as I have shown above, yet none of the means of amplification are discussed in connection with either invention or disposition in the grammars. It is Geoffrey's *Poetria* that contains the earliest known systematic list of the means of amplification, and it is from that instruction that Chaucer's allusion to him derives.⁶⁸ Furthermore, Chaucer shows additional direct knowledge of Geoffrey's instruction in the translation of the first lines of the *Poetria nova* that is found in *Troilus*:

For everi wight that hath an hous to founde
Ne renneth naught the werk for to bygyne
With rakel hond, but he wol bide a stounde,
And sende his hertes line out fro withinne
Aldirfirst his purpos for to wyne.
Al this Pandare in his herte thoughte,
And caste his werk ful wisely or he wrouhte.
(I, 1065-71)⁶⁹

This passage and the other evidence I have cited do show that Geoffrey of Vinsauf was known and admired in Chaucer's time, and make it quite certain that Chaucer himself knew the *Poetria nova* first hand, and that, at the time he composed *Troilus* and *The Canterbury Tales*, he had access, perhaps in his own library, to that treatise.

The second problem that requires consideration is Chaucer's alleged criticism of Geoffrey's *Poetria nova*. Despite the obvious application in Chau-

⁶⁸ Naunin divided the means of amplification into those related essentially to disposition (*digressio* and *descriptio*) and those that also belong to the figures and tropes; see especially 15-16. She makes the well-taken point regarding the reference to Geoffrey in The Nun's Priest's Tale: "Er [Chaucer] spielt... mit einer kurzen Bemerkung auf die Nova Poetria des Gaufred an und kann voraussetzen, dass jeder gleich weiss, was er damit meinte" (p. 49). I have no argument with Murphy's contention that Chaucer did not need the manuals of poetry to learn of the figures taught in medieval grammar and illustrated in his French, Latin, and Italian sources. However, the instruction regarding the *suitability* of particular figures is not in the grammars, nor in any other source than the rhetorics and the *poetriae*. — There are a couple of inaccuracies in Murphy's discussion of the figures. Geoffrey may not use the expression *colores rhetorici* (*RES*, 15, 9), but he does refer to the *colores* (e.g., vss. 1097, 1220, 1587), and he does write "Rhetoricae flores" (vs. 1226); and, it is not true that Matthew of Vendôme omits all the *schemata* and *tropi* (*RES*, 15, 9, note 2); see Faral, *Arts poétiques*, 107-108.

⁶⁹ See note 14 above; also Marie P. Hamilton, "Notes on Chaucer and the Rhetoricians," *PMLA*, 47 (1932), 407; Atkins, 157-159; Robert O. Payne, *The Key of Remembrance* (New Haven, London, 1963), *passim*, with bibliography, 233-240. The citation of the first line and a half in the *Poetria nova* in de Briggis, cited by Murphy in *Medium Ævum*, 34, 16; *RES*, 15, 15, could not therefore account for Chaucer's entire stanza. And it is simply not true that Chaucer's passage may be traced to Luke xiv. 28-30 or to *Boece*, IV, prosa, 6 lines 90-96, as easily as to the *Poetria nova*, vss. 43-48. The idea was commonplace, but that Chaucer was translating Geoffrey is unmistakable.

cer's writings of the instruction contained in the medieval *poetriae* like Geoffrey's, the parody in *The Nun's Priest's Tale* has seemed sufficient evidence that Chaucer disapproved of their use, and that he is in that poem throwing off the shackles and criticizing openly the unreal constraints imposed upon writers by the schools. Spearing seeks to bring this out by contrasting Chaucer's parody with the praise of Geoffrey made by a mediocre Middle English writer, and a near contemporary of Chaucer, Osborn Bokenham.⁷⁰ Yet parody does not in itself necessarily imply a condemnation of the form being parodied. Mock heroic poetry — this is the term used by Manly to describe *The Nun's Priest's Tale*⁷¹ — is not written to ridicule epic poetry as such, but rather represents the turning of epic form and typical epic conventions and devices, usually by some sort of exaggeration, to comic purposes. The grandiose thus becomes the ridiculous. In Chaucer's tale, which is clearly a parody of epic conventions, the appeal to Geoffrey is simply an example of this technique. The perversion of epic apostrophe for comic purposes does not prevent Chaucer from using the device seriously, and others like it, elsewhere. Chaucer is in fact doing no more than following Geoffrey's advice and example in the treatment of comic subjects. In the *Poetria nova*, Geoffrey explains how apostrophe may be used for comic effects in satire (vss. 431-454), and in the *Documentum* he even takes a passage from Vergil to illustrate *praecisio* as a comic device (p. 318, § 169). Yet there is no more evidence in his words that Geoffrey is mocking Vergil than there is in *The Nun's Priest's Tale* that Chaucer is mocking Geoffrey. Lehmann's description of the role of parody in a great deal of medieval writing will serve to place Chaucer's parody in the proper perspective. "Die formale Nachahmung und die Absicht des komischen Effektes sind da und liegen zutage. Ihr Vorhandensein ist das Wichtigste. Verspottung, Beschmutzung des zugrunde gelegten Textes ist gar nicht das hauptsächliche, ist meist gar kein Ziel unserer Parodien. Der mittelalterliche Mensch konnte etwas profanieren und sich damit amüsieren, ohne es zu persiflieren. Die Parodisten spielen mehr leichtfertig als schändlich mit Hohem und Heiligem."⁷² This does not mean that Chaucer does not

⁷⁰ Spearing, 47-48 and 55. Bokenham himself accounts for his inferior writing by his lack of training in the rules taught by the *Poetria nova*; see the *Legendys of Hooly Wummen*, ed. M. S. Serjeantson, EETS 206 (London, 1938), vss. 83-98 and 407-420. In the latter passage, he distinguishes himself in this respect from "the fresh rethoryens" Gower, Chaucer, and Lydgate; he could not mean the Second Rhetoric, for he is speaking of amplification by description. See also vss. 1401-1406 in the *Legendys*.

⁷¹ *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 12, 95.

⁷² *Parodie*, 4. The abundant illustrations given by Lehmann in this study corroborate the generalization. It is significant in this context that the schools and their instruction were seldom parodied or satirized (22).

constitute an exception to the rule. However, the obvious dependence of his writing on the instruction of the schools regarding composition, the lack of any conclusive evidence in *The Canterbury Tales* or elsewhere that Chaucer despised the theory of composition taught by men like Geoffrey, makes his presumed opposition to the traditional conception of composition very unlikely, when that contention is built upon the sole evidence of these few lines in *The Nun's Priest's Tale*.

Classical rhetoric taught that mastery and performance depend upon *ingenium*, *ars*, and *exercitatio*. That mediocre or slavish authors like Bokenham satisfied the last two prerequisites may be apparent, but the first is obviously lacking. But Chaucer and Dante, Gottfried von Strassburg and Chrétien de Troyes, clearly possessed all three. The manner in which they applied the precepts of the *poetriae* to the conception and elaboration of their narrative poems, the way in which the restraints were mastered and then made to serve the individual author's purposes, may however be understood and appreciated only by a return to their works and a study of the composition of those works in the light of the instruction contained in treatises like Geoffrey of Vinsauf's *Poetria nova*. In this way it should be possible to assess the treatises' influence on medieval narrative poetry, and judge once and for all whether they were a hindrance or a support to the poet. The weaknesses or limitations of Geoffrey and his peers need not blind us⁷³ to their usefulness as guides towards an understanding of composition in medieval writing. Bad writing is always with us, even though good and bad writing may proceed from common principles of composition. Genius, not freedom from restraint, makes the difference.

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⁷³ However, Brinkmann for one considers Matthew of Vendôme "ein Führer von feinem Geschmack und hoher Selbständigkeit" (54) and Geoffrey "zweifelloos ein Mann von feinem Geschmack" (79). Professor Everett recognized the distinction between "a slavish imitation of the devices which the rhetoricians [like Geoffrey] describe, and the adaptation of these devices, or others like them, to individual ends" (*Proceedings of the British Academy*, 36, 139). She did not notice, however, that Geoffrey of Vinsauf was aware of the same distinction (*Proceedings*, 144). The best description of medieval poetics is still found in Atkin's *English Literary Criticism*; for Chaucer in particular, see also the commentary of G. L. Kittredge, *Chaucer and his Poetry* (Cambridge, Mass., 1915), especially 11-26 and Alain Renouir, "Tradition and Moral Realism: Chaucer's Conception of the Poet," *Studia Neophilologica*, 35 (1963), 199-210.

Imagery in the *Knight's Tale* and the *Miller's Tale*¹

CHRISTOPHER DEAN

ALL critics agree that Geoffrey Chaucer is one of the major poets of the English language. Critics also agree that imagery and metaphoric comparison are central to most, if not all, poetic expression. In view of this, it is surprising that so little has been written directly on Chaucer's imagery. What there is, is either very specialized and restricted, or treats the imagery incidentally while dealing essentially with other matters.

From the earliest days of Chaucer criticism, commentators have attempted to trace Chaucer's sources and allusions and may, therefore, have told us in passing that an image here and there is translated directly from a source, is adapted from it or seems to be original. But this kind of commentary on Chaucer's imagery is only incidental. Other commentators, explaining Chaucer's language, have sometimes explained the reference of a simile or metaphor. But again this is only incidental commentary on imagery. General discussions on Chaucer's style usually say something about Chaucer's imagery but never in any detail.² The other discussions of Chaucer's style are specialized and though they may treat the imagery that comes within their scope in some detail, the treatment is restricted by their choice of subject.³ A frequently adopted approach to studying Chaucer's style is to consider its relationship to the medieval theories of rhetoric, particularly the poetic manuals of Geoffrey of Vinsauf and the like, but these studies deal with imagery as only one aspect of style and not a very central one at that.

¹ An earlier version of this paper was read to the Association of Canadian University Teachers of English at their annual meeting in Ottawa in June, 1967.

² H. S. Bennett's comment in *Chaucer and the Fifteenth Century* (Oxford, 1947), 78 is an example. He says: "Chaucer liked his pictures with clear edges... His images are curiously simple and direct. They are for the most part introduced with nothing more than a 'like to', or 'as', and cover all phases of human activity, and make their effect by their homely and immediate appeal."

³ Claus Schaar, *The Golden Mirror: Studies in Chaucer's Descriptive Technique and its Literary Background* (Lund, 1955), for example, talks about Chaucer's use of traditional imagery but only in connection with the subjects of emotions, portraits and landscapes.

There have, of course, always been perceptive commentaries on individual images.⁴ There are also some useful discussions of groups of images,⁵ including the larger groups of images which have been recently discussed in attempts to relate the bible and medieval theories of exegetical reading to the work of Chaucer. What is significantly lacking, however, is a major study that centres directly on Chaucer's imagery as a principal subject in its own right.⁶

There are at least three reasons why little has been said about Chaucer's imagery. The first springs from a certain practical problem that is well described by A. C. Spearing :

Close reading of the kind we have been discussing clearly depends for its success on a delicate response to fine shades of meaning and tone. We may find that such a response comes naturally to us in reading the writers of our own age, because their language is ours; and we even find that it is possible, though hardly easy, with literature going as far back as the age of Shakespeare. But to achieve such a response towards literature even older than that seems almost impossibly difficult, simply because of the language problem. The great period of medieval English literature — the fourteenth century — lies too far back in the past for us to be able to catch more than the dictionary definitions of most words; and there are still some of which we do not know even the dictionary definitions.⁷

Anyone who deals with Chaucer's imagery will come up against this problem and decisions as to the imagery value of certain lines will often perhaps appear to be rather arbitrary.

Three lines from the *Knight's Tale* will illustrate the problem :

- a) Whan she hadde swowned with a deedly cheere (913)⁸
- b) The sesoun priketh every gentil herte (1043)
- c) This Palamon gan knytte his browes tweye (1128).

⁴ See for example the discussion of the opening Spring image of the *Canterbury Tales* by R. Baldwin in *The Unity of the Canterbury Tales* (Copenhagen, 1955), 19-28.

⁵ See, for example, B. Rowland, "Chaucer and the Unnatural History of Animals," *Med. St.*, 25 (1963), 367-372, and her other studies of animal images.

⁶ Discussions of specific tales often include commentary on the imagery. Thus P. A. Olson, "Poetic Justice in the *Miller's Tale*," *MLQ*, 24 (1963), 230, speaking of the *Miller's Tale*, says "the imagery of the tale [defines] rather more precisely... the norms according to which the characters are punished." C. A. Muscatine, *Chaucer and the French Tradition* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1957) talks about the "pragmatic, prosaically solid imagery of fabliau" (224) and "a mass recurrence of images" (225).

⁷ *Criticism and Medieval Poetry* (London, 1964), 6. See also E. T. Donaldson, "Idiom of Popular Poetry in the *Miller's Tale*," *Eng. Inst. Essays* (1950), 116-117.

⁸ All Chaucerian quotations are from *The Works of Geoffrey Chaucer*, ed. F. N. Robinson, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1957).

In the first example, *deedly* comes from OE *dēadlic* "subject to death, mortal." It is defined by the OED, sense 7 as "pale in colour like a corpse."⁹ The first quotation illustrating this meaning is from *The Legend of Good Woman*. The MED gives this line from the *Knight's Tale* as its first example of *deadly cheer*.¹⁰ A comparison between the colour of a fainting woman's face and that of a corpse is obviously present. Was it a fresh comparison for Chaucer as the dictionaries seem to suggest? Was it a cliché by his time? Had it become so commonplace that, like today, all its imagery value had disappeared? In the second example, *priketh* comes from LOE *prician* "to pierce or indent with a sharp point" and sense 10 (labelled *fig*)¹¹ is "to drive or urge as with a spur: to impel, to instigate, incite, stimulate, provoke." The first quotations are again from Chaucer. In the last example, *knytte* comes from OE *cnyttan* "to tie in or with a knot." The OED's sense 4 is "to draw closely together; to contract in folds or wrinkles." This line from the *Knight's Tale* is the first illustration of the sense. In these lines we face the problem that Spearing describes. I have assumed that each of these expressions had metaphorical value in the fourteenth century, were perhaps even original metaphors, but there can of course be no certainty.

A second reason for not writing of the imagery of medieval verse is that the poetic effects are claimed to be spread diffusely throughout long passages.¹² This diffuseness is explained by reference to the medieval habit of oral delivery and the fact that the audience supposedly took in the poem cumulatively *line by line*. Spearing says:

If an audience of listeners is to be able to respond to a poem on a single reading of it, not only must its expressive devices be largely simple, they must also contain a high proportion of the familiar. In such circumstances a poet cannot afford to be too novel, too original, too individual in style: he must keep largely within a stylistic convention which his audience will understand and accept without consideration.¹³

Surprisingly, it does not occur to Spearing that Shakespeare, with whom he explicitly contrasts Chaucer, also wrote for oral delivery to a largely illiterate audience and that he apparently felt no such restrictions on his style of writing.

A third reason for imagery not attracting the attention in medieval

⁹ *The Oxford English Dictionary*, ed. J. A. H. Murray et al. (Oxford, 1933), s.v. DEADLY a.

¹⁰ *Middle English Dictionary*, ed. S. M. Kuhn (Ann Arbor, 1954-), s.v. DEDLI 4(b).

¹¹ OED, s.v. PRICK v. Earlier examples are cited under PRICKING *vbl. sb.*

¹² Spearing, 16ff., Bennett, 83.

¹³ Spearing, 20.

literature that it does in modern is that its role in medieval poetry was very different from that of later times. There was no suggestion in the middle ages that, as C. Day Lewis puts it, "imagery is at the core of a poem, that a poem may itself be an image composed from a multiplicity of images."¹⁴ It would be wrong to swing to the other extreme and think of medieval imagery as purely decorative but this extreme is nearer the truth than that of imagery being the poem's core. This is what the poetic manuals taught and to some extent at least what medieval poets practised. Imagery in the middle ages is generally more of stylistic concern than thematic.

I have found only one general treatment of Chaucer's imagery, R. K. Gordon's "Chaucer's Imagery."¹⁵ Gordon believes that: "A poet's choice of images throws light on the range of his experience and observation. It tells us something of his tastes and preferences, and something also, perhaps, of the life of his time."¹⁶ His article lists some 77 images, arranged according to the subject with which a comparison is made. Some subjects are well represented, others hardly at all. There is, he claims, little war imagery, few references to the sea, though Chaucer crossed it many times, few images relating to the Thames, though he worked by it, and little concern with the Customs House.¹⁷ Gordon concludes that: "though Chaucer was a Londoner, a busy civil servant, and a court poet, the best of his images come from the country, from fields."¹⁸

The value of Gordon's study is limited, directed as it is at the poet and his times rather than at the poems as works of art. This present paper takes the opposite approach, attempting to see how much an investigation that places imagery at its centre can tell us about the works in which the imagery is found.¹⁹

A basic premise of this study is that no examination is valid if it picks and chooses amongst the images to be discussed for however well the choice may be defended, the charge of arbitrary selection can always be brought against it. Every image in the two poems, therefore, has been considered. In order to give this study practical limits it has been confined to two

¹⁴ *The Poetic Image* (London, 1947), 18.

¹⁵ *Trans Royal Soc. of Canada*, 33, ser. 3, sec. 2, 81-90. Beryl Rowland's chapter "Chaucer's Imagery" in *Companion to Chaucer Studies* (Toronto, 1968) arrived too late for consideration in this paper.

¹⁶ Gordon, 81.

¹⁷ Gordon, 81-92.

¹⁸ Gordon, 84.

¹⁹ A recent article by J. Richardson, "The Façade of Bawdry: Image Patterns in Chaucer's *Shipman's Tale*," *ELH*, 32 (1965), 303-313, deals with the imagery of a tale somewhat in the manner that I propose, but it does not deal with every image in the tale, only a selected group.

tales — the *Knight's Tale* and the *Miller's Tale*. It is generally accepted that these tales are a deliberately contrasted pair both in theme and style²⁰ — the one courtly, chivalrous and in the high style, the other colloquial, scurrilous and in the low style. A study of them together should, therefore, show more variation of style and treatment than any other pair of Chaucer's poems.

Before beginning such a study we must face one more obstacle, namely what we understand by the word *imagery*. Miss Spurgeon is probably right when she says that « few people would entirely agree as to what constitutes an image, and still fewer as to what constitutes a poetic image, »²¹ but her understanding of the term is satisfactory for this study. If a formal definition is required that by H. W. Wells will serve: "Metaphor is the recognition of a suggestion of one concept by another dissimilar in kind but alike in some strong ungeneric characteristic."²² I have taken comparison, stated or implied, between two different things as the essential element that must be present to constitute an image. All other figurative devices, including personification, allusion, symbolism and visual detail, whether literally possible or exaggeratedly impossible such as Palamon and Arcite fighting ankle-deep in their own blood, have not been counted as images.

Two main questions have been considered in this paper. First, how wide is Chaucer's range of reference and what kind of object does he use as vehicles in his comparisons? Second, is there anything distinctive in the way that Chaucer uses his imagery, and has it more than a stylistic value?

Chaucer is not a poet who uses imagery profusely. Indeed long stretches of verse stand virtually devoid of all images. The opening 54 lines of the *Knight's Tale*, for example, contain only one image. Later in the poem, from the beginning of the quarrel of the gods after the prayers of Emily, Arcite and Palamon at 1.2438 until the beginning of the tournament, some 170 lines further on, there are but two images. In the same way, the *Miller's Tale* has passages which are almost devoid of imagery. Nicholas and Alisoun begin planning to deceive John at 1.3397. After 309 lines, at the point where Absolon sings at Alisoun's window, we have encountered only eight images.

The imagery in these two tales tends to appear in clusters. In the *Knight's*

²⁰ See W. Frost, "An Interpretation of Chaucer's *Knight's Tale*," *RES*, 25 (1949), 303-304; W. C. Stokoe, "Structure and Intention in the First Fragment of *The Canterbury Tales*," *UTQ*, 21 (1952), 120-127; C. A. Owen, "Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*: Aesthetic Design in Stories of the First Day," *ES*, 35 (1954), 51-56; T. W. Craik, *The Comic Tales of Chaucer* (London, 1964), 1.

²¹ *The Development of Shakespeare's Imagery* (Cambridge, Mass., 1935), 8.

²² *Poetic Imagery: Illustrated from Elizabethan Literature* (New York, 1961), 21.

Tale, five passages — the description of Emily at her first appearance, the description of Lygurge and Emetrius, Arcite's complaint in the woods that is overheard by Palamon, the fight in the woods and the tournament — account for 35 images or more than a quarter of the total and yet the passages add up to only 227 lines or about one tenth of the whole poem. Similarly in the *Miller's Tale*, two passages — the description of Alisoun and Absolon's first speech at Alisoun's window — account for 25 images, nearly half of the total in the poem. But the two passages are only 48 lines long in a poem that totals 668 lines. It is clear that Chaucer's usual style is to use few images. It takes a special occasion for him to turn heavily to their use and as a result when he does, certain passages stand out strikingly from their surrounding contexts.

Chaucer's purpose in using imagery varies in the two tales. I have classified his images in these tales according to their function, using the five-point system of the table that follows.

Purpose of the image	<i>Knight's Tale</i>		<i>Miller's Tale</i>	
	Number of images	Approx percent of total	Number of images	Approx percent of total
1 External condition of people				
(a) appearance	22	18	19	31
(b) action	7	6	8	13
(c) visible emotion	10	8	—	—
(d) physical condition	1	1	1	2
2 Internal condition of people				
(a) character	3	2	3	5
(b) emotions felt	25	20	5	8
(c) relationship to others	6	4	8	13
3 Description of things	13	11	12	20
4 Description of animals, birds	4	3	—	—
5 Expression of general abstract ideas in concrete terms	31	25	5	8
	<u>122</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>100</u>

It is clear that in the *Miller's Tale*, the main function of the imagery is to describe people from the outside, then the physical world in which they live. Its secondary concerns are to describe what people do and how they feel toward other people.²³ The way the imagery is used clearly categorizes

²³ A somewhat similar conclusion was reached by Schaar, 63-64.

the tale as one of externals, of action and physical reality. On the contrary the imagery of the *Knight's Tale* deals primarily with abstract ideas and people's emotions. Only secondarily does it turn to people's appearances and their actions. This usage substantiates our impression from other sources that the *Knight's Tale* is a contemplative, leisurely and philosophical poem.

Our next topic is the kind of object that Chaucer uses as points of comparison in his images. To list all the images would be long and tiresome. I shall concentrate on a few areas only and state my main conclusion at the outset, namely that there is almost no repetition of imagery between the two poems. The *Knight's Tale* has, for example, 18 references to animals (six to the lion, two each to the boar and the tiger and one each of the bear, the dog, the hare, the sheep, the mouse, the griffin, the steer and beasts in general).²⁴ The *Miller's Tale* has 8 animal references (the weasel, kid, calf, lamb, mouse, ape and the colt twice).²⁵ The only references in common are the sheep and the mouse and their signification is different in the two poems. The two lists differ not only in specific items but also in general classification. The animals of the *Knight's Tale* are on the whole large, fierce, wild and noble which fits well with the courtly romance atmosphere of that tale. By contrast, and equally suitably, the animals of the *Miller's Tale* are the domestic animals of the English farmyard.

The same kind of distinction can be seen in the flower imagery of the two poems. In the *Knight's Tale* we have a rose, lilies and flowers in general;²⁶ in the *Miller's Tale* there is blossom on the branch, the primerole and possibly the piggesnye.²⁷ The birds of the *Knight's Tale* (the crow, the raven and the cuckoo)²⁸ are not those of the *Miller's Tale* which are the white duck, the turtle-dove, the swallow, the nightingale and the goose.²⁹ The plants and fruits of the *Knight's Tale* are the citron, the tare, the ivy leaf, the oak and the boxtree.³⁰ In the *Miller's Tale* we have apples, pears, sloes, beans, cress, cinnamon, cetewale and licorice.³¹ Even amongst miscellaneous objects there are differences. The *Knight's Tale* has among other things a bucket in a well, a ring, a trumpet and a ball; the *Miller's Tale* has milk,

²⁴ ll. 1598, 1640, 1656, 1775, 2171, 2630, 1658, 1699, 1657, 2626, 1640, 1177, 1810, 1307, 1261, 2133, 2149, 1309.

²⁵ ll. 3234, 3260, 3704, 3389, 3346, 3263, 3282.

²⁶ ll. 1038, 1036, 2178, 982, 1037, 3048, 3059.

²⁷ ll. 3324, 3268.

²⁸ ll. 2692, 2143, 1810.

²⁹ ll. 3576, 3706, 3258, 3377, 3317.

³⁰ ll. 2167, 1570, 1702, 3017, 1838, 1302.

³¹ ll. 3262, 3249, 3246, 3772, 3756, 3699, 2307.

wool, a noble and a fan.³² Furthermore, whole areas of comparison as well as specific items differ. There are, for example, in the *Knight's Tale* 13 images referring to fire, 9 referring to religion and 10 to wounding and dying.³³ None of these is paralleled in the *Miller's Tale*.

There are no more than six images common to both poems. *Coal* as a measure of blackness appears twice in both tales. Lygurge has a bear's skin which is *col-blak* (2142) and Arcite lies in the lists as *black as any cole* (2692). Alisoun's collar is made of *col-blak silk* (3240) and later the night is as *black as the cole* (3731). Imprisonment in both poems is likened to being in a cage.³⁴ Palamon complains that he is dying *here in a cage* (1294) while John holds Alisoun *narwe in cage* (3224). A common image of falling into a snare describes how Arcite is captured by Fortune's plans (1490) and how John is captured by love for Alisoun (3231). The conventional image of bright as gold appears in both poems (2141, 3314).

The sixth common image is different. Emetrius's voice is *as a trompe thonderynge* (2174). Thunder here fittingly suggests the loudness of voice as well as the power and majesty of Emetrius himself. Loudness is also suggested in the *Miller's Tale* in:

This Nicholas anon leet fle a fart,
As greet as it had been a thonder-dent (3806-7)

but in addition we hear in the second thunder clap an ironic echo of the first. This is not similarity of image by coincidence but a deliberate artistic placing. Perhaps Alisoun's black silk collar and Lygurge's collar of black bear skin echo each other also.

Though Chaucer's range of reference in his imagery in these two tales is very wide and even though many of the images are in themselves stereotyped, there is very little overlapping from poem to poem. This is a stylistic fact of some interest. We must naturally ask why there is such a difference. Two possibilities come to mind. It may be that the ideas and themes of the two poems are so different that differences of imagery inevitably follow. If this is true then the difference of imagery is incidental. Alternatively, if

³² ll. 1533, 1908, 1958, 2165, 2174, 2614; 3236, 3249, 3256, 3315.

³³ ll. 2164, 1493, 1502, 1922, 2862, 2403, 2383, 2320, 1299, 1997, 2337, 1302, 1364; 2529, 2159, 1237, 1226, 2228, 2948, 1460, 1562, 1055; 1574, 1564, 1043, 1078, 1118, 1567, 913, 1082, 2780, 1096.

³⁴ This may or may not be an image. According to both the *OED* and *MED*, the word's primary sense is that of a bird- or animal-cage. It is used in English from the 13th century. Sense 2 in *MED* is 'a cage for prisoners, jail, prison, cell' and an illustrative quotation from *Mk T*, where children are likened to birds, seems to provide the transition from the literal to the figurative use. On the other hand a quotation dated 1306 in *MED* seems already to use *cage* as a purely literal equivalent of *prison cell*.

there is similarity of ideas and themes, then the difference of imagery becomes the result of artistic choice by Chaucer and deserves closer study.

Are there then any common themes or ideas in the two tales that we can compare? We can start with something simple and non-controversial, images of colour. Only two colours are in both tales, black and white. As we have seen black as coal occurs four times, twice in each tale. In addition Lygurge's hair is as black as a raven's feather and Arcite lies in the field as black as a crow.³⁵ In the *Miller's Tale* Alisoun's eyebrows are as black as sloes and the night is as black as pitch.³⁶ The black as coal simile seems to have no appropriateness to the subjects described as black. Further, coal is twice linked in a double comparison, once with pitch and once with a crow. The lack of any thematic justification for such a linking emphasizes clearly that for Chaucer black as coal is merely a cliché and that its use is purely mechanical.

The other common colour, white, is less helpful. Arcite and Palamon fight like wild boars and froth as white as foam. Emetrius has an eagle as white as a lily. Alisoun's barmcloth is as white as morning milk while Absolon wears a surplice as white as blossom on the branch.³⁷ We can deduce nothing from Chaucer's use of these similes. But there are some similarities in the images of brightness. Lygurge's bearskin has nails as bright as gold. Absolon's hair shines as bright as gold and something of the same idea is contained in the likening of Alisoun's face to a shining new noble.

Absolon twice states his lack of interest in something through images: *Of paramours he sette nat a kers* (3756) and *he roghte nat a bene/Of al his pley* (3772-3). In the *Knight's Tale* Arcite counts himself not worth *a myte* (1558) and judges all his sorrow to be not worth *a rate* (1570). Though it might be argued that the homely parallels of beans and cress suit the low domesticity of the *Miller's Tale*, there is no corresponding elevation in the *mite* and *tare* of the *Knight's Tale*. On the contrary, the *tare*-simile occurs twice in the *Reeve's Tale*.³⁸ In the *Knight's Tale*, at least, these images are conventional. The same simile for violent action occurs in both tales. Arcite's funeral fire burns *as it were wood* (2950) while Absolon *cride and knocked as that he were wood* (3436). Chaucer refers to a common rural pastime in each tale to describe a task that has to be done. The Knight likens his telling of his tale to ploughing a field (886-887) while Absolon, plotting his revenge, likens it to spinning tow on a distaff (3774). So far, it is

³⁵ ll. 2143, 2692.

³⁶ ll. 3246, 3731.

³⁷ ll. 1659, 2178, 3236, 3324.

³⁸ ll. 4000, 4056.

reasonable to say that when a similar idea has appeared in each poem, Chaucer has tended to use the same or similar image. This would suggest that his use of imagery has followed the conventional and the mechanical and that no particular suiting to the tone of the poems has been attempted. However, to this point we have looked at only a few insignificant ideas far removed from the major themes of the tales.

It is quite otherwise when we turn to the major themes of the tales. Here can be seen what Miss Spurgeon calls 'iterative' imagery, imagery linked together in a significant way so as to contribute to the total thematic statement of the poem.

The nucleus of the *Knight's Tale* is the love story of Palamon and Arcite.³⁹ Both men fall in love and suffer its pangs. The images of the love story are individually commonplace but reviewed collectively they add up to a unified picture. The love story begins with the two heroes falling in love. A single image, that of wounding and death, is repeated:

he bleynte and cride, "A!"
As though he stongen were unto the herte (1078-9)
But I was hurt right now thurghout myn ye (1096)
The fresshe beautee sleeth me sodeynly
Of hire that rometh in the yonder place (1118-9)
Love hath his firy dart so brennyngly
Ystiked thurgh my trewe, careful herte (1564-5)
Ye sleen me with youre eyen, Emelye! (1567)

Being in love, thus, becomes imaginatively an after-death state and all the subsequent imagery of love derives from this fact. We see it in the young men's physical appearance. Palamon is *pale and deedly on to see* (1082). He *lyk was to biholde| The boxtree or the asshen dede and colde* (1301-2). Arcite became as *drye as is a shaft* (1362) and as *pale as asshen colde* (1364). Their emotional state is also tied to this after-death image. When happy, which is rare, the lovers live in paradise. Arcite calls Palamon's prison this (1237) because he can see Emily from there. When they are unhappy, their state is likened to hell. Arcite complains: *Now is me shape eternally to dwelle| Noght in purgatorie, but in helle* (1225-6) while Palamon cries to Venus of *the tormentz of myn helle* (2228). The actual turmoil in their hearts is likened conventionally to fire:

The firy strokes of the desiryng
That loves servantz in this lyf enduren (1922-3)

³⁹ As this paper does not attempt an entirely new reading of the *Knight's Tale*, no summary and criticism of the existing material on the tale seems necessary. All critics recognize the love story. D. S. Brewer, *Chaucer*, 2nd ed. (London), 1960, 91 says: "The great theme is Love." Differences of opinion arise when the love story is related to the other elements of the tale.

Contrasting with these images of chance and change are others which emphasize control. Man is first seen apparently in control of his own affairs. The image of judging by weighing one thing against another implies control (1781). The image of holding a bridle in the hand indicates control of events (2376) and most emphatically of all the comparison of Theseus to a god on a throne (2529) suggests that man is in charge of his own destinies. It is significant that these images refer to Theseus who stands outside the love affair whereas the mutability images refer to Palamon and Arcite who do not. Set against the images of control is the striking image of false control:

We faren as he that dronke is as a mous.
 A dronke man woot wel he hath an hous,
 And he noot which the righte wey is thider,
 And to a dronke man the wey is slider.
 And certes, in this world so faren we;
 We seken faste after felicitee,
 But we goon wrong ful often, trewely (1261-7)

Here we meet the idea of men making the wrong decisions and failing to achieve their ends. One of the ironies of the poem is that Theseus, who seems so very much in control of events on earth, is in fact in a position much closer to that of the drunken man.⁴¹ Theseus's plans are consistently thwarted. His intended triumphal entry into Athens is thwarted by the widows at the gate; his plan to keep Arcite in prison perpetually is changed at the intervention of his friend, Perotheus; his decision to kill Palamon and Arcite when he finds them fighting in the woods is altered at the request of the ladies while his careful plans to avoid death in the tournament are destroyed by the direct intervention of the gods.

Real control of man's affairs in this poem rests with forces outside him. Though the gods seem indifferent to man's affairs as Palamon charges in two strong images:

What is mankynde moore unto you holde
 Than is the sheep that rouketh in the folde?
 For slayn is man right as another beest. (1307-9)

in fact they are not and the tangled affairs are finally straightened out by Saturn. Other images pointing to the control of the world by external agents are those of Fate deciding man's life from the moment of his birth (1566) and the two images of the fair chain of love (2988, 2991).

The *Miller's Tale* presents love, or what passes for love, very differently from the *Knight's Tale*. First John, falling in love with Alisoun, is likened

⁴¹ Other critics have taken the opposite view, thus Muscatine, 183-184, and Frost, 297-298.

to a man falling into a snare (3231). This immediately links him with the somewhat cynical observers in the *Knight's Tale*, of whom the same image is used, and disassociates his love at once from the spiritual kind of love felt by Arcite and Palamon. But even further away are Absolon and Nicholas for neither of them fall in love at all. Absolon, in an apt image, is likened to a cat who, if Alisoun had been a mouse, would have seized her at once. For Nicholas, the situation is even more direct. One day he fell *to rage and pleye* (3273) and *prively he caughte hire by the queynte* (3276). We see both of them thinking of a woman as a prey to be hunted and seized. Their attitude is that of Troilus before he was smitten by love's arrows. He cynically called women *prey* (I. 201). By contrast, Arcite and Palamon feel as Troilus did after he fell in love.

Alisoun is painted as a delectable morsel or a draught to drink.⁴² She is *bragot* (3261) or *meeth* (3261). She is Absolon's *hony* (3617), *hony-comb* (3698) and *sweete cynamome* (3699). She is a *mouse* pursued by a *cat* (3346-7). Fruit — *sloes* (3246), *pears* (3248) and *apples* (3262) — enter into her description and *milk* (3236) into the description of her clothes. Absolon, deprived of her love, mourns like a lamb for the teat (3704) and loses his appetite so that he can eat no more than a maid (3707). The idea suggested is that love, like eating and drinking, is a basic physical necessity, difficult to restrain and not wholly to be condemned when not held in check. Length of service and total loyalty to one woman, basic ideas in the love philosophy of the *Knight's Tale*, are no more possible in the *Miller's Tale* than abstention from food would be. Equally, just as in eating, once the food is consumed, the lover must turn elsewhere for more. We have no doubt that this is just what Nicholas will do.⁴³

We notice further that the young men in the *Miller's Tale* suffer no surging passions of fire. At the most they lose their appetites. When an image from the world of the *Knight's Tale* is used with its noble connotations, such as the love of the turtle-dove, it is immediately burlesqued by its comic juxtaposition with that of the lamb sucking the teat.⁴⁴ Love is simply a malady in the *Miller's Tale* and it can be healed (see 3757). What is a serious emotion in the *Knight's Tale*, leading to literal as well as meta-

⁴² H. R. Patch, *On Rereading Chaucer* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), 182 calls her "a delicious morsel."

⁴³ W. F. Bolton, "The Miller's Tale: An Interpretation," *Med St.*, 24 (1962), 88 points out that Nicholas is a traditional name for gluttons as well as lechers. The portrayal of Alisoun by food imagery is particularly appropriate in his case.

⁴⁴ This is only one example of the comic juxtaposition of the two styles. For further examples see Donaldson and also G. Stillwell, "The Language of Love in Chaucer's Miller's and Reeve's Tales and in the old French Fabliaux," *JEGP*, 54 (1955), 693-699.

phorical death, in the *Miller's Tale*, is finally dismissed as a childish mis-demenour:

paramours he gan defie,
And weep as dooth a child that is ybete. (3758-9)

In the final count it provokes mirth and amusement all round (3855-8).

The other major image theme that runs through the *Miller's Tale* is the likening of people to animals or birds. We meet this especially in the picture of Alisoun where she is compared to a weasel (3234), a kid (3260), a calf (3260) and a colt twice (3263, 3282). Later she is a mouse (3346), pursued by Absolon who is a cat. The wool of the wether image (3249), the reference to morning milk (3236) and piggesnye (3268), which suggests a pig as well as its primary sense of a flower, completes the list of animal images referring to Alisoun. Meanwhile Absolon is compared to an ape (3389) and likens himself to a lamb (3704). Alisoun is called a bird three times by Absolon (3699, 3726, 3805) and is likened to a swallow on a barn (3258) and a duck (3576). She is held in a cage by her husband (3224) which again suggests a bird comparison. Absolon's eyes are as grey as those of a goose (3317); he sings like a nightingale (3377) and compares himself to a turtle-dove (3706). John's falling into a snare (3231) makes us think of the fate of an animal or bird.

With the sole exception of the ape, and even it might have been seen at village sideshows, all the animals and birds are common ones of the English countryside, if not actually of the farm. This serves to keep the mood and tone firmly on the ground and ordinary. There is none of the grandeur suggested by the lions, tigers, griffins and eagles of the *Knight's Tale*. Secondly, while the animal imagery can suggest the lustful nature of humanity with consequent moral overtones, the simple domesticity of the images and the emphasis on youth (kid, calf, colt) partially mitigate the sinfulness and if they do not make it innocent at least they make it normal and expected. In the *Miller's Tale*, man as a lustful animal, is simply being himself.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Some commentators have felt that moral judgment is unimportant in the tale, thus Craik, 5-6 and P. V. D. Shelly, *The Living Chaucer* (Philadelphia, 1940), 246. But other critics, while not denying the humour of the tale in any way, have seen a moral judgment too. Amongst such critics are Bolton and D. W. Robertson, *A Preface to Chaucer* (Princeton, 1962), 384. The most important study of the tale from this point of view is that by R. E. Kaske, "The *Canticum Canticorum* in the *Miller's Tale*," *SP*, 59 (1962), 479-500. Kaske gives a long account of much (but not all) of the imagery in the *Miller's Tale* and relates it to the *Canticum Canticorum* hoping to show "a pattern of related allusions to the *Canticum Canticorum* and some of its medieval interpretations, centred in a profoundly comic association of Absolon with the *sponsus* and of Alisoun with the *sponsa*" (479). While not wishing to "minimize the literal narrative," (497) or to "impose a distinct allegorical

In conclusion, a study of Chaucer's imagery is seen to have a direct value for the appreciation of his poetry. The overall view of his images leads us to the conclusion that his style is usually to avoid all but the plainest images. This simplicity contrasts effectively with his emphatic use of vivid imagery at key points. More importantly, however, it can be demonstrated that Chaucer's imagery transcends the merely stylistic and decorative and ultimately leads to iterative imagery or imagery patterns which have a significant contribution to make to the understanding of his works. If this still does not make Chaucer a modern poet in C. Day Lewis's sense, it at least brings him much closer to the mainstream of English poetry. If he is still not the father of English poetry, he is much more than simply a many-times removed medieval cousin.

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significance on every part," (497), Kaske does argue that the associations he makes give the tale "a moral edge" (497). Some objections to Kaske's study seem legitimate. First, his centre of interest is mainly the relationship between Alisoun and Absolon to the relative neglect of Nicholas. Yet the two are of equal importance in the literal story at least. Second, in Kaske's paper the associations that he argues for tend to become central to his judgment of the poem's meaning, yet at the same time he grants that the reminiscences upon which they are based are not central to the poem but "flicker sporadically over the tale" (497). Some of the parallels that he cites are rather strained and not easy to accept, a fact that he seems to be aware of himself (see pp. 491, 495, 498). Lastly, Chaucer clearly intended the *Miller's Tale* to contrast with the *Knight's Tale*. If we see a relationship between the *Miller's Tale* and the *Canticum Canticorum* then of necessity there must also be a relationship between the *Knight's Tale* and the *Canticum*, too. Thus *caritas* and a "quite different attraction" (480)' this time that of Palamon and Arcite for Emily, would have to be compared. But there seems no sense of this in the *Knight's Tale*. That is a problem that Chaucer meets in *Troilus and Criseyde*.

Parce Continuis

Some Textual and Interpretive Notes*

BRIAN STOCK

THE learned Latin sequence, *Parce Continuis*, was first published by Wilhelm Meyer in 1911.¹ His text, based upon a single, thirteenth-century manuscript in the Laurenziana,² was reproduced in F. J. E. Raby's *Secular Latin Poetry*³ and in two publications by Giuseppe Vecchi.⁴ Peter Dronke discovered a fragment of the same poem in an Augsburg manuscript⁵ written in two different south German hands of the early twelfth century. He first published his text in 1962⁶ and later in the second volume of *Medieval Latin and the Rise of European Love-Lyric*.⁷ Dronke made a redaction of the stanzas of the Florence manuscript (F) which were not found in the Augsburg version (A), including a textual comparison between the two. He eliminated, among other mistaken views about the poem, the theory that it could have been written by Peter Abelard. In 1965, the late Dr. Raby, whom I assume had not seen Dronke's second volume, published a text and interpretation of *Parce Continuis*⁸ which were in some ways unsatisfactory. Nonetheless, with his usual erudition, Raby added considerably to our insight into the poem's intellectual milieu, placing it in the tradition of *amor/amicitia* literature which flourished primarily between the ninth and the twelfth century.

* I should like to thank J. Reginald O'Donnell, C. S. B., and Leonard Boyle, O.P., for help in checking the text, and Prof. and Mrs. M. P. Gilmore, Harvard Center for Renaissance Studies, Florence, for their hospitality while I looked at this and other manuscripts.

¹ "Zwei mittellateinische Lieder in Florenz," *Studi letterari e linguistici dedicati a Pio Rajna nel quarantesimo anno del suo insegnamento* (Milan, 1911), 151-161.

² *Bibliotheca Aedilium Florentinae ecclesiae codex 197*, fol. 131^v. The manuscript consists of a *Thebiad*, into which nine medieval Latin songs have been inserted at fol. 130-131 in a different hand. Meyer has described the collection which contains mostly love songs; *art. cit.*, 149-150.

³ *A History of Secular Latin Poetry in the Middle Ages*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1957) vol. 2, 313-314.

⁴ *Pietro Abelardo, I 'Planctus'* (Istituto di Filologia romanza dell'Università di Roma, testi e manuali ed. A. Monteverdi, no. 35), (Modena, 1951), 72-77; *Poesia latina medievale*, 2nd ed. (Parma, 1958), 194-201.

⁵ *Bischöfliches Ordinariat 5*, fol. 1^r.

⁶ "The Return of Eurydice," *Classica et Mediaevalia* 23 (1962-1963), 211-212.

⁷ (Oxford, 1965-1966); text in vol. 2, (1966), 341-352.

⁸ "Amor and Amicitia: a Mediaeval Poem", *Speculum* 40 (1965) 559-610.

A poem which has attracted so many major historians is perhaps entitled to still another investigation. In what follows, I have reproduced and re-read the Florence manuscript, which is interesting from paleographical, textual, and interpretive points of view. However, so much work has been done on *Parce Continuis* that I neither claim originality for much of the critical work necessary to establish the text, nor have I felt I needed to repeat all the previous scholarship, which, for such a short poem, is quite detailed. Those who wish to review these problems are referred to the second, revised edition of Dronke's volumes, to appear soon, the proofs of which I was kindly allowed to see. As Dronke has virtually solved all the cruces of the Augsburg version, I have concerned myself only with the later, Florentine reworking of the poem. If this work possesses a unified theme at all, it is one which is heavily indebted, not only to classical motives as Raby illustrated, but to contemporary ideas as well. Without proposing to solve all the problems connected with F, I have added, in the commentary which follows the text, a fresh look at some of these relationships.

TEXT

PARAPHRASE

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>1a <P>arce continuis,
deprecor, lamentis.
neque uincularis;
legem amoris
nimium queraris.</p> | <p>Cease, I beg,
your incessant complaints.
For you are not enchained;
you complain too much
of the law of love.</p> |
| <p>1b Duris in cotibus
Rodope aut Ysmarus
illum progenuit,
neque nostri generis
puerum aut sanguinis.</p> | <p>Among hard rocks
Rhodope or Ismarus
brought him forth,
a boy not of our kind
or blood.</p> |
| <p>2a Non reluctanti
stetit ut rebellis.
sepe consilia
fallit exquisita.
gaudet querelis,
gaudet et lamentis.
ridet et exangues
miseros amantes.
ridet et precordia
trahere suspiria.</p> | <p>Although no one oppose,
he renews the fight.
Often he deceives
choicest counsels.
He delights in griefs,
delights in laments;
laughs at feeble,
miserable lovers,
laughs at breasts
heaving sighs.</p> |

- 2b Cuntos euasit
 nexus infortunii;
 cui⁹ sola compede
 stringor adamante.
 placet honestas;
 urit, urit utilitas;
 herent et uerba
 nobis tandem unica.
 non altis sermonibus,
 solis loquor fidibus.
- 3a Quantos preterita
 genuere secula
 quos ins<o>ubili
 nexu graciosa
 iunxit amicitia:
 Nisum ut Eurialo,
 Pirothoum Theseo,
 Pollinice Tideo?
- 3b Quid Daud et Ionathe
 fedus uenerabile,
 quid¹⁰ amici memorem
 planctum lacrimabilem;
 postquam Saul cecidit,
 Ionathas occubuit,
 dum sederet, Sichelec
 ceso,¹¹ uictor Amalech?
- 4a Viuit adhuc Pirus,
 Thisbe dilectissimus,
 et amoris concia
 parietis rimula
 primum illis cognita;
 qua sibi colloquia
 diuidebant intima.
 optimus colloquiis,
 sed infidus osculis,
 disparabat corpora
 paries, spiritibus
 solis quidem peruius.
- He avoids all
 the coils of misfortune;
 to him I am bound
 with a single, adamantine fetter.
 His honour pleases;
 his service burns, burns;
 his unique words, at last,
 catch us;
 not by lofty discourse,
 I say, but only with lovesong.
- How many men
 have past ages produced
 whom beloved friendship
 united
 with an indissoluble bond:
 as Nisus to Euryalus,
 Pirithoüs to Theseus,
 Polynices to Tydeus?
- Why need I recall
 the ancient bond
 of David and Jonathon,
 why the tearful lament for his friend?
 After Saul fell,
 Jonathon was slain,
 and with Ziklag overcome,
 the Amalekite sat as victor.
- Pyramus, most beloved of Thisbe,
 still lives in memory, and as well,
 the little fissure in the wall,
 known first to them,
 knowing their love.
 Through it they shared
 intimate conversations.
 Best for talking,
 but unfaithful to kisses,
 the wall,
 pervious alas to souls only,
 kept their bodies apart.

⁹ MS unclear; Dronke reads *tui*, Meyer emends to *qui*.

¹⁰ MS *quod*.

¹¹ MS *seso*.

Seuus amor ultima
urget in discrimina.
non ignis incendia
Bosforis¹² non aspera
perorrescit equora.
quas dum sepe salebras
iuuenis temeritas
superasset, uincitur
tandem maris estibus.
operitur Sestias;
Sestias, in speculis,
ponto perit iuuenis.

Cruel Amor urges us
to the ultimate dangers.
Neither at fire's blaze
nor the Bosphorus' rough waters
does he tremble.
Though the rash youth (Leander)
often overcame these rough ways,
in the end even he is conquered
by the billowing sea.
His Sestian maid is hidden (from him);
she perishes on the watchtower,
he on the sea.

5a Forma, uoce, lingua bonus
gratus erat unice
solus Trachas¹³ inter omnes
Orpheus Euridice;
cuius capto federe
gestit omnes fugere;
dumque procos fugit illa
dente petit letifer,
calle pressus, coluber.
Orpheus illam modulis
urget insolabilis.

Favoured in beauty, song, and language,
Orpheus, unique among Thracians,
was alone beloved
by Eurydice.
Caught by her bond,
he desires to flee everyone;
and while she flees her own suitors,
the deadly viper, concealed by the path,
seeks her with his bite.
Inconsolable, Orpheus
urges her on with his songs.

5b Quercus illum uatem sequi
subigebant cithare
dulces modi, quos uocalis
temperat Calliope,
sed nec curas pectore
efficax est demere.
solam uates non adesse
queritur Euridicen.
ingemit Euridicen :
atque semel fidicen
retulit Euridicen.

The sweet notes of the lute,
which Calliope, singing, tempers,
compelled even the oaks to follow
the poet, but she is not
powerful enough to remove
the griefs from his heart.
The poet laments
that his only Eurydice is not there.
He bemoans Eurydice:
and at once the lutanist
brought back 'Eurydice.'

¹² MS *Borsris*

¹³ MS *Trarchas*

- 6a Liquid auras superiores.
 placet inanes uisere sedes
 fidibus in querulis
 incombendo modulis.
 Manes sistit; penas fugit;
 Cerberi domantur ora.
 Cerberi, Proserpine
 dire manent lacrimae
 prius incontigue.
 He leaves the upper air.
 Relying on the plaintive melodies
 of his lute,
 he resolves to visit
 the regions of death.
 He stills the Manes;
 he shuns their torments.
 The mouths of Cerberus are subdued.
 The harsh tears of Cerberus and
 Proserpine,
 formerly untappable, flow.
- 6b Tandem mitis carmine uatis
 superum terror, inferum rector:
 'tollat' inquit 'Orpheus
 meritam melodibus,
 lege certa, ne respectat;¹⁴
 sola gaudeat dilecto...'
 The terror above, the judge below,
 meek, at length, through the poet's
 song,
 declares: 'Let Orpheus raise
 her whom he has merited
 through his music,
 but with a fixed condition,
 that he not look back,
 Let his unique love rejoice
 in her beloved.
 Amor deceives Orpheus;
 he looks back at his prize.
 Called back through the proviso,
 Eurydice slips away.
 The poet prepares
 to cross the shades anew.
 The steersman keeps him away
 from the Stygian slime.
 Dispirited, he returns
 from the lower world,
 bemoaning the fate of his wife.
- *
 * *
 *
- fallit amor Orpheus;
 respicit ad premia.
- 7a Repetita lege,
 labitur Euridice.
 rursus uates
 parat ire Manes.
 uector Stigio
 prohibet ab alueo.
 luridus ab inferis
 redditur auris
 fata merens coniugis.
 Love conquers all,
 love rules all.
 The flight of so many great lovers
 is betrayed.
 Hands, ears, eyes,
- 7b Vincit amor omnia,
 regit amor omnia.
 fuga tantum
 fallitur amantum.
 fraude subdola

¹⁴ Perhaps a rare use of *ne* with the indicative in the sense "see that...;" Hofmann-Szantyr, *Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik*, (Munich, 1965), 327.

subnectendo modula
manus, aures, oculi
strenua¹⁵ paci
uix negant cupidini.

8 Do quietem fidibus;
finem, queso, luctibus
tu curas alentibus.

by adding little gestures
in sly deceit,
can scarcely deny the passion
to be endured for love.

I give rest to my lute;
and you, I beg, give rest
to those nurturing cares through
grief.

If this poem presents some difficult textual points, it also submits to a variety of interpretations. Until a third manuscript is discovered, we may treat F as an independent version based upon A, written around the third quarter of the twelfth century by an author who was acquainted with an exceptional amount of classical poetry as well as some contemporary writers like Alan of Lille and Peter Abelard.

Although certain parts of the poem remain problematical, I should like to suggest that the classical and contemporary allusions are employed to achieve a conscious unity of design. The major theme is really *amor*, as Meyer saw clearly,¹⁶ conceived both as an allegorical figure in 1b and as a generic concept under which *exempla* are arranged in two categories: *amicitia*, love of man for man, and *amor*, love of man for woman. Why the poet proceeds from the first to the second type of love is not entirely clear, but there is nothing in the text itself which suggests that he is trying to contrast the two.¹⁷ Only if we look at the poem from this viewpoint, moreover, can

¹⁵ MS sternuo. I have retained the orthography of *paci* for *paci*, as above *liquid* for *liquit*.

¹⁶ "Offenbar also ist das Hauptthema des Gedichtes die Liebe und besonders das mit ihr verbundene Unheil. Die Freundschaft, die milde, segensreiche Schwester der Liebe, ist eine Hauptsache im Gedichte; sie soll nur durch ihren Gegensatz das unheilvolle Wesen der Liebe klarer machen;" *art. cit.*, 153.

¹⁷ This, it seems to me, was Raby's fundamental error in interpretation, despite the numerous important insights he gave us in the article cited (1965). He was, of course, correct in stating that *amor* and *amicitia* were often contrasted in the Middle Ages; but in citing Publilius Syrus, even through Seneca, he chose a fragment too obscure for the author of *Parce Continuis*, whose allusions to the classics generally refer to well known authors and episodes. In addition, the medieval tradition did not always contrast *amor* and *amicitia*. From the ninth century especially, the two began to be viewed often as different aspects of an underlying spiritual love in both secular and religious verse; see Adele Fiske, "Alcuin and Mystical Friendship," *Studi medievali, serie terza* 2 (1961), 551-575. Hennig Brinkmann, one of the first to draw attention to the importance of this literary tradition, cited *Parce Continuis* as an example of its complexity; *Geschichte der lateinischen Liebesdichtung im Mittelalter* (Halle, 1925), 10 ff; 28. As interesting a title as "Amicitia Soror Amoris" would make, it is beyond this article. One passage from Aelred's *De Spirituali Amicitia*, however, serves as an excellent gloss to the friendship stanzas: "Ab amore, ut mihi videtur, ami-

we account for the friendship stanzas as an integral part of its design, if indeed they are, and not as an interpolation in a previous version from which they were omitted. The simplest way of viewing the overall structure of the poem is as follows:

1. invocation to Amor, 1-30.
2. *amor* and *amicitia*, 31-46.
3. love for woman; (a) Pyramus and Thisbe,
(b) Hero and Leander,
(c) Orpheus and Eurydice, 47-119.
4. conclusion: *omnia vincit amor*, 120-131.

The poem begins with the common classical and medieval device of addressing a work to an imaginary friend who is suffering from the torments of love; it ends with an equally rhetorical appeal to Amor to grant peace to all those whom he has victimized. The poem's *exempla amorum* are placed within the frame of these two statements.

After describing Amor's inhuman birth and inhumane disregard for those in his power, the poet asserts that he is bound to him by an inflexible chain. He then parodies the language of *amicitia*, as it was handed down by Cicero and Seneca to the medieval schools, in describing the pervasive effects of *amor*. It is clear, even here, that *amor* does not refer to the classical notion of love as a form of madness, but to a more embracing concept. The references in the *exempla* "cannot... be intended to contrast the blessedness of friendship with the fatality of love. For each of the four friendships mentioned falls under the shadow of death.... The examples of *amicitia* point, if anything, in the same direction as those of *amor*: no deep human attachment can remain permanently blessed on earth."¹⁸

Let us look a little closer at the four examples themselves. The first three may be taken from classical sources, but they may also come, as the fourth, from Alan of Lille's *Anticlaudianus*. In the second book of Alan's allegorical epic on the formation of a perfect man there is a description of the personified arts and virtues who are to be sent to God in the form of a chariot of human knowledge in order to beg an exemplar for the soul of the *novus homo* who, in a moral as well as a physical sense, is to inaugurate a reign of natural harmony on earth. The allegorical goddess *Concordia* plays a leading role in this part of the poem. It is she who unites *Prudentia* and *Ratio* in

cus dicitur, ab amico amicitia. Est autem amor quidam animae rationalis affectus per quem ipsa aliquid cum desiderio quaerit et appetit ad fruendum; per quem et fruatur eo cum quadam interiori suavitate, amplectitur et conservat adeptum ... Porro amicus quasi amoris, vel, ut quibusdam placuit, ipsius animi custos dicitur ..." PL 195, 663B-C.

¹⁸ Peter Dronke, *op. cit.*, 348.

favour of the plan, despite their individual doubts about its chances of success. Describing her entrance onto the stage of the epic, Alan portrays on her garments some of the famous *amicitiae* of antiquity:

Vnius uultus, uno contenta colore
Vestis in ornatum membrorum transit, eisdem
Sic aptata foris quod eis inscripta putetur.
Illic arte sua vitam pictura secundam
Donat eis quos castus amor, concordia simplex,
Pura fides, uera pietas coniunxit et unum
Esse duos fecit purgati fedus amoris ;
Nam Daud et Ionathas ibi sunt duo, sunt tamen unum ;
Cum sint diuersi, non sunt duo mente sed unus ;
Dimidiant animas, sibi se partitur uterque.
Vt sibi Pyrithoüs se reddat, redditus orbi
Theseus inferni loca, monstra, pericula uictat,
Viuere posse negat in se, nisi uiuat in illo ;
Tydeus arma rapit, ut regnet Thydeus alter
In Polinice suo pugnat seseque secundum,
Dum regnare cupit sibi, poscere regna uidetur.
Alter in Eurialo comparet Nisus et alter
Eurialus uiget in Niso ; sic alter utrumque
Reddit et ex uno comitum pensatur uterque.¹⁹

Thus we see all those whom "pure love, simple concord, true faith, and genuine piety" had once united have their tragic ends undone through a new, eternal "bond of love." As exactly the same examples appear in *Parce Continuis*, may we not assume at least a similarity of intention ?

The most famous example of friendship in the group is David and Jonathon. In contrast to the simple list of classical *amicitiae*, the poet here devotes a stanza to their relationship. His source must be the description in the Vulgate, where the passionate strength of the bond between the two friends is unmistakable:

Et factum est cum compleret loqui ad Saul, anima Jonathae conglutinata est animae David, et dilexit eum Jonathas quasi animam suam. Tulitque cum Saul in die illa, et non concessit ei ut reverteretur in domum patris sui. Inierunt autem David et Jonathas foedus ; diligebat enim eum quasi animam suam.²⁰

This relationship, which medieval glossators normally did not comment on,²¹ does not fall within the normal classical dichotomy *amor/amicitia*. If this is the poet's idea of *amicitia*, then surely it is a type of *amor*, not a con-

¹⁹ *Alain de Lille, Anticlaudianus*, ed. R. Bossuat (Paris, 1955), Bk. 2, 178-196, p. 78.

²⁰ I Reg. 18:1-3.

²¹ The *Glossa Ordinaria*, citing Rabanus Maurus (?), simply says: Jonathas dilexit David ... PL 113, 558A; cf. Hugh of St. Victor, *Adnotatiunculae in Librum Regum Secundum*, PL 175, 11-101; Aelred, *De Spirituali Amicitia*, Bk. 3, PL 195, 692-693.

trasting sentiment. What the author of *Parce Continuis* appears to have done is to provide a spiritual context for *amor* which includes both friendship and the love of man for woman. Compare, for instance, the friendship stanzas with a few lines from David's lament for Jonathon, noting the language in which the relationship is described:

Jonathas in excelsis tuis occisus est.
Doleo super te, frater mi Jonatha,
decore nimis et amabilis super amorem mulierum.
Sicut mater unicum amat filium suum,
ita ego te diligebam.²²

Alan of Lille's highly abstract portrayal of friendship and the language of the Vulgate bring us very close to the idea of *amicitia* in *Parce Continuis*. Its spirituality, moreover, is carried over to the next set of examples.

The first of these is Pyramus and Thisbe. There is a striking difference in the nature of the love experience in Ovid and in *Parce Continuis*. For Ovid, love is a totally consuming experience presented in sensual terms: it involves both the ears with which the two lovers hear each other through the crack in the wall and the kisses which the wall denies them:

fissus erat tenui rima, quam duxerat olim
cum fieret, paries domui communis utrique.
id vitium nulli per saecula longa notatum —
quid non sentit amor? — primi vidistis amantes
et vocis fecistis iter; tutaeque per illud
murmure blanditiae minimo transire solebant.
saepe, ubi constiterant, hinc Thisbe, Pyramus illinc,
inque vices fuerat captatus anhelitus oris,
'Invide' dicebant 'paries, quid amantibus obstat?
quantum erat, ut sineres toto nos corpore iungi,
aut, hoc si nimium est, vel ad oscula danda pateres.'
nec sumus ingrati: tibi nos debere fatemur,
quod datus est verbis ad amicas transitus aures.²³

Ovid's drama and narrative skill are not reflected in *Parce Continuis*, where the example of Pyramus and Thisbe possesses an emblematic significance, almost as if the poet were describing only one scene in the story from a medieval miniature. As in his other *exempla*, the details remain misty, the narrative, episodic. In his reworking of Ovid's metaphor of the fissure, however, he makes one change, consciously or unconsciously, which adds a new spiritual context: he sees the wall allowing their souls to commune but not their bodies. He imitates Ovid in the personification of *rima/rimula*, but tends to fashion out of the episode a metaphysical conceit. If there is

²² II Reg. I: 26.

²³ Ovid, *Met.*, 4, 65-77.

a bridge between the stanzas on friendship and the scenes from famous love stories, it lies in the common, spiritual background for both types of *amor*.

Turning to the other two examples of tragic lovers, there are a number of individual points worth noting. At 4b, describing Hero and Leander, the language is somewhat contorted. The stanza begins with the idea of fierce love urging one to *discrimina*. Leander, next introduced, fears neither the fire's flames nor the rough seas. Continuing the idea of the first two lines, Leander is seen to fear neither the strength of his own desires nor the obstacles placed between him and their satisfaction. From the metaphor we then turn to reality: Leander, who conquered the obstacle of the sea is himself overwhelmed by the *maris estibus*. *Aestus* has a wide range of meaning — the billowy tossing of the sea, the union of hot and cold, or the passionate commotion of the mind. The poet has progressed through the first two images to this one, which unites the metaphorical associations of *discrimina*, *ignis incendia* and *aspera equora* in one word. The last three lines of the stanza are somewhat difficult, but the same ideas seem to be continued. Hero is hidden from Leander: *operio* could refer to concealing thoughts as well as things in medieval Latin, since concrete terms were frequently made more abstract. Perhaps the Sestian maid must atone for the pride of Leander's *temeritas*;²⁴ perhaps in *operitur* the poet intends that Leander's love is concealed from him as he fails to overcome the sea. Concluding the twofold metaphor of the dangers of love, he then states that, as Leander perishes physically in the sea, Hero sees the death of her relationship from her watchtower. The poet has thus presented us again with a situation in which the physical and spiritual are exploited for poetic reasons. Although the syntax of the following example of Orpheus and Eurydice is, if anything, more obscure than the above²⁵, the illustration points in the same direction. In the difficult stanza 7b, the conclusion seems to emphasize and to summarize what the previous *exempla* have stated: the disappointments of *amor* are very hard to bear.

Parce Continuis thus appears to be a minor adaptation of the *Freundschaftsliteratur* of the Middle Ages to some wider currents in medieval Latin love poetry.

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²⁴ The only instance of *temeritas* in the Vulgate refers to disobedience and punishment: II Reg. 6:7; cf. Archpoet, ed. Watenphul and Krefeld, 1, 45, *falsa temeritas*.

²⁵ Similar lines occur in MS Auxerre 243, ed. A. Vernet "Poésies latines des XII^e et XIII^e siècles," *Mélanges ... F. Grat.* vol. 2 (Paris, 1949), 261-262. A probable source for the episode in *Parce Continuis* is Fulgentius, *Mitologiarum* III, X; ed. Helm, p. 77: "Postquam maritus ad inferos descendit legem accipit, ne eam conversus aspiceret; quam conversus et aspiciens iterum perdidit."

Repertorium Mertonense

JAMES A. WEISHEIPL, O. P.

THIS is a preliminary list of MSS of the writings of certain Merton Masters between 1300 and 1350 that I have noted in the course of my research on early Fourteenth Century physics at Oxford. This list has been utilized by A. B. Emden in his *Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A. D. 1500* (Oxford, 1957-59). It contains mainly the writings pertaining to the Faculty of Arts, whether written in Oxford or elsewhere, but it also contains some theological treatises. This preliminary checklist makes no pretence of being complete. However, I have tried to see as many of the MSS as possible myself. Those which I have not seen personally are marked with an asterisk. The Masters are listed in alphabetical order of place name and their writings are arranged according to the curriculum of studies. The works of Thomas Wilton, a Fellow of Merton College, are basically those listed by P. Glorieux (*Répertoire des Maîtres en Théologie de Paris*, n. 228, t. 1, 460-462), since I have nothing to add.

LIST OF MERTON MASTERS NOTED

1. Ashinden, John	page 175
2. Billingham, Richard	176
3. Bradwardine, Thomas	177
4. Bredon, Simon	183
5. Buckingham, Thomas	184
6. Burley, Walter	185
7. Campsall, Richard de	208
8. Collingham, William de	209
9. Dumbleton, John	210
10. Estry, William de	211
11. Hennor, William de	212
12. Heytesbury, William	212
13. Maduith, John	217
14. Rede, William	218
15. Segrave, Walter de	218
16. Sutton, William de	219
17. Swineshead, Richard	219
18. Tewkesbury (? John)	221
19. Wilton, Thomas	222

1. ASHINDEN, JOHN

Biogr. Merton College Fellow in 1322 (Mert. Rec. 724) and still in 1355 (Mert. Rec. 6032). Noted by Bale, Leland and Tanner under the forms of "Aeschendenus" and "Estwode". See A. B. Emden, I, 56.

Works

1) *Summa judicialis de accidentibus mundi* (1347-8).

Inc. lib. I: "Intencio mea in hoc libro est compilare sentencias astrologorum..."

Expl. lib. I: "... completa est ergo hec compilacio tractatus primi summe iudicialis de accidentibus mundi in civitate Oxonie per mag. Joh. de Ascheldon, 20 die mensis Julii anno 1347."

Expl. lib. II: "... gracias quantas sufficio referens Deo patri cui sit honor et gloria et infinita secula Amen. Completa est hec compilacio tractatus secundi summe iudicialis de accidentibus mundi 18 die mensis Decembris anno Christi 1348."

*Erfurt, Amplon. F. 207a (membr. xiv), fol. 1-

« Amplon. F. 379 (s. xiv), fol. 99v-159

Oxford, Bodl. 369 (SC 2479), (s. xv), fol. 1-379

« Bodl. 714 (SC 2621), (s. xiv), fol. 1-235v

« Savile 25 (SC 6571), (membr. xiv), fol. 1-163 [2nd Bk.]

« Digby 225 (SC 1803), (membr. xv), fol. 1-243vb

« Oriel College 23 (membr. xv), fol. 1-226

Paris, Universitaire 598 (membr. xv), fol. 1-136

Ed. Venice 1489, 1542.

2) *Tractatus de significatione coniunctionis Saturni et Martis in Cancro, que erat isto anno Christi 1357, octavo die Junii, et de significatione coniunctionis magne Saturni et Jovis, que erat anno Christi 1365 in 30 die Octobris hora 5 minutis 22 (1365).*

Inc.: "Sicut dicit Ptholomeus in Centiologio..."

Expl.: "... ad presens sufficiant."

Cambridge, Emmanuel College (s. xv), fol. 4v-14v

London, B. M. Harley 637 (s. xv), fol. 129va-138vb

« « Royal 12. F. XVII (s. xv), fol. 2-

Oxford, Ashmole 393 (SC 6734), p. 82-98

« Digby 176 (SC 1719), (membr. xv), fol. 42-49v

3) *Prognosticon de eclipsi lune universali, que contingit anno Christi 1345.*

Inc.: "Significatio eclipsis lune universalis..."

Expl.: "... predicta significationibus."

Oxford, Bodl. Digby 176 (SC 1719), (membr. xv), fol. 9-16

2. BILLINGHAM, RICHARD

Biogr. Merton College Fellow in 1344 (Mert. Rec. 3676) and still in 1361 (Mert. Rec. 6031). Frequently Bursar of the College. He, together with Richard Swineshead and others, was a supporter of Mag. John Wylyot in his tumultuous election to the Chancellorship in 1349 (*Cal. of Close Rolls*, Edw. III, 1349-1354, p. 74). See Emden 1, 188-9.

*Works*1) *Speculum iuvenum* (or, *De probationibus propositionum*)

Inc.: "Terminus est in quem resolvitur propositio ut in subiectum et predicatum..."

Expl.: "... et possibile est hoc esse post sui corruptionem, sed ista est falsa, igitur et illa."

* Assisi, Conv. 690, fol. 189-225 [anon.]

* Erfurt, Amplon. Q. 30 (s. xiv), fol. 144v-149v

* « Amplon. Q. 243 (s. xiv), fol. 52-53v [incompl. ?]

* « Amplon. Q. 245 (s. xiv), fol. 209-232v

* « Amplon. O. 75 (s. xiv), fol. 1-18

Florence, Naz. Cent. Magl. V. 43 (membr. xiv-xv), fol. 1-12

Oxford, Bodl. Auct. F. 5. 23 (SC 2674), fol. 1-4

Padua, Antoniana XIX, 407 (a. d. 1469), fol. 40v-45v

« Bibl. Univ. 1123 (membr. xiv), fol. 11vb-14ra

Vatican, Vat. lat. 674 (s. xiv), fol. 110-114

« Vat. lat. 3038 (s. xv), fol. 1-13

« Vat. lat. 3058 (s. xv), fol. 47-67v

« Vat. lat. 3065 (s. xv), fol. 1-11v

Venice, S. Marco, Z. lat. 277 (1728), (s. xiv), fol. 2-5v [with commentary]

Vienna, Nat. Bibl. lat. 4698 (a. d. 1383), fol. 104-108

Worcester, Bibl. Cathed. F. 118 (s. xv), fol. 43vb-45vb [with commentary of mag. Edward Upton]

* Wurzburg, Minorit. I, 63, fol. 46v-51

2) *De sensu composito et diviso*

Inc.: "Pro sensu composito et diviso est sciendum et primo de compositione est notandum quod nunquam est propositio in sensu composito nisi ..."

Expl.: "... significare que non consumuntur secundum compositum vel divisum. Ido hoc pro facultate puerorum comprehensiones feci et brevi. Explicit tractatus de sensu composito et diviso

mag. Ricardi Bilingam anglici valde utilis et brevis."
Paris, B.N. lat. 14715 (membr. xiv), fol. 79-82

3) *Conclusiones*

Inc.: "Tu credis aliquam proposicionem esse veram quam nullus homo credit esse veram..."

Expl.: "... ad illud concludendo conclusionem."

Padua, Bibl. Univ. 1123 (membr. xiv), fol. 29ra-31rb [Expliciunt conclusiones date a mag. Riccardo bylyngham complete]

Vatican, Vat. lat. 3065 (s. xv), fol. 21-25v

Vienna, Nat. Bibl. lat. 4698 (a. d. 1373), fol. 108-114v

4) *Sophisma*

Inc.: "Numquid scire sit credere..."

Expl.: "Explicit sophisma mag. Ricardi Bylyngham, quod sic incipit, numquid scire sit credere, etc."

Worcester, Bibl. Cathed. F. 35 (s. xv), fol. 107-109vb

5) *De significato proposicionis*

Inc.: "Utrum propositio affirmativa vel negativa..."

Expl.: "... Explicit intencio Bylyngham de significato proposicionis."

Worcester, Bibl. Cathed. F. 35 (s. xv), fol. 109vb-110va

Uncertain

1) *Consequentias*

Inc.: "Quia in sophismatibus probando..." [Pits 489]

2) *Proportiones*

Inc.: "Proportio quedam est communiter dicta..."

[attributed to Billingham by Tanner (p. 100) and reference to MS Bodl. sup. A. 1 Art 98, fol. 7]

3. BRADWARDINE, THOMAS

Biogr. Born about 1295, probably in the diocese of Chichester. First noted as a Fellow of Balliol College in August 1321, but by 1323 he became at least a probationary Fellow at Merton. His necessary regency in arts probably between 1321-1323. In 1335 he relinquished his fellowship at Merton and joined the household of Richard de Bury. Chancellor of St. Paul's Cathedral, London, from September 1337 until 1349. Appointed to the archbishopric of Canterbury on June 19, 1349, and consecrated at Avignon on July 10, 1349. Died of the plague at Lambeth, August 26, 1349. See Emden 1, 244-6 and 3, xv-xvi.

*Works*1) *Insolubilia* (12 capitula)

Inc. Prol.: "Solvere non est ignorantis vinculum 3^o Metaph., capitulo primo. Quia ergo insolubilium vinculo..."

Inc. cap 1: "Scias igitur quod insolubile capitur dupliciter secundum quod solubile vel solucio..."

Expl.: "... et sic ista sufficiant ad omnia insolubilia dissolvendum."

Bruges, de la Ville 500 (membr. xiv), fol. 134-143v

Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College 434/434 (membr. xiv), fol. 10v-12v [incomplete]

*Erfurt, Amplon. O. 76 (membr. xiv), fol. 6-21v

« Amplon. Q. 276 (a. d. 1295-1333), fol. 163-167 [first six chapters]

* « Amplon. F. 135 (membr. xiv), fol. 17v-20v [without prologue and subtitled "incipiunt insolubilia swynesheyft. data Oxonie"]

London, B. M. Royal 12. F. XIX (membr. xiv), fol. 149-152v [incomplete]

Munich, Clm. 23530 (s. xv), fol. 210v-222 ["Beluardini de Anglia"]

Oxford, Canon. Misc. 219 (a. d. 1393-5), fol. 53-57

*Prague, Capit. Metrop. 1327 (s. xiv), fol. 47 ff.

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2154 (s. xv), fol. 13-22rb ["Thome bralduardini anglici"]

« Vat. lat. 3065 (s. xv), fol. 107v-116v [without prologue]

Venice, S. Marco, Z. lat. 301 (1576), (s. xiv), fol. 27-37

2) *Arithmetica speculativa*

a) Inc.: "Horum que sunt aliud est continuum aliud discretum."

Expl.: "... hec est sesquioctava proportio differencia. Explicit arismetica Bragward."

*Erfurt, Amplon. F. 375 (s. xiv), fol. 15v-17v, 88v-92v

* « Amplon. Q. 23 (s. xiv), fol. 75-81v

Ed. Paris 1495, 1502, Valencia 1503

b) Inc.: "Numerus est duplex: mathematicus qui dicitur numerus numerans et naturalis qui dicitur numerus numeratus. Numerus autem mathematicus..."

Expl.: "... in sesquialtera proportionem. Explicit arismetica Bragwardine."

Munich, Clm. 24809 (s. xv), fol. 100v-106

- Vienna, Nat. Bibl. lat. 4951 (a. d. 1501), fol. 273-304v [with anon. commentary]
 « Nat. Bibl. lat. 4953 (a. d. 1466), fol. 36-61v [with anon. commentary]

3) *Geometria speculativa*

Inc.: "Geometria est assecutiva..."

Expl.: "... sicut deducitur per hanc communionem evidenter; et in hoc completa [est] quarta pars et ultima huius libri. Deo gracias. Expl. geometria Bragwardini."

- *Basle, Univ. F. IV. 30, fol. 58-96
- *Erfurt, Amplon. F. 375 (mid xiv), fol. 1-15
- * « Amplon. Q. 343 (late xiv), fol. 1-38
- *Escorial, O. II. 9, fol. 39-57v
- *Florence, Bibl. Naz. Conv. Soppr. J. IV. 29, fol. 73-99v
- *Krakow, Bibl. Jagell. 1919, pp. 61-137
- * « Bibl. Jagell. 1859, pp. 347-367
- *London, B. M. Add. 17420, fol. 1-30
- *Lyons, Palais des Artes, 45, fol. 173-197v
- *Munich, Clm. 14908 (s. xv), fol. 224-299v
- *Naples, Bibl. Naz. VIII. C. lg, fol. 186v-234
- *Oxford, Bibl. Lyell Empt. 10
- *Paris, B. N. lat. 7368, fol. 28-55v
- *Prague, Univ. 44. F. 8, fol. 1-22v
- * « Univ. V. F. 6, fol. 98-134v
- * « Metrop. Bibl. L. 29, fol. 1-17
- *Torun, R. 4^o. 2, pp. 105-110
- *Valencia, Univ. 320, fol. 1-20v
- Vatican, Vat. lat. 3102 (membr. xiv), fol. 85-111v
- * « Pal. lat. 1420 (s. xv), fol. 53-63
- * « Pal. lat. 1380, fol. 237-260
- * « Reg. lat. 1235, fol. 1-31
- * « Ottobon. lat. 1389, fol. 4-51
- Ed. Paris 1511, 1530

4) *Tractatus de proportionibus velocitatum in motibus* (1328)

Inc. prol.: "Omnem motum successivum alteri in velocitate proportionari contingit..."

Inc.: cap. 1: "Proportio vel est dicta communiter vel proprie. Est accepta communiter in omnibus..."

Expl.: "... situatur; sic ergo quid volumus lucide demonstratur. Perfectum est enim opus de proportionibus velocitatum in motibus cum illis motoris auxilio a quo motus cuncti procedunt."

- *Bruges, Bibl. de la Ville 500 (membr. xiv), fol. 158-172v
 Cologne, Stadtbibliothek XII, 1, W. 8^o. 15 (membr. xiv)
 [anon. attr. to Albertus Magnus in cat.]
 Erfurt, Amplon. F. 135 (membr. xiv), fol. 20v-25
 * « Amplon. F. 380 (membr. xiv), fol. 49-58v
 * « Amplon. Q. 325 (c. 1369), fol. 13-22
 * « Amplon. Q. 348 (a. d. 1393), fol. 13-22
 * « Amplon. Q. 385 (late xiv), fol. 1-16v
 * « Amplon. Q. 387 (late xiv), fol. 1v-8
 London, B. M. Harley 3243 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-8v
 Oxford, Bodl. 676 (SC 2593), (s. xv), fol. 162-163v [anon.]
 « Canon, Misc. 177 (a. d. 1395), fol. 164-170v
 « Digby 76 (SC 1677), fol. 110-120
 « Digby 228 (SC 1829), fol. 56-61
 *Padua, Antoniana, XX, 431 (s. xv)
 Paris, B. N. lat. 6559 (membr. xiv), fol. 49-58
 « B. N. lat. 14576 (membr. xiv), fol. 255-261v
 « B. N. lat. 14734 (s. xv), fol. 1-34
 « B. N. lat. 15105 (a. d. 1402), fol. 1-24
 « B. N. lat. 16621 (s. xiv), fol. 202v-212v
 « B. N. Nouv. Acq. lat. 625, (a. d. 1348), fol. 62-70v
 *Prague, Cath. Chap. 1293 (s. xv), fol. 1-19
 Rome, Angelica 1017 (R. 6. 32), (membr. xiv), fol. 50-56v
 « Casanatense 267 (s. xiv), fol. 1-10
 Vatican, Vat. lat. 1108 (s. xiv-xv), fol. 69-81
 « Vat. lat. 1108 (s. xiv-xv), fol. 104-119v
 « Vat. lat. 2185 (s. xiv), fol. 23v-27v
 « Vat. lat. 4429 (s. xiv), fol. 23-29
 « Ottobon. lat. 179 (s. xiv), fol. 23-29
 Venica, S. Marco lat. VI, 62 (2549), (s. xv), fol. 99-111
 « S. Marco lat. VI, 155 (3377), (s. xv), fol. 92v-105
 « S. Marco lat. VIII, 77 (3223), (s. xiv), fol. 1-14 [muti-
 latus in principio]
 « S. Marco lat. VIII, 38 (3383), (a. d. 1391), fol. 1-8
 Vienna, Dominikanerkloster 192/158 (membr. xiv), fol. 146-
 152v
 « Nat. Bibl. lat. 1312 (s. xiv), fol. 223v-242 [incomplete]
 Ed. Paris 1495, Venice 1505 (fol. 9-16v), Madison, Wis. 1955

5) *Tractatus de continuo*

Inc.: "Continuum est quantum cuius partes ad invicem copulantur.
 Continuum permanens..."

Expl.: "... igitur continuatur et finitur seipso. Sic igitur primus liber qui est de compositioe continui ad sua essentialia, finem capit. Amen. Explicit tractatus Bradwardini de continuo."
 Erfurt, Amplon. Q. 385 (late xiv), fol. 17-48 [anon.]
 Paris, B. N. Nouv. Acq. lat. 625 (membr. xiv), fol. 71v [ascr. but only beginning]
 Tourn, Quarto 2 (late xiv), pages 153-192 [ascr.]

6) *Tractatus de futuris contingentibus* (partially published by B. M. Xiberta in *Festschrift M. Grabmann* (B. G. P. M. A., Suppl. III, 2) 1169-1180.

7) *Summa de causa Dei contra Pelagium et de virtute causarum* (1344)

a) Inc. prol.: "Magnorum et multorum petitionibus..."

Inc. lib. I: "In primis firmissime supponatur quod Deus est eterne perfectus..."

*Budapest, Mus. Nat. 79 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-168 [abbrev. ?]
 Cambridge, Corpus Christi 24 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-271v [perscriptum Lond. 1344]

London, Lambeth Pal. 32 (membr. 1385; perscriptum Cantab.), fol. 1-257

Oxford, Merton College 71 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-263v

« New College 134 (membr. xiv), fol. 3-322 [perscriptum London 1344]

« Canon. Misc. 244 (membr. xiv Vincenza), fol. 1-221

Padua, Anton. IX, N. 170 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-335 [perscriptum London. anno 1344]

Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 15390 (paper 1477)

« B. N. lat. 15976-15977 (membr. a. d. 1356)

« B. N. lat. 3153 (membr. xiv) [imperfect beg. and end]

*Rome, Angelica 623 (Q. 1. 10), (membr. Perscriptum Paris 1352), fol. 1-204

Vatican, Vat. lat. 1039 (perscriptum Paris 1357), fol. 1-175v

« Vat. lat. 1040 (a. d. 1411), fol. 1-305v

Vienna, Dominikanerkloster 91/67 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-147v [lib. II-III]

« Nat. Bibl. lat. 1312 (membr. xiv), fol. 9-69v [incomplete]

« Nat. Bibl. lat. 1521 (membr. perscriptum Paris 1345), fol. 1-166.

Ed. Paris 1495, 1500, Venice 1505, Vienna 1515, London 1618.

Cf. Stegmüller, RS, nn. 896-898, 2; Doucet, *Suppl.*, *ibid.*

b) *Epitome Summe de causa Dei*

Inc.: "Magnitudinem huius operis michi videbatur extervis prospicienti tam in auctoritatum profunditate..."

Vatican, Ottobon. lat. 662 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-120

c) *Tractatus de meditatione* [extract from *De causa Dei*, lib. II, cap. 34, minus the corollarium]

Inc.: "O magne, O mirabilis Deus noster..."

Expl.: "... aut quis tibi sufficienter retribuet summe pater."

Vienna, Nat. Bibl. lat. 4487 (a. d. 1430), fol. 305-315 [ascrib.]

* « Schottenkloster 321 (a. d. 1433), fol. 122-131v [ascrib.]

8) *Sermo coram Edwardo III epinicius* (1346)

Inc. prol.: "Deo gracias qui semper triumphat, etc. Licet dominus noster rex habeat multos clericos..."

Inc. sermo: "Nos karissimi nos est in factis armorum..."

Oxford, Merton College 180 (membr. xiv), fol. 183v-188v

Ed. H. A. Oberman and J. A. Weisheipl in AHDLM, 25 (1958), 295-329.

*Uncertain*1) *Ars memorativa*

Inc.: "Ad artificialem memoriam duo requiruntur, scilicet loci certus..."

Expl.: "... in dextro pede vas aquaticum nobile et in sinistro pede pistes mirabiles."

*Cambridge, Fitzwilliam Mus., McClean Bequest 169, fol. 254-356v

London, B. M. Sloan 377 f (late xv), fol. 7v-8v

2) *Tractatus de predestinatione et libero arbitrio*

Inc.: "Quia plerosque sollicitat an predestinationis divine similiter et reprobationis aliqua causa in predestinato et reprobo consistat..."

Vienna, Nat. Bibl. lat. 4306 (s. xiv-xv), fol. 90-105v

3) *Tractatus de incipit et desinit*

Inc.: "Ad maiorem et clariorem noticiam illorum terminorum 'incipit' et 'desinit' habendam..."

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2154 (s. xv), fol. 24-29v [ascrib.]

« Vat. lat. 3066 (s. xv), fol. 50v-52ra [ascrib.]

4) *Tractatus insolubilium*

Inc.: "Quia a pluribus queratur facilius invenitur maxime [*sic*] si humilitas et concordia..."

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2154 (s. xv), fol. 22va-24ra [ascrib.]

4. BREDON, SIMON

Biogr. Merton College Fellow in 1330 (Mert. Rec. 3660) and still in 1341 (Mert. Rec. 3712). Canon of Chichester by papal provision May 9, 1348. Died in 1372, having made his will at Battle Abbey, Sussex, dated Oct. 12, 1368; the will was proved on April 18, 1372 (Will published by F. M. Powicke, *The Medieval Books of Merton College*, Oxford 1931, 82-86). See Emden 1, 257-8.

Works

1) *Arsmetrica continens sententiam arsmetricae Boecii*

Inc.: "Quantitatum alia continua, que magnitudo dicitur, alia discreta, que multitudo seu numerus nuncupatur..."

Expl.: "... geometricalis proportio inter secundum et tertium terminum repperitur. Explicit Ars Metrica Bredon."

Cambridge, Univ. Lib. Ee. III. 61 (s. xv), fol. 92v-101

*Escorial, i. II. 6 (paper 1489), fol. 63-70 [ascrib. to Bradwardine]

2) *Arithmetica theoricā et practica*

Inc. prol.: "Scientia de numero ac virtute numeri..."

Inc. pars I: "Numerus quem pro presenti..."

Oxford, Bodl. 465 (SC 2459), (s. xv), fol. 18-194v

3) *Expositio super quedam capitula Almagesti Ptholomei*

Inc.: "Nunc superest ostendere quanta sit maxima declinatio ecliptice ab equinoctiali..."

Cambridge, Univ. Lib. Ee. III. 61 (s. xv), fol. 40-44 [imperfect]

4) *Expositio super libro Theorica Planetarum*

Inc.: "Circulus eccentricus et egressus cuspidis et circulo egredientis..."

Oxford, Digby 93 (SC 1694), (s. xv), fol. 37-49v [imperfect]

« Digby 98 (SC 1699), (s. xv), fol. 132-145

*Uncertain*1) *De equationibus planetarum* (to a. d. 1392)

Inc.: "Tempus correspondens an/1392/completus ultimo die decembris 23 secund. et 12 primis annorum/et ultimo die decembris anno 1393, 23 secund. et 13 primis etc. Tabule reductionis annorum extensa ad..."

*Cambridge, Peterhouse 75 (s. xiv), fol. 1-50

5. BUCKINGHAM, THOMAS

Biogr. Merton College Fellow in 1324 (Mert. Rec. 3654) and Master in Arts by 1331 (Cal. Pap. Let., 2, 365). It seems he left Merton in 1340. On March 25, 1346, he became Chancellor of Exeter; at that date he was already a Master in Sacred Theology. He appears to have died by 1356, when a new Chancellor was appointed. See Emden, 1, 298-9.

*Works*1) *Tractatus de infinito tam logice quam philosophie naturali utilis*

Inc.: "Utrum aliquid sit actualiter infinitum..."

Expl.: "... pars esset divisa a toto."

*Erfurt, Amplon. F. 135 (a. d. 1337), fol. 48-59 [according to Schum also ascribed to Guilelmus Collingham in margin]

2) *Questiones theologice* (QQ. 88)

Inc.: "Utrum credere prophetas de aliquo contingenter futuro sit meritorium creature. Primo tractavi de contingentia futurorum ..."

Expl.: "... commorimur et consepelimur Christo."

Oxford, Merton College 143 (membr. xv), fol. 1-84

« New College 134 (membr. xiv), fol. 324-438v

Cf. M. D. Chenu, *Studia Mediaevalia R. J. Martin*, 229-241.

3) *Questiones super libros Sententiarum*

Inc.: "Utrum Deo frui sit summa merces cuiuslibet creature beate. Arguo primo, quod non. Quia tunc quam bona est creature rationali fruitio divina, tam mala esset ei carentia fruitionis divine ..."

Inc.: "Queramus istam questionem in primo libro, viz. ex hoc quod scientia presigit in scito necessario imperfectionem impediat de Deo esse scientiam proprie dictam..."

- *Bruges, de la Ville 192 (a. d. 1374), fol. 45-79v ["Utrum Deo frui..."]
 Florence, Laurenz, Conv. Soppr. 129 (s. xv), fol. 1-47v
 Paris, B. N. lat. 15888 (membr. xiv), fol. 6-64v
 « B. N. lat. 16400 (membr. xiv), fol. 2-109
 *Prague, Univ. 2357, XIII. F. 19 (paper a. d. 1394), fol. 127v-174 ["Utrum intellectus viatoris..."]
 Vatican, Vat. lat. 1089 (membr. xv), fol. 1-107v
 « Pal. lat. 329 (membr. xv), fol. 94-140
 Ed. Paris: J. Barbier 1505. Cf. Stegmüller, RS, 1, n. 899;
 V. Doucet, *Supplément* (Quaracchi 1954), *ibid.*, p. 85.

6. BURLEY, WALTER

Biogr. Born about 1275, probably in Yorkshire. He was already Master of Arts in 1301, and the earliest mention of him as Fellow of Merton College is in the Records of 1305 (Mert. Rec. 3634). Probably lectured in arts at Oxford until his departure for Paris in 1310. Master of Theology of the University of Paris, c. 1320-22. Remained at the University of Paris until early in 1327, when he was appointed envoy of Edward III to the Papal Court at Avignon. Burley received constant encouragement from Richard de Bury, to whom he dedicated numerous works. He was still alive on January 12, 1344. See Emden 1, 312-4; C. H. Lohr, *Traditio*, 24 (1968) 171-187.

Works

1) *Expositio super lib. Porphyri*

- a) Inc.: "Cum sit necessarium grisatorii, etc. Primo querende sunt cause huius libri quia secundum Aristotelem 1^o Phis., tunc arbitramus unumquodque cognoscere quando cognoscimus eius causas..."

Expl.: "... et sic patent difference et conveniencie inter omnia universalia."

Cambridge, St. John's College 100 (membr. early xiv), fol. 47-49vb

- b) Inc.: "Quia de dictis in logica intendo quoddam compendium compilare dicende sunt primo tria circa logicam in communi..."

Expl.: "... et species non continet genus. Comparaciones quinque universalium sunt tantum decem. Differentia est prior quam [*sic*] species quam [*proprium*]. Et hic finitur. Explicit liber

Porphyrii secundum expositionem mag. Walteri Burley doctoris evangelice veritatis."

Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College 139/79 (membr. xiv), pp. 12-42

c-e) See below nn. 5, 6, 7.

2) *Expositio super lib. Predicamentorum*

- a) Inc.: "Equivoca dicuntur, etc. Intencio huius libri est determinare de decem predicamentis cuius subiectum est ens..."

Expl.: "... Alii sunt modi quod est habere, set hii qui sunt dicte sunt magis principalia."

Cambridge, St. John's College 100 (membr. xiv), fol. 49vb-54rb

- b) Inc.: "Equivoca dicuntur, etc. Impossibile est cognoscere totum partibus ignotis. Cum igitur demonstratio, que est finis logici negocii, sit ex propositionibus..."

Expl.: "... set que sit ordinacio istorum predicamentorum et species et genera subalterna, in libro de sex principiis planius apparebit."

Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College 448/409 (membr. xiv), pp. 1-31a [anon.]

« St. John's College 100 (membr. xiv), fol. 55-66v [ascrib.]

« Peterhouse 184 (membr. xv), fol. 171-189v

London, B. M. Royal 12. F. XIX (membr. xiv), fol. 3-13v [second part only]

Vatican, Vat. lat. 3048 (s. xv), fol. 21-88

c-e) See below nn. 5, 6, 7.

3) *Expositio libri sex principiorum*

- a) Inc.: "Forma est compositioni, etc. Iste liber intitulatur de sex principiis. Cum tamen sit de sex predicamentis, genre generalissima sunt principia..."

Expl.: "... fit minus nobile sive in substantiis sive in accidentibus; et oppositio modo est de corruptione. Et in hoc [finitur] liber sex principiorum."

Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College 139/79 (membr. xiv), page 131-153

Vatican, Vat. lat. 9341 (s. xiv-xv), fol. 77-92

- b) Inc.: "Quamvis Aristoteles in libro Predicamentorum sufficienter quantum est de intencione logici determinavit, tamen ut facilius et evidencius habetur cognicio..."

Expl.: "... generatur minus nobile sive in substanciis sive in accidentibus. Et opposito modo est de corruptione. In hac completur intencio Poretani in sex principiis."

Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College 448/409 (membr. xiv)
pp. 57-87b [anon].

« Peterhouse 184 (membr. xv), fol. 156v-171 [ascrib.]
Olean, St. Bonaventure, N. Y., Univ. 2 (paper xv), fol. 1-22ra
[ascrib.]

c) *Expositio vetus*

Inc.: "Iste liber intitulatur de sex principiis. Cum tamen sit de sex predicamentis; genera enim generalissima est sunt principia et sunt predicamenta..."

Expl.: "... et cum aer generatur ex igne, est generacio secundum quid respectiva. Ista satis patent ex 1^o De gen., et hoc finitur liber sex principiorum. Explicit expositio Burley super librum sex principiorum, que dicitur expositio vetus."

London, Lambeth Pal. 70 (membr. xiv), fol. 35-43

« Lambeth Pal. 143 (s. xv), fol. 141-150

d) *Expositio nova*

Inc.: "Quamvis Aristoteles in libro Predicamentorum sufficienter quantum est de intencione logici determinavit, tamen ut facilius et evidencius habeatur cognicio predicamentorum Gilbertus Porretanus hunc librum composuit..."

Expl.: "... et quando ex magis nobili fit minus nobile est generacio secundum quid respectiva. Unde cum ignis generetur ex aere est generacio simplex absoluta; et cum aer generatur ex igne est generacio secundum quid respectiva; ista satis patent ex 1^o De gen. Explicit expositio Burley super librum sex principiorum."

London, Lambeth Pal. 70 (membr. xiv), fol. 43v-55v

e) (written after leaving Paris, i. e., after 1327)

Inc.: "Iste est liber qui intitulatur de sex principiis. Cum tamen sit de sex predicamentis. Genera enim generalissima sunt principia et predicamenta... Et istam opinionem tenui Parisius et eam declaravi in primo tractatu de formis accidentalibus..."

Expl.: "... Unde cum ignis generatur ex aere est generacio simplex absoluta, et cum aer generatur ex igne est generacio secundum quid respectiva."

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2147 (s. xv), fol. 81-102

f-g) See below nn. 6, 7.

4) *Expositio super lib. Peryermenias*

- a)
- Questiones quinque date a mag. Waltero de Burley super librum Peryarmenias a. d. 1301*

Inc.: "Queritur utrum vox primo significet rem..."

Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College 668*/645 (membr. xiv)
fol. 60-76

- b) Inc.: "Primum oportet constituere, etc. Iste liber qui intitulatur liber periarmenias est de interpretatione, quia periarmenias dicitur a peri quod est de et armeneias quod est interpretatio..."

Cambridge, St. John's College 100 (membr. xiv), fol. 54r-54v
[incomplete]

- c) Inc.: "Primum oportet, etc. Cum cognicio sillogismi sit finis logice et cognicio partis precedit cognicionem totius et sillogismus habet partes propinquas et remotas..."

Expl.: "... sunt magis quam que enunciant minus contrario quam illa que enunciant contraria de eadem. Explicit tractatus libri peryarmenias datus a mag. Waltero de Burley."

Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College 448/409 (membr. xiv)
pp. 32-56b« Gonville & Caius College 139/79 (membr. xiv),
pp. 153-164 [incomplete]

« St. John's College 100 (membr. xiv), fol. 67-73rb

London, B. M. Royal 12. F. XIX (membr. xiv), fol. 14-23ra

- d) See below, n. 7.

5) *Expositio in Aristotelis librum Priorem [sic] et Predicam.*

Inc.: "Questio est utrum logica sit necessaria ad alias ciencias..."

Expl.: "... Explicit scriptum libre prior [sic] et Pred. Arist. per mag. Burleum, preclarissimum famosum doctorem in logica necnon in naturali philosophia."

*Padua, Antoniana, Scaff. XVIII. 391 (s. xv), fol. 1-89

6) *Questiones de arte vetere: De universalibus, de predicamentis et de sex principiis*

Inc.: "Circa universalia sunt dubitationes notande..."

Expl.: "... Explicit Burleus super Arte Veteri per me Joannem de Lovanio Alemanno, an. 1448."

*Cambridge, Gonville & Caius 139 (s. xiv), fol 1-11 [inc. mutil.]

- *London, Lambeth 70 (s. xiv), fol. 110-114 [incomplete]
- Padua, Antoniana, XVIII. 402 (s. xv), fol. 1-91
- *Poznan, Bibl. Seminar. 46 (a. 1459), p. 241-251.
- *Wrocław, Bibl. Univ. (fond. de Milich) 4. 9423 (s. xv), fol. 394v-402.

7) *Expositio super artem Veterem, a. d. 1337*

Inc.: "Quia de dictis in logica quoddam compendium intendo compilare... Circa librum predicamentorum est sciendum quod... Quamvis Aristoteles in libro Predicamentorum sufficienter... Liber Peryarmenias quem ad presens intendimus exponere..."

Expl.: "... Istam tamen materiam alibi diffusius pertractavi, et in hoc finitur secundus liber peryarmenias. Completa est hec expositio quinta die mensis Augusti anno domini millesimo CCC^o tricesimo septimo et anno etatis exponentis sexagesima secundo."

Cambridge, Gonville & Caius 139/79 (membr. xiv), fol. 12-131
 Florence, Laurenz, Ashburnh. 171 (a. d. 1443), fol. 1-10 [incompl.]

« Laurenz. Ashburnh. 1145 (a. d. 1458-60), fol. 2-144v

« Laurenz. Plaut. 71, cod. 25 (a. d. 1427), fol. 1-72v

London, Lambeth Palace 70 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-84

« Lambeth Palace 143 (s. xv), fol. 151-185 [Periher.]

« B. M. Royal 12. B. XIX (s. xv), fol. 19-34v [Porph.]

Naples, Naz. Cent. lat. VIII. E. 15 (a. d. 1463), fol. 1-125v

« Naz. Cent. lat. VIII. E. 1 (s. xv), fol. 1-76v [incompl.]

« Naz. Cent. lat. VIII. G. 72 (s. xv), fol. 31-130v

* « Bibl. dell' Oratorio, cod. Pil. XVI, n. X

Oxford, Bodl. 643 (SC 2256), (s. xiv), fol. 1-69

« Canon. Misc. 180 (s. xv), fol. 1-42

« Canon. Misc. 460 (s. xv), fol. 1-109

« Magdalen College 47 (membr. xv), fol. 37v-54 [Porp.]

« Magdalen College 146 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-83

Rome, Angelica 1498 (V. 3. 5), (a. d. 1442), fol. 1-119

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2146 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-87

« Vat. lat. 2147 (s. xv), fol. 1-102v

« Vat. lat. 2148 (s. xv), fol. 1-45v [Periher.]

« Vat. lat. 3048 (s. xv), fol. 1-111v

*Wrocław, Bibl. Univ. IV. Q. 3 (s. xv), fol. 102-111 [Porph.]

*Wrocław, Bibl. Univ. IV. Q. 25 (s. xv), fol. 13-142v

Ed. Venice 1481, 1497, 1519.

8) *Commenta super II Priorum Analyticorum* (? Kilwardby)

Inc.: "Cum omnis scientia erit inquisitiva..."

Expl.: "... quod non est inconueniens."

*Erfurt, Amplon. Q. 276 (a. d. 1295-1333), fol. 63-97v

9) *Expositio super libros duos Posteriorum Analyticorum*

a) Inc.: "Omnis doctrina, etc. Secundum Philosophum in moralibus in quibuscumque actibus nostris accidit rectitudo et peccatum, ideo necessario indigemus arte..."

Expl.: "... et hoc quando statim cognoscitur, quia sic est de omnibus singularibus sicut est de uno singulari. Explicit expositio mag. Walteri de Burley super librum posteriorum Aristotelis." Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College 448/409 (membr. xiv), pp. 117a-171b [anon.]

*Cracow, Bibl. Jagellon. 2229 (s. xv), fol. 114-149v

London, B. M. Royal 12. B. XIX (s. xv), fol. 244-301

« Lambeth Palace 70 (membr. xiv), fol. 149-169

*Wrocław, Bibl. Univ. (fond. de Milich) 13. 7809 (s. xv), fol. 289-314

Ed. Venice: per mag. Otinum Papiensem 1497

b) Uncertain

Inc.: "Omnis cognitio nostra vel est sensitiva vel intellectiva..."

Expl.: "... et hoc patet alibi in isto capitulo."

Ed. Venice 1514, fol. 40v-44v (with comm. of Grosseteste)

c) *Questiones super librum Posteriorum* (10 qq.)

Inc.: "Queritur utrum aliquis posset adquirere aliquam scienciam de novo. Videtur quod non per argumentum illorum qui negabant scientiam..."

Expl.: "... per quod aliquid aliud debet determinari. Explicit questiones super librum posteriorum date a domino Waltero de Burley."

Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College 668*/645 (early xiv), fol. 119v-132v

10) *Expositio super libros Topicorum*

Inc.: "Ut de dicendis in hoc opere cognitio distinctior habetur, distinguam librum istum totalem..."

Expl.: "... sed pocius immediate et hoc planius determinari habet in fine posteriorum. Expliciunt notule octavi libri topicorum Aristotelis."

London, Lambeth Palace 70 (membr. xiv), fol. 170-268va

Oxford, Merton College 295 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-92 [lib. I-VII]
 Vatican, Vat. lat. 2146 (membr. xiv), fol. 113-204

*Wrocław, Bibl. Univ. IV. Q. 3 (s. xv), fol. 124-174v

11) *Expositio super librum Elenchorum*

- a) Inc.: "De sophisticis autem elenchis, etc. Modi arguendi sunt duo ut ait Philosophus 1^o Elencorum: unus est secundum dictionem, alius extra dictionem..."

Expl.: "... et eodem modo est hec falsa: omnia que non vident et sunt apta nata videre sunt ceca. Explicit lib. elenchorum W. Burley."

Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College 448/409 (membr. xiv), pp. 95b-115a [Hic explicit quidam tractatus qui vocatur modus arguendi.]

London, Lambeth Palace 70 (membr. xiv), fol. 134vb-144ra

b) *Questiones libri Elenchorum*

Inc.: "De sophisticis autem elenchis etc. Queratur utrum de sillogismo sophistico est sciencia. Quod non..."

Expl.: "... esse nisi inter accionem et passionem. Expliciunt questiones date super librum elencorum."

Cambridge, St. John's College 100 (membr. early xiv), fol. 153-162va

12) *Suppositiones*

Inc.: "Eorum que dicuntur, quedam dicuntur cum complexione et quedam dicuntur sine complexione..."

Expl.: "... ideo non valet quia arguit a pluribus determinatis ad unum determinatum. Expliciunt suppositiones date a mag. W. de Boursl[ey]."

Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College 434/434 (membr. xiv), fol. 13-19

London, B. M. Royal 12. F. XIX (membr. xiv), fol. 130-133v

13) *De puritate artis logicae*

- a) shorter and earlier version:

Inc.: "Ut iuvenes in quolibet problemate disputantes possint esse exercitati et velociter obviantes..."

Expl.: "... possunt categorematiche vel syncategorematiche accipi. Explicit burleus minor."

*Los Angeles, Hoose Library 6 (s. xiv), fol. 77-88

Vatican, Vat. lat. 3066 (a. d. 1347-49), fol. 26-33v

Ed. P. Boehner, Olean, St. Bonaventure, N. Y. 1955

b) longer version, after 1324:

Inc.: "Suppositis significatis terminorum incomplexorum, in hoc tractatu intendo perscrutari..."

Expl.: "... eodem modo est syllogizandum hic, sicut in simplicibus categoricis de inesse."

*Bruges, de la Ville 501 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-69v

*Erfurt, Amplon. F. 120 (s. xiv), fol. 74-98v

* « Amplon. Q. 259 (a. d. 1340), fol. 159-208

* « Amplon. Q. 291 (s. xiv), fol. 51-64v

* « Amplon. O. 67 (a. d. 1329), fol. 123v-134 [extracts]
Florence, Laurenz. S. Croce, Plut. XII, sin. cod. 2 (membr. xiv), fol. 167-203

London, Lambeth Palace 70 (membr. xiv), fol. 85-109v

Munich, Clm. 1060 (a. d. 1347), fol. 97v-130v

Paris, B. N. lat. 16130 (s. xiv), fol. 80-110v

*Treviso, Bibl. Comm. 377 (membr. xv), fol. 97-121v [mutil. at end; AL, 1078]

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2146 (a. d. 1397), fol. 204v-234v

« Vat. lat. 3066 (a. d. 1349), fol. 34-50

Vienna, Dominikanerkloster 160/130 (member. xiv), fol. 61-74v

*Venice, S. Marco lat. 261 (s. xiv), fol. 31-44

Ed. P. Boehner, Olean, St. Bonaventure, N. Y. 1955

14) *Notabilia de logicis*. See. A. Maier, *Ausgehendes Mittelalter* I, 230-234.i) *Tractatus de relativis*

Inc.: "Circa relativa est sciendum quod relativum est duplex in genere, scilicet relativum grammaticale et relativum logicum seu reale..."

Expl.: "... prout descendit ab hoc adiectivo hic et hec animalis et hoc animale."

London, Lambeth Palace 70 (membr. xiv), fol. 114ra-115ra

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2146 (membr. xiv), fol. 248-249

ii) *Tractatus de abstractis*

Inc.: "Sed dubium est quid huiusmodi abstracta humanitas et animalitas significant, utrum formam tantum vel aggregatum..."

Expl.: "... ponentes quod affirmatio eiusdem de se est necessaria."

London, Lambeth Palace 70 (membr. xiv), fol. 115ra-rb

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2146 (membr. xiv), fol. 249r-v

iii) *De divisione entis*

Inc.: "Circa divisionem entis per se in decem predicamenta..."

Expl.: "... et sic antichristus dicitur esse nichil, eodem modo est de non ente."

London, Lambeth Pal. 70 (membr. xiv), fol. 115va-116ra

« Lambeth Pal. 143 (s. xiv), fol. 139r-v

Oxford, All Souls College 85 (membr. 1428), fol. 131-132

« Bodl. Add. A. 370 (s. xv), fol. 173-175

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2146 (membr. xiv), fol. 249v-250

Ed. H. Shapiro, *Manuscripta* 7 (1963), 105-108.

iv) *De finito et infinito*

Inc.: "Circa finitum et infinitum est sciendum quod finitum et infinitum quantitati conveniunt..."

Expl.: "... iste terminus infinita potest teneri categorice vel sinca-
tegorice."

London, Lambeth Pal. 70 (membr. xiv), fol. 116va-vb

Oxford, All Souls College 85 (membr. 1428), fol. 171rb-va

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2146 (membr. xiv), fol. 250v

v) *De toto et parte*

Inc.: "Intelligendum quod pars et totum multipliciter accipiuntur.
Pars enim accipitur pro partibus essencialibus..."

Expl.: "... nisi corrupto subiecto, nec falsa nisi manente subiecto."

London, Lambeth Pal. 70 (membr. xiv), fol. 116ra-va

Oxford, All Souls College 85 (membr. xv), fol. 169r-v

« Bodl. Add. A. 370 (s. xv), fol. 175-176

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2146 (membr. xiv), fol. 250r-v

vi) *Tractatus de sensibus*

Inc.: "Nota quod in homine sunt quinque sensus interiores sicut
exteriores..."

Expl.: "... causantium illas qualitates et econtra experimentum."

Cambridge, Univ. lib. Hh. IV. 13 (s. xv), fol. 58v-60

London, Lambeth Pal. 70 (membr. xiv), fol. 116vb-117vb

« Lambeth Pal. 143 (s. xiv), fol. 139v-140v

« B. M. Royal 12. B. XIX (s.xv), fol. 301v-304

Oxford, Oriel College 15 (membr. xv), fol. 97v-99

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2146 (membr. xiv), fol. 246-247

« Vat. lat. 2151 (membr. xv), fol. 117-119

vii) *De duobus primis principiis*

Inc.: "Notandum quod tantum sunt duo principia prima substance
secundum rem, scilicet materia et forma..."

Expl.: "... per operationem artis applicantis artificialiter partes domus ad invicem."

London, Lambeth Pal. 70 (membr. xiv), fol. 117vb-118ra

« Lambeth Pal. 143 (s. xv), fol. 150va-b

Oxford, All Souls College 85 (membr. xv), fol. 169vb-171rb

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2146 (membr. xiv), fol. 247r-v

Ed. H. Shapiro, *Manuscripta* 6 (1962), 96-98.

viii) *De qualitatibus*

Inc.: "Sciendum quod quatuor sunt species qualitatis..."

Expl.: "... iracundia ex aliquo displicibili, et ita de aliis."

London, Lambeth Pal. 70 (membr. xiv), fol. 118va-119rb

Oxford, Bodl. Add. A. 370 (s. xv), fol. 171v-173

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2146 (membr. xiv), fol. 245r-v

Ed. H. & C. Shapiro, *Franziskanische Studien*, 45 (1963), 257-260.

ix) *De tribus in toto universo per se agentibus*

Inc.: "Notandum est quod in universo tria sunt agencia per se, scilicet Deus, natura et ars..."

Expl.: "... per operationem artis applicantis artificialiter partes domus adinvicem."

London, Lambeth Pal. 70 (membr. xiv), fol. 118ra-va

Oxford, All Souls College 85 (membr. xv), fol. 170va-171rb

« Bodl. Add. A. 370 (s. xv), fol. 168-169v

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2146 (membr. xiv), fol. 247va-248ra

Ed. H. Shapiro, *Medievalia et Humanistica*, 15 (1963) 88-90.

x) *De divisione potentie in activam et passivam*

Inc.: "Sciendum quod duplex est potencia, scilicet activa et passiva. Et ponatur..."

Expl.: "... passo super quod dominatur de necessitate agit."

London, Lambeth Pal. 70 (membr. xiv), fol. 119rb-va

Oxford, Bodl. Add. A. 370 (s. xv), fol. 176v-177

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2146 (membr. xiv), fol. 245v-246

Ed. H. Shapiro & F. Scott, *Modern Schoolman*, 43 (1966) 180-182

xi) *De diffinitione sive de modo diffiniendi*

Inc.: "Sciendum quod duplex est modus diffiniendi, scilicet compositionis et divisionis..."

Expl.: "... sed loco istius ponitur eius diffinicio."

London, Lambeth Pal. 70 (membr. xiv), fol. 119va-vb

Naples, Bibl. Naz. VIII. F. 10 (a. d. 1426), fol. 96v-106v

Oxford, Magdalen College 146 (membr. xiv), fol. 46v-49

« Bodl. Add. A. 370 (s. xv), fol. 170-171

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2146 (membr. xiv), fol. 244v-245
Ed. H. Shapiro & F. Scott, *Med. Studies*, 27 (1965), 337-340.

15) *De probationibus*

Inc.: "Quoniam innata est nobis via a communibus..."

Expl.: "... sed totum ratione partis."

*Erfurt, Amplon. Q. 276 (a. d. 1295-1333), fol. 6-19v

16) *De exclusivis*

Inc.: "Circa diccionem exclusivas est sciendum quod dicio exclusiva addita subiecto removet predicatum ab apposis subiecti..."

Expl.: "... aliud quam Plato ex quo non sequitur quod Sortes non differe a Cathone. Expliciunt exclusive mag. W. de Burleye."

London, B. M. Royal 12. F. XIX (membr. xiv), fol. 123-126

17) *De exceptivis*

Inc.: "Hoc signum 'preter' aliquando tenetur exceptive, aliquando diminutive..."

Expl.: "... sed subiectum in comparacione ad actum ideo non oportet consequenciam valere. Expliciunt exceptive mag. W. de Burl."

London, B. M. Royal 12. F. XIX (membr. xiv), fol. 126v-129v

18) *De syncategorematibus*

Inc.: "Queritur de obliquis utrum possit fieri syllogismus..."

Expl.: "... consequentias necessarias, licet non syllogizatis."

*Erfurt, Amplon. Q. 276 (s. xiv), fol. 19v-21v

19) *De consequentiis*

a) Inc.: "Quia in sophismatibus probandis et improbandis consequentiis utimur, et ideo circa natura consequentiarum multa oportet scire..."

Expl.: "... non fit una obiectio tantum [sed] plures diverse.

Expliciunt consequentie edite a mag. Gualtero de burley."

Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College 434/434 (membr. xiv). fol. 1-10

Florence, Laurenz. Plut. XII, sin. cod. 2 (membr. xiv), fol. 203v-212

b) Inc.: "Consequentiarum quedam simplex quedam ut nunc. Consequentia simplex est illa que tenet pro omni..."

Expl.: "... quia substantia predicatur de homine, et ideo hec est vera, homo est species. Et sic est finis. Expliciunt consequencie a ven. arcium doc. mag. Burley composite."

Vatican, Vat. lat. 3065 (s. xv), fol. 39vb-43rb

20) *De obligationibus*

- a) Inc.: "In disputatione dialectica due sunt partes, scilicet opponens et respondens. Opus autem opponentis..."

Expl.: "... dummodo non fit una obiectio tantum, sed plures et diverse. Explicit optimus tractatus de obligationibus datus a mag. Waltero de Burley anno domini Millesimo trecentesimo secundo."

London, B. M. Royal 12. F. XIX (membr. xiv), fol. 138-148
Venice, S. Marco, Z. lat. 301 (1576), (s. xiv), fol. 47-57v

- b) Inc.: "Obligacio secundum quod nos utimur hoc nomine in sophismatibus est prefixio..."

Expl.: "... ad omnia enim respondendum est dubie. Expliciunt obligationes date a mag. Galtero Burley."

*Erfurt, Amplon. Q. 259 (a. d. 1340), fol. 209-214v

Paris, B. N. lat. 16130 (membr. xiv), fol. 110v-114

Venice, S. Marco, Z. lat. 302 (1873), (s. xiv), fol. 151-240

- c) Inc.: "Cum ars obligatoria sit..."

Expl.: "... tu es Rome. Explicit obligationes."

*Erfurt, Amplon. O. 76 (s. xiv), fol. 34v-36

21) *De insolubilibus*

Inc.: "Circa insolubilia queritur duo: primo circa insolubile simplex, secundo circa insolubile compositum..."

Expl.: "... sed sufficit veritas huius partis et sic de insolubilibus dicta sufficiant. Expliciunt insolubilia mag. Waltheri Wurley, Anglici."

London, B. M. Royal 12. F. XIX (membr. xiv), fol. 133v-138

Paris, B. N. lat. 16621 (s. xiv), fol. 243-247v [Expliciunt sophismata insolubilia mag. Galtheri de Burley anglici mag. in theologia.]

Vienna, Dominikanerkloster 160/130 (membr. xiv), fol. 60r-v and 125va-126vb

22) *De sophismatibus cum sua sophisteria*

Inc.: "Circa signa universalialia quatuor proponimus inquirere..."

Expl.: "... in se duo contradictione opposita."

*Erfurt, Amplon. Q. 276 (s. xiv), fol. 22-62

*Rome, S. Isidoro 1/10, fol. 2 ff. [ascr. "Bonaventura"]

Venice, S. Marco, Z. lat. 302 (1873), fol. 1-50 [Burley, "Flores totius logice"]

Ed. S. Bonaventurae, *Opera Omnia*, Bassani 1767, col. 467 ff.

23) *Tractatus de universalibus realibus*

Inc.: "Circa universalia sunt dubitationes non paucae. Prima utrum universalia existant in rerum natura..."

Expl.: "...representantem chimeram."

Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College 139/79 (membr. xiv),
fol. 1-11 [begin. imperfect]

London, Lambeth Palace 70 (membr. xiv), fol. 110-113v

Naples, Bibl. Naz. lat. VIII. E. 1 (s. xv), fol. 11v-16

Oxford, Bodl. Add. A. 370 (SC 29621), (s. xv), fol. 207-216v

* « Univ. College 120 (membr. xiv)

« Magdalen College 146 (membr. xiv), fol. 43-46v

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2151 (s. xv), fol. 119-126v

« Vat. lat. 3048 (s. xv), fol. 121-130

Vienna, Dominikanerkloster 14/14 (s. xiv), fol. 40-46

Ed. Venice 1492-3 [GW 5770]

24) *Expositio librorum Physicorum*

a) early version before 1316:

Inc.: "Quoniam autem intelligere, etc. Iste liber habet duas partes..."

Expl.: "...nec in corpore, sed etiam indivisibilis et impartibilis, nullam habens magnitudinem. Explicit expositio omnium librorum physicorum edita a mag. Waltero de Burley cum questionibus optime disputatis."

Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College 448/409 (membr. xiv),
pp. 172-543b

« St. John's College 100 (membr. xiv), fol. 76-85v
[frag. from lib. V, comm. 9 = Caius Coll. MS,
pp. 361a-376b]

b) final version, begun after 1324:

Inc.: "Quoniam quidem intelligere, etc. Aristoteles determinaturus de rebus naturalibus..."

Expl.: "...virtutem resistivam mobilem non esset aliqua proportio, et hic finitur expositio super totum librum Physicorum."

Basel, Univ. Bibl. F. II. 30 (membr. xiv), fol. 3 ff.

*Cesena, Bibl. Malatest. S. IX. 3 (s. xiv), fol. 1 ff.

*Erfurt, Amplon. F. 295 (s. xiv), fol. 145 ff. [anon., I-VI]

Florence, Naz. Cent., Conv. Soppr. D. 1. 1362 (a. d. 1364),
fol. 15-147

« Naz. Cent., Conv. Soppr. A. 1. 1361 (a. d. 1465), fol.
1-228v

- London, Lambeth Pal. 70 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-53va [qq. extracted from comm.]
- Naples, Bibl. Naz. VIII. E. 35 (s. xv), fol. 1-175v [incomplete]
- « Bibl. Naz. VIII. E. 47 (a. d. 1446), fol. 1-303v
- *New York, Plimpton Libr. 19 (a. d. 1400), fol. 1-235 [incomplete]
- Oxford, All Souls College 86 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-199
- « Balliol College 91 (membr. xiv), fol. 5-246
- Padua, Antoniana, XVI, n. 365 (a. d. 1447), fol. 1-244
- « Antoniana, XVI, n. 369 (s. xv), fol. 1-263
- * « Antoniana, XVI, n. 391 (s. xv)
- Paris, B. N. lat. 6528 (s. xv)
- Rome, Angelica 226 (C. 2. 3), (a. d. 1442), fol. 1-174 [lib. I-IV]
- « Casanatense 267 (s. xiv), fol. 86-89 [frag. lib. III]
- *Seville, Columbina 5. 1. 13 [dubia super libros *Physicorum*]
- Vatican, Vat. lat. 2149 (s. xiv), fol. 1-122 [first 6 bks.]
- « Vat. lat. 2150 (s. xiv), fol. 1-223 [incomplete at beginning of bk. VII]
- « Vat. lat. 4591 (a. d. 1411), fol. 1 ff.
- *Venice, S. Marco, Z. lat. 255 (s. xv), fol. 1-325
- Vienna, Nat. Bibl. lat. 5267 (s. xv), fol. 1-311
- Ed. Venice 1482, 1491, 1501
- c) *Questiones super libros Physicorum* (1324)
- *Basel, Univ. Bibl. F. V. 12 [incompl. cf. S. H. Thomson, *Mitt. Inst. Öster. Gesch.* 62 (1954), 390-405]
- d) *Sententia super libris Physicorum*
- Inc.: "Philosophia secundum definitionem vocis sic definitur..."
- Expl.: "... ens ipsum est motor efficiens."
- *Erfurt, Amplon. Q. 312 (before 1323), fol. 1-14
- e) *Quaedam quaestiones naturales*
- Inc.: "Prima questio est super hoc quod dicit Aristoteles in lib. Posteriorum quod questio quia est..."
- Expl.: "... per hoc quod videtur, idest per formam."
- *Erfurt, Amplon. Q. 290 (s. xiv), fol. 57-62
- 25) *Questio de duratione*
- Inc.: "Utrum per alicam potenciam alica creatura possit durare per solum instans. Et arguitur quod non primo sic: quia inter adquisicionem et deperdicionem..."

Expl.: "... Ad decimum dico ad minorem quod res in potencia de potencia obiectiva habet esse eternum, sed non de potencia subiectiva, et sic non valet. Explicit questio Galterie burley."
Rome, Casanatense 267 (s. xiv), fol. 89-91v

26) *De principiis naturalibus*

Inc.: "Sicut fructus est ultimum quod expectatur de arbore..."

Expl.: "... et ideo in talibus dictus quod est processus in infinitum. Explicit tractatus m. Walteri Burley de principiis naturalibus."

*Madrid, Bibl. de Palacio 2092, fol. 190-194v

*Munich, Clm 3548

Oxford, Balliol College 93 (membr. xiv), fol. 7-11

* « Bodl. Digby 172 (SC 1725)

27) *Expositio de Celo et Mundo*

Incl.: "In hoc libro qui dicitur de celo et mundo sunt quedam communia scienda..."

Expl.: "... quam corpus resistens, tunc corpus resistens dividitur et fit motus deorsum. Explicit expositio W. Burley super libros de celo et mundo."

London, Lambeth Palace 74 (membr. 1390), fol. 110-151v
[anon.]

Oxford, All Souls College 86 (membr. xiv), fol. 222v-256

« Magdalen College 63 (membr. xv), fol. 2-58 [imperf.
at end]

« St. John's College 113 (membr. xiv), fol. 62-120v
[anon.]

28) *Expositio super de Generatione et Corruptione*

a) Inc.: "In prohemio huius libri proponit Philosophus suam intencionem, dicens quod intendit in hoc libro determinare causas universales..."

Expl.: "... nam quod est corruptum non redit idem in numero. Et in hoc terminatur liber de gen. Explicit expositio Walteri Burley super de gen. et corrup."

Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College 448 (s. xiv-xv), fol. 544-555 [anon. incompl.]

London, Lambeth Palace 74 (membr. 1390), fol. 9-30ra [anon.]

Oxford, All Souls College 86 (membr. xiv), fol. 199v-212

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2151 (s. xiv), fol. 149-171

b) Inc.: "De generatione autem et corruptione, etc. Inquirat in hoc libro de generabili in communi..."

Expl.: "... tetigit hoc quod est motivum."

*Erfurt, Amplon. Q. 312 (before 1323), fol. 14-20v

29) *Expositio super Metheorum libros quatuor brevissime*

Inc.: "De primis ergo causis, etc. Liber metheorum dicitur quasi liber metheorum logicorum. Et dicitur..."

Expl.: "... formam alicuius rei tunc scimus principia eius et motum per Aristotelem. Explicit expositio m. Walteri Burley super 4 libros metheorum secundum litteram brevis et utilis."

Cambridge, Trinity College 1109 (membr. xiv), fol. 395-411

London, Gray's Inn 2 (s. xiv), fol. 172-176v

Oxford, Balliol College 93 (membr. xiv), fol. 91v-96

« Digby 98 (s. xv), fol. 49-61v

« Bodl. Add. A. 370 (s. xv), fol. 191-203

30) *Tractatus de planetis et eorum virtute*

Inc.: "Sciendum si quis nascatur in aliqua hora diei in qua..."

Expl.: "... si fecerit prima digna a bono divino, suscipiet scilicet vitam eternam. Explicit tract. de planetis et eorum virtute."

London, Lambeth Pal. 70 (membr. xiv), fol. 147vb-148va

[anon.]

« Lambeth Pal. 74 (membr. 1390), fol. 8va-b [anon.]

31) *Problemata Aristotelis*

Prol.: "Felix qui poterit causas, etc. Felicitas quandoque sive beatitudo est summum bonum..."

Inc. expos.: "Abstinencia: quare labor et abstinencia sunt salubres..."

Expl.: "... Zephirus, vere ventus. Expliciunt abbreviatio libri problematum Aristotelis secundum ordinem alphabeti laborata per Walterum Burley, doctorem in theologia, Universitatis Oxon."

Oxford, Digby 206 (s. xiv), fol. 96-129

« Magdalen College 65 (s. xv), fol. 1-58

32) *Expositio librorum De Anima*

a) Inc.: "In prohemio primo probat necessitatem sciencie de anima..."

Expl.: "... scilicet vegetabilem et sensibilem."

*Erfurt, Amplon. Q. 312 (before 1323), fol. 20v-28

b) *Questiones super III De anima*

Inc.: "Queritur utrum anima sit substantia simplex vel composita. Et videtur composita..."

Expl.: ...quod ordinat aliquod ad opus hic actio vel operacio."
 Cambridge, Gonville & Caius 668*/645 (membr. early xiv),
 fol. 150-173 [first two books ascr. to 'mag. Adam de burely'
 in upper margin (cf. Emden 1, 311); third to 'Walterus
 de Burley']

c) *Expositio*

Inc.: "Bonorum honorabilium, etc. Sicut dicit Themistius primo
 huius, que sunt perfecciora..."

Expl.: "... qui faciunt alimentum dulce vel amarum. Explicit ex-
 positio super libros de anima secundum mag. Walterum de
 Burley."

London, Lambeth Pal. 74 (membr. 1390), fol. 33-109v

« Lambeth Pal. 143 (s. xv), fol. 76-138

Oxford, Balliol College 92 (membr. xiv), fol. 9-200

« Oriel College 12 (membr. xv), fol. 2-69v

« Magdalen College 146 (membr. xiv), fol. 123-130
 [imperf.]

Vatican, Ottobon. lat. 2165 (membr. xiv), fol. 48v-63v

« Vat. lat. 2151 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-88

33) *Tractatus de potentiis animae*

Inc.: "Ut dicit Philosophus 2^o de anima, potenciarum anime quibus-
 dam animatis..."

Expl.: "... appetitus sensitivus in irrascibilem et concupiscibilem. Ex-
 plicit tractatus de potentiis anime compilatus ab eximio doc-
 tore mag. Galtero Burleo."

Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College 668*/645 (membr. xiv),
 fol. 13v-18v ['notabilia']

« University Libr. Dd. 12. 46 (s. xv), fol. 149-168

*Durham, Bibl. Cathed. V. II. 5 (item 7; cat. p. 146)

Florence, Laurenz. Plut 83, cod. 29 (s. xv), fol. 9-20

London, Lambeth Pal. 70 (membr. xiv), fol. 120r-124rb

« Lambeth Pal. 74 (membr. 1391), fol. 190-197 ['no-
 tabilia']

« B. M. Royal 12. B. XIX (s. xv), fol. 46-55v

* « B. M. Add. 18630 (s. xv), fol. 76-84

*Munich, Clm. 8950 (s. xv), fol. 292-310

« Clm. 19680 (a. d. 1376), fol. 169-181

* « Clm. 26889 (s. xv), fol. 1-20

*Naples, Bibl. Naz. lat. VII. D. 4 (s. xv), fol. 135-144

« Bibl. Naz. lat. VIII. F. 10 (a. d. 1426), fol. 80v-96

- Oxford, All Souls College 85 (membr. 1428), fol. 87-95
 « All Souls College 87 (a. d. 1473), fol. 222-236 [anon.]
 « Balliol College 93 (membr. xiv), fol. 3-6v [mutil.]
 « Corpus Christi College 293 (membr. xiv), fol. 110-128
 « Magdalen College 47 (membr. xv), fol. 54v-67
 « Magdalen College 146 (membr. xiv), fol. 107-112
 « Bodl. Add. A. 370 (s. xv), fol. 177-190
 * « Canon. Misc. 104 (s. xv), fol. 117-126
 * « Digby 104 (s. xv), fol. 104-109
 * « Digby 172 (s. xv), fol. 1-6
 * « Rawl. C. 677 (a. d. 1428), fol. 159-166
 * Perugia, Bibl. Comm. 580 (a. d. 1450), fol. 65-74
 Vatican, Vat. lat. 901 (membr. xiv), fol. 163-168v
 « Vat. lat. 2146 (membr. xiv), fol. 252v-256v
 « Vat. lat. 2151 (s. xv), fol. 252v-256v
 * « Borghese 431, fol. 101v-107
 * « Ottob. lat. 1816, fol. 17-21
 * « Urb. lat. 218 (s. xv), fol. 246-252
 Venice, S. Marco, lat. VI. 160 (2816) (a. d. 1443), fol. 67-73
 Worcester, Bibl. Cathed. F. 86 (s. xv), fol. 1-8v

34) *Expositio de sensu et sensato*

Inc.: "Sciencia de anima in tres partes..."

Expl.: "... Explicit tractatus libri de sensu et sensato datus a mag. Waltero Burley."

London, Lambeth Pal. 74 (membr. 1390), fol. 175-184vb

Oxford, Magdalen College 146 (membr. xiv), fol. 95-99

« Oriel College 12 (membr. xv), fol. 86v-97v

35) *Expositio de memoria et reminiscencia*

Inc.: "In prohemio huius libri qui durat ibi usque..."

Expl.: "... propter hoc de facili amittat eas, et in hoc terminat. Explicit expositio mag. Walteri Burley de mem. et reminiscencia."

London, Lambeth Pal. 74 (membr. 1390), fol. 185-189v

Oxford, Magdalen College 80 (membr. xiv), fol. 63v-68

« Magdalen College 146 (membr. xiv), fol. 112v-117

36) *Expositio de somno et vigilia*

Inc.: "Intencio philosophi in hoc libro..."

Expl.: "... et hic finis est libri qui dicitur liber de sompno et vigilia secundum mag. Walterum de Burley."

- London, Lambeth Pal. 74 (membr. 1390), fol. 158-174
 Oxford, All Souls 86 (membr. xiv), fol. 212-222v
 « Magdalen College 146 (membr. xiv). fol. 83-95
 « Oriel College (membr. xv), fol. 69v-86v

37) *Expositio de longitudine et brevitate vitae*

Inc.: "Intencio Philosophi in hoc tractatu est determinare de causis longitudinis et brevitatis vite..."

Expl.: "... secundum speciem longitudinis vite in aliis viventibus. Explicit expositio."

- London, Lambeth Pal. 74 (membr. 1390), fol. 152-158
 Oxford, Magdalen College 80 (membr. xiv), fol. 180v-185
 « Magdalen College 146 (membr. xiv), fol. 117v-123
 « Oriel College 12 (membr. xv), fol. 109-115 [anon.]

38) *Expositio de motu animalium*

Inc.: "De motu autem, etc. Secundum Philosophum 3^o Phys., volentem considerare de natura necesse est considerare de motu..."

Expl.: "... in uno tempore et non in alio. Postea recapitulant, ut patet. In hoc finitur liber. Explicit liber de motu animalium W. Burley."

- London, Lambeth Pal. 70 (membr. xiv), fol. 144rb-147vb
 « Lambeth Pal. 74 (membr. 1390), fol. 30rb-32v [incomplete]
 Oxford, Magdalen College 80 (membr. xiv), fol. 177v-180v
 « Oriel College 12 (membr. xv), fol. 115-119 [anon. and incomplete]

39) *Expositio super Averrois De substantia orbis*

Inc.: "Prohemium huius libri continet duas partes..."

Expl.: "... corporis celestis cum habitudine ad motorem primum. Explicit expositio de substantia orbis."

- London, Lambeth Pal. 74 (membr. 1390), fol. 1v-8 [anon.]
 Oxford, Oriel College 12 (membr. xv), fol. 199-109 [anon.]

40) *Expositio et quaestiones super Metaphysicam Arist.*

Inc.: "Incipit questio metaph. Liceat nobis parumper dissesere de quadam propositione quam dicit Arist. in veteri philosophia..."

Expl.: "... expresse significant oppositionem. Explicit questio super librum prime philosophie."

*Erfurt, Amplon. Q. 290 (s. xiv). fol. 1-40v

- 41) *Divisiones et sententiae summarie super Metaph.*
 Inc.: "Quoniam temporis interrupcione..."
 Expl.: "... inquantum substantia est."
 *Erfurt, Amplon. Q. 290 (s. xiv), fol. 46-56v
- 42) *Tractatus de formis* (against Ockham)
 Inc.: "Notandum quod materia prima est materia remotissima respectu cuiuscumque compositi ex ea..."
 Expl.: "... que intencio non est directe cognita ab intellectu. Explicit tractatus burley de formis."
 London, Lambeth Pal. 70 (membr. xiv), fol. 125ra-134vb
 Oxford, Bodl. Add. A. 370 (s. xv), fol. 143-166v
 Vatican, Vat. lat. 2146 (membr. xiv), fol. 235-244v
 « Vat. lat. 2151 (membr. xv), fol. 131-148
- 43) *Commentum in lib. Sententiarum* (lost)
 Inc.: "Cupiens aliquid, etc. In hoc pro[logo]..." [Bale]
- 44) *Tractatus primus: De comparacione specierum*
 Inc.: In prima questione quarti Sentenciarum dixi quedam que aliquibus dubia et aliquibus sophistica videbantur. Ideo ad requisicionem..."
 Expl.: "... et hec de questione ad presens sufficiat. Explicit tractatus de comparacione specierum."
 *Bruges, de la Ville 501 (s. xv), fol. 70-105
 *Erfurt, Amplon. O. 76
 London, B. M. Harley 3243 (membr. xiv), fol. 92-100 [anon.]
 *Leipzig, Univ. Bibl. 529, fol. 127-132
 Rome, Casanatense 267 (s. xiv), fol. 92-117v
 Vatican, Vat. lat. 817 (membr. xiv), fol. 203-223
 « Vat. lat. 2148 (s. xv), fol. 46-54rb
 « Ottobon. lat. 318 (s. xv), fol. 101r-108v
 Venice, S. Marco, lat. VI, 160 (2816), (a. d. 1443), fol. 49-96
 Vienna, Dominikanerkloster 160/130 (membr. xiv), fol. 83-89v
- 45) *Quaestio disputata: utrum contradictio sit maxima oppositio*
 Inc.: "Questio est utrum contradictio sit maxima oppositio, et est quinta questio de numero questio burlei in suo primo tractatu. Et arguo primo ad partem quam credo fore veram, scilicet quod contradictio non sit maxima oppositio..."
 Expl. "... illa que in multo conveniunt, quare etc."
 Vatican, Vat. lat. 2148 (s. xiv-xv), fol. 54-65
 « Ottobon. lat. 318 (s. xv), fol. 141vb-145vb

Ed. Ryszard Palacz, *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum*, 11 (1963), 128-139.

46) *Tractatus secundus: De intentione et remissione formarum*

Inc.: "In hoc tractatu secundo intendo perscrutari de causa intrinseca susceptionis magis et minus..."

Expl.: "... veritati fidei christiane."

*Bruges, de la Ville, 501 (s. xv), fol. 111-158v

Munich, Clm. 4377 (s. xv), fol. 153v-160v

Rome, Casanatense 267 (s. xiv), fol. 61-86

Vatican, Vat. lat. 817 (membr. xiv), fol. 227-257v

« Vat. lat. 2148 (s. xv), fol. 57-70v

« Vat. lat. 2185 (membr. xiv), fol. 21-23 [incomplete]

« Vat. lat. 3026 (s. xv), fol. 1-14

Ed. Venice 1496, fol. 2-15v

47) *Quodlibet: De primo et ultimo instanti* (Toulouse; before 1327 and after *Q. de susceptione magis et minus*)

Inc.: "Queritur utrum sit dare primum et ultimum instans rei permanentis sui esse ..."

Expl.: "... est dare ultimum. Et sic patet quid dicendum sit de ista questione secundum burleum."

*Columbia Univ., Plimpton 171 (s. xv), fol. 7-10

Florence, Bibl. Naz. II. IV. 553 (a. d. 1455), fol. 65-67v

Oxford, Canon. Misc. 177 (a. d. 1399), fol. 11-14ra

« Canon. Misc. 506 (s. xv), fol. 452-458

*Paris, B. N. lat. 14514 (s. xiv), fol. 346-349v

« B. N. lat. 16401 (s. xiv), fol. 120-125v

« B. N. lat. 16621 (notebook xiv), fol. 136-142v

Rome, Casanatense 267 (s. xiv), fol. 136-142v

Vatican, Vat. lat. 3026 (s. xiv), fol. 14-16v

« Vat. lat. 3066 (s. xiv), fol. 52v-54

« Chis. E. V. 161 (a. d. 1401), fol. 45-49v

« Ottobon. lat. 381 (s. xv), 34-36

« Vat. lat. 4545 (s. xv), fol. 48v-57v

Ed. Venice 1501, H. & C. Shapiro in *Arch. f. Gesch. der Philosophie* 47 (1965), 159-173.

48) *Expositio librorum Ethicorum*

Inc. ded.: "Reverendo in Christo patri et domino Ricardo divina disponente clementia Dunelmensis sedis episcopo Gualterus de Burley..."

Inc. text.: "Etsi multorum scriptorum in disciplina morali commentarios..."

Inc. Comm.: "Omnis ars et omnis doctrina, etc. Scientia moralis quae est actionibus voluntariis ut dicit Averroes..."

Expl.: "... et ei qui dedit intelligere sint gracie iusticie. Amen."

*Berlin, S. Bibl. lat. Fol. 482 (s. xiv), fol. 1-119

*Bruges, de la Ville 502 (s. xiv), fol. 1-185 [mutil.]

Cambridge, Gonville & Caius 490/486 (membr. xiv), fol. 75-263

« Peterhouse 93 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-102v [first three books missing]

Florence, Laurenz. Fesul. 168 (membr. xiv), fol. 169-238v

Oxford, Balliol College 95 (membr. xv), fol. 2-159 [mutil.]

« Canon. Misc. 251 (a. d. 1424), fol. 1-151

« Magdalen College 205 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-141

« New College 242 (membr. xiv), fol. 2-168

« Oriel College 57 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-208

*Paris, B. N. lat. 6459 (s. xv)

*Vatican, Urbin. lat. 1369

Venice, S. Marco, lat. VI, 88 (2530), (membr. xiv), fol. 1-247

Ed. Venice 1481, 1500.

49) *Expositio super libros Politicorum*

a) *Quaestiones super Politica*

Inc.: "Ut dicit Philosophus Ethicorum quinto... in hoc libro primo sunt novem. Explicit prohemium. Amen. Prima questio est quid est servus..."

Expl.: "... sint gracie infinite. Amen."

Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College 505/383 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-101

b) *Scriptum super libros Politicorum*

Inc. ded. I: "Reverendo in Christo patri et domino suo domino Ricardo ordinatione divina Dunelmensis episcopo..."

Inc. ded. II: "Sanctissimo patri ac domino Clementi supernaque vocatione papae sexto creatura vestra Gualterus de Burley..."

Inc. Comm.: "Quoniam omnem civitatem, etc. Subiectum libri Politicorum est divitas in qua pro materia est multitudo hominum sufficiens ad omnia exercenda..."

Expl.: "... et per consequens facilius attingent ad felicitatem; et in hoc finitur intencio Aristotelis super totum quod translatum est de greco in latinum super librum Politicorum."

- Cambridge, Univ. lib. Ii 2. 8. (membr. xiv), fol. 1-60v
 « Gonville & Caius 490/486 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-74v
 « Peterhouse 93 (membr. xiv), fol. 104v-166
 Florence, Laurenz. Plut. XII, sin. cod. 12 (membr. xiv), fol. 2v-84v
 « Laurenz. Conv. Soppr. 455 (s. xiv-xv), fol. 77-128va [incomplete, ends in lib. 7]
 *Crakow, Bibl. Jagellon. 513 (s. xv), frag. fol. 45-48v, 64v, 74, 81, 82r-v
 * « Bibl. Jagellon. 675 (s. xv), fol. 2-155v [with comm. of Henry of Oyta]
 Oxford, Balliol College 95 (membr. xv), fol. 161-232
 « Balliol College 282 (membr. xiv), fol. 124v-202 [imperf.]
 « Magdalen College 205 (membr. xiv), fol. 141-202v
 « New College 242 (s. xiv), fol. 168-232
 « Oriel College 57 (s. xiv), fol. 208v-310
 Vatican, Borghese 129 (membr. xiv), fol. 1v-148v [with dedication to Clement VI]
 Vienna, Dominikanerkloster 93/57 (s. xiv), fol. 109-192
 *Wrocław, Bibl. Univ. IV. F. 29 (s. xv), fol. 367-383 [extracts]

For further MSS of Burley's commentary on the *Politics* see the D. Phil. Thesis of Conor Martin, Bodl. D. Phil. Thesis Hilary Term 1949, and S. H. Thomson, "Walter Burley's Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle," *Mélanges A. Pelzer* (Louvain, 1947) 564.

50) *De Vitis et Moribus Philosophorum*

Inc.: "De [vita et moribus] philosophorum veterum tractaturus multa que ab antiquis autoribus in diversis libris..."

Expl.: "... Nihil in humanis adinventionibus ex omni parte perfectum."
 Ed. Hermann Knust, Tübingen 1886 (Bibl. d. Litterarischen Vereins in Stuttgart 177). See J. O. Stigall, "The Manuscript Tradition of the *De Vita et Moribus Philosophorum* of Walter Burley," *Medievalia et Humanistica*, 11 (1957), 44-57.

Uncertain

1) *Auctoritates Philosophiae, or Flores Parvi*

Inc.: "Omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant. Sensus visus nobis multas differentias rerum ostendit..."

Expl.: "... Et ibi manebit causa brevitatis pro quo Deus sit benedictus per infinita secula seculorum."

- *Crakow, Bibl. Jagellon. 711 (s. xiv), fol. 48-82v
- * « Bibl. Jagellon. 1453 (s. xv), fol. 394-478
- * « Bibl. Jagellon. 2032 (s. xiv-xv), fol. 384v-441v
- * « Bibl. Jagellon. 2001 (s. xv), fol. 202-270v
- *Wrocław, Bibl. Univ. IV. Q. 51 (paper xiv), fol. 61-109
- * « Bibl. Univ. IV. Q. 55 (paper xv), fol. 243-278

7. CAMPSALE, RICHARD DE

Biogr. Fellow of Balliol College in 1304 (*Balliol Deeds* [O. H. S.] 141, 285), but mentioned as Fellow of Merton College in 1305 (Mert. Rec. 3630) and still in 1326 (Mert. Rec. 3655). He was regent Master in arts ("in artibus apud Oxoniam actualiter regens" *Snappe's Formulary* [O. H. S.], 66) on April 6, 1308; and on October 18, 1322 he is mentioned as "sacre theologie professor" (*ibid.*, 71). He is last mentioned as the Chancellor's Commissary who absolved the Mayor of Oxford on January 10, 1326, from the censure of excommunication. (*Mun. Acad. Oxon.* [R. S.], 1, 114-6). See Emden 1, 344-5.

Works

- 1) *Questiones date a Ricardo de Camsal super librum Priorum Analeticorum* (17 qq. on lib. I-II)
 Inc.: "Queratur utrum sillogismus sit subiectum huius. Quod non videtur quia si sic..."
 Expl.: "... eo quod tunc, nullus discursus in talibus esset regulatus."
 Cambridge, Caius College 668*/645 (membr. xiv) fol. 76-117
 Ed. Edward A. Synan, *The Works of Richard Campsall*, vol. 1, Toronto (PIMS) 1968 [Studies and Texts 17].
- 2) *Logica valde utilis et realis contra Ockham* (after Ockham's *Summa logicae*)
 Inc.: "Domino Jesu, qui est terminus sive termino..."
 Expl.: "... et non convertitur, sicut patet lex contrariorum."
 *Bologna, Bibl. Univ. 2657 (s. xv), fol. 1-99v [fol. 44-45 missing and cap. 63 incompl.]
 Cf. E. Synan, "Richard of Campsall, an English Theologian of the 14th Century," *Mediaeval Studies* 14 (1952), 1-8; *Texts and Studies* 1: *Nine Mediaeval Thinkers* (Toronto, 1955), 183-232.
- 3) *Questiones super tres libros Physicorum* and *Notabilitates breves super omnes libros Physicorum*
 Mentioned in the ancient catalogue of the library of St. Augustine's

Abbey, Canterbury, n. 1423 (fol. 105, col. 2, n. 6, items 12 and 13).
See M. R. James, *Ancient Libraries of Canterbury and Dover*, 362-3.

- 4) *Notabilia quedam mag. Ricardi Camsale pro materia de contingenti et prescien-
cia Dei* (= 16 propositiones)

Inc.: "Accipiat igitur ista propositio de futuris: Antichristus erit.
Ista propositio potest esse falsa..."

Expl.: "... quatuor arguit in Deo, sicut nec in propositione, ut satis
clare patet ex dictis."

London, B. M. Harley 3243 (membr. xiv), fol. 88v

Ed. E. A. Synan, "Sixteen Sayings by Richard of Campsall
on Contingency and Foreknowledge," *Mediaeval Studies* 24
(1962), 257-262.

8. COLLINGHAM, WILLIAM DE

Biogr. Born in the diocese of York. Mentioned as a Fellow of Merton in
1331 (Mert. Rec. 3666). Nominated a Fellow of Queen's College by the
founder in 1341, and was still at Queen's in 1348 (cf. Magrath, 1, 334-8).
See Emden 1, 466.

Works

- 1) *Tractatus de infinito tam logice quam philosophie naturali utilis*

Inc.: "Utrum aliquid sit actualiter infinitum..."

Expl.: "... pars esset divisa a toto."

*Erfurt, Amplon. F. 135 (a. d. 1337), fol. 48-59 [according to
Schum this treatise is ascribed to both Buckingham and
"Guilelmi Collingham"]

- 2) *Due questiones naturales colynham*

Inc.: "Sciendum quod dicit Aristoteles 3^o Metaph. in textu suo..."

Expl.: "... non plus sequitur nisi quod aliquid corporeum et a seipso
per accidens, et isitus proposicionis causa satis fuit superius
declarata. Et sic finitur questio prima magistri Willelmi de
Colingham Oxon."

Inc.: "Textus quem exponere intendo est textus Aristotelis..."

Expl.: "... et sic patet quod argumentum factum in contrarium non
procedit. Et sic finis est questiones Collingham expositione
5a p'p' phisicorum."

Paris, B. N. lat. 6559 (membr. xiv), fol. 133-190v

Mentioned in the catalogue of the ancient library of the Austin Friars

in York, n. 306 F (cf. M. R. James, "The Catalogue of the Library of the Augustinian Friars at York," *Fasciculus Ioanni Willis Clark Dicatus*, [Cambridge, 1909] 48).

9. DUMBLETON, JOHN

Biogr. Dumbleton was born about 1310 in Gloucestershire within the diocese of Worcester. He is noted as a Fellow of Merton College in 1338 (Mert. Rec. 3673) and is still mentioned in 1347-8 (Mert. Rec. 3680). He was named as a Fellow of Queen's College in the founder's statutes of February 10, 1340, at which time Dumbleton must have completed his necessary regency and begun the study of theology. He is again noted as a Fellow of Merton in 1344-45 (Mert. Rec. 3676-7). He seems to have been a Bachelor of Theology at the time of his presumed death in 1349. See Emden 1, 603.

Works

1) *Summa logicae et philosophiae naturalis*

Inc. prol.: "Plurimorum scribencium grati laboris..."

Inc. P. I: "Incipiendum est a primis cum minimus error in principio in fine maxime est causa..."

Expl. P. IX (incompl.): "...procul respicit et a longe."

Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College 499/268 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-162v

« Peterhouse 272 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-111 [ends imperfectly in P. IX, c. 46]

*Dubrovnik-Ragusa, Dominikanerbibliothek 32 (s. xv), fol. 89-200 [cf. *Starine* (Jugoslavenska Akademija Znanosti i Umjetnosti), 28 (Zagreb 1896), p. 4]

London, B. M. Royal 10. B. XIV (membr. xiv), fol. 1-244

« Lambeth Palace 79 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-212r

Munich, Clm 4377 (s. xv), fol. 161-195v [frag.: sect. of P. II-III]

Oxford, Magdalen College 32 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-292

« Magdalen College 195 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-131

« Merton College 279 (membr. xiv), fol. 4-179 [ends imperf. in P. VIII, c. 4]

« Merton College 306 (membr. xiv.), fol. 9-118 [mutil. end P. IX]

Padua, Bibl. Antoniana XVII. 375 (s. xiv-xv), fol. 1-205

Paris, B. N. lat. 16146 (membr. xiv English), fol. 2-141ra

« B. N. lat. 16621 (paper xiv), fol. 117v-123v; 169-180v
[frag. from P. III]

« Universitaire 599 (membr. xiv English), fol. 1-128 [mu-
til. at end of P. IX]

*Prague, Capit. Metropol. 1291 (L. XLVII)

Vatican, Vat. lat. 954 (paper xv), fol. 1-201 [ascr. to Ockham]

« Vat. lat. 6750 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-202

« Pal. lat. 1056 (paper xiv), fol. 1-144 [ends in P.
VIII]

Venice, S. Marco lat. VI. 79 (2552), (membr. xiv), fol. 1-229
[fol. 230-232v = tabula librorum]

Worcester, Bibl. Cathed. F. 6 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-165

« Bibl. Cathed. F. 195 (membr. xiv), fol. 91-126v
[ends in P. III, c. 8]

2) *Expositio capituli quarti Bradwardini De proportionibus*

Inc.: "In hoc compendio intellectum sex conclusionum quarti capituli
tractatus proportionum mag. Thome Bradwardin intendo
brevissime declarare..."

Expl.: "... ad proportionem superficiorum suarum eodem ordine est
sexquialtera, igitur etc. Explicit Dummulton."

Paris, B. N. Nouv. Acq. lat. 625 (membr. xiv), fol. 70v-71v

Uncertain

1) *Liber de insolubilibus, de significatione et suppositione terminorum, de arte
obligatoria, etc.*

Inc.: "De sophismatibus que non re sed nomine insolubilia extant,
superest pertractare..."

Expl.: "... Expliciunt tractatus de diversis insolubilibus, et de signi-
ficatione et suppositione terminorum, et confusione et dis-
tributione eorundem, et de modis signis universalibus et de
arte obligatoria cum aliis incidentibus."

Oxford, Merton College 306 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-7v

10. ESTRY, WILLIAM DE

Biogr. Fellow of Merton College in 1305. He seems to have retained his
Fellowship until 1315, when he became Rector of Stowting, Kent. See
Emden 1, 651.

Works (lost)

- 1) *Lectura magistri W. de Estry super libros phisicorum*

Mentioned in the ancient catalogue of the library of St. Augustine's Abbey, Canterbury, n. 1423 (fol. 105, col. 2, n. 6, item 14). See M. R. James, *Ancient Libraries of Canterbury and Dover*, 362-3.

11. HENNOR, WILLIAM DE

Biogr. Bachelor Fellow of Merton College in 1299 and Fellow by 1301. He is still mentioned in the records for 1305. See Emden, 2, 909.

Works (lost)

- 1) *Lectura brevis magistri W. de hennor' super 9^m a^m et 14^m metaphysice*

Mentioned in the ancient catalogue of the library of St. Augustine's Abbey, Canterbury, n. 1423 (fol. 105, col. 2, n. 6, item 16). See M. R. James, *Ancient Libraries of Canterbury and Dover*, 362-3.

12. HEYTESBURY, WILLIAM

Biogr. Born before 1313, probably in Wiltshire in the Salisbury diocese. He is first mentioned as a Fellow of Merton College in 1330 (Mert. Rec. 3660). In February 1340 he was named one of the foundation Fellows of Queen's College together with Dumbleton. But shortly he returned to Merton. He was a "Doctor in Theology" by July 1348 (*Mun. Acad. Oxon.*, I, 167). Heytesbury may have been Chancellor of the University from 1353 until 1354, and again from Pentecost 1370 until Pentecost 1372. He died in December of 1372 or in January of 1373. See Emden 2, 927-8.

Works

- 1) *Insolubilia*

- a) Inc.: "Iam sequuntur regule de insolubilibus, et primo videndum est quid sit casus..."

Expl.: "... affirmative respondens."

*Erfurt, Amplon. Q. 270 (membr. xiv), fol. 37-42v

Vatican, Vat. lat. 3065 (s. xv), fol. 28-30v [anon., "secundum usum heusonie"]

- b) Inc.: "Insolubile est propositio affirmativa vel negativa aliququaliter esse vel aliququaliter non esse significativa..."

Expl.: "... sic dicendum est ad omnia consimilia. Expliciunt insolubilia valde utilia secundum hetysbery."

Padua, Bibl. Univ. 1123 (membr. xiv), fol. 22vb-24rb

2) *Tractatus consequentiarum*

Inc.: "Iuxta hunc textum tactum in libro Perihermenias de quolibet dicitur affirmacio vel negacio. Ideo quero hanc questionem, utrum aliqua sit consequentia bona et formalis que de se non valet..."

Expl.: "... quia totum antecedens includit contradictionem sicut antecedens, etc. Explicit tractatus 'Iuxta hunc textum' nuncupatur."

Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College 182/215 (s. xv), p. 102-116 [expl.: "... qui sunt quam pro omnibus qui erunt."]

« Corpus Christi College 244/245, (membr. xv), fol. 39v-58v [expl.: "... ad lapidem."]

« Corpus Christi College 378 (s. xv), fol. 82-84v [incompl.]

Padua, Bibl. Univ. 1123 (membr. xiv), fol. 24rb-28vb [anon.]

Rome, Casanatense 85 (a. d. 1410), fol. 13ra-22rb ["Explicit tractatus qui vocatur iuxta hunc testum correctus secundum mag. robertum Alyngton."]

Vatican, Vat. lat. 3065 (s. xv), fol. 76ra-83va [expl.: "... satis evidenter sequitur antecedens esse verum et consequens falsum; quapropter non valet consequentia, ergo, etc."]

Venice, S. Marco, Z. lat. 277 (1728), (c. 1399), fol. 23-33
Ed. Venice 1517, fol. 108v-115v

3) *De propositionibus multiplicibus*

Inc.: "Qui autem nominum virtutis sunt ignari et ipsi disputantes et alios audientes paralogizant de facili, pro elencorum. Cum igitur in disputatione cuiuslibet de vocali significato debeat..."

Expl.: "... Unde et de propositionibus multiplicium significacionibus iam hec dicta ad presens pro iuvenibus informandis sufficiant. Amen. Explicit tractatus Hentisberi de propositionum multiplicium significacione valde raro inventus."

Venice, S. Marco, lat. VI. 160 (2816), (a. d. 1443), fol. 252-253v

4) *De veritate et falsitate propositionis*

Inc.: "Omnis propositio est vera vel falsa..."

Ed. Venice 1494, fol. 183v-188

5) *Casus obligatorii*

Inc.: "Primo ponitur talis casus quod heri videmus: Sortes et nullus alius a Sorte videmus et bene... Secundo ponitur talis casus quod inter duo..."

Expl.: "... Expliciunt casus obligatorii hesberi."

Oxford, Canon. lat. 278 (s. xiv), fol. 70-72

Venice, S. Marco, Z. lat. 310 (1577), (s. xv), fol. 96va-b

6) *De sensu composito et diviso*

Inc.: "Arguendo a sensu composito ad sensum divisum frequenter fallit argumentum, unde non sequitur..."

*Copenhagen, Thott 581 (s. xv), fol. 119-127

Florence, Naz. Cent., Magl. V. 43 (membr. xiv-xv), fol. 38-44v

Oxford, Canon. Misc. 219 (a. d. 1395), fol. 4-6

Rome, Casanatense 85 (s. xv), fol. 32v-36

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2136 (s. xiv), fol. 32v-36

« Vat. lat. 2139 (s. xiv), fol. 155v-175v [with comm.]

« Vat. lat. 2154 (s. xiv-xv), fol. 43-67 [with comm.]

« Vat. lat. 2189 (s. xv), fol. 39v-50 [with comm.]

« Vat. lat. 3038 (s. xv), fol. 15-22

« Vat. lat. 3065 (s. xv), fol. 30vb-34vb ["Expliciunt consequencie compilate a ven. arcium doc. mag. Rodulfo Strode."]

Venice, S. Marco, Z. lat. 277 (1728), (membr. xiv), fol. 12-16

« S. Marco, A. lat. 310 (1577), (s. xv), fol. 48-53

7) *Sophismata XXXII*

a) Inc.: "Omnis homo est omnis homo..."

Expl.: "... set uterque modus loquendi est impossibilia de vi vocis."

Cambridge, Peterhouse 102 (membr. xiv), fol. 141-218 [end imperf.]

*Erfurt, Amplon. Q. 332 (membr. xiv), fol. 3-100v [first sophisma lacking]

Oxford, Trinity College 198 (s. xiv-xv), fol. 1-176

« Canon. lat. 311 (membr. xv), fol. 9-28v, 37-38, 29 [anon.; attr. to Thomas Walleys or Hervei in Catalogue]

« Canon. Misc. 203 (s. xv), fol. 75-99 [selected sophismata with comm.]

Padua, Bibl. Univ. 1123 (membr. xiv), fol. 97-172v

Paris, B. N. lat. 16234 (membr. xiv), fol. 81-146

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2137 (s. xiv), fol. 1-78v [24 sophismata]
 « Vatican, Vat. lat. 2138 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-86
 Venice, S. Marco, Z. lat. 310 (1577), (s. xv), fol. 54-78v
 ["Sex sophismata principalia edita et compilata per mag.
 Guilielmum Hentisberum..."]
 Ed. Venice 1494, fol. 77v-170v [with comm. of Gaetano di
 Thiene]

b) *Epitome Summe Sophismatum Guilelmi Hentisberi completum anno domini
 M^oCCC^o octogesimo octavo in nostro collegio de Mertone*

Inc.: "Adspiciens a longe condicionem iuvenum elegancium suis
 ingeniis tanquam visibus aquelinis..."

Vatican, Vat. lat. 3056 (s. xv), fol. 1-41

Venice, Conv. S. Giovanni e Paoli, cod. 539 (paper xv), fol.
 1-69 ["Expliciunt Sophismata magistri Wilhelmi Hentis-
 beri, scriptum Oxonii anno Domini MCCCCLXXXIII
 post quartum sonum noctis Dominicae primae quadrige-
 simae per fr. Thomam Utinensem Ord. praed."] This
 codex is now lost, but described by D. M. Berardelli, *Co-
 dicum omnium Latinorum et Italicorum qui manuscripti in Biblio-
 theca SS. Joannis et Pauli Venetiarum apud PP. Praedicatores
 asservantur Catalogus*. Nouva Raccolta d'Opuscoli scientifi-
 ci e filologici, t. 38, Venezia 1783, opusc. II, p. 149.

8) *Regulae solvendi sophismata* (a. d. 1335)

Inc. prol.: "Regulas solvendi sophismata non ea que quidem ap-
 parenti contradiccione..."

Inc. cap. 1: "Secundum Philosophum in Predicamentis, cap. 4^o,
 quadratura circuli si est scibilis..."

Inc. cap. 2: "Scire multis modis dicitur, sed sive..."

Inc. cap. 3: "In terminis relativis sophismata multa..."

Inc. cap. 4: "Incipit dupliciter solet exponi..."

Inc. cap. 5: "Circa finem seu terminum tam active potentie..."

Inc. cap. 6: "Tria sunt predicamenta vel genera quorum..."

*Bruges, de la Ville 497 (membr. xiv), fol. 46-59va

* « de la Ville 500 (membr. xiv), fol. 33-71va [c. 2-6]

Erfurt, Amplon. F. 135 (a. d. 1337), fol. 1-17 [om. prol.]

* « Amplon. F. 313 (s. xiv), fol. 192-209 [exc. c. 6]

* « Amplon. Q. 270 (s. xiv), fol. 1-36v [cap. 2-6]

Munich, Clm. 23530 (s. xv), fol. 222v-255 [prol. and cap. 1
 omitted; cap. 5 entitled: "Incipit tractatus de potentia
 activa et passiva, et de latitudine intensiva in motu."]

- Oxford, Canon. Misc. 221 (s. xv), fol. 60-85
 Padua Antoniana, XIX, 407 (s. xv), fol. 26-30v [prol. and cap. 1]
 « Bibl. Univ. 1123 (membr. xiv), fol. 50rb-65v [cap. 2, 4, 5, and 6]
 Vatican, Vat. lat. 2136 (s. xiv), fol. 1-32
 « Vat. lat. 2138 (s. xiv), fol. 89-109v
 « Vat. lat. 2130 (s. xv), fol. 173-177 [cap. 5 with comm.]
 « Vat. lat. 3058 (s. xv), fol. 122-139 [cap. 6 with comm. of Thomas of Udine, O. P.]
 « Chigi E. V. 161 (c. 1401), fol. 63v-70v [cap. 2]
 « Ottobon. lat. 662 (membr. xiv), fol. 121-127v [cap. 5]
 Venice, S. Marco, Z. lat. 310 (1577), (s. xv), fol. 1-3v [prol. and cap. 1]
 « S. Marco, Z. lat. 277 (1728), (a. d. 1399), fol. 17-22 [cap. 5 with comm.]
 « S. Marco, lat. VI. 160 (2816), (a. d. 1443), fol. 255-275 [cap. 6 with comm.]
 * « S. Marco, lat. VIII, 38 (a. d. 1391), fol. 66v-72
 Ed. Venice 1494, fol. 9v-52

9) *De probationibus conclusionum*

Inc. cap. 1: "A est scitum a te et idem A est tibi dubium..."

Inc. cap. 2: "Infinite sunt partes Sortis..."

Inc. cap. 3: "Una propositio que non est plures..."

Inc. cap. 4: "Quod non sit dare maximum quod Sortes..."

Inc. cap. 5: "Aliquis est motus uniformis quoad tempus..."

Florence, Laurenz. Ashb. 171 (a. d. 1440), fol. 13-31ra

Oxford, Canon. Misc. 376 (s. xv), fol. 23-32 [frag.]

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2189 (s. xv), fol. 13v-38

Venice, S. Marco, Z. lat. 277 (1728), (c. 1399), fol. 34-39v
 [anon.; cap. 1 only]

« S. Marco, Z. lat. 277 (1728), (c. 1399), fol. 40-45
 [cap. 2-3 with comm.]

« S. Marco, lat. VIII, 38 (a. d. 1391), fol. 40-54v

Ed. Venice 1494, fol. 188v-203v

10) *Termini Naturales*

Inc.: "Natura est principium motus et quietis in quo est primo per se et non secundum accidens. Istam diffinitionem ponit Philosophus et Commentator in 2^o Phys...."

Expl.: "... cuiusmodi est tabula. Hec complexio terminorum philosophie compilata a mag. Wilhelmo Hesbri."

Florence, Laurenz. Plut. 83, cod. 28 (s. xv), fol. 1-7v

London, B. M. Royal 8. Z. XVIII (membr. xiv), fol. 69v-75 [anon.]

Munich, Clm. 5961 (a. d. 1441), fol. 22-26 ["Expliciunt termini naturales sec. usum Oxonii"]

« Clm. 8997 (s. xiv), fol. 163-167 ["compilata a mag. Wilhelmo Hesbri"]

Naples, Bibl. Naz. VIII. F. 10 (a. d. 1425), fol. 107-114 [anon.]

Oxford, Canon. Misc. 393 (a. d. 1402 Padua), fol. 78-83 [anon.]

« New College 289 (s. xv), fol. 38-50v [with comm. of John Garisdale]

Padua, Bibl. Univ. 1123 (membr. xiv), fol. 36vb-39rb [anon.]

Paris, B. N. lat. 6673 (s. xv), fol. 14-18 [anon.]

Vatican, Vat. lat. 5132 (s. xv), fol. 41-48v [anon.]

Vienna, Dominikanerkloster 93/57 (s. xiv), fol. 99-109v [anon.]

« Nat. Bibl. lat. 4698 (s. xiv), fol. 114v-120v

Worcester, Bibl. Cathed. F. 118 (s. xv), fol. 32rb-35rb

13. MAUDITH, JOHN

Biogr. Born in the diocese of Worcester, he is mentioned as a Fellow of Merton College in 1309 (Mert. Rec. 3636). This Fellowship he seems to have vacated in 1319, but he was granted licence for further study on October 4, 1319, and October 4, 1320 (*Reg. Cobham, Worc.*, Worces. Hist. Soc., 243, 256, 260). He was a member of the 'familia' of Richard de Bury, and was appointed dean of Auckland, Durham, in 1343, a few years before De Bury's death. See Emden 2, 1243-4.

Works

1) *Tabulae Mathematicae* (a. d. 1310)

Inc.: "Quia sciencia astronomie sine debitis..."

Tab. prima: De chorda, et arcu recto et verso, umbris, etc.

Tab. secunda: De arcu equinocciali elevato, et horis, etc.

Tab. tertia: De altitudine stellarum, et arcu diurno stelle, et distancia ab equinoccio.

Tab. quarta: De ascensionibus regionis tue etc.

*Cambridge, Univ. Libr. Gg. VI. 3

Oxford, Laud. Misc. 674 (SC 504), (membr. xiv), fol. 67-73

2) *Tractatus de doctrina theologica* (completus 1342)

Inc.: "Legimus in Scripturis Sacris..." (Tanner)

*Sarum Cath. 167, art. 3

14. REDE, WILLIAM

Biogr. Born in the diocese of Exeter, he was reared by Master Nicholas of Sandwich (cf. Powicke, *Medieval Books...*, p. 90). He is listed as a Fellow of Merton College in 1344 (Mert. Rec. 3676) and still in 1357 (Mert. Rec. 4148). He was appointed Bishop of Chichester on October 11, 1368, and consecrated at Avignon on September 2, 1369. He died on August 18, 1385. (Will published by F. M. Powicke, *Medieval Books...*, 87-92). See Emden 3, 1556-60.

Works

1) *Tabulae astronomicae* (or *Canones Tabularum*)

Oxford, Bodl. 432 (SC 2589), (a. d. 1460), fol. 28-35

« Wood D. 8 (SC 8538), (s. xv), fol. 48v-

« Jesus College 46 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-42 [Iste liber constat Wilermo Rede]

15. SEGRAVE, WALTER DE

Biogr. Fellow of Merton College in 1321 (Mert. Rec. 3621) and still in 1337 (Mert. Rec. 4147b). Elected dean of Chichester May 17, 1342 (*Cal. Pap. Let.*, III, 209, 211, 254), and Chancellor of Richard de Bury in 1340 (*Reg. Palat. Dunelm.*, [R. S.], III, 426). He seems to have died by June 1349. See Emden 3, 1664.

Works

1) *De insolubilibus*

Inc.: "Sicut vult Philosophus 2^o Metaphisice, non solum debemus..."

Expl.: "... tamen intelligitur in illo generali."

Erfurt, Amplon. Q. 276 (a. d. 1295-1333), fol. 159-162 [Explicit insol. mag. Walteri (*erasure*) de Anglia.]

« Amplon. O. 76 (membr. xiv), fol. 21v-34 ["... mag. Walterii de Sex Grave de Anglia"]

Oxford, Canon. Misc. 219 (SC 1395), fol. 1-3v [beginning missing; "... expliciunt insolubilia mag. gualterii de sex-grave cuius anima requiescat in pace."]

16. SUTTON, WILLIAM DE

Biogr. Fellow of Merton College from 1330 (Mert. Rec. 3417) until 1346 (Mert. Rec. 4141). Vicar of St. Peter's in the East, Oxford, from February 1, 1346, until his death. Seems to have died by December 1349. See Emden 3, 1826.

Works

1) *De suppositionibus*

Inc.: "Ut iuvenes habeant faciliorem cognicionem in supposicionibus terminorum, breves regule atque generales sunt ponende. Primo videndum est quid sit suppositio quantum ad eius esse et quomodo.."

Expl.: "... et iste stat mobiliter. Explicit textus de supposicionibus."
Munich, Clm. 4379 (s. xiv), fol. 198

« Clm. 4384 (a. d. 1340), fol. 123v-131v [with comm.; "suppositiones edite a magno cetu philosophorum in anglia"]

Vienna, Dominikanerkloster 160/130 (membr. xiv), fol. 123ra-rb

« Dominikanerkloster 160/130 (membr. xiv), fol. 96-100v [13 "sophismata curialia" on the text]

2) *De consequentiis*

Inc.: "Quia in sophismatibus probandis et improbandis utimur consequentiis, que..."

Expl.: "... ne igitur proxilitas animi reportancium perturbet ecce finis. Explicit textus de consequenciis."

Vienna, Dominikanerkloster 160/130 (membr. xiv), fol. 123rb-124

« Dominikanerkloster 160/130 (membr. xiv), fol. 100v-109v ["scriptum Suttonis Anglici" with commentary]

17. SWINESHEAD, RICHARD

Biogr. Earliest mention of 'Richard' Swyneshed as a Fellow of Merton College is in 1344-45 (Mert. Rec. 3676), and he is still listed in 1355. Together with Richard Billingham and others, he supported Mag. John Wyl-

yot in his election to the Chancellorship in 1349 (*Cal. of Close Rolls*, Edw. III, 1349-1354, p. 74). He was ordained deacon to the title of Fellowship on March 29, 1354. It would seem that Richard must be distinguished from Roger Swyneshed, who later became a Benedictine, and John, a Fellow of Merton College, who distinguished himself in Civil and Canon Law. See Emden 3, 1836-7.

Works

1) *Calculationes*

Inc.: "Penes quid habent intensio et remissio qualitatis attendi plures sunt posiciones. Pro quo tamen primo est notandum quod intensio potest dupliciter..."

Expl.: "... ad puncta intrinseca quam ad extremum remissius; patet ergo prima pars conclusionis, etc."

Cambridge, Gonville & Caius 499/268 (membr. xiv), fol. 165-203

*Erfurt, Amplon. O. 78 (c. 1346), fol. 1-36v [attr. to "clyminton"]

Paris, B. N. lat. 6558 (membr. xiv), fol. 1-70va ["Richardi de Glhymi Eshedi"]

« B. N. lat. 16621 (s. xiv notebook) [fragments]

*Pavia, Aldini 314, fol. 41-44v

*Perugia, Bibl. Comm. 1062 (pap. xv), fol. 1-82 [Johannis Suiset ang.]

*Rome, Angelica 1963 (s. xv), fol. 59r-v (incomplete)

* « Vittorio Emanuele 250, fol. 79-82

Vatican, Vat. lat. 3095 (s. xv), fol. 1-118v ["Riccardi suisset ang."]

* « Vat. lat. 3064, fol. 82-86v

« Chigi E. IV. 120 (s. xv), fol. 1-112v ["mag. Ricardo de Swynishede"]

Venice, S. Marco, lat. VI, 226 (2565), (s. xv), fol. 1ra-98v

Worcester, Bibl. Cathed. F. 35 (s. xv), fol. 27-65rb, 70ra-75v [fragments; Swyneshed]

Ed. Padua c. 1477, 1489, Pavia 1498, Venice 1505, 1520

2) *Tractatus de motu locali*

Inc.: "Multe possint elici conclusiones sive regule super variacionem porporcionum et motu ex variacione potencie motive ad suam resistenciam, et econtra. Et quia omnis variacio potencie motive seu resistive vel est uniformis vel difformis..."

Expl.: "... his inde motus alteracionis et quemadmodum variata fuerit ipsa proporcio, ita et velocitas, ideo etc. Et ecce finis. Explicit tractatus de Swineshede de motu locali."

Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College 499/268 (membr. xiv), fol. 213rb-215rb

*Seville, Colombina 7-7-29 (s. xv), fol. 30va-34rb [anon.]

3) *Tractatus de intensione et remissione formarum* (6 cap.)

Inc.: "In primo de celo Philosophus comm. 35 arguit corpus infinitum circumvolvi non posse; ad cuius probacionem capit quod sicut..."

Expl.: "... Cum igitur aer aut B tantam latitudinem deperdet quantum ipsa aqua, scilicet 3 illius latitudinis. Explicit tractatus de Swynshede."

Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College 499/268 (membr. xiv), fol. 204-211v

Worcester, Bibl. Cathed. F. 35 (s. xv), fol. 65va-69vb

Uncertain

1) *Questiones quatuor super Physicas magistri Ricardi*

Inc.: "Utrum in omni motu potencia motoris excedit potenciam rei mote. Et probo quod non, quia tunc vel esset..."

Inc. q. 2: "Utrum qualitas suscipit magis et minus..."

Inc. q. 3: "Utrum aliquod corpus simplex possit moveri eque velociter in vacuo et in pleno..."

Inc. q. 4: "Utrum onme transmutatum in transmutacionis inicio sit in eo ad quod primitus transmutatur..."

Expl.: "... in tractatu suo de coloribus, ponendo tamen quod albedo sit lux et opatitiis [sic] admixti; respondetur per dicta in alia questione, etc."

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2148, fol. 71-75, fol. 78 [frag. of qq. 1-2]

« Vat. lat. 4429, fol. 64-70v [q. 2]

Venice, S. Marco, lat. VI, 72 (2810), (s. xv), fol. 81-112

« S. Marco, lat. VI, 72 (2810), (s. xv), fol. 168-169v [q. 4]

18. TEWKESBURY

Biogr. A certain Tewkesbury is mentioned as a Merton College Fellow in 1340-1 (Mert. Rec. 3673; cf. *Mert. Mun.* [O. H. S.], 37). It is not certain whether this is the same as "Johannes Teukesbury" mentioned by Tanner (*Bibl. Brit.-Hib.*, 706).

*Works*1) *Sophisma de alteratione*

Inc.: "Uniformiter continue variari..." [Bale]

It is not certain whether the work seen by Bale is identical with:

a) "Uniformiter continue variabitur alteracio uniformis. Ad quod sophisma arguitur sic..."

Venice, S. Marco. lat. VIII. 19 (3267), (s. xv), fol. 193-211

b) "Uniformiter continue variatur alteracio uniformis..."

Paris, B. N. lat. 16621 (s. xiv), fol. 124-130

19. WILTON, THOMAS

Biogr. Thomas de Wylton is noted as a Fellow of Merton College in 1288-9 (Mert. Rec. 3612) and still in 1300-1 (Mert. Rec. 4063). On April 26, 1304, he was granted licence to study at a university in England or abroad for four years. He was certainly studying theology at Paris on Nov. 6, 1308. He was a Bachelor of Theology by 1311 (*Cal. Pap. Let.*, II, 82) and a Master of Theology of Paris by March 1314 (*Chart. Univ. Paris.*, II, 171). He was Canon of St. Paul's London, on Nov. 13, 1316, and Chancellor by August 1320; the position of Chancellor was vacated by 1327. Although he held many prebends in England, he remained in Paris at least until Nov. 1, 1322.

*Works*1) *Quaestiones in lib. Physicorum*

Inc.: "Cum natura sit principium motus et quietis et per consequens..."

*Cesena, Bibl. Malatestiana, Plut. VIII, sin. cod. 2, fol. 3

2) *Quaestiones De anima*

Inc.: "Bonorum honorabilium, etc. [Queritur] an de anima possit esse sciencia. Quod non videtur. Sciencia est habitus intellectualis. Anima non intelligit seipsam..."

Oxford, Balliol College 91 (a. d. 1334-49), fol. 247-277v

* « Magdalen College 63

3) *Actus inaugurales* (c. 1312-13)i) *Vesperies*

Inc.: "Utrum relationes absolute que dicuntur de Deo secundum substantiam..."

Expl.: "... a deitate. Ideo opinio nulla."

ii) *Quaestio in Aula*

Inc.: "Utrum relationes respective que dicuntur de Deo ex tempore..."

Expl.: "... relatio enim formarum est in se ipsa."

iii) *Resumpta*

Inc.: "Utrum omnes rationes absolute que dicuntur de Deo..."

Expl.: "... in rebus autem materialibus non. Alia per idem potest solve."

Vatican, Vat. lat. 1086 (membr. ante 1323), fol. 170-171v

Ed. P. Glorieux, AFH 24 (1931), 7-11

4) *Quaestiones disputatae* (1314-20)

i) *Contra Durandum de S. Porciano* (c. 1314)

Inc.: "Utrum in intellectu possint esse plures intellectiones simul..."

Expl.: "... nec sufficit habitudo maior in actu ad unum obiectum quam ad aliud."

Vatican, Vat. lat. 1086 (membr. ante 1323), fol. 193-194v

« Borghese 36 (membr. xiv), fol. 99-101v

ii) *Contra Petrum Auriolem* (c. 1319)

Inc.: "Utrum virtus in quantum sit ens per accidens..."

*Oxford, Balliol College 63 (s. xiv), fol. 19

iii) *Contra Petrum Auriolem*

Inc.: "Utrum habitus theologicus sit practicus vel speculativus..."

*Oxford, Balliol College 63 (s. xiv), fol. 19v

iv) *Contra Petrum Auriolem: De anima intellectiva*

Inc.: "Utrum intellectivam esse formam corporis humani possit ratione necessaria et evidenti convinci..."

Expl.: "... quin sit aeternum ex parte ante et e converso."

*Oxford, Balliol College 63 (s. xiv), fol. 52-54 [incompl.]

*Pelpin, Seminarium Duchowne 53 (102), (membr. xiv), fol. 217vb-223rb

Ed. W. Seńko, *Studia Mediewistyczne* 5 (Warsaw 1964), 75-116

v) *Quaestiones tres*

Inc.: "Utrum sit tantum una prudentia directiva..."

*Barcelona, Arxiu de la Corona d'Arago, Ripoll. 95 (s. xv), fol. 35-40v

vi) *Quaestio de susceptione magis et minus*

Inc.: "Utrum qualitas suscipiat magis et minus..."

Oxford, Canon. Misc. 226 (s. xv), fol. 38-43

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2148 (s. xv), fol. 71-75

5) *Quaestiones Quodlibetales* (qq. 23)

Inc.: "An essentia divina sit perfectio infinita intensive..."

Expl.: "... quod paternitas et essentia realiter different, quod ipsimet negant."

Vatican, Vat. lat. 1086 (membr. xiv), fol. 15v-79v

6) *Tractatus de validis mendicantibus numquid sint in statu perfectionis*

*Oxford, Bodl. Digby 75, fol. 122-125

*Uncertain*1) *Quaestiones de generatione et corruptione*Inc.: "Sicut dicit Philosophus 3^o de anima, sicut res sunt separabiles..."

*Erfurt, Amplon. F. 348 (s. xiv), fol. 158v-174v

2) *De oratione dominica*

Inc.: "Debes cognoscere quae sunt..." (Glorieux, 462)

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Fragmentation of Farms and Fields in the Chiltern Hills Thirteenth Century and Later

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I

PARTIBLE inheritance (that is inheritance by more than one heir) could, through the dismemberment of compact holdings, produce a field pattern of unenclosed strips held by different tenants. In medieval England at least some of the subdivided fields of Kent, the East Riding of Yorkshire and parts of East Anglia were created by division following the death of a land holder.¹ It has also been established, in recent years, that substantial tenurial fragmentation of complete holdings and fields might occur where impartible inheritance prevailed, especially during periods of rapidly growing population. Lords sometimes split larger tenancies so as to increase manorial rents and services,² but alienation by sale, lease and gift, both within and outside family groups, was a more significant divisive force. In Norfolk and Suffolk, for example, tenemental units held under customs of impartibility could be inherited by more than one son, although they were "just as likely to break-up by sale as by division between sons." Lands might be alienated to a number of sons and daughters before death, holding either jointly or individually, or beyond the immediate family: "the result was that villein tenements became divided into a number of fragments, held in part by members of one family, in part by outsiders."³

¹ H. L. Gray, *English Field Systems* (Cambridge, Mass., 1915), 293-8, 303-4, 337; A. R. H. Baker, "Open Fields and Partible Inheritance on a Kent Manor," *Economic History Review*, Second series, 17 (1964) 1-23; T. A. M. Bishop, "Assarting and the Growth of Open Fields," *Economic History Review*, 6 (1935) 13-29; G. C. Homans, "Partible Inheritance of Villagers' Holdings," *Economic History Review*, 8 (1937-8) 48-56; B. Dodwell, "Holdings and Inheritance in East Anglia," *Economic History Review*, Second series, 20 (1967) 59-61.

² M. M. Postan, "The Charters of the Villeins," being Chapter 2 of C. N. L. Brooke and M. M. Postan (eds.), *Carte Nativorum, a Peterborough Abbey Cartulary of the Fourteenth Century*, Northampton Record Society Publications, 20 (1960), (for 1945-6), p. xxxix; J. A. Raftis, *Tenure and Mobility*, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Studies and Texts, No. 8, 1964, 17-18.

³ B. Dodwell, *op. cit.*, 63, 64.

The actual mechanics of fractionation under these and similar circumstances, and the significance of the features produced in the context of local field and tenemental systems has still to be examined in detail. In particular, there is as yet no satisfactory answer to the important question of whether land divided up by alienation or multiple succession under impartible custom was added to the permanent common arable land of a township or remained separate and distinctive. The following account of practice in the Chiltern Hills considers this neglected corner of English field system studies.

II

The dissected chalk plateau that is the Chiltern Hills rises above the clay vales of Oxford and Aylesbury, and dips gently southeastwards for five to ten miles to the gravels of the Thames' terraces and the Vale of St. Albans. The region extends nearly fifty miles from the Goring Gap northeast to the Hitchin Gap, and includes a variety of soils ranging from heavy clays to light sands. During the thirteenth century, as later, this was an area of arable farming with little meadow or pasture, but with extensive woods and wastes surviving, especially on the more broken relief of the southwest and centre of the Hills. A substantial proportion of the arable land was held in severalty, either in large demesne closes that were often 50-100 acres or more, or in small tenant crofts of, on average, about five acres. Common arable, lying as half acre and one acre strips and open to common grazing, existed throughout the region, but it was most widespread in the northeast (east of the Gade valley) where less than half the ploughland of some townships was farmed in severalty. Within the individual common fields, strips were grouped into furlongs — although the fields themselves were small in comparison with the great open units of the vales below the escarpment — and there were often as many as ten, twenty or thirty common fields in one Hill township.⁴

Thirteenth century Chiltern society was characterised by considerable personal freedom. A substantial body of free tenants existed in many manors, while villein services — assessed on the basis of customary units of tenure, especially the half virgate (25-30 acres) and the ferlingate (10-15 acres) — were relatively light and mainly seasonal. Free and bond tenants alike were able to alienate land from their holdings unobstructed

⁴ D. Roden and A. R. H. Baker, "Field Systems of the Chiltern Hills and of Parts of Kent from the Late Thirteenth to the Early Seventeenth Century," *Transactions and Papers of the Institute of British Geographers*, 38 (1966) 73-88.

by lord or custom provided, in the case of villeins, all transactions took place through the manorial courts. As a result, an active peasant land market had developed by *c.* 1250, with individual tenants buying, selling and leasing a few acres, and a more flexible pattern of landholding had appeared. Some customary units were broken-up by sale from them; others were supplemented by the acquisition of strips and closes on lease or by purchase. Some men were able to build up substantial farms in this way, while others were consolidating their land. Average holding sizes differed considerably from manor to manor, the proportion of small tenants in particular varying according to local opportunities for their supplementary employment as wage labour.

The relative prosperity of the thirteenth century gave way, in the first few decades of the following century, to a period of economic decline and social change that was to reach a peak after the epidemic of 1348-50, and that continued until early in the sixteenth century. With a contracting population, engrossment of properties was frequent, and the land market was dominated by transactions in complete holdings. Sale and exchange of a few acres revived only after *c.* 1550 as consolidation of common field strips increased.⁵

III

Primogeniture was practised throughout the Chilterns during the thirteenth century and later. A single son inherited land held by the parent at death, and where there is detailed evidence it was clearly the eldest son.⁶ Partible inheritance did occur, but only when, in the absence of male heirs, descent was to daughters: this was a feature of primogeniture in many parts of southeast England.⁷ Custom also allowed the widow a dower claim of one third in her dead husband's estate. Borough English, found east of the

⁵ For a more detailed account of the social and economic background, see D. Roden, "Studies in Chiltern Field Systems," unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of London, 1965, 271-6.

⁶ D. Roden, "Inheritance Customs and Succession to Land in the Chiltern Hills in the Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries," *Journal of British Studies*, 7 (1967) 3.

⁷ *Ibid.*; A. Hills, "Essex Manor Customs," *Essex Review*, 51 (1942) 97; K. G. Fieling, "An Essex Manor in the Fourteenth Century," *English Historical Review*, 26 (1911) 337; G. H. Fowler (ed.), "Roll of the Justices in Eyre at Bedford, 1202," *Publications of the Bedfordshire Historical Record Society*, 1 (1933) 167, no. 74; G. H. Fowler (ed.), *A Calendar of the Feet of Fines for Bedfordshire, Preserved in the Public Record Office, of the Reigns of Richard I, John, and Henry III*, Publications of the Bedfordshire Historical Record Society, 6 (1919) 11, no. 19, 14, no. 34; G. H. Fowler (ed.), "Tractatus de Dunstaple et de Houcton," *Publications of the Bedfordshire Historical Record Society*, 19 (1937) 33, no. 53; P. Hyde, "The Winchester Manors at Witney and Adderbury, Oxfordshire, in the Later Middle Ages," unpublished B. Litt. thesis, University of Oxford, 1955, 83.

Hitchin Gap in parts of Essex and eastern Hertfordshire,⁸ was apparently unknown in the Hills.

Historians have recently become increasingly aware that customs of impartibility were by no means as rigid as previously thought, and that the type of flexible arrangements described by G. C. Homans more than 25 years ago were followed over a wide area. It is now recognised that by the thirteenth century, if not earlier, villeins often had considerable freedom of alienation which they frequently used to dispose of land to chosen successors or to determine its descent before they died.⁹ Chiltern practice was similar. Although inheritance was usually undivided, actual succession to property could be far more complex because the Chiltern peasant was able to alienate his lands before death in any proportion and to anyone. Inheritance laws operated only in cases of intestacy, and through devices such as joint tenure and conditional surrender, which were widely adopted by 1300, a tenant might arrange the *post mortem* transmission of his property during his lifetime.¹⁰

In theory, there was no obstacle to the division of a holding by its occupant amongst all his children: partible succession to land was possible although impartible inheritance was the rule. But in fact, arrangements for the disposal of an entire patrimony between a number of relatives were rarely made. Large scale dismemberment of the average half virgate or ferlingate was impracticable during the thirteenth century, and when the basic family farm was granted away before death it was usually to a single successor. The small properties (often a cottage or a few acres) frequently

⁸ A. Hills, *op. cit.*, 100; L. L. Rickman, "Brief Studies in the Manorial and Economic History of Much Hadham," *Transactions of the East Hertfordshire Archaeological Society*, 8 (1928-33) 303; G. C. Homans, *English Villagers of the Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge, Mass., 1942), 127; R. J. Faith, "Peasant Families and Inheritance Customs in Medieval England," *Agricultural History Review*, 14 (1966), 83-4.

⁹ G. C. Homans, *loc. cit.* 1942, 127-131, 144-6, 152-3, 179, 204; F. B. Stitt, "The Manors of Great and Little Wymondley in the Later Middle Ages," unpublished B. Litt. thesis, University of Oxford, 1951, 128; P. Hyde, *op. cit.*, 83; M. M. Postan, *op. cit.*, xxxix, xlix, lviii; J. A. Raftis, *op. cit.*, 63, 65-6; B. Dodwell, *op. cit.*, 63, 64.

¹⁰ Joint holdings were usually between husband and wife or between parent and child, but also sometimes between brothers and sisters. The usual procedure was that a tenant surrendered land to the joint holding of himself and a partner, or related partners entered newly acquired land together. When one died the property automatically passed to the other. Another advantage of conjoint holding was that payment of heriot was avoided. By conditional surrender a tenant transferred land to the person or persons he had chosen to succeed him, on condition that he be allowed to retain legal possession for the rest of his life. Although both wills and death-bed surrenders were being made by peasants in the thirteenth century, they did not become common until the end of the following century. For details, see D. Roden, *loc. cit.* 1965, 167, 239, 285.

given by parents to non-inheriting children had generally been acquired separately, and were only occasionally subtracted from the main holding.¹¹

IV

Wherever custom was such as to allow partibility in the descent of land, division of property was possible — a possibility that was strongest where partible inheritance occurred. This latter might take one of three forms: co-heirs could work a farm jointly, or they could apportion a parental holding amongst themselves, either allotting it complete unit by complete unit, or dividing each individual piece of land to ensure a fair distribution of all types and quality. Any of these three could apply whenever there were a number of claims on inherited land, circumstances that arose in the Chilterns only in the case of the widow's dower right or when daughters were heirs.

The widow usually released her life interests of one third to the holder of her dead husband's property, or she held the land jointly with the inheriting son.¹² Actual partition was rarely necessary because the dower claim was usually nothing more than a legal right over the whole estate. It seldom existed as a physical entity, but when it did fragmentation of land could follow. A three acre croft at King's Walden was split into three pieces by the creation of a central dower strip of one acre, and subdivision was perpetuated when the inheriting son alienated his two pieces outside the family.¹³ Similar cases in the Vale of Aylesbury and in Essex show that this Chiltern example was by no means unique.¹⁴ More usually, however, any partition was reconsolidated by a grant from widow to inheritor in return for a money payment, as with another unit dividing part of the same patrimony in King's Walden.¹⁵ Failing this, dower land normally reverted to the main holding on the widow's death.

Property inherited by daughters was sometimes worked jointly and sometimes shared out between the sisters. Four daughters of Robert de Studham

¹¹ For a more detailed assessment of Chiltern custom, see D. Roden, *loc. cit.* 1967, 1-11.

¹² As for example, in many of the dower cases recorded in M. W. Hughes (ed.), *A Calendar of the Feet of Fines for the County of Buckingham, 7 Richard I to 44 Henry III*, Publications of the Records Branch of the Buckinghamshire Archaeological Society, 4 (1942) (for 1940).

¹³ British Museum (henceforth B. M.) Add. Ch. 35570, 35571.

¹⁴ G. H. Fowler and J. G. Jenkins (eds.), *Early Buckinghamshire Charters*, Publications of the Records Branch of the Buckinghamshire Archaeological Society, 3 (1939) no. 30; R.E.G. Kirk (ed.), *Feet of Fines for Essex, 1 (A. D. 1182-A. D. 1272)*, Essex Archaeological Society (Colchester, 1899-1910), 47, no. 261.

¹⁵ B. M. Add. Ch. 35587.

were freely transferring land as partners early in the thirteenth century,¹⁶ while the three women who held a virgate in Kensworth in 1299 were probably sisters.¹⁷ On the other hand, agreements were drawn-up dividing the manorial demesnes of Great Gaddesden and Applehanger in Goring, in each case between two inheriting sisters.¹⁸ At Great Gaddesden, individual units of land, and even buildings, were to be halved, whereas the property at Goring was allotted wherever possible on the basis of complete fields and woods. It is not clear whether either of the proposed partitions was effected. There is, however, a strong suggestion in early thirteenth century Missenden charters of actual fragmentation following partible inheritance by the four daughters of Geoffrey de Missenden. Woodland groves, arable closes, common field strips and meadows were all individually subdivided, in each case between two of the sisters, although much of this land was eventually acquired by the husband of one of them.¹⁹ Such situations may have appeared more widely than has been recognised up till now — there were certainly conjoint holdings and subdivisions by heiress's in Essex as well as in the Chilterns²⁰ — but there is no evidence that partition through inheritance ever occurred on a really significant scale in the Hills, and certainly not of the creation of a field pattern of open strips in that way.

There are other examples of the complete and systematic subdivision of entire farm holdings following agreement between two parties, but no reasons are given for them. Sometimes partition and apportionment was by a system of sun or shade division reminiscent of the Scandinavian *solskifte*. When a half virgate at Knebworth was halved in 1228, the claimant was given "that half which everywhere lies towards the sun", while the part of a thirty acre holding in Chesham that was granted away in 1241 was described as "a moiety of all lands as it lies everywhere in the fields towards the shade."²¹ Casual application of sun division as a convenient and equitable method of partitioning a single holding stresses the danger of implying any significant correlation between English and Scandinavian field systems on the basis of terminology alone.

¹⁶ B. M. Harl. MS. 1885, f. 13d; Hertfordshire Record Office 17465.

¹⁷ Library of the Dean and Chapter of St. Paul's WD16 Liber I, f. 123d.

¹⁸ *Cal. Close Rolls*, 1323-27, 293; T. R. Gambier-Parry (ed.), *A Collection of Charters Relating to Goring, Streatley and the Neighbourhood, 1181-1546*, Oxfordshire Record Series, 13 (1931), no. 162.

¹⁹ J. G. Jenkins (ed.), *The Cartulary of Missenden Abbey, Part I*, Publications of the Records Branch of the Buckinghamshire Archaeological Society, 2 (1939), nos. 117, 119, 120, 122-5, 144-7, 149.

²⁰ H. F. Westlake (ed.), *Hornchurch Priory. A Kalendar of Documents in the Possession of the Warden and Fellows of New College Oxford* (London, 1923), no. 274; R. E. G. Kirk (ed.), *Feet of Fines for Essex*, 2 (*A. D.* 1272-*A. D.* 1326), Essex Archaeological Society, (Colchester, 1913-28), 49, no. 321.

²¹ Public Record Office CP 25(1)/84/12/114; M. W. Hughes, *op. cit.*, 77.

Although descent of property arranged before death did not usually affect the integrity of the Chiltern half virgate or ferlingate tenement, it could lead to a division of land such as might have been produced by partible inheritance. Property granted to the joint holding of children was occasionally split between the partners: a three acre croft in Codicote remained subdivided for 26 years following a parental gift to a brother and sister, the two parts being reunited only after elaborate transactions.²² But it was more usual under such circumstances for one partner to release his rights to the other, or for the land to remain with co-tenants who shared any produce and profit, eventually passing to one on the death of the other.²³ Partition would have defeated the main purpose of joint tenure, which was to ensure descent to only one of the occupants.²⁴ Again children, and especially unmarried daughters, were sometimes given a small plot in a close of the parental holding on which to build a cottage,²⁵ or they might receive part of the family messuage, perhaps by some form of disposition before death.²⁶ Property broken-up in these different ways was small in amount, and most usually only dwellings were involved. When a gift of arable land was made to a dependant from a peasant farm, it was generally an entire close or a few strips in a common field.²⁷ Large scale fragmentation of a complete holding, such as might follow partible inheritance, rarely resulted from succession determined before death.

V

The most frequent cause of the subdivision of individual units of land, as of the disintegration of customary tenements, was simple gift, sale or

²² B. M. Stowe MS. 849, ff. 17, 28d, 32, 41d, 42.

²³ For example, a cottage at Codicote that was surrendered by Robert de London to the joint holding of a son and a daughter later passed to another brother by sale and inheritance: *ibid.*, ff. 32d, 37d, 78. Again, a two acre plot of land was given by Peter Doget, a Codicote villein, to his two daughters who each received an acre; but one daughter died almost immediately and so the other entered the share: *ibid.*, ff. 16d, 17.

²⁴ The role of joint tenure was thus very different in the Chilterns to that in an area of partible inheritance, where it was frequently adopted as an alternative to fragmentation on the death of a tenant.

²⁵ For example, Amicia Okslade of Ibstone built two cottages for two daughters in 1344: Merton College MS 5221.

²⁶ For example, at Codicote Matilda Synoth surrendered half her messuage and curtilage to her daughter on condition that she herself be allowed continued possession of this half until she died. When she died, nine years later, half of the property thus passed to the daughter, while a son inherited the other half in the normal way: B. M. Stowe MS 849, ff. 52, 63.

²⁷ D. Roden, *loc. cit.*, 1967, 6-7.

lease not necessarily connected with descent of property. The break-up of a holding in this way was usually a gradual and piecemeal process quite different from the immediate and systematic partitioning that might accompany a joint inheritance. Thomas le Driver, a Codicote villein, succeeded his father in the family half virgate in 1285, and during the next forty years he reduced it by more than eleven acres surrendered in fifteen transactions. There were also eight leases from the property for periods ranging from five to sixteen years. No addition was made to the farm, the remaining part of which was finally surrendered by Thomas to his daughter in 1325.²⁸ Actual fractionation occurred when a compact unit was alienated to two or more tenants separately, or when only part of a single unit was granted away. Land of all types was involved: woods were divided into blocks that were sometimes fenced or ditched-off from each other;²⁹ assarts were occasionally broken-up by the granting away of parcels within them to different men (see fig. 1 at end of article);³⁰ while a common field strip in a single tenancy was sometimes split by surrender of a part of it.³¹ But it was the established arable closes that were fragmented most frequently. At Caddington in 1299, a 3½ acre croft which had formerly been in one holding lay as three parcels each belonging to separate occupants, while a 5¼ acre close at Kensworth was likewise divided in three.³² Such features

²⁸ B. M. Stowe MS 849, ff. 18, 19, 19d, 20, 20d, 21d, 22, 24, 25, 25d, 28d, 30d, 35d, 37, 37d, 38, 39d, 40d, 45, 47, 48, 49.

²⁹ For example, c. 1195 the nuns of Goring were granted part of the grove of Chalcora (T. R. Gambier-Parry, *op. cit.*, no. 2), while at Missenden a grant by Ingram de Betun to the Abbey included an additional piece of his wood of Peterleystone, and Ralf de Scaccario divided his wood called Senreden, on Kingshill, by granting away part of it to a Wycombe merchant (J. G. Jenkins, *op. cit.*, nos. 137, 151). There are numerous other examples, and by the late thirteenth century some men were enlarging and consolidating woodland holdings through the acquisition, by purchase and exchange, of wood next to that they already held, in the same way as others were consolidating holdings of arable land (D. Roden, "Woodland and its Management in the Medieval Chilterns," *Forestry*, 41 [1968], 63).

³⁰ For example, at Caddington the eight acre assart owned by John Poleyn had, by 1299, been divided into three parcels of three acres, four acres and one acre leased to separate tenants; an eighteen acre assart called Le Rudyng had probably been partitioned in this or a similar way — it had once been in a single tenure but by 1299 lay in eight pieces all held by different men; and William Hakeny held two acres and six acres in a new assart that had formerly been one holding: Library of the Dean and Chapter of St. Paul's WD16, Liber I, ff. 116, 116d, 117d.

³¹ For example, at Codicote both Reginald Aleyn and Thomas atte Pirie surrendered land in Ash Field while retaining part of each parcel: B. M. Stowe MS 849, f. 44. There were similar divisions at Welwyn and Kensworth: Hertfordshire Record Office 59117, 59120C, 59124; B. M. Add. Ch. 19939, 19940.

³² The closes had previously been held by Ralph Hicheman and John le Seler respectively: Library of the Dean and Chapter of St. Paul's WD16 Liber I, ff. 116d, 122d.

were by no means unique to the Chiltern Hills. They abounded in the surrounding regions in both assart and long cultivated land,³³ and they have often been noted further afield in various parts of medieval England.³⁴ Rarely, however, has their form and formation been discussed in any detail, and attempts to assess their actual significance in local field systems are few.

Tenurial fragmentation of enclosed fields through partial or diverse alienation could take one of several forms. At Codicote, some closes were leased-out or sold in parcels to more than one tenants at the same time;³⁵ others were released by one tenant to another in a number of pieces and over a period of years;³⁶ while some tenants surrendered only part of a close, retaining a portion for their own use.³⁷ Very often two or more of these methods contributed to the break-up of an enclosed field. Walterscroft was first subdivided by sale of two pieces within it to another holder, and then it was further fragmented with the release, over four years, of another seven parcels each adjacent to the other, to a third party.³⁸ Division of Bromecroft resulted from piecemeal leasing and sale to two men during a three year period (Table I); while particularly complicated transactions involving both free and villein tenants were responsible for the dismemberment of Halecroft.³⁹ There is evidence of similar forms of partitioning in

³³ For example: W. H. Turner and H. O. Coxe (eds.), *Calendar of Charters and Rolls Preserved in the Bodleian Library*, (Oxford, 1878), 28, 29; G. H. Fowler and J. Godber (eds.), *The Cartulary of Bushmead Priory*, Publications of the Bedfordshire Historical Record Society, 22 (1945) (for 1940), nos. 71, 85; J. Godber (ed.), *The Cartulary of Neunham Priory*, Publications of the Bedfordshire Historical Record Society, 43, (1963), nos. 386, 662, 671; A. F. Westlake, *op. cit.*, nos. 370, 394, 443, 524.

³⁴ For example, by R. H. Hilton in Leicestershire and the West Midlands: R. H. Hilton in W. G. Hoskins (ed.), *A History of the County of Leicester*, 2, (London, 1954), 166, and *The Stoneleigh Leger Book*, Publications of the Dugdale Society, 24 (1960), p. LVII. Leasing also produced subdivided fields in Kent: J. L. M. Gulley, "The Wealden Landscape in the Early Seventeenth Century and its Antecedents," unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of London, 1960, 355; and A. R. H. Baker, "Field Systems in the Vale of Holmesdale," *Agricultural History Review*, 14 (1966) 4, 7, 9. Alienated demesne was sometimes divided up on Ramsey estates, in this case by private agreements between the co-tenants: J. A. Raftis, *op. cit.*, 26.

³⁵ During the seven years 1307 to 1314 Godfrey Whitecock leased-out most of his Whitecokescroft in four pieces (three of one acre and one of three roods) to two men for periods ranging from eight to twelve years (B. M. Stowe MS 849, ff. 31, 33d, 35d, 36), and between 1346 and 1348 the five acre Moriscescroft was released as thirteen parcels to two tenants — it was back in a single holding by 1374 (*ibid.*, ff. 72d, 73, 103).

³⁶ In 1316 Alice Thurbern surrendered her two acre croft to Simon de Childemere in four separate plots: *ibid.*, ff. 38d, 39, 40.

³⁷ John le Reveson leased-out half his three acre Hamstalecroft for twelve years: *ibid.*, f. 38d.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, ff. 46, 46d, 48d, 51.

³⁹ In 1283 Walter atte Strate, a villein, bought 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ acres in Halecroft as five different pieces from Thomas atte Wike, the free tenant who owned the whole close (B. M. Add. MS 40734, ff.

many other Chiltern townships in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, often producing a far more complex pattern of open parcels and strips than division through either inheritance or descent of land arranged before death.⁴⁰ Plough ridges, which provided ready-made physical units for land transfers in the common fields,⁴¹ were also sometimes used as a basis for the tenurial fragmentation of enclosed fields. A grant in Little Missenden, for example, consisted of three selions in Fulkescroft.⁴²

Subdivision was, in many closes, only temporary, the individual parcels being reintegrated on the expiry of leases or because one of the tenants had gradually bought-up the entire field.⁴³ Crawley Croft in Codicote passed through the complete cycle of partition and reconsolidation over a period of 54 years. Starting in 1282, small plots were alienated from the close in seven transactions, and 44 years later a ditch was made to separate the two main tenures within it. During the next ten years one tenant obtained land on both sides of his own land, in much the same way as common field strips were amalgamated, and the croft returned to a single holding.⁴⁴ Other closes, especially larger fields where land, had been sold to a number of men, remained subdivided, with the different units either surviving for a while as open pieces⁴⁵ or being fenced-off to form a network of smaller closes. At Kingshill, where fields were being partitioned through gift and sale before the end of the twelfth century,⁴⁶ some parcels formed in this way were undoubtedly enclosed at the time of division or soon afterwards: a piece that a tenant granted away in his Suthfeld (it extended the full length of the field) had been marked-out by a newly made ditch,⁴⁷ while

18-21d). Another two villeins, Hugo Cok and Roger Poleyn, held the remaining land in the field (*ibid.*, ff. 18, 18d). The former exchanged his five roods with Walter atte Strate, while the latter leased his single acre to Walter (*ibid.*, f. 18; B. M. Stowe MS 849, f. 19). By 1287 the entire close seems to have been once more in a single holding, for Walter then surrendered "a croft called Halecroft" enclosed with hedges and ditches to one of his daughters (*ibid.*, f. 18d).

⁴⁰ Evidence for Abbots Langley and Bramfield is especially detailed: Library of Sidney Sussex College James MS 1; Hertfordshire Record Office 40702-3.

⁴¹ The average common arable strip of half an acre may usually have comprised a single plough ridge, but strips also often consisted of a number of ridges: D. Roden, *loc. cit.* 1965, 332.

⁴² J. G. Jenkins, *op. cit.*, no. 142.

⁴³ For example, Moricescroft and Halecroft in Codicote: *vide supra*.

⁴⁴ B. M. Stowe MS 849, ff. 16d, 32, 37, 38d, 46d, 48, 48d, 49d, 60, 61d.

⁴⁵ Thus Ruding Field in Codicote was held by a number of tenants at the end of the thirteenth century following surrender of land within it by Thomas atte Wike. The separate existence of some of these pieces was perpetuated by continuing alienation — Robert Smith, for example, granted away his holding to four men — and the field still contained unfenced units thirty years later: B. M. Stowe MS 849, ff. 32, 38, 47, 51, 54, 88d, 89, 100d; Add. MS 40734, ff. 19, 19d, 25d.

⁴⁶ M. W. Hughes, *op. cit.*, 8.

⁴⁷ J. G. Jenkins, *op. cit.*, no. 171.

a portion of land held by Geoffrey Taylifer in two fields belonging to Misenenden Abbey was hedged-off from the Abbey's section.⁴⁸

Open units within subdivided closes were probably fenced for exactly the same reason that common field strips were later enclosed, namely to prevent grazing by livestock not belonging to the tenant. Pasturing in common was certainly practised by the occupiers of at least some fragmented closes. A Bramfield villein was allowed, in 1332, to enclose land in Clay Field in order to free it from the right of common pasture claimed by Elias Thurston — the Thurston family had earlier been disposing of parcels in a Clay Croft which had once been in their sole possession⁴⁹ — and it was actually stipulated in a King's Walden grant of two units in a three acre croft that these should be held in severalty.⁵⁰

A. C. Chibnall has shown how at Sherington, in northern Buckinghamshire, demesne ploughland in severalty was transformed into two large common fields and added to the ancient common arable of the township (itself in two fields), following twelfth century subinfeudation of the main fee in the parish and later piecemeal granting of common rights over it.⁵¹ In the Chilterns, too, some smaller and later common fields may have been formed by a lord letting out freshly cleared land to dependent tenants,⁵² and a seventeenth century common arable area in Berkhamsted called Twelve Acres was apparently undivided and held in severalty 250 years earlier.⁵³ These examples were, however, exceptional. Most tenurially divided closes in the Hills were quite distinct from common fields there, although it is often difficult to distinguish the two from descriptions of land alone. Parcels in the closes had neither the regular size nor systematic organisation into furlongs of the common field strips; subdivided closes were usually much smaller than the common fields — they were split into five to ten pieces at most; and a pattern of open strips rarely survived in them for more than a few years, whereas the common fields remained more or less intact for several centuries. Certainly there is very little evidence that closes fragmented as a result of either succession to property or ordinary alienation

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, no. 187.

⁴⁹ Hertfordshire Record Office 40703.

⁵⁰ B. M. Add. Ch. 35571.

⁵¹ A. C. Chibnall, *Sherington. Fiefs and Fields of a Buckinghamshire Village* (Cambridge, 1965), 108-110.

⁵² E. C. Vollans, "The Evolution of Farm-Lands in the Central Chilterns in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries," *Transactions and Papers of the Institute of British Geographers*, 26 (1959), 233; D. Roden, *loc. cit.*, 1965, 300.

⁵³ B. M. Lansd. MS 905, ff. 110, 113; Public Record Office SC11/271-2.

were ever added to the common arable of a Chiltern township on any significant scale, or were ever regarded individually as common fields. The actual process of common field formation in the Hills remains a mystery.

Divided closes of all types appear to have been most numerous and complex during the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. They were subsequently less widespread. Holding dismemberment also became less marked in the second half of the fourteenth century: many more complete tenements were changing hands, and extensive farm engrossment occurred. But fractionation of complete holdings and individual enclosed fields alike did continue on a smaller scale for several hundred years afterwards. An entire farm at Ibstone was partitioned between Merton College and Thomas London in 1451. Two surveyors were employed, and scrupulous care was taken to ensure an accurate division and equitable apportionment of land of all types. Smaller crofts and woodland groves were halved, whereas the larger fields were split into a number of units referred to as "furlongs", each of which was halved longitudinally between the two parties. South Field, for example, was subdivided into six pieces (that is the halves of three furlongs), while White Field was divided into the eight halves of four furlongs. No reason was given for the partition.⁵⁴ Again, a late fifteenth century rental for King's Walden shows two demesne fields of 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ acres and 19 acres leased-out amongst three and four tenants respectively.⁵⁵

In sixteenth and seventeenth century surveys and terriers and in eighteenth and early nineteenth century maps, closes of all sizes appear as divided into two or more unfenced units: sometimes individual parcels had been rented to different tenants;⁵⁶ sometimes an entire field was held by one farm, but was partly under grass or was under two crops;⁵⁷ and sometimes a field in a single holding was occupied under more than one tenure.⁵⁸ The creation of divided closes was thus a continuing feature of the Chiltern field pattern. By the seventeenth century, however, there were rarely

⁵⁴ Merton College MS 5250.

⁵⁵ B. M. Add. Ch. 35945. One of the fields contained both arable and pasture.

⁵⁶ As in closes called Hodginlane and Cloudinale, named in a Great Gaddesden survey *c.* 1600: Hertfordshire Record Office 1162.

⁵⁷ Marsh Farm in Great Gaddesden included one field containing grass and arable in 1740, and Old House Farm in the same parich had two fields divided in this way in 1761: Hertfordshire Record Office 15596, 15598. William Strode of Medmenham cultivated both oats and barley in one close of four acres in 1574: Lincolnshire Record Office Inv. 56/309.

⁵⁸ For example, in 1697 most of North Field in Little Gaddesden was the freehold of a Mr. Jarman, but there were also four acres of glebe in it. Mr. Jarman rented the glebe holding, so obtaining occupation of the entire field under two tenures: Lincolnshire Record Office AT15, AT36.

more than five or six within a manor or township,⁵⁹ and most were similar in appearance to the increasingly numerous relics of common arable enclosure — groups of a few strips that had been fenced-off but were still to be finally consolidated. By the end of the sixteenth century, too, many of the large demesne fields of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and also some of the bigger tenant closes, had been permanently broken into smaller enclosed units, although the reverse process, close amalgamation, was also occurring.⁶⁰

VI

It is clear from the account above that, by the thirteenth century, holdings and fields in the Chiltern Hills were being subdivided between different tenants in a number of ways and for a variety of reasons. Of these, inheritance customs were least prominent: the prevailing primogeniture allowed little direct scope for multiple descent of property. Divided succession — which most usually arose from some arrangement made by a tenement holder during his lifetime as to its disposal after his death — could produce land fragmentation; but the infrequent partitioning that took place under such circumstances should not be overemphasised, for transmission to a single son was by far the commonest practice. Alienation through ordinary sale and lease was more important: previously compact units were quite often split up into pieces held by a number of occupiers and customary farm holdings were dispersed amongst many tenants. Closes subdivided tenurially in these ways were of no more than minor significance in local field patterns. They were usually short-lived, the different parcels either becoming reconsolidated into single ownership within a few years or being individually fenced to form separate closes; and although sometimes grazed in common by the parceners, they almost always remained distinct from the much more stable pattern of permanent common arable. The main trend within the common fields, by the thirteenth century, was towards strip amalgamation rather than any further disintegration.*

⁵⁹ For example, there were three subdivided closes in the manor of Great Hampden in 1741: Map in the Hampden Estate Office.

⁶⁰ As, for example, in Berkhamsted in 1607, where two demesne fields of 80 and 160 acres had recently been broken-up into sixteen closes, and where tenant closes were also being amalgamated and divided: Public Record Office E315/365.

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TABLE I

THE DIVISION OF BROMECROFT BY SALE AND LEASE

(folio references are to B. M. Stowe Ms. 849)

Granter	Date	Amount and Nature of Transfer	Recipient	Ref.
John le Reveson	1316	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ a. — 12 year lease	Roger le Helder	f.38d
« «	1316	$\frac{1}{2}$ a. — 6 crop lease	« «	f.40d
« «	1321	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ a. — surrendered (land of John on both sides)	« «	f.44
« «	1322	$\frac{1}{2}$ a. surrendered (between the land of Roger & John)	« «	f.46
« «	1322	$\frac{1}{2}$ a. surrendered (between the land of Roger & John)	« «	f.46
« «	1323	1a. surrendered (between the land of John & Roger le Helder)	Roger May	f.46
« «	1323	1a. surrendered	« «	f.46d
« «	1324	1a. surrendered (between the land of Roger May & the common heath)	« «	f.48

FIG. 1. SUBDIVISION OF AN ASSART IN KING'S WALDEN

I. Grant by Robert de Estholt to Robert de Hurne, *c.* 1250, of 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ acres including "the two acres which lie in my large croft in the old assart between my demesne lands on both sides; whereof one end extends into my new assart and the other end extends onto the land that was Mathew's." (B. M. Add. Ch. 35614).

	Robert's demesne (1a.)	
Mathew's land	2a. of the great croft in the old assart	The new assart
	Robert's demesne (1a.)	

II. Grant by John de Beyford to Richard de la Hurne, in 1266-7, of 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ acres including "two acres of the four acres lying together in the old assart between the land of Sylvester de Preston and Walter Carpentarius; one end extends onto the new assart." (B. M. Add. Ch. 35577).

	Sylvester de Preston (1a.)	
Mathew's land	2a. of the 4a. lying together in the old assart	The new assart
	Walter Carpentarius (1a.)	

Summary:— Some, if not all, of the land in the old assart had been enclosed into a croft of four acres, which was subsequently divided into three units by the transfer of a central piece of two acres to Robert de Hurne. By the time the second grant was made, land on both sides of the two acres had been alienated to different holders (Sylvester de Preston and Walter Carpentarius).

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Francesc Eiximenis on Royal Officials

A View of Fourteenth Century Aragon

JILL R. WEBSTER

THE aim of this article is not to give a complete list of all the administrative positions in the Catalano-Aragonese Federation in the fourteenth century, but to show the historical importance of the *Dotzè del Crestià* of Francesc Eiximenis. A Catalan Friar Minor whose dates are approximately 1340-1409, Eiximenis wrote prolifically, his main work being an encyclopaedia on the Christian life, bearing the title *El Crestià*, the Christian. He intended to write thirteen books but only four are extant and it is the last of these — Book twelve in the original scheme — with which we are concerned here. Most of this is still unpublished.

In the twelfth book Eiximenis uses many well-known sources, both ecclesiastical and secular, ranging from Aristotle through Alfonso X of Castile, St. Thomas Aquinas and John of Salisbury, to mention four of the most important. More specifically, however, when referring to the officials of the kingdom he is relying not only on Alfonso X but on Peter IV of Aragon, who drew up a series of rules for court functionaries, known as *Ordinacions*. Many of these *Ordinacions* have been published by Bofarull¹ and it is interesting to see how on many occasions Eiximenis has copied them almost literally.

Bofarull omitted the document dealing with the requirements for and duties of the Constable, probably because the manuscript was in a very poor state of legibility.² Quotations in this article therefore have been taken directly from the manuscript and have been partly reconstructed from the Friar's text which must have been written with Peter IV's *Ordinació* on the Constable at hand. The latter was dated at Valencia, 25th September, 1386 and whilst a large part of Eiximenis' book was written by that date, it is unlikely that it was completed before 1391. This date serves to indicate the exact period which will be described here.

¹ "Ordinacions fetes per lo molt alt senyor en Pere Terc (referred to here as Peter IV by his position as King of Aragon), rei d'Aragó sobre lo regiment de tots los oficials de la sua cort", ed. Próspero de Bofarull, *Procesos de las antiguas cortes y parlamentos de Cataluña, Aragón y Valencia*, 5 (Barcelona, 1850); except that relating to the Constable, which can be found in MS 622 of the Archivo del Real del Reino de Valencia, fols. 146v-158r.

² *Op. cit.* Note 1.

The *Dotzè del Crestià* classifies the officials of the King's household under three main headings: —

“firstly... those who act as ministers of justice.

Secondly... those who act as advisers.

Thirdly those who act as the King's personal attendants.”³

This classification will be followed here, but before describing the individual offices, Eiximenis makes certain general statements which should be borne in mind: —

“laws should [be established as they are] necessary to the good ruling of the kingdom and principality of the overlord.”⁴

All officials must swear at the beginning of their term of office that they will not receive bribes of money or in kind: —

“under penalty of penury and of being declared infamous for evermore and of being deprived forthwith of their office and all benefits.”⁵

They should be appointed for one year only at the end of which “a man ordained for that purpose”⁶ should declare before the Council assembled in the Town Hall the good and bad things the officials had done to the Community during that time. Such a declaration should not be prejudiced and should consist of a recitation of facts. The officials should be paid adequate salaries but Eiximenis considers it advantageous if they have private incomes, as they will not then be tempted to accept bribes. The salaries should be taken from the common funds (*Comú*) and not from money collected by the various officials. To summarise, Eiximenis was anxious to stress the importance of moral integrity in those who were to hold positions of importance.

Primary importance is given to the Chancellor whom Eiximenis regards as the first officer of the realm after the King. Alfonso X puts him in second place, giving the first to the King's chaplain. The Chancellor, according to the *Ordinacions* of Peter IV, should be an archbishop or bishop, who is a doctor of law and Eiximenis agrees that he should be “a learned, famous and conscientious ecclesiastic.”⁷ He is called the Head of Justice because on him should rest all justice and he should be firm and incapable

³ *Dotzè del Crestià*, Ch. 679, MS 167, Valencia Cathedral Archives “primerament... aquells qui servexen a justícia. Segonament aquells qui servexen a consell. Terçament aquells qui servexen a la perssona del príncep.”

⁴ *Op. cit.*, Ch. 672, “leys... necessàries al bon regiment del regne o del principat del senyor.”

⁵ *Op. cit.*, Ch. 672, “sots pena de penúria e de ésser infamis per a tostemps e de continent sien prifats de lur offici e de tot benefici.”

⁶ *Op. cit.*, Ch. 672, “hom a açò deputat”.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, Ch. 680, “hom ecclesiàstich entenent e conscienciat e famós.”

of being moved by anyone regardless of their importance. He is the king's chief minister, president of the Council, the *Audiència* (tribunal of justice) and the Chancellory and should consequently receive a salary which will free him from financial worry. Eiximenis obviously thinks that Peter IV does not give sufficient importance to the moral qualities, and the Friar's views in this connection have been dealt with by Probst.⁸ To summarise his observations on this office: briefly, the Chancellor must be honest, merciful, pleasant, accessible, without ostentation or pride and it is preferable that he be chosen for his wealth so that he will be above temptation and less likely to show partiality. Alfonso X makes no mention of the Chancellor's position as Lord Chief Justice but this is emphasised by Eiximenis and brought out by Probst in his comments on the Chancellor. Probst develops the question of justice by setting out the system used in the oriental empire, under Theodosius II, taken by Eiximenis as his ideal.⁹

Four courts are recommended according to the gravity of the matter, the *Tribunal de les coses menudes* (Magistrate's Court), the *Justícia Civil* (Civil Tribunal), the *Justícia Criminal* (Criminal Court) and the *Tribunal del Príncep* (Prince's Court) which would serve as a court of appeal. This latter would also deal with differences between nobles and peasants and would have twelve counsellors. Each tribunal would be presided over by a judge and have one assessor. The Friar then gives twelve things a judge should consider before pronouncing a sentence and the procedure to be followed in the hearing of witnesses. Since these have been quoted in full by Probst, it would seem superfluous to repeat them here. The Friar, however, goes on to describe just how justice was administered in the Catalano-Aragonese Federation and the officials of importance under the Chancellor or Lord Chief Justice.

Under him are the *veguers* (ordinary judges) and *batlles* (magistrates) in Catalonia and Valencia (*zalmedinas* and *justícias* in Aragon). The former presided over local tribunals and were appointed by the king with the approval of the rulers of the town, whilst the *batlles* dealt with all cases concerning the royal patrimony or the Jewish and Moorish communities.

The Constable, who is not given any placing by Eiximenis, is the head of the army and generally known as the *Mestre de la Cavalleria* (Master of the Cavalry) in the Catalano-Aragonese Federation. According to the Statutes of Aragon this position should be occupied by one of the king's sons who should also be a knight. Neither Eiximenis nor Peter IV insist

⁸ J. H. Probst, "Francesch Eiximeniç, ses idées politiques et sociales," *Revue Hispanique*, 39 (1917) 1-82.

⁹ *Idem.*

on this point but both emphasise that if no member of royalty is available, a man of noble lineage may be chosen. The officer had previously been called *senescal* in Catalonia, but Peter IV wished him to be known in the future as Constable. As head of the army, the Constable in the words of Peter IV had "endless work and important missions"¹⁰ and consequently deserved fitting remuneration. The way in which this should be given is particularly interesting, as it is evident that Eiximenis has copied the relevant part of Peter IV's *Ordinacio* almost word for word. This particular document is still unpublished, as already indicated, and is in a very bad state of preservation, so that Eiximenis' remarks enable otherwise illegible words to be deciphered.¹¹ The fact that Eiximenis has so literally copied his authority on this occasion would lead the scholar to suppose this to be the case in other instances, where the source is not so readily available.

In addition to all military gains the Constable was to receive one thousand *sols* (obsolete monetary unit) per hundred households in any town where a siege had lasted more than fifteen days. If the siege were successful and the place captured, the Constable was entitled to one twentieth of all booty with the exception of arms and food. Two thirds of all fines or taxes levied on the army were to be for the account of the Constable and he had the right to all horses and arms of knights conquered in closed battle. All these stipulations follow very closely Peter IV's *Ordinació* of 25th September, 1386.

Under the Constable were two other Officials, the *Alguatzir* and the *Mostassaf*. The former is rated by Eiximenis as the third official in the kingdom and stress is laid on the fact that he is the lowest executor of justice. His functions too have been fairly fully described by Probst who mentions that his duty is to punish all wrongdoers in the interests of peace and prosperity within the Community.¹² If he sees that he is ordered to

¹⁰ V. note 1, MS 622, "treballs infinits e les missions grans".

¹¹ *Dotzè del Crestià*, Ch. 238, "Que lo dit conestable haja de tots guanyis de cavalcades que-s faran per hòmens de la dita host, axí de cavall com de peu, ço és hajen de les cinch parts pertanyents al rey les dues parts e lo rey n'aja les tres. Axí mateix de la batalla campal que no sia reyal e de entrades de lochs dels enemichs de tot guany alrey pertanyent d'aquestes coses ell deu haver una part de la quinta qui-n pertany al rey."

Ms. 622, v. Note 1.

"Que'l dit conestable haja de tots guanyis de cavalcades que faran per hòmens de la dita host, axí de cavall com de peu, e a saber de la quinta part pertanyent a nos [i. e. the King] les dues parts axí que a nos ne haja (?) les tres. De tot guany que no farem de la batalla campal que no sia reyal com encara de tots guanyis qui-s fehen (?) per entrades de lochs dels enemichs, ço és del quint pertanyent a nos, e lo dit guany la quinta part axí que del dit host nos ne hajam quatre parts e ell la huna."

¹² *Op. cit.*, Note 8.

disobey these principles, he should endeavour to prevent the execution of the command, as being against truth and justice. Greater stress is laid on his powers of executing civil justice but it is clear that his jurisdiction extended to war. He was to receive one third of the fines and taxes imposed on the army, with the exception of those imposed on merchants and retailers; and these latter were to be for the *Mostassaf*. He also was to receive one twentieth of the king's share of the *cavalcades* (cavalcades) once the Constable's part had been deducted. In the *Ordinació* outlining the duties of the *Alguatzir*, however, no mention is made of his activities in wartime. Since these are included in the *Ordinació* on the Constable, it would appear that Eiximenis only consulted this latter document. He does not even consider it important to mention the *Alguatzir*'s civil duties which occupied the greater part of his time.

A similar discrepancy is evident in the case of the *Mostassaf* who is described by Soldevila as a municipal magistrate engaged in inspecting markets, weights and measures.¹³ Eiximenis, whilst corroborating this, stresses that in fact his sphere of activity was the army and this latter fact is borne out by Peter IV's *Ordinació* regarding the *Alguatzir*. The Friar mentions that the *Mostassaf* is elected by the Constable and "has by right of office one third of all goods and confiscations of false merchandise incurred by members of the army or accruing through the army... and has in addition the bodies and tongues of all animals cut up in the army to be sold."¹⁴

It has already been mentioned that one third of all taxes and fines imposed on the army was to be shared between the *Alguatzir* and the *Mostassaf*. In addition the latter was entitled to one third of all benefits accruing from punishments and sentences imposed on merchants and retailers.

Eiximenis is very explicit about how prisoners should be treated and stipulates that men of an honourable station in life should be treated accordingly, being subjected to the least possible discomfort. The method of procedure is amusing in itself: —

"It used to be the custom that if the *Alguatzir* should ride forth and take a man of honour that he say to him, 'Sir, I would like to speak with you a while. Mount this mule and we will talk at my house', and he would make him ride on some beast provided for the purpose and no-one would perceive that the

¹³ Ferran Soldevila, *Historia de España*, 2 (Barcelona, 1952).

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, note 3, Bk. I, (1484), Ch. 238, "haja per dret de son offici lo terç de tots los bens e confiscacions de falses mercaderies en que seran encorreguts aquells de la host o qui vendran per la host... e haja encara los cors e les lengues de tota bèstia qui-s desfaça en la host per vendre."

man was a prisoner. On arrival at his house he would say to him, 'mount your mule or horse and come with me a while.'¹⁵

If he were not a man of honour, then the *Alguatzir* would ask him to go with him but no man would be ill-treated, unless he were a dangerous criminal or expected to escape. The outlook of an ecclesiastic is bound to differ from that of a temporal ruler and Eiximenis shows this by recommending that prisoners be consoled and comforted in prison. By treating them with compassion, the *Alguatzirs* would make lifelong friends and the wrongdoers would remember their kindness with gratitude, he thinks. As far as the housing of prisoners was concerned, this should be according to status and men and women should be separated. Non-Christians should also be kept apart from Christians, all being treated with justice and courtesy. In all aspects of justice a love of God and his mercy was to be kept in mind.

After the officers of justice, Eiximenis places in order of importance those who personally served the king, such as the Chamberlain (*camarlench*), Majordomo and the *Mestre Racional* (in charge of financial affairs). This order is to be found in the *Ordinacions* of Peter IV, the above officials being placed second, fourth and fifth respectively. Here a difference of emphasis is observed, in that the King describes the duties of the Chamberlain in considerable detail, whereas Eiximenis has very little to say about them. This is understandable since the King would naturally be more concerned over his own personal attendants than the Friar. The latter's interests would necessarily lie in a broader field and would be related to the contribution made by the body of officials to the prosperity of the Community. He describes the Chamberlain as the King's personal adviser and counselor, who because he is constantly at his side, can do him more good or harm. If there are any secrets such as personal defects or diseases, which the King wishes to keep secret from the public, the Chamberlain will be aware of them, as his position is that of private and confidential secretary. Peter IV states that there should be two chamberlains, so that one can take over from the other in case of sickness or excessive work. One, however, would be in charge and the King goes into careful detail as to when and how the two chamberlains should go about their duties.

The Majordomo, who is given fourth place in order of importance, is also concerned with the king's person. Probst does not comment at any

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, note 3, Ch. 794, "Costuma solia ésser que si l'alguatzir cavalcàs e presés a negun hom de honor que li diguera axí, 'N'aytal, yo he a parlar ab vos un poch. Pujats en aqueixa mula e parlarem a casa mia', e feya'l cavalcar en qualque bèstia que ja aguera presta a açó, e negun no percebia que l'om aquell fos estat pres. Vinguera a sa casa e li diguera, 'muntats en vostra mul o cavall, e venits ab mi un poch'.

length about this official but stresses the main points. The Majordomo is in charge of all table and culinary arrangements and Alfonso X describes him as "an official without whom no money should be spent in the king's house."¹⁶

It was customary in the Catalano-Aragonese Federation to have three majordomos, one for Aragon, one for Valencia and Majorca and a third for Catalonia. These officers were chosen from the nobility, *nobles cavallers* (noble knights), and were responsible for the good health and complexion of the sovereign. They were to be guided in this by the advice given by the prince's doctors or any other competent person. This was a very important aspect of their duties, as on them depended in many cases the lives of the members of the royal family. It was not uncommon for people to be poisoned and Eiximenis comments on this by stating that the prince should be "preserved from potions in various ways, for example by having his food and drink tasted or by the presence of good precious stones provided for that purpose, and special snake's tongues, and celestial tokens which the said prince should wear on the advice of the astrologers and should always have prepared in the court much theriac and *matridat* and other profitable remedies against poisons."¹⁷ Theriac (*triaga*) and *Matridat* were both medieval medicines, the former an antidote against poison and the latter more usually applied in case of the Black Death.

The Majordomo was responsible for seeing that the prince ate the right food for the four seasons and that the royal chef could provide international cuisine. He was also in charge of table procedure and had to see that grace was said before the meal had begun, that doctors were in attendance to watch the way the prince ate and assist him if he should be poisoned or about to choke. The Majordomo was also responsible for the welfare of the royal guests, says Eiximenis, and particularly those who were from other nations. In these circumstances the banquet should be well prepared "so that not the slightest detail be forgotten, and the curtaining be both beautiful and abundant, and the crockery adequate and in readiness, and all the servants well-dressed and attired better than on other days, and many different and good foods, well-prepared in the style of the guests' nation if at all possible."¹⁸

¹⁶ Alfonso X, *Las Siete Partidas*, (Madrid, 1807), 2, Title 9, "oficial sin el qual non se debe facer despensa en casa del rey."

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, note 3, Ch. 746, "guardat de metzines per diverses vies, ço és per tasts de ses viandes e de son beure, e per assistència de bones pedres precioses a açó deputades, e de lengues de serps specials, e de empromptes celestials que lo dit príncep deu portar segons consell dels astrólechs, e tostemps se deu tenir en la cort molta triaga aparellada, e matridat, e d'altres coses profitoses contra verí."

¹⁸ *Idem*, "que no y falla plats ne tille, ans l'encortinament sia bell e copiós, e la vexella presta

There should be a large quantity of food, well-prepared and well-served and the waiters should be ready to do the Majordomo's bidding, without engaging in superfluous conversation. The smooth running of any banquet depended on the skill and efficiency of the Majordomo, whose position was of undisputed importance.

The third main department within the King's household was also exceedingly important, for it concerned the exchequer. The three officers occupying fifth, sixth and seventh places in order of precedence were all in charge of royal finance. The chief of these, known as the *Mestre Racional* was assisted by two other officers, the *Escrivà de Ració* who dealt with the distribution of money amongst the personnel of the royal household and the treasurer (*tresorer*) who took charge of income and expenditure. Eiximenis does not seem to be particularly interested in the *Mestre Racional*, whom he says is responsible for all accounts rendered to him by his subordinates. It is obviously necessary that he should be loyal, trustworthy and God-fearing but since he has no other duties apart from "listening to the expenditure of the others, it is not necessary for us to deal with him at length,"¹⁹ the Friar adds. Peter IV would not have agreed with Eiximenis, as in *Ordinació 149* he deals at great length with this officer's duties and obligations. Much of this description is devoted to enumerating the officials with whom the *Mestre Racional* is required to deal in the course of his work. The King also indicates the procedure he should follow in several different circumstances.

The *Mestre Racional's* subordinate, the *Escrivà de Ració*, is not dealt with at much greater length by Eiximenis, who stresses the moral integrity necessary for such a position. In war, "he has special duties, since he has to take care of the wages, and see to the inspection of the knights and the estimates of live and dead beasts, and attend to the watches...."²⁰

He should be near the Constable's tent, so that he can be relied upon at any time and be careful to see that the prince can pay his army in order to avoid the lowering of his reputation. With him should be those guides (*adalills*) and infantrymen (*almugàvers*) who were given the job of being on the alert. Peter IV lists the way in which the *Escrivà de Ració* should perform his duties and mentions the keeping of four account books, to prevent unauthorised persons from entering the King's household.²¹

e aparencada, e ls servidors tots bé vestits e endreçats mils que altres dies, e les viandes moltes e bones, e bé endressades segons l'estil de la nació dels convidats si fer-se pot."

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, note 3, Ch. 747, "hoir lo compte dels altres no-ns cal fer lonch tractat."

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, note 3, Ch. 747, "porta singulars càrrechs, car ha a fer a tots les cauteles del sou, e a fer les mostres dels cavallers e les estimacions de les bèsties vives e mortes, e ha attendre a les guaytes..."

²¹ *Op. cit.*, note 1.

The second official under the *Mestre Racional* was the treasurer and Eiximenis indicates why a knight should not be chosen for this position but opts in favour of a *notable ciutadà* (worthy citizen). The treasurer's position has been described in great detail by Probst. However, to complete this survey of officials of the realm, some reference should be made to points already dealt with by Probst. Peter IV does not stipulate from which level of society the treasurer should be chosen, nor does he have a great deal to say about this particular office. Eiximenis, on the other hand, states that there had been some discussion as to whether the treasurer should be a member of the clergy, a Jew, a eunuch, or a member of the laity. The latter option was considered most suitable and it was decided that a *notable ciutadà* would be able to fulfil the duties required of him better than a knight. The treasurer was in charge of income and expenditure in the royal household and was consequently exposed to certain vices, such as avarice. He often tended to defer payments rather than meet the expenses incurred with generosity. Such parsimoniousness undermined the dignity of the king but it was a failing more likely to be found in a Jew than in a Christian layman. Although Eiximenis displays no anti-semitic feeling, he considers the Jew as morally suspect in that his life is spent in amassing money, often by the impoverishment of others. Knights err in being too generous and in any case the Friar regards fighting as their vocation. It becomes increasingly evident as he describes the reasons why a *notable ciutadà* should be appointed as treasurer, that Eiximenis looks upon each class as having its specific duties in accordance with the true spirit of the *Respublica Christiana*. These duties should not be conceded to members of another class, as the balance of society would be upset.

The *notables ciutadans* are wiser than the knights, according to Eiximenis, since they have the advantage of living in large cities, which he repeats, were built so that people would become more knowledgeable. Knights on the other hand do not have their minds sharpened by contact with ignorant peasants. The *notables ciutadans* are especially privileged as they are midway between knights and merchants and can therefore understand the idiosyncrasies of both classes.²² Eiximenis seems to regard the *notables ciutadans* as possessing only the good points culled from those above and below them in the social scale. Their sound common-sense and business acumen will stand them in far greater stead than the more romantic cha-

²² *Op. cit.*, note 3, Ch. 755, "e saben de l'un e de l'altre, e per consequent entenen-se queucom en la noblea dels cavallers, e per tal se fan mills ab ells en ço que per tresoreria han a fer ab ells." ("and they know something about each, and consequently understand something of the nobility of the knights, and as a result do better with them in matters of the treasury pertaining to them.")

racter of the knights. The daily life of a knight does not teach him how to do accounts properly and his pride would preclude him from dealing kindly with humble folk. It would also make it difficult for him to be under the command of others, so it is obvious that he would be unsuited to the duties of a treasurer. Also unsuitable were Jews who might use the office as a means of taking revenge on Christians. Eunuchs too were looked upon as the most mean-spirited and revengeful people and should not on any account be chosen for important offices.²³

The treasurer is the last official described in any detail by Eiximenis, as he makes the comment that "to relate the duties of other lesser officials is not necessary in the present treatise since they are subordinate to those we have already mentioned and do not therefore greatly influence the *Cosa Pública (Respublica Christiana)*."²⁴

Nevertheless, whilst denying the need for explaining the positions of lesser officials, the Friar makes some general observations on the way the rulers of the towns should behave, and although these do not really fall within the category of officials of the realm, a brief reference to them helps to complete the historical picture. Their business is to see that the towns are governed for the well-being of the Community, for they are said to care for the good of all men. They should provide them with the necessities of life and see that peace is maintained publicly and privately. In this way they ensure the good estate and continuity of the *Respublica Christiana*.

The importance of Eiximenis' observations lies not in their originality but in the emphasis he places on the requirements for and the duties of the King's officers. Whilst upholding the basic conditions laid down by Alfonso X and Peter IV, the Friar reveals his ecclesiastical calling in the way he regards their various qualifications and outlines their activities. For instance, moral integrity is required in a Chancellor, Eiximenis states, but Peter IV does not comment on this. In the case of the *Alguatzir* the King merely comments on his wartime activities. More attention is paid by the Friar to the post of treasurer than any other office and it would seem that this reflects the period during which he was writing.

²³ *Op. cit.*, note 3, Ch. 754, "quant l'om és castrat, se torna pijor que no era, especialment se torna a presumtuós e maliciós e avar, e pus cobeu de fembres en son cor que altre, quant és depertit si mateix, e açò procura la malícia que ha dins, qui'l fa tornar cech e foll e li encén al cor sa mala cobejança." ("when a man is a eunuch he becomes worse than he was before, becoming especially presumptuous, malicious and miserly, and more covetous of women in his heart than any other man; for he is so degenerate himself and that causes the malice within him and makes him blind and mad and inflames his heart with his evil lust.")

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, note 3, Ch. 755, "dir dels altres menuts e menors officials no pertany al present tractat en quant lur ordinació està sots aquests que avem dits e qui no toca molt l'estament ne regiment de la cosa pública."

At the end of the fourteenth century in the Catalano-Aragonese federation the *notables ciutadans* had already attained a significant position within the Community. Since it is thought that Eiximenis came from the merchant class, he had a special interest in its prosperity and the treasurer's post gave him an opportunity of extolling the virtues of the successful merchants who rose to the ranks of *notables ciutadans*. It will also have been noticed that all officials were chosen from the ranks of the ecclesiastics, the nobility or the *notables ciutadans*, no mention being made of any other class participating in royal government.

Justice is dealt with more fully than any other aspect of this government and this merely emphasises the moral purpose of the Friar's works. His recommendation that prisoners be treated with mercy and kindness reveals his Franciscan background and stands out in contrast to Peter IV's advocacy of harsh treatment and torture. Nevertheless, a modern reader finds it difficult to see the efficacy of the over-kind treatment recommended by Eiximenis in a society where brutality was evidenced even in very minor cases of infraction of the law.

In the foregoing an attempt has been made to introduce the English reader to an important fourteenth century Catalan writer, Francesc Eiximenis. The value of his works for historical research will have been observed; his corroboration of the *Ordinacions* of Peter IV published by Bofarull would alone support this contention. However, his words also enable scholars to decipher other manuscripts no longer legible, such as the *Ordinació* on the Constable. As a friar minor his views differ from those of the authorities he quotes for his prime concern is not the material well-being but the moral integrity of the Community. For Eiximenis the royal officials hold positions of supreme importance, as upon their good government depends the prosperity of the *Respublica Christiana*. If they fulfil their obligations as laid down by Alfonso X and Peter IV and keep in mind the recommendations he himself makes, they will set an example worthy of emulation by their inferiors in the social scale. Only in this way can the King's officials and those beneath their jurisdiction observe the true concept of the medieval *Respublica Christiana* as a hierarchical body of men working together for the establishment of a Christian Community on earth.

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The Life of Guy of Merton

by Rainald of Merton

MARVIN L. COLKER

MERTON Priory,¹ founded in 1114,² was "perhaps the most influential of all the English houses of regular canons"³ and figured prominently in the growth of the Austin Order in England. Not only did the priory flourish itself, but it also established daughter houses at Taunton, Bodmin, Canterbury, Twinham, Cirencester, and perhaps Dover.⁴

One of the earliest members of Merton Priory was a certain Guy. Like Lanfranc and Anselm, he came from Italy to England,⁵ where he had important impact, though less than that of his two countrymen. An account of the foundation of Merton Priory in College of Arms Arundel MS 28 fol. 3v (15th century) mentions him as "Ille apud nos merito famosissimus magister Gwido,"⁶ and he may be the distinguished philosopher named in a fragmentary chronicle of French history: "Hoc tempore tam in diuina quam in humana philosophia floruerunt Lanfrancus Cantuariorum episcopus, Guido Langobardus, Maingaudus Teutonicus, Bruno Remensis."⁷

¹ On Merton Priory see: William Dugdale, *Monasticon Anglicanum* VI (London, 1830) 245-247; Alfred Heales, *The Records of Merton Priory* (London, 1898); H. E. Malden, *The Victoria History of the Counties of England: Surrey*, IV (London, 1912) 64-68; L. H. Cottineau, *Répertoire topo-bibliographique des abbayes et prieurés* II (Mâcon, 1939) 1826; J. C. Dickinson, *The Origins of the Austin Canons and Their Introduction into England* (London, 1950) 117-119, 126, 128-130, 133, 150, 161, 187-188, 192, 230, 234, 238, 253-254, 288; David Knowles and R. N. Hadcock, *Medieval Religious Houses of England and Wales* (New York, 1953) 146; G. R. C. Davis, *Medieval Cartularies of Great Britain* (London, 1958) 75; N. R. Ker, *Medieval Libraries of Great Britain: A List of Surviving Books* (London, 1964) 130-131; J. C. Dickinson, 'Les constructions des premiers chanoines réguliers en Angleterre,' *Cahiers de civilisation médiévale X^e-XII^e siècles* 10 (1967) 181; D. J. Turner, 'Excavations near Merton Priory, 1962-3,' *Surrey Archaeological Collections* 64 (1967) 35-70, esp. 36-38.

² See Dickinson, *Origins*, 117.

³ *Ibid.* 116.

⁴ *Ibid.* 117-119.

⁵ See the Latin text *infra* ch. 1.

⁶ I am grateful to Dr. Conrad Swan, Rouge Dragon Pursuivant of Arms, of the College of Arms, London, who had the texts in the codex which pertain to Merton photographed for me and granted me permission to publish these texts.

⁷ "Ex historiae Francicae fragmento" in *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France* XII (1781) 3. Note *e* on this page declares "Quis fuerit iste Guido Langobardus nobis assequi non licuit."

Guy joined Merton at its inception and later became the first prior and a principal organizer of its daughter houses Taunton and Bodmin.⁸

Fortunately, there is preserved a biography of Guy, recording events in his life after he entered Merton Priory. This work abounds in interest, providing insights into the character, personality, efforts, and problems of a twelfth-century monastic administrator.

The biography is in the form of a letter written by a Rainald to a Ralph, in answer to Ralph's request for information about Guy's life. Rainald certainly belonged to Merton Priory, as is plentifully evident from the *Epistola*: cf. "nostrorum quidam" (ch. 4), "ad nos" and "nobis" (ch. 10), "confessionum nostrarum" and "nostris miseriis" (ch. 11), "inter nos" and "omnes nos" (ch. 13) in reference to Merton. T. D. Hardy is probably correct in regarding Ralph as a carnal, rather than spiritual, son of Guy:⁹ cf. "de uita gloriosi parentis tui" (introd.) and "Te... patrisare cognoui," "honorabilis pater tuus," "uenerandi parentis tui," and the admonition not "a tam religioso parente degeneres" (ch. 18). In any case, it is clear that the *Epistola* was composed while Algar was bishop of Coutances (ch. 13), and so, between 1132 and 1151.¹⁰

The *Epistola* represents almost a Mirror of the Ideal Religious. Guy is depicted as sincerely devout and zealous in religious duties (chs. 2, 4, 5, 8, 10), as conscientious and strict in keeping the finest points in the customs of Merton (chs. 2, 3), as able to endure suffering (ch. 11), as humble (chs. 1, 4, 5, 12), as extremely charitable toward the poor (chs. 8, 9), as comforting to those in need of support and encouragement (chs. 11, 13).

Guy, however, disliked administrative work and felt as if it were a trap and a prison (ch. 10). The *Epistola* speaks of him as a man of truth in every way (ch. 18). Indeed the text says that he wished to please God alone (ch. 10), that he was fearless in speaking his mind (ch. 18), and that he would say what had to be said (chs. 8, 18) and lived by his words (ch. 8). Such forthrightness would have caused difficulty to any administrator. And Guy did have trouble more than once. At Taunton he was unable to reform the habits of the secular canons, who had no wish to change their ways (ch. 7). The poor were not satisfied with his gifts, and the rich were vexed by his giving to the poor what they themselves had coveted (ch. 9). Likewise, it seems that people complained to the bishop of Exeter against Guy on the

⁸ See the Latin text *infra* chs. 1, 6-8, 13.

⁹ *Descriptive Catalogue of the Materials Relating to the History of Great Britain and Ireland to the End of the Reign of Henry VII II* (Rolls Series; London, 1865) 139.

¹⁰ P. B. Gams, *Series episcoporum ecclesiae catholicae* (Regensburg, 1873) 542 and Dickinson, *Origins*, 119.

grounds that he did not know how to receive guests and did not show sufficient respect to men of power and influence, who could benefit the church greatly (ch. 10).

Whatever the complaints and annoyances that he occasioned, Guy must have been highly respected at the time of his death. Such a multitude came to Exeter for the funeral as had never been seen there before, and not even a bishop, within the memory of those then present, had received such veneration (ch. 17). In the *Epistola* Guy is mentioned as saintly (chs. 12, 18) and as saint-like (ch. 17), and there are some hagiographic touches in the biography when it deals with the efficacy of his prayers (chs. 11, 12) and with a miracle about his burial (ch. 16).

But here is an English summary of the *Epistola*, which will allow the reader to form a fuller impression of Guy of Merton:

(Intro.) Dear brother, after a delay because of my many occupations, I now fulfill your urgent request that I write to you about the life of your father.

(1) Guy, an Italian of great reputation for his direction of schools, joined Merton Priory at its start. (2) He took his novitiate very seriously. When the time came for his confession before the prelate, he was so anguished that he could hardly speak; instead he pulled his hair and dashed his head against a wall. After he fully became a monk at Merton, he was unlike others, who are consumed with pride and disdain learning the minute points among the customs of the monastery. On the contrary, he observed these minutiae as if they came from God himself.

(3) He avoided secular concerns and attended to reading and meditation. When he engaged in devotions and his mind happened to wander by human frailty, he would return to himself with indignation and sometimes gnash his teeth or dig his nails into his flesh or beat his chest with his fist to make his mind more attentive. He persecuted his flesh as a hostile enemy. He frequently slept on straw, and he would have killed himself through starvation, had the prior not objected.

(4) The prior of the monastery, Robert, promoted Guy to deacon even though Guy protested his unworthiness. Certain of our canons, especially subprior Robert, still recall that Guy performed with particular zeal the consecration of the taper on Holy Saturday. He was so intent on psalms during his recitation of them that it seemed as if he were holding God by the foot, as people commonly say. (5) Only under compulsion did he accept the priesthood. He was deeply involved in his priestly duties, and as he declared humbly to a friend, only twice did he celebrate Mass without tears.

(6) Bishop William of Winchester, eager to establish a community of Austin canons at Taunton, requested Prior Robert to grant Guy for this enterprise. (7) Guy and the brothers who came with him from Merton lived according to the Rule of St. Augustine at Taunton, and certain secular canons who had been there began to adopt the way of life according to the rule. But though Guy invested much effort in training the secular canons, he was unable to accomplish much, because of their firmly rooted bad habits and their lack of will to improve. Guy was deeply upset over his failure to achieve the success at Taunton that he had wished.

(8) While he was prior at Taunton, he said what had to be said and lived according to his words. He gave to the poor all that he could. Frequently he would assign to the sick and needy the food that had been set on his own table, while he would be content with bread and water. Someone, expressing pity for Guy, complained that he was handing over to the poor the good food that had been brought for him, whereas he could have exerted his authority and obtained from the cellarer other food for the poor. Guy replied "I do not doubt that the poor should be provided for from any source. But what is taken from one's own mouth is more pleasing to God. Let me not fatten my flesh for the worms and see a precious creature of God die before me with hunger. We desire to be saved and do not want to take pains. Who of the saints attained rest without having taken pains? In passing from delight to delight, one cannot attain happiness in this world and also the next." Guy macerated his body with fasting, vigils, and excessive cold: in winter he often clothed himself only in a tunic beneath a thin cape and did not use a pelisse. He lived an even more austere life at Taunton than at Merton, for at Taunton there was no one to restrain his fervor. He gave to the poor whatever he could have kept for himself. He would buy for them capes, tunics, and shoes. He would even secretly take from the dormitory clothing which he would present to beggars, without working hardship upon the monks, to whom he always provided whatever was necessary.

(9) The people of Taunton still remember him as a good prior, though the poor were not pleased despite all that he gave to them and though the rich disliked him because he would not lavishly assign to them what had been allotted for the poor. (10) Thus, complaints seem to have reached the bishop of Winchester that Guy was not carrying out his priorate satisfactorily, since he did not know how to receive guests and to honor the powerful, through whom the Church ought to grow. Guy in fact wished to please God alone and always considered the post of administrator burdensome. And so, by letters and many appeals he requested the prior of Merton to recall him to the place he loved. Finally he gained his desire. When he came back to us, he did not grieve, as do some people who are deposed from the priorate, but rejoiced as if freed from a prison or like a bird released from a trap, and he remarked to us that he had now found his heart which had left him for a long time. He was as ardent in his duties after his return as a man just beginning his monastic career.

(11) Among us he heard confessions: no one came to him in sadness who did not depart greatly comforted by him. He had a special gift of knowing how to console. The prior himself experienced Guy's sanctity, for after Guy's prayer on one occasion, the prior's illness was alleviated. (12) Indeed I heard that when Guy was at Taunton, he frequently calmed storms and performed other services through prayer.

(13) He taught and encouraged us all, until he was again sent off, to establish the Austin canons of Bodmin. Algar, then in charge of that place and now bishop of Coutances, obtained, though with difficulty, Guy as prior for the new Austin community. But not much later Guy died: he was sent to Bodmin in the winter and died in the following May, but only after the religious life was firmly fixed at Bodmin and after Algar and very many others had become canons and were strengthened in their way of life by Guy's teaching. (14) Shortly before the end of his life, a case arose which had to be discussed with the bishop of Exeter. On his journey to the bishop, Guy's horse dashed wildly and Guy

fell into a pit. His injury was grave. Brought to Exeter, he worsened in health from day to day. Geoffrey, then canon of Plimpton and now prior there, visited Guy, and Algar too was at his bedside. During his last period on earth, Guy ceaselessly accused himself of his sins.

(15) When the time of death drew near, he asked what day it was. Told that it was the Vigil of Ascension, he declared "Today is the day of my redemption, today is the day of God's compassion," and he concluded "It is the day of my joy."

(16) Geoffrey looked after the body, since Algar, in tears, could not control his distress. When the body was being clothed according to custom and the cloak with which Guy was to be wrapped was discovered too small, extending only to the knees, suddenly, as if by miracle, a suitable long cloak was found.

(17) Algar arranged to bring the body to the church of Bodmin. But the canons of Exeter objected to this plan, and the funeral was held in Exeter. Such a multitude flocked together for the rite as had never been seen in the city. So much respect for the body was shown as no one of Exeter remembers had been shown even to the body of a bishop or of anyone else of the city. Guy's body was laid in a stone sarcophagus and set in a place of honor in the monastery.

(18) See, dear brother, how excellent a man was your father. It would be detestable for you to degenerate from such a parent. His remarkable fervor, purity, and spirit of truth, by which he feared no one and spoke his mind freely, and his other gifts cannot be fully expressed by words. I wrote my account of Guy between the canonical hours, and often, when I should have been intent on these religious services, I was thinking instead about the composition: therefore, I wish you to compensate my effort by praying that I become an imitator of the sanctity of Guy.

Despite the value of the *Epistola* for the early history of Merton, Alfred Heales in his *The Records of Merton Priory* (London, 1898) strangely omits all mention of the biography, even though he names numerous sources on pp. xvii-xix and in Appendix pp. i-viii. Heales speaks of Guy only by citing the Arundel MS reference to him.¹¹ Three small passages from the *Epistola* are reproduced by Dickinson: "Quidam Italicus---consecutus fuerat" of ch. 1; "Qui in eadem ecclesia---non ualebant" of ch. 7; and "ad institutendam Bothminensem---roboratis" of ch. 13.¹²

The *Epistola* is preserved on folios 91-98 of British Museum Royal MS 8. E. ix, which also contains Alexander Nequam's *De laudibus diuinae sapientiae*.¹³ Both the Nequam and the Rainaldus in the codex were transcribed in the 15th century. The book belonged to Merton Priory¹⁴ and later to John Lord Lumley (ca. 1534-1609).¹⁵

¹¹ Heales, *Records of Merton Priory* 4. See the second paragraph of this paper.

¹² Dickinson, *Origins* 187 n. 7, 242 n. 1, 119 n. 1. Still another passage (p. 118 n. 8) is wrongly assigned to the *Epistola* and actually appears in a different work, concerning the foundation of Merton, on fol. 3^v of the Arundel MS. Dickinson mentions Guy on pp. 118-119, 187, 242.

¹³ The codex is described in G. F. Warner and J. P. Gilson, *British Museum Catalogue of Western Manuscripts in the Old Royal and King's Collections* I (London, 1921) 254.

¹⁴ Ker, *Medieval Libraries* 130.

¹⁵ See n. 13 *supra* and cf. Sears Jayne and F. R. Johnson, *The Lumley Library* (London, 1956) 313.

In presenting now the first complete edition of the biography, I adhere to the orthography of the only known manuscript, but errors of the scribe are corrected and chapter numbers are added. I am grateful to the authorities of the British Museum for granting permission to publish the text from a very clear microfilm. I likewise appreciate the encouragement of Rev. J. C. Dickinson, of Birmingham University, England.

EPISTOLA DE VITA VENERABILIS GVIDONIS
MERITONENSIS ECCLESIE CANONICI

Dilecto Suo Radulfo Suus Rainaldus¹

Petisti, charissime frater, et obnixe petisti quatinus de uita gloriosi parentis tui uel breuiter aliqua tibi transscriberem. Petitioni tue, quamuis pie, tamen assensum prebere diu distuli, tum multis occupationibus prepeditus tum potius materie magnitudinem uiribus mee possibilitatis nimis preponderare perpendens. Sed quoniam quas imperitia denegat, interdum uires caritas sumministrare solet, uitam ipsius saltem summam perstringere temptabo, tuoque desiderio, prout potero,² satisfacere curabo.

<i>

Igitur in primordio quo fratres apud Meritonam³ ad regulariter uiuendum secundum institutionem egregii doctoris Augustini congregabantur, quidam Italicus genere,⁴ qui in scholis regendis preclaram famam consecutus fuerat, nomine Guido, ad conuersionem inter ceteros uenit. Dicitur non potest quam^{4a} humiliter ut susciperetur expetiit, cum quanta deuotione religionis habitum suscepit.

<ii>

Totum enim negotium illud, quo ad militiam Christi nouicii promouentur, magnis gemitibus multisque lacrimis et suspiriis prosequabatur. Nam dum ad confessionem, ut mos est, prelato faciendam (fol. 91^v) uenisset, tanto dolore affectus est ut loqui uix posset, sic sibi uehementer indignans ut semetipsum per capillos traheret, caput ad parietem allideret, ex doloris uehementia quam ueraciter ad Deum conuerteretur insinuans. Tandem conuentui sociatus, non, tu plerique solent, quos scientia secularis inflat,⁵ minutas consuetudines monasterii dedignabatur addiscere, sed uelut ab ore Dei prolatas⁶ diligenter inuestigare et obseruare satagebat. Et quoniam, ut scriptum est 'Qui modica spernit, paulatim decedit,'⁷ ita e contrario per minimorum custodiam preceptorum fit progressus ad summa uirtutum.

¹ On Ralph and Rainald see my Introduction.

² petero *MS.*

³ On Merton Priory see n. 1 on my Introduction.

⁴ Cf. the second paragraph of this paper.

^{4a} quod *MS.*

⁵ scientia---inflat: cf. 1 Cor. 8: 1.

⁶ ab ore---prolatas: cf. Iob 15: 13.

⁷ Qui modica---decidit: cf. Eccli. 19: 1.

<iii>

Sic uir uenerabilis implendis maioribus institutis operam dabat ut non minorem diligentiam minimis obseruandis adhiberet. Verbi gratia: si quando uel ante capitulum uel alibi locorum ubi nobis moris est inclinare transisset et non inclinasset, licet iam longius processisset, ilico reuertebatur et tam deuote quam humiliter inclinabat. Amator claustris erat in tantum ut cum eum exire causa rationabilis uel necessitas compulset, quantocius redire festinaret. Curis secularibus animum impediri semper declinans, lectionibus etenim et meditationibus totus deditus erat, non solum stultiloquia uel scurrilia sed etiam ociosa uerba deuitans⁸ quando fratrum colloquiis intererat. (fol. 92) Sermones suos iuxta Apostolum semper in gratia sale sapientie condiebat,⁹ locutiones certis horis in claustris a patribus non ad destitutionem sed morum instructionem institutas perpendens. In ecclesia diuinis laudibus cum ceteris assistens, quando, ut se habet humana miseria, corde uagabatur, in semet reuersus sibi que multum indignans, interdum dentibus stridebat¹⁰ uel carnem unguibus discerpebat uel pectus pugno percutiebat, uelut hoc modo mentem stabiliorem reddere posset. Precipue uii psalmis^{10a} quando in conuentu dicebantur, interesse uolebat, dicens quod qui peccatorem se recognoscit, his psalmis, qui specialiter pro peccatis instituti sunt, occurrere debeat. Sic enim minuta peccata paruasque negligentias deflebat acsi omnium criminum reus esset. Quid referam quod suimet ex toto contemptor extiterit, qui nullam corporis ciram gerebat, immo uelut hostem infestissimum carnem suam persequabatur? Et nisi patris nostri prudentia refragaretur, eandem miro spiritus feruore ieiuniorum et escarum abstinentia funditus consumpsisset. In lectulo dum super uestimenta sua quiescere putaretur, subtus in solo stramento uolutabatur, iuxta illud de Canticis, circuiens et querens quem diligebat anima sua.¹¹ Et in eius (fol. 92v) amorem suspirans, lauabat per singulas noctes lectum suum. Lacrimis suis stratum suum rigabat.¹² Maxime tamen post matutinas usque ad lucem in sacris uigiliis excubare solebat.

<iv>

Quid plura? Tam¹³ religiose in omni conuersatione se habebat <ut>¹⁴ etiam his, qui ante se ad conuersionem uenerant, exemplo esset. Cernens pater monasterii, dominus Robertus,¹⁵ uirum ad omnem perfectionem uirtutum gradibus tendere, ad sacros illum ordines festinauit prouehere, et de clerico usque ad diaconatus officium se indignum reclamantem promoueri fecit. In quo sacro officio quam strenue ministrauerit, uerbis expleri non potest. Adhuc nostrorum quidam, maxime dominus

⁸ scurrilia---deuitans: cf. Matth. 12: 36 and esp. *Regula S. Benedicti* 6 (ed. R. Hanslik, *CSEL* 75 [1960] 39).

⁹ in gratia---condiebat: Coloss. 4: 6.

¹⁰ dentibus stridebat: cf. Ps. 36: 12, Marc. 9: 17, Act. 7: 54.

^{10a} These are the seven penitential psalms.

¹¹ circuiens---anima sua: Cant. 3: 1.

¹² In ejus amorem---rigabat: Ps. 6: 7.

¹³ tam *bis MS.*

¹⁴ A space of five letters is left at this point in the codex, but perhaps only an *ut* is missing.

¹⁵ Canons from Huntingdon were the first to staff Merton Priory, and Robert, subprior of Huntingdon, became the first prior of Merton. He seems to have held this priorate from 1114 until his death in 1150. See Dugdale, *Monasticon* VI 78-81, 245; Heales, *Records* 6; Cottineau I 1438; Dickinson, *Origins* 116-117.

supprior Robertus,¹⁶ memorare solent cum quanta deuotione cerei consecrationem in Sabbato sancto persoluerit, asserentes nunquam, ut sibi uisum est, alicui officio deuotius peracto se interfuisse, omnibus circum astantibus miro compunctionis affectu permotis. Nimirum que legebat uel cantabat, cum tanta deuotione, cum tanto feruore tam instanter proferebat ut uere per os ipsius Spiritus Sanctus uerba proferre uideretur. Psalmis etiam quos dicebat quasi Deum, ut dici solet, pede teneret, totus insistebat.

<v>

Postea presbyterii gradum suscipere uix compulsus, hoc etiam sacrosanctum officium (fol. 93) tam deuote prosecutus est ut, sicut cuidam familiari suo post multum temporis humiliter confessus est, nunquam nisi bis missam¹⁷ sine lacrimis celebrauerit. Cerneret dum ad hoc sacrum misterium celebrandum se prepararet, lacrimis suffundi et quodam modo subito in uirum alterum commutari ut spiritu Dei totum illum agi dubitare minime posses.

<vi>

Interea uenerabilis Wintoniensis episcopus Guillelmus,¹⁸ quandam ecclesiam suam in Tantonensi territorio¹⁹ suo secundum regularem canonicorum institutionem informari desiderans, patrem nostrum dominum Robertum conuenit, et ut sibi prefatum uirum ad hoc opus concederet, humilibus precibus expedit. Quem licet nobis ualde necessarium, tamen quia sciebat Apostoli preceptum ut non que nostra sunt sed que aliorum querere debeamus,²⁰ ad instituendam prefatam ecclesiam cum paucis fratribus nostris direxit.

<vii>

Quo uir uenerabilis cum peruenisset et cum fratribus qui secum uenerant secundum morem ecclesie nostre regulariter uiueret, quidam canonicorum qui in eadem ecclesia seculariter antea uixerant ad conuersionem uenire ceperunt. In quibus erudiendis licet plurimum laborauerit, tamen parum proficere potuit quoniam eorum mores, in mala consuetudine inueterati, nouellam sancte conuersionis (fol. 93^v) gratiam aspirare non ualebant quia nec ad hoc niti, sicut opus est, omnino uolebant. Vnde nimis anxiabatur quod fructum quem desiderabat non faciebat.

<viii>

Tamen quamdiu in loco illo commoratus est, quod ad susceptum pastoris officium pertinet, que dicenda erant dicebat nec a uerbis uiuendo dissentiebat, sed sicut in Christo coram Christo uerba Christi loquebatur, sic Christo fauente quicumque

¹⁶ Not to be confused with the Robert of n. 15 *supra*.

¹⁷ *missam* (i *superscript* by the scribe) *MS*.

¹⁸ William Giffard was bishop of Winchester from 1100 to 1129: see Gams, *Series episcoporum* 198; Dickinson, *Origins* 118, 120 n. 1, 128; *Dictionary of British Biography* (1950) XXI 298-299; F. M. Powicke and E. B. Fryde, *Handbook of National Chronology* (London, 1961) 258. See also n. 19 *infra*.

¹⁹ The Austin priory of Taunton was founded about 1110 by William Giffard. On this priory see Dugdale, *Monasticon* VI 165-168; James Savage, *The History of Taunton in the County of Somerset* (Taunton, 1822) 71-82; Cottineau, *Répertoire* II 3123; Dickinson, *Origins* 118, 135, 242; Knowles and Hadcock, *Medieval Religious Houses* 155.

²⁰ non que---debeamus: 1 Cor. 10: 24.

precipiebat, prior ut erat nomine ita et opere prior implere satagebat. Ad hec cultor pauperem erat in tantum ut quicquid rationabiliter poterat eisdem impendere summo studio²¹ procuraret. Frequenter ad mensam sedens, que sibi apponebantur, infirmis et indigentibus reseruari faciebat, pane solummodo et aqua contentus. Cum autem aliquis, uelut illi compatiendo quia nichil boni corpusculo suo uel in cibis uel aliis uite necessariis conferret, conquereretur quod omnes pene bonos cibos sibi allatos pauperibus et infirmis offerendos reseruaret, non opus esse ut ita faceret, cum de celario de coquina potestatem haberet accipere sicut magister que pauperibus erogaret, humiliter respondebat: 'Et de penu et undecunque rationabiliter possunt, que Christi membris indigentibus largiantur, sumenda non ambigo. Tamen quod ori proprio subtrahitur, Christo fore magis gratum estimo. Ego cum (fol. 94) uolueram, bonas escas habere potero. Pauper et infirmus hinc penuria inde doloribus uexatur. Quid putas? Quomodo attendit et considerat unde aliquid boni sibi ueniat? Ego miserimus deuorarem quod aliquam illi conferre ualeat consolationem? Absit absit ut meam putridam carnem ad opus uermium²¹ incrassare debeam et preciosum membrum Christi²² coram me fame mori uideam. Esto. Saluari desideramus et laborare nolumus. Quem uero sanctorum absque labore ad requiem²³ peruenisse legimus? Veracis testatoris uerba sunt, quod difficile, immo impossibile, sit ut de deliciis ad delicias transeamus ut in hoc seculo et etiam in futuro beati simus.^{23a} Hinc ieiuniis, escarum abstinentia, magnis uigiliis, nimis etiam frigoribus corpus macerabat, tanto amplius quanto non, sicut apud nos, supra se habebat qui equi Dei supra modum interdum currentis habenas restringeret. Nimiis, inquam, frigoribus corpusculum affligebat, qui sepius in hyeme sine pellicea sola tunica sub tenui cappa uestitus erat. Quicquid habere poterat, maxime quod ad altare ex fidelium oblationibus ueniebat, in usus pauperum expendebat, inde cappas inde tunicas et sotulares ad opus eorum emens. Que cum deficerent, ad perticam in dormitorium ibat, et nunc pelliceam nunc tunicam pie rapiens, petenti pauperi secreto porrigebat. Nec hoc ita facie (fol. 94 v) bat ut fratres expoliaret, quibus abundanter necessaria semper procurabat.

<ix>

Tantonienses adhuc allum bonum priorem appellant. Qui uere pater orphanorum et uir uiduarum²⁴ erat, qui pauperum et infirmorum curam tam sollicitate gerebat, quibus dum inpenderet quicquid poterat, nunquam tamen eis satis erat. Diuitibus uero non bene placebat quoniam res pauperum in usus eorum prodige, sicut quidam faciunt, expendere nullo modo uolebat. Quibus tamen quod opus erat inpendebat, totum studium totaque deuotio ipsius erga pauperes existebat.

<x>

Hinc putant quidam auribus domini episcopi Wintoniensis insusurratum illum prioratum dignum non fore, qui hospites suscipere nesciret, potentes per quos ecclesia crescere habebat, sicut dignum erat non honoraret. Vir autem Dei, qui soli Deo placere querebat, oneri prelacionem semper habebat quia animarum lucrum, quod sitiebat, sicut uellet non inueniebat. Vnde litteris multisque legationibus, ut ad dictum locum de quo exierat reuerteretur, dominum priorem interpellauit. Tandem

²¹ putridam---uermium: cf. Eccli. 19:3.

²² preciosum---Christi: cf. 1 Cor. 6: 15, Ephes. 5: 30.

²³ absque---requiem: cf. Isai 14: 3, 2 Thess. 1: 17.

^{23a} difficile---simus: cf. Matth. 19:24, Mar. 10: 25, Luc. 18: 25.

²⁴ pater---uiduarum: cf. Ps. 67: 6.

desiderium consecutus, ubi ad nos reuersus est, non ut quidam de prioratu depositi solent contristabatur, sed tanquam ab ergastulo graui liberatus uel sicut auis de laqueo uenantium ereptus, letabatur, exultabat, Deoque gratias agebat, nobisque post modicum temporis quia cor suum, quod se diu dereliquerat, iam inuenisset, gaudens indicauit. Ac uelut tunc (fol. 95) primo ad conuersionem accederet, que retro gesserat paruipendens, ad summa toto studio ferebatur.

<xi>

Dumque illi suscipiendarum confessionum nostrarum cura commissa fuisset, ita se nostris miseriis compatiendo ac miserando contemperabat ut pene nullus de peccato suo siue de aliqua temptatione tristis ad eum accederet qui non ab eo consolatus reuerteretur. Habebat sane magnam gratiam in uerbo consolationis, omnem etiam infirmitatem ferre sciebat, unde uelut peritus medicus, animarum uulneribus medicandis opportunitate et diligentiam modis omnibus impendebat. Cuius etiam sanctitatis uirtutem dominus prior in semetipso expertus est. Nam cum grauissimam incurisset egritudinem et se posse conualescere desperasset, euocans illum ad se, rogauit ut in ecclesiam iret ac pro se Deum deprecaretur: mox ut fudit precem, sensit infirmitas alleuiationem.

<xii>

Audiui apud Tantonam eundem constitutum, pro ingruentibus tempestatibus aliisque necessitatibus frequenter orare rogatum, orasse statimque petitionis effectum subsecutum. Non ista commemorauim quod uirum sanctum miracula facere affectatum putauerim, tanquam ex hoc sue sanctitatis ostentationem quesierit, cum iactantiam uelut pestem maximam semper abhorruerit, sed ut ostenderem quam magne fidei extitit quod totus pietatis uisceribus affluebat, qui proximorum necessitatibus quibuscumque modis poterat subue (fol. 95^v) nire paratus erat.

<xiii>

Semper autem animarum lucrum querebat. Vnde inter nos positus, tanquam bonus pater omnes nos instruebat exhortabatur, et uelut pia nutrix fouebat et consolabatur²⁵ donec iterum nobis preripitur et ad instituendam Bothminensem ecclesiam²⁶ transmittitur. Magister enim Algarus, nunc Constantiensis ecclesie presul, tunc autem illius loci procurator,²⁷ tum per se tum per Exoniensem episcopum²⁸ eundem uenerabilem uirum ad prioratum prefate ecclesie, licet cum difficultate, tandem impetrauit. Verum non multo post uitam finiuit. Erat enim tempus hyemale quando illuc missus est, et in estate proxima mense Maio, idus Maii, uiam uniuerse carnis ingressus est,²⁹

²⁵ pia---consolabatur: cf. 1 Thess. 2: 7.

²⁶ Bodmin was founded about 1120. On Bodmin see Dugdale, *Monasticon* II (1819) 459-465; George Oliver, *Monasticon diocesis Exoniensis* (Exeter, 1846) 15-21; Cottineau, *Répertoire* I (1935) 403; Dickinson, *Origins* 118 n. 7, 128; Knowles and Hadcock, *Medieval Religious Houses* 128.

²⁷ Algar, who had been dean of Bodmin, was bishop of Coutances in Normandy from 1132 to 1150/1151: cf. Gams, *Series episcoporum* 542 and Dickinson, *Origins* 118-119.

²⁸ William Warelwast, bishop of Exeter from 1107 to 1136/1137, was founder of Plympton and Bodmin monasteries. See Dugdale, *Monasticon* II 515; Oliver, *op. cit.* 15, 129; Dickinson, *Origins* 113, 128; *Dictionary of National Biography* (1950) XX 818-819; Gams, *Series episcoporum* 189 and Powicke and Fryde, *Handbook* 225.

²⁹ uiam---ingressus est: cf. Ios. 23: 14; 3 Reg. 2: 2.

prius tamen in ecclesia Bothminensi, quam regebat, religione fundata, magistro quoque Algaro aliisque quam plurimis canonicis effectis et in sancta conuersatione per eius institutionem plurimum roboratis.

<xiv>

Circa finem uero causa extitit qua Exoniensem episcopum adire debebat. Quo itinere equo cui presidebat in preceps ruente, contigit ut in foueam quandam corruens grauissimam circa intestinorum loca lesionem incurreret. Vnde quibusdam uisum est quod hac de causa celerius ad extrema peruenerit. Ad Exoniam uero perductus, lecto prosternitur, morbo de die in diem semper ingrauescente. Venerat ad uisendum eum (fol. 96) uir religiosus magister Gaufridus, tunc canonicus de Plintona, nunc autem in eodem loco prioris officio fungens,³⁰ affuit et magister Algarus, uterque ad obsequendum in omnibus infirmo tam sedulus quam deuotus. Qui leticia pariter ac mesticia uehementer afficiebantur: hinc gaudentes quod illum in tanta deuotione ad exitum properare cernerent, inde contristati quod tam dilecti presentia destituebantur. Siquidem testati sunt nobis quod aliquem in infirmitate sua deuotius se habentem nunquam uiderint. Accusabat enim se sine intermissione de peccatis suis, lapsum quo in foueam ceciderat sepe commemorans et cum lacrimis dicens 'In foueam cecidi. Heu heu, ego captiuus.' Hoc enim uerbum, quando se accusabat, semper in ore habebat: 'Ego captiuus in quam profundum puteum inferni propter nimia peccata mea precipitandus sum. O Christe, miserere serui tui, quia licet aliter uixi quam debui, tamen in te, Domine, speraui: non confundar in eternum, sed in tua, non mea, iusticia libera me et eripe me.'³¹ Multum de confessione loquebatur, quia nescio si aliquis purius illo delicta sua confitebatur. De fide quoque sancte Trinitatis tam perfecte tamque profunde disserebat ut prefati docti uiri in stuporem conuerterentur.

<xv>

Appropinquante uero hora mortis eius,³² iam membris (fol. 96^v) premortuis, uelut in extasim raptus, diu iacuit immobilis. Expergefactus autem cepit inquirere que dies esset. Responsum est uigiliam esse Ascensionis Dominice.³³ Tunc ab intimo cordis longa trahens suspiria, in hanc uocem exultationis erupit³⁴ 'Hodie dies est redemptionis mee.' Et tanquam in gaudio tante solennitatis aliquandiu repausans, subiecit 'Hodie dies est misericordie Dei.' Iterumque uelut in consideratione tante misericordie paululum respirans, ita conclusit 'Dies gaudii mei.' Erat autem inter nonam et uesperam cum hec uerba proferret. Sicque totus in amorem Christi suspensus, usque ad confinium diei et noctis quo spiritum exalauit, per interuallum uerba dulcia ad gloriosam Ascensionem pertinentia proferebat ita ut cum loqui uix posset, ascendens in altum,³⁵ sepius reuolueret.

³⁰ The Austin priory of Plympton was founded by Bishop William Warelwast in 1121. Concerning Plympton see Dugdale, *Monasticon* VI 51-55; Oliver, *op. cit.* 129-150; Cottineau, *Répertoire* II 2304; Dickinson, *Origins* 113, 128; Knowles and Hadcock, *Medieval Religious Houses* 150. Geoffrey was prior from 1128 to 1160: cf. Dugdale, *op. cit.* VI 51 and Dickinson, *op. cit.* 8, 9 n. 40.

³¹ in te---eripe me: cf. Ps. 70: 1-2.

³² Appropinquante---eius: cf. Matth. 26: 45.

³³ Ascension Thursday is forty days after Easter.

³⁴ in hanc---erupit: cf. Isa. 48: 20.

³⁵ ascendens in altum *bis MS.*

<xvi>

Curabat corpus satis diligenter magister Gaufridus quoniam magister Algarus solummodo lacrimis et gemitibus uacabat, non de salute defuncti male sentiendo sed quod sibi tam dulcis subtrahebatur amicus ingemiscendo nec dolori modum imponere³⁶ preualendo. Cum uero corpus secundum consuetudinem uestiretur, cappam, qua super induendum et totum obuoluendum erat, nimis curtam, id est usque circa genua pertingentem, (fol. 97) inuenerunt. Vnde turbati dum de alia querenda tractarent, subito mirum in modum satis, et supra quam necesse erat, longa reperta est, uehementer super hoc stupentibus qui aderant Deoque gratias agentibus, qui et huic miraculo fidele postmodum testimonium perhibuerunt.

<xvii>

Disponerat magister Algarus ad Bothminensem ecclesiam corpus deferre. At Exonienses canonici nullo modo consentire uoluerunt, immo eiusdem corporis exequias tanquam sancti et a Deo sibi concessi cum omni honorificentia celebrare statuerunt. Aderat dies Dominice Ascensionis, cum ex diuersis partibus tantus conuenit populus, quantus in Exonia ciuitate nunquam antea simul conuenisse uisus est, mirantibus plurimis et ueraciter affirmantibus ad uiri Dei obsequium diuinitatis instinctu tantam excitatam fuisse multitudinem. Baiulabant feretrum maiores illius ecclesie persone, totumque officium cum tanta ueneratione persoluebatur, quantam in illa ciuitate uel exequiis episcopi uel alterius cuiuslibet persone defuncte exhibitam fuisse nullus Exoniensium recordatur. Quid multa? In honorabili loco claustrum sui, in precioso sarcophago de petra preciso, corpus uenerandum reposuerunt, omnibus qui aderant, tam clericis quam laicis, una proclamantibus quod ueraciter ea die cum Christo (fol. 97v) celos ascendit.

<xviii>

Ecce, karissime frater, qualiter honorabilis pater tuus in presentis uite stadio currit, quomodo cursu legitime consummato ad brauium feliciter peruenit.³⁷ Te uero quoniam patrissare cognoui, multo tibi libentius uitam ipsius utrumque descripsi quatinus perpendas non tam laudabile si religiose uiuere contendas quam detestabile si, quod absit, male uiuendo a tam religioso parente degeneres. Noueris tamen ut promisi summatim ista perstricta quoniam mirabilem illius feruorem, lacrimarum abundantiam, sincerissimam religionem, omnimodam puritatem et ueritatem, ex quarum fiducia nullam formidabat personam quin libere diceret quod ei dicendum sentiebat, aliaque quam plurima Dei dona, que in eo florere conspeximus, puto uerbis ad plenum explicari non posse. Siquidem huiusmodi bona spiritualia ex uisu auditu cohabitatione colloctione multo magis intelliguntur quam ullis uerbis ualeant insinuari. Michi uero pro tantillo labore aliquid rependi desidero ut quoniam inter horas canonicas ista scribebam (sepe dum ipsis horis instare deberem, de his dictandis potius cogitabam), te suppliciter orante non solum huius uerum etiam omnium culparum mearum ueniam consequar, insuper hanc gratiam tuis precibus (fol. 98) obtineam, quatinus sepe memorati semperque uenerandi parentis tui sanctitatis imitator in presenti et in futuro beatitudinis particeps existam. Amen.

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³⁶ dolori---imponere : cf. Verg. *Aen.* II 619.

³⁷ stadio---peruenit : cf. I Cor. 9 : 24.

The Sin of Brunetto Latini *

RICHARD KAY

HALF of Dante's day in Hell had already passed when he came to a plain of sterile sand upon which fire perpetually fell in flakes like snow. When he arrived, he knew in a general way what sins were punished on this desert. Somewhat earlier, Virgil had explained that the circle through which they were now passing contained those who had injured someone by force rather than by fraud. The crimes of violence punished in this seventh circle were of three kinds, corresponding to the three parties to whom injury could possibly be done: injuries to one's fellow man, injuries to one's self, and injuries to God. The seventh circle was accordingly subdivided into three rings. The first was the river Phlegethon, a ring of boiling blood, in which were plunged tyrants, murderers, bandits, and merciless soldiers, who all had done violence to their neighbors (*Inf.* xii). In the second ring lay the dolorous wood of bleeding trees that were the souls of those who had destroyed their bodies (xiii). In accordance with the Roman legal concept that a man's property is an extension of his body, profligates who had wantonly wasted their substance were also punished in the wood, through which they were forever pursued by a pack of hellhounds.

As Dante passed from the wood of the suicides and approached the third and final ring of the circle of the violent, he may have recalled Virgil's description of the sins punished there. And so may the reader, for it is the only explicit definition he will be given in the poem: "Violence can be done against the Deity by denying and blaspheming Him with the heart, and by despising His Goodness in nature; and hence the smallest ring leaves its mark on Sodom and Cahors and whoever, despising God with his heart, speaks."¹

* Dedicated to the memory of Robert Leonard Reynolds. An earlier version was read at the Third Biennial Conference on Medieval Studies (March 1966) sponsored by the Medieval Institute of Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo.

¹ The original will regularly be quoted from Dante's *Opere; testo critico della Società dantesca italiana* (2nd ed., Florence, 1960). The translations are based on that of John Aitken Carlyle (1849, rev. 1867) as rev. with notes by H. Oelsner for the Temple Classics, *The Inferno of Dante Alighieri* (London, 1900), although improvements have often been tacitly introduced.

Puossi far forza ne la deitade,
 col cuor negando e bestemmiano quella,
 e spregiando ['n] natura sua bontade;
 e però lo minor giron suggella
 del segno suo e Soddoma e Caorsa
 e chi, spregiando Dio col cor, favella. (xi. 46-51)

Just as in the two preceding rings an injury to property was treated as an injury to its owner, so here an offense against nature is an injury to nature's Creator. A life contrary to nature is an indirect denial of God Himself. Virgil explained that his broad definition of injury to God included not only the sin of blasphemy but also the sins of sodomy and usury, or to repeat his precise words, the ring "seals with its sign both Sodom and Cahors."

Arriving at the plain itself, Dante found a scene reminiscent of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah (Genesis XIX, 23-25). Suffering there beneath an eternal rain of fire were three groups of sinners, each with a characteristic action.

Supin giacea in terra alcuna gente;
 alcuna si sedea tutta raccolta,
 e altra andava continuamente. (xiv. 22-24)

The blasphemers, who once had exalted themselves by daring to judge God, now were literally abased in their particular mode of punishment, for here they were laid low, prone upon the burning sands. The usurers sat huddled up in a place apart, on the very edge of the precipice, motionless even as they had lived without laboring. Both the supine blasphemers and the squatting usurers remain forever fixed in one spot, but the third class of sinners must run forever. They do not all run together, however, for Dante met two bands of runners, and there may well have been more.

What was the sin of these runners? That, I think, is a good question. Most critics find the answer self-evident and the subject embarrassing.²

² André Pézard is a distinguished exception: his Sorbonne dissertation, *Dante sous la pluie de feu* (*Enfer*, chant xv, *Études de philosophie médiévale*, 40 (Paris, 1950), strives with ingenuity and erudition to reverse the verdict of sodomy, marshalling historical and philological evidence for 408 dense pages in support of the thesis that the sin was blasphemy. The crux of this interpretation is the alleged blasphemy of Brunetto, which consisted in his intentional glorification of French, to him a foreign language, at the expense of Italian, his God-given mother tongue (p. 95). Although the thesis itself has found little acceptance, the book remains a mine of insight and evidence, which have saved me much effort and spared my readers many footnotes as long as this one. My own views, however, were formed before reading the book. Pézard's approach differs from mine in that he does not seek a sin common to *all* the runners; rather, in his view, the nobles of *Inf.* xvi remain sodomites.

For further criticism, consult the reviews cited by E. Esposito, *Gli studi danteschi dal 1950 al 1964* (Rome, 1965), 251. Against these hostile critics, Pézard reaffirmed his thesis in *Cahiers*

After all, did not Virgil specify three sins that are punished in this ring — blasphemy, usury and sodomy? Since the blasphemers are lying in one place and the usurers are sitting in another, must not all the runners be sodomites? This conclusion, however, soon places the commentator in an awkward position. The inference is logically valid only if Virgil's enumeration of the crimes punished on the plain was an exhaustive catalogue. It is possible, however, that he selected a characteristic sin from each of the three categories to illustrate his definition. If this were the case, the runners would include not only sodomites but also those who disdained nature and her bounty in other ways as well. From Virgil's reference to Sodom, we may be sure that *some* runners are sodomites, but not that they *all* are. His ambiguous words provide nothing more than a preliminary orientation. Like the pilgrim Dante, we must see for ourselves what was meant.

Dante the narrator describes his encounter with the runners in Cantos xv and xvi. For the reader who has anticipated a scathing exposé of unnatural vice, they are a disappointment. The sin of the runners is never explained. Indeed, neither canto mentions it at all, either directly or indirectly. The Virgilian ambiguity remains unresolved. In the absence of an explicit amplification of Virgil's explanation, most commentators have taken it literally to mean sodomy and nothing more.³

Now this interpretation is based on a single ambiguous line in Canto xi. Cantos xv and xvi, in which the sin should be treated, contribute nothing but silence. But if the interpretation is correct, it should be the key to those cantos. Armed with the hint that the sin is sodomy, the reader should be able to see the sin mirrored in the place and manner of punishment, the character of the inmates, and in Dante's reaction to them. But in fact it is hard to see that sodomy is the appropriate vice of the passage in any of these respects. At best, one may say that the setting is reminiscent of the Biblical plain of Sodom. Nothing in the punishment itself is peculiar to sodomy. The endless running is appropriate to all those who are the slaves of their appetites. If sodomy alone were to be punished by a characteristic action, little imagination would have been

du sud, an. 38, no. 308 (1951), 35-38. In contrast to the reactionary tone of most reviewers, L. Portier accepted the need for reinterpretation but suggested essential modifications in Pézard's approach: *Revue des études italiennes*, N. S., 1 (1954), 5-19. This perceptive discussion anticipated my own line of argument without pursuing it. Pézard in his book gives a conspectus of previous interpretations (pp. 29-57) and a copious bibliography, now updated by Esposito for *Inf.* xv at pp. 249-251.

³ F. Mazzoni typifies the consensus on *Inf.* xi. 46-51: "la chiara precisazione" of the passage places the sin of the runners beyond question: *Studi danteschi*, 30 (1951), 278-284, esp. 282.

required to provide a more striking image. Some commentators have observed the generality of the imagery, from which they have concluded that "the Sodomites are chosen as the image of all perverse vices which damage and corrupt the natural powers of the body."⁴ Nonetheless; they continue to suppose that those runners whom Dante encountered were in fact sodomites.

If that was what Dante intended, then some distinction between *kinds* of sodomy should be the basis of his classification of the runners. As he and Virgil crossed the plain, they encountered two distinct groups of runners. They were told explicitly that the members of the first band "all were clerks, either great Latinists or of great fame, defiled on earth by one same sin."⁵

In somma sappi che tutti fur cherci
e litterati grandi e di gran fama,
d'un peccato medesimo al mondo lerci. (xv. 106-108)

Dante's informant was the Florentine scholar Brunetto Latini, who recognized Dante and lingered behind the first band to trot alongside his former protégé. Among his fellow sufferers, he identified only two by name: Priscian, the greatest Latin grammarian, and Francesco d'Accorso, a professor of Roman law at Bologna. Contemptuously Brunetto added that the bishop whom Pope Boniface VIII had transferred from Florence to Vicenza was also in the group, although he was not worthy to be named, much less seen. All four conform to Brunetto's definition: the first three were laymen famous for their learning; the bishop was a clergyman infamous for his lack of it.

The composition of the second band of runners is not explicitly defined in the poem, but its nature can easily be inferred by comparison with the other. We may be sure that the two groups are mutually exclusive, for when Brunetto saw the second troop approaching across the sands, he hastily excused himself with the words: "I would say more, but my visit and my speech cannot be longer, because there I see new smoke arising from the sand. People are coming with whom I ought not to be."

⁴ D. L. Sayers, trans. *The Comedy of Dante Alighieri the Florentine* (New York, 1963), I, 164; who further observes, "Their perpetual fruitless running forms a parallel, on a lower level, to the aimless drifting of the Lustful in Canto v."

⁵ The predicate must be construed so as to be true of all (*tutti*) members of Brunetto's band. All were clerks *large sensu*, all shared the same sin; but not all were distinguished in Latin letters, least of all Mozzi, whose *gran fama* amounted to notoriety if not downright infamy. Pézard argues for this translation of *cherici* (p. 78, n. 3) but on dubious grounds: *sages clerics* in his example I take to be ecclesiastics, in contrast to lay *philosophes* (Brunetto's *Trésor* I. i. 2). Little or no Latin made the *illiteratus*, even though he both read and wrote in his vernacular: see H. Wieruszowski (*op. cit. infra*, note 27), 187-188. For the early commentators on this passage, see Pézard, 32-33.

Di più direi; ma 'l venire e 'l sermone
più lungo esser non può, però ch'i' veggio
là surger novo fummo del sabbione.

Gente vien con la quale esser non deggio.

(xv. 115-118)

As he hastened to catch up with the first runners, the other group came in view. Three Florentines detached themselves from the main body and ran to Dante to learn how their city fared, for they knew he was a fellow citizen by his dress. All three were prominent statesmen in Florence about the time Dante was born. Unlike the scholars in the preceding group, they were all men of action, the political leaders of the last generation. Moreover, they were all of the Guelf faction, as was Dante's father, who shared their exile in 1260. Two were of noble birth, but the third, Jacopo Rusticucci, was not. Only Guido Guerra was a military leader. What all three have in common is their prominence in Florentine politics, and particularly in the Guelf party. The three mention only one person who shares their fate: Guglielmo Borsiere (xvi. 70), a Florentine gentleman of Dante's own generation, also a Guelf, with a reputation as a peacemaker and matchmaker in high society. Like the others, his talents were political, although he was more courtier than statesman.⁶

The runners, then, are divided into two mutually exclusive groups, one for clerks and the other for political laymen. Since we are explicitly told that the clerks are all being punished for one sin (xv. 108), the politicians, too, must have their characteristic sin. What could these vocationally determined vices be? If one maintains that all the runners are sodomites, then it should follow that each group has its characteristic variety of sodomy. Few recent commentators have ventured thus far, however.⁷ They are agreed that the two groups are differentiated by profession but have had little success in finding a characteristic perversion for each. No doubt the cleric and academic have always been suspect of pederasty because their work with young people offers special opportunities, but so far as I know, no one has yet been able to suggest a sexual perversion peculiar to politicians. Happily for the dignity of all involved, the attempts to find one have been few.

We have reached a point where it is best to change the subject, as has been the convenient practice of most commentators, but let us not do so

⁶ Biographical details and sources conveniently given at *Inf.* xvi. 37-45, 70, in *La Divina Commedia... col commento scartazziniano rifatto da G. Vandelli*, 19th ed. (Milan, 1965). Editions prior to the 9th (1928) quoted the medieval commentators more generously; for these, my references are to the 6th ed. (1911): *La D. C. commentata da G. A. Scartazzini... riveduta e corretta da G. Vandelli*.

⁷ Pézard reviews the various explanations for the division into two bands and argues that it is not based on profession (69, n. 3; cf. 79) but on distinct crimes which have appropriate punishments (296, n. 5).

before observing that we have been led into this absurdity by a literal interpretation of Virgil's reference to the sin of Sodom. Perhaps sodomy should be understood figuratively after all. To do so would at least remove the hedge of inhibitions that presently surrounds the so-called cantos of the sodomites.

What is more, by not insisting on sodomy, we can resolve an embarrassing conflict between poetry and history. For not a single one of the eight persons placed among the runners has a record of homosexuality outside of the *Divine Comedy*. The grammarian Priscian is the clearest case in point. He lived some eight hundred years before Dante, so the poet's sources must have been much the same as ours; but the accusation of sodomy is peculiar to Dante alone. Surely it was not his own invention, the critics argue. "It is an insult to Dante," says one, "to assume that he condemns Priscian merely because, as a grammarian and teacher of youth, he was specially liable to fall into the vice here condemned. There must have been some medieval tradition to account for Priscian's position in this circle."⁸ Yet even so indefatigable a literary historian as Ernst Curtius could not find that legend, although he did not doubt its existence.⁹ Dante was a contemporary of the other seven suspected sodomites, all of whom were fellow Florentines, which has encouraged the comfortable assumption that he knew more about them than we do, and hence must be believed. Commentators and biographers, duly noting that Dante is the only source for the accusations, have thought this "a curious fact, considering the prominence of Guido" and the others.¹⁰

In their reverence for Dante, his commentators have not considered the possibility that the charge of sodomy was in fact so outrageously false that the poet insinuated it with deliberate intent to shock his contemporary readers.¹¹ Let us suppose that Virgil's reference to Sodom was made ambiguous on purpose to create in the reader a false expectation. As the runners approach, the curious reader wonders who of the many Classical

⁸ H. Oelsner, ed. *Inferno*, 167 at xv. 109.

⁹ *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, trans. W. R. Trask, Bollingen Series, 36 (London, 1953), 43, n. 22. The lexicographer Huguccio of Pisa stated that Priscian followed his patron Julian into apostasy ("legamus eum fuisse sacerdotem, sed amore Iuliani postea apostatasse") and G. Schizzerotto has recently proposed that Dante misunderstood him to mean *amore carnale*: "Uguccione da Pisa, Dante e la colpa di Prisciano," *Studi danteschi*, 43 (1966), 78-83.

¹⁰ J. Ciardi, trans. *Inferno* (New York, 1954), 147-148; Pézard, 22, cf. 17, 133-135, 203, for Brunetto, Priscian, Mozzi; F. C. von Savigny, *Geschichte des römischen Rechts im Mittelalter*, Bd. V, 2nd ed. (1850; reprinted Bad Homburg, 1961), 315, for Francesco d'Accorso; Scartazzini-Vandelli¹⁹ at xv. 22, xvi. 38, 40, 43, for Brunetto and the nobles.

¹¹ A similar attempt to disquiet the reader has been discerned by D. J. Donno, "Dante's Argenti: Episode and Function," *Speculum*, 40 (1965), 611-625, esp. 622-624. See also Pézard, 23-24.

homosexuals shall be among them — Hylas, Alcibiades, Caesar, Alexander? And who of his own generation? What will be his reaction if the first shade he meets was a man of irreproachable virtue? In surprise and disbelief, he will exclaim as Dante the character does in the poem,

Siete voi qui, ser Brunetto? (xv. 30)

"Are you *here*, Ser Brunetto?" He should take his cue from Dante and *be* surprised at the discovery that the runners are not the notorious homosexuals he had expected to meet.¹² And in his bewilderment, the surprised reader should begin to wonder why he was mistaken. Dante's commonsense audience would not be apt to think that Florentine public opinion had been mistaken about the morals of seven prominent citizens. Rather, on finding that the runners included Brunetto and the rest, Dante's ideal reader would be brought to realize that the poet's conception of unnatural vice was something more subtle than sodomy. Consequently, as he read the rest of the passage, this question should have been uppermost in his mind: In what sense could such honorable men be said to have sinned against nature? Needless to add, Dante's original audience contained no such ideal readers that we know of. Our hypothetical device was too sophisticated for minds habituated to respect the authority of the written word, and hence must be accounted as no small psychological miscalculation.

Before we proceed in our search for the sin of Brunetto Latini, let us have well in mind what we are looking for. The range of possible sins is clearly set by Virgil's definition: The runners did violence to nature, which is to say they violated some natural law. The only such offense that we can exclude categorically is usury, since the usurers are already seated at the edge of the burning sands. We have examined at considerable length the traditional view that the offense is sodomy. Although there may well have been a band of sodomites running about somewhere on the plain, Dante does not seem to have met them, for the runners whom he encountered have no reputation for that sin in either history or legend. Instead, the two groups of runners he met were composed of scholars and statesmen. Each group had its own characteristic sin, and neither group dared mix with the other. The sin of sodomy does not explain these distinctions, so we must seek some other explanation.

¹² Dante's surprise at finding Brunetto among the supposed sodomites has puzzled the commentators, for either Dante the pilgrim did know he was guilty and should not have been surprised, or else the poet did not know and placed him there unjustly. The dilemma has been ingeniously evaded by supposing that Dante did not know in 1300, the ideal date of the poem, but discovered Brunetto's sin before the *Inferno* was written (1310-14): M. Scherillo, *Alcuni capitoli della vita di Dante* (Turin, 1896), 136; quoted by Scartazzini-Vandelli¹⁹ at *Inf.* xv. 30. See Pézard, ch. ii, and esp. 59, n. 1.

One way we might proceed would be to look for another sin, or more precisely, two other sins, one for each group of runners. From scholastic sources we could collect a list of likely suspects and hope to hit upon an appropriate pair. Such a method would be based on two assumptions: (1) that Dante did indeed have two specific sins in mind, and not a nameless class of sins; and (2) that the sins in question were not original with Dante but were derived from other sources. Should either prove to be false, we would have learned much about scholasticism and little about Dante. Happily, greater certainty can be obtained with less risk. Undoubtedly the best approach is to confront the text of the poem directly. Now that we have excluded sodomy and defined the question, Cantos xv and xvi may appear in a new light when subjected to an *explication de texte*. Such a textual analysis was, in fact, my first approach to the problem, and provided an approximate solution. However, in this case the original method of discovery is neither the clearest nor the shortest means of exposition.

The very terms of our problem suggest a shortcut. Essentially, we want to know how scholarship and statesmanship are related to Dante's concept of nature. That should explain why he divided the violators of natural law into two mutually exclusive groups of statesmen and scholars. The answer will be related to Dante's attitude towards two subjects dear to his heart — philosophy and politics. Doubtless his views on both find their highest artistic expression in the *Comedy* itself, but he also expounded these subjects explicitly and systematically in two treatises: philosophy in the *Convivio* and politics in the *Monarchia*. Both abound in problems of their own which could easily turn our shortcut into a permanent detour. Fortunately we have a guide almost as wise as Virgil himself to lead us through these uninviting tracts of scholastic learning. Almost thirty years ago, scholasticism's most distinguished historian, Professor Etienne Gilson, was faced with a problem not unlike our own. In a book entitled *Dante et la philosophie*, Gilson sought to explain why the Latin Averroist philosopher Siger of Brabant was placed by Dante in Paradise. The argument was based on an expert analysis of Dante's fundamental views on the relation of philosophy to theology and politics. These tools, forged as they were by the hand of a master, will serve our purpose, and I shall proceed to unpack them without further apology.¹³

¹³ *Dante et la philosophie*, Études de philosophie médiévale, 28 (Paris, 1939); trans. D. Moore, *Dante the Philosopher* (New York, 1949; facsimile reprint 1963 under the title *Dante and Philosophy*). Although the translation is cited here, the pagination approximates the original within two or three pages. The analysis of *Mon.* iii. xvi below should be read in the context of his full exposition of the *Convivio* and *Monarchia* (chs. ii-iii, 83-224). While my reading of the passage follows Gilson

Gilson's basic contention is that Dante had a view of philosophy peculiar to himself. To be sure, Dante borrowed concepts from Aristotle, Averroes, and Aquinas, among others, but he recast these elements into a new system that was uniquely his own. The *Banquet* and the *Monarchy* expound portions of this original synthesis in formal scholastic terms. The *Comedy* is based on it, and consequently the poem must be interpreted in terms of Dante's philosophy and not those of some rival system, as has too often been done. The cantos we are discussing are a case in point. They are based on Dante's singular conception of the goals mankind should strive to attain, and of the function of the scholar and the statesman in mankind's common pursuit of happiness. This conception is fundamental to Dante's philosophical thought, and accordingly it pervades his writings, but its essential outlines can be found in the concluding chapter of his treatise on *Monarchy*.¹⁴

The argument is based on the familiar concept that every man is a compound composed of two parts (*partes*) — body and soul. Each part has its own nature (*natura*): the body is corruptible and the soul is incorruptible. Man partakes of both natures, being neither one nor the other exclusively. This double nature of man gives him a double goal, because every nature is directed to its own ultimate end. Unique among God's creatures, man has two final goals (*hominis duplex finis, duo ultima*): one appropriate to his corruptible body and the other to his incorruptible soul. Dante breaks with the scholastic tradition, and particularly with Aquinas, by refusing to reduce the two ends of man to only one by subordinating the good of the body to the good of the soul. Instead, he maintains that the two are coordinate, each with its own independent fulfillment or beatitude (*beatitudo*). One finds fulfillment in this life, the other in eternal life. The happiness of this life consists in the life of reason, the exercise of man's highest and characteristic power (*operatio propriae virtutis*). The happiness of eternal life, on the other hand, consists in the enjoyment of the beatific vision, which human reason cannot attain unless aided by grace. Symbolically, the two states of felicity correspond to the earthly paradise and the heavenly paradise.

Having established a double goal for man, Dante next explains how each goal can be achieved. Just as the ends are distinct, so also are the means by which man reaches them. Both are attained by the practice of virtue, but each has its appropriate virtues. Man gains his earthly happiness by

closely, it avoids the controversial aspects of his interpretation, which are not essential to the present argument. See the review by B. Nardi, "Dante e la filosofia," *Studi danteschi*, 24 (1940), 5-42, esp. § 3; cf. notes 18-19 *infra*.

¹⁴ *Monarchia* III. xvi; text as ed. E. Rostagno in *Opere* (1960), 379-381; useful commentary by G. Vinary, ed. *Monarchia* (Florence, 1950), 279-289. Expounded by Gilson, 191-201.

living in accordance with the moral and intellectual virtues. Collectively these may be termed *natural* virtues because they have been discovered by human reason unaided by grace.¹⁵ Human reason alone has been sufficient to make these ethical teachings (*philosophica documenta*) known in their entirety (*tota*). They were discovered by the great philosophers of antiquity, especially by Aristotle, whose *Nicomachean Ethics* was for Dante the highest authority in this domain.¹⁶ A second set of truths guides man to his other goal of heavenly happiness. These are spiritual teachings (*documenta spiritualia*) from which man learns how to live in accordance with the three theological virtues — faith, hope, and charity. Spiritual truths cannot be discovered by human reason but have been revealed to mankind by the Holy Spirit through prophets, sacred writers, Christ Himself, and His disciples. Unlike the natural truths of the philosophers, these supernatural truths are *not* known to us in their entirety; instead, we know only as much of them as is necessary for our eternal salvation.¹⁷

Throughout this argument, Dante has been carefully separating human activity into two distinct orders, one natural and the other supernatural, based on the twofold nature of man. Mankind, then, has two goals which are reached by two paths. The natural truths discovered by the philosophers using only human reason teach man the virtues by which he can attain happiness in this life. The supernatural truths revealed by God through His spokesmen teach man the virtues by which he can attain eternal life through grace.

Reason and revelation have provided mankind with all the knowledge necessary for attaining temporal and eternal felicity. But for Dante, knowledge is not virtue. Man knows his true goals and how to pursue them, but he does not act on this knowledge because he is led in the other direction by his greed (*humana cupiditas*). He will never attain his goals unless his animal passions are restrained. Like horses who wander at the mercy of their bestial appetites, men must be kept on their true course by bit and bridle. Providence has accordingly given mankind two drivers to direct it to its double destination. The pope leads mankind to eternal life in accordance with revealed truth; the emperor directs mankind to temporal felicity in accordance with the teachings of philosophy. In the *Monarchia*,

¹⁵ Thus Gilson, 197, without textual authority for the term *virtutes naturales*.

¹⁶ Gilson, 134-135, 144.

¹⁷ *Mon.* III. xvi. 9: "Has igitur conclusiones et media, licet ostensa sint nobis hec ab humana ratione que per philosophos tota nobis innotuit, hec a Spiritu Sancto qui per prophetas et agiographos, qui per coeternum sibi Dei filium Iesum Christum et per eius discipulos supernaturalem veritatem ac nobis necessariam revelavit, humana cupiditas postergaret nisi homines, tanquam equi, sua bestialitate vagantes 'in camo et freno' compescerentur in via."

the stress is on the need for an emperor who will provide a supreme political authority over the human community. Mankind as a whole must be regulated if individual men are to attain happiness in this life, for without the necessary preconditions of universal peace and freedom, individual self-realization will be difficult, if not impossible. The principal function of the emperor is to maintain peace and freedom by restraining human greed. The final step in Dante's argument is the demonstration that the emperor's authority must be derived directly from God and not indirectly through the pope. At each stage of his argument, Dante has distinguished the natural order from the supernatural. The two hierarchies culminate only in God. We need not follow Dante to the ultimate conclusions of his treatise, for here we are not concerned with the relationship between the two orders but only with the order of nature.¹⁸

We have been looking for a principle explicitly stated by Dante in his philosophic works that will explain the classification of sins against nature in Cantos xv and xvi. Why are scholars and statesmen and usurers the only professions to violate nature? And what do the runners have in common that distinguishes them from the usurers? And why do they run in mutually exclusive bands? Dante's concept of the natural order provides the answers. In the Dantesque dichotomy of orders, philosophy and temporal government both pertain properly to the natural order rather than the supernatural. They are the two coordinate authorities which guide man to mortal happiness. Each has its proper function. The philosopher shows men the road to mortal virtue and the emperor makes sure that they travel along it. The human intellect should be subject to philosophy, but man's will is to be subject to the emperor. One authority governs theory, the other practice. Neither has competence in the other's domain. "Now taken together, Philosophy and the Empire govern the entirety of human life in the realm of nature, and against them there is no appeal. Within this sphere nothing evades their suzerainty, since Aristotle shows men what is their natural aim, while the Emperor subjects their wills to it."¹⁹

¹⁸ On the relationship between the *imperiatus* and *papatus* in *Mon.* III. xvi, see M. Maccarrone, "Il terzo libro della Monarchia," § 6, *Studi danteschi*, 30 (1955), 112-142.

¹⁹ Gilson, 142-151; quoted from 150. The essential dualism of the *Monarchia* is not endangered by the introduction of the authority of philosophy as distinct from that of the emperor and pope, as Ernst Kantorowicz supposed: *The King's Two Bodies* (Princeton, 1957), 460-462. Quite rightly he castigates Gilson (190) for applying *Mon.* III. xii. 9 ("non potest dici quod alterum subalternetur alteri") to the *optimus homo* as well as to pope and emperor. This minor slip does not, however, invalidate Gilson's exposition of the chapter (189-191), for the *optimus homo* is not an authority in the same sense that the emperor and pope are: the former rules man by virtue of the *substantia humanae naturae*, the latter pair by virtue of their respective *relationes dominationis et paternitatis*. Thus

Those who recognize the authority of philosophy and the emperor as man's supreme guides in the theory and practice of the natural virtues will live in accordance with nature. Those who deny the supremacy in the natural order of the monarch or the philosopher, will in effect reject God's provisions for the temporal well-being of mankind. They do violence to God, to use Virgil's words, by "despising His Goodness in nature" (*Inf.* xi. 48). In place of the natural authority which they do not acknowledge, they will set up for themselves an *unnatural* authority. Since there are but two natural authorities, one governing the human intellect and the other the will, perversions of natural authority will also be of two distinct types. Any unnatural authority must necessarily constitute a denial either of the true authority of philosophy over the intellect or of the true authority of the empire over the will.

This twofold division of the means of doing violence to nature is implicit in Dante's concept of nature. Now we must enquire whether it corresponds to the classification of sins against nature in Cantos xv and xvi. We may begin by recalling that only the runners are violent against nature alone. The usurers who sit at the edge of the burning desert are in a class by themselves, as Virgil expressly declared (*Inf.* xi. 94-111), because usury does violence not only to nature but also to art, which should follow nature: "And because the usurer takes the other way, he despises nature in itself and in its follower [art], since he puts his hope in another."

e perché l'usuriere altra via tene,
per sé natura e per la sua seguace
dispregia, poi ch'in altro pon la spene. (xi. 109-111)

Violence against nature, then, can be either simple or compound. Simple violence against nature alone is the sin of the runners, while compound violence against nature *and* against art is the sin of the usurers.

As we saw earlier, the runners are divided into at least two exclusive

Kantorowicz's schematic representation of the relationship between the three authorities (note 31) is only a more graphic expression of the distinction between substance and relation in Gilson's original diagram (190). The authority of philosophy is not exercised by an officer but by the *philosophica documenta* of *Mon.* iii. xvi. 9-10. That their authority guides the emperor but is distinct from his own is certain from *Conv.* rv. iv-vi, esp. vi. 17 and there the comment of G. Busnelli and G. Vandelli, ed. *Il Convivio*, 2nd ed., Opere di Dante, 4-5 (Florence, 1953-54). Although the authority of philosophy is distinct from that of government, both serve the same natural end — the temporal happiness of mankind: "opus fuit homini... Imperatore, qui secundum philosophica documenta genus humanum ad temporalem felicitatem dirigeret" (*Mon.* iii. xvi. 10). By thus coordinating the two authorities to a single goal in the natural order, the independence of each is assured without creating a *tertium hominis ultimum* by which the teleological dualism of the *Monarchia* would be impaired.

groups, one containing intellectuals and the other politicians. Previous interpretations of the poem have failed to provide a coherent explanation of why the sins against nature should be committed only by these two professions. The twofold Dantesque division of natural authority seems to provide the principle on which the distinction is based. The politicians have refused to recognize the natural authority of the empire, and the intellectuals have done the same to philosophy.

On the face of it, this appears to be a plausible explanation, since the professional character of each group in the poem corresponds to the two forms of natural authority in Dante's authentic thought. But can we be sure that this is the correct explanation and not merely an ingenious hypothesis? The architectonic character of Dante's art should provide the means of verification, for we expect that a structural principle employed by Dante will govern his treatment of the parts subsumed under it. Since we have discovered such a principle that appears to explain the classification of sins in a pair of cantos, it should also explain those cantos in detail, just as many another passage in the *poema sacro* is suffused with the structural principles on which it is based. The parts will elaborate the principle and will be appropriate to it; the principle will pervade the parts and give them coherence and articulation. In short, the principle, if we have hit upon the correct one, should explain the parts as well as the whole. In the present case, if the sins of the individual runners can be seen to conform to the pattern we have detected, our hypothesis will be confirmed. Let us begin with the relatively simpler problem of the three Florentine statesmen, and then return to the more difficult case of Brunetto Latini himself.

In our discussion of sodomy, we have already remarked the high regard in which the three Florentine statesmen were evidently held by everyone save Dante and his commentators. Certainly they had no reputation for sodomy outside of the poem, and Canto xvi contains no clear reference to that sin. Indeed, when we read that canto without preconceptions, it is difficult to see why they are in Hell at all, for Dante emphasizes their noble character.²⁰ Virgil sets the tone even before the trio has arrived, saying that courtesy is their due; by rights Dante should hasten to them rather than they to him (xvi. 15-18). When Dante learns who they are, his first impulse is to leap down and embrace them (46-48), but since that is impossible, he does the next best thing and plainly affirms that he has always held them in the highest respect. His exact words are significant,

²⁰ To Pézard's 1950 bibliography, add now that of E. Esposito, *Gli studi danteschi dal 1950 al 1964* (Rome, 1965), 251-255.

for they expressly exclude the possibility of a scandalous reputation: "Of your city am I, and ever with affection have I always repeated and heard your deeds and honored names."

Di vostra terra sono, e sempre mai
l'ovra di voi e li onorati nomi
con affezion ritrassi e ascoltai. (xvi. 58-60)

Even in their torment, the three remain perfect gentlemen. Although bitterly disappointed by Dante's denunciation of Florentine morals and appalled at his bluntness, they speak with dignity and courtesy.

The contemporary reader might well have wondered why such admirable men were among the damned, but a careful reading of their speeches could have suggested to him the true nature of their besetting sin. Like all damned souls, their personalities have been deformed by the characteristic vice which was the cause of their damnation. In Hell this fatal defect continues to pervade their words and actions, and because this is so, the nature of the sin can be known through its effects on the sinner. In the case of the three Florentines, we do not have to look long for such a motif: they are obsessed with fame. This theme emerges quite early in the episode as their spokesman, Rusticucci, introduces himself and his companions. He identifies the three because he is sure their fame (*la fama nostra*, 31) will impress a fellow Florentine and induce him to answer their questions. This appeal to fame suggests the importance which Rusticucci attaches to reputation, but the full extent of his obsession becomes evident only in his second speech. Dante the character has explained the purpose of his journey with a metaphor: "I leave the gall and go for sweet apples promised me by my veracious guide; but first it is necessary that I fall lowest to the center."

Lascio lo fele e vo per dolci pomi
promessi a me per lo verace duca;
ma infino al centro pria convien ch'i' tomi. (xvi. 61-63)

The pilgrimage from evil to good cannot be comprehended in Hell, however. Literally, the explanation tells Rusticucci nothing more than that Dante must pass through Hell to attain some desideratum. The object of the search is unstated, but in his response, Rusticucci assumes that Dante's *dolci pomi* are long life and fame thereafter.

"Se lungamente l'anima conduca
le membra tue" rispuose quelli ancora,
"e se la fama tua dopo te luca." (64-66)

Thus the pilgrim's conception of human happiness is replaced by Rusticucci's own. By this misunderstanding, he inadvertently discloses his own false values: *fama* for Rusticucci is the crown of life. Only at the end of

the episode do we learn that his companions also share this obsession. Then, as the trio departs, all three in chorus admonish the traveller to "see that you speak of us to men — *fa che di noi alla gente favelle*" (85). Personal reputation is their last as well as first thought in the encounter.

The theme of fame, however, is only one aspect of their character. Throughout the scene their primary concern is Florence itself. Rumors of its moral decline (70-73) caused them to approach Dante simply because he was a fellow citizen. After introductions are exchanged, they get to the point: "tell us whether courtesy and valor abide within our city as once they truly did, or whether they have departed altogether out of it."

cortesia e valor di se dimora
ne la nostra città sì come suole,
o se del tutto se n'è gita fuori. (xvi. 67-69)

Dante replies that pride and excess — *orgoglio e dismisura* — the vices opposed to *cortesia e valor*, now flourish in their stead (73-75).²¹ Having heard their worst fears confirmed, the Florentines have no further interest in the conversation and quickly take their leave (77-87). They had come to verify a rumor and nothing more.

We have gleaned the raw materials of an interpretation from the text. Let us summarize what can be said with certainty of the three Florentines as they appear in the poem: (1) they are men famous in Florence for their deeds and honored names; (2) they regard fame as the goal of life; and (3) they are concerned that courtesy and valor no longer flourish in Florence. Do these data all point to some fundamental sin against nature? Guided by a knowledge of Florentine history, the reader might reason out the answer from these established facts, but we shall take a shorter route, for the time has come to test our hypothesis. If it is correct, it shall enable us to coordinate these data. Let us assume, then, that the sin against nature is a failure to recognize the political supremacy of the empire. To be sure, nothing in the poem suggests that the three statesmen were distinguished for their opposition to the empire, but every Florentine knew it to be true. The modern reader may need *un peu d'histoire*.

²¹ The opposition of the two pairs of virtues and vices was remarked by Scartazzini-Vandelli⁶ at xvi. 74. *Cortesia e valor* were the two ennobling virtues proper to the knight. Writing of *cortesia* in *Conv.* II. x:8, Dante declared that this virtue is no longer characteristic of the courtly society after which it was named: "ne le corti anticamente le vertudi e li belli costumi s'usavano, sì come oggi s'usa lo contrario...." The interrelated decline of Florence, her nobles, and their virtues as a recurrent Dantesque concept can be traced conveniently in the apparatus of *La Divina Commedia*, ed. N. Sapegno, *La Letteratura italiana*; Storia e testi, Vol. 4 (Milan-Naples, n. d. [1957]), starting at *Inf.* xvi. 67-69, 74. Note esp. the identification of knightly virtues at *Purg.* xvi. 115.

These three Florentines were all leaders of the Guelf party during the years that saw the climax of its struggle with the Ghibellines in Florence. They were the men who fought for Florence and the Guelfs at Montaperti in 1260,²² and in the wake of that great Ghibelline victory, they fled into exile as the first Florentine republic, *il Primo Populo*, collapsed. Florence became a Ghibelline city and supported Manfred in his attempt to dominate Italy. It was to be the last chance for a union of Italy under the Hohenstaufen and the Ghibellines, if not the Empire. With the defeat and death of Manfred in 1266, the Ghibelline cause became an anachronism. The next year, the Guelf exiles returned to Florence, and from that day on Florence remained a Guelf city.²³ Never again was a Ghibelline Florence to look to the emperor for leadership. This was the political legacy of our three Florentine statesmen, who led the Guelfs through their darkest hour to ultimate triumph. For Dante's generation, which remembered them as the leaders who had freed Florence forever from the shadow of imperial control, their political career was a singularly appropriate symbol of insubordination to the emperor's authority.

From the poem's ideal perspective of 1300, these statesmen of the preceding generation also represented a type of leader that had all but vanished from the political scene. All three belonged to the aristocratic wing of the Guelf party, which was purged therefrom, or at least deprived of political influence, by the Ordinances of Justice in 1293. The old Florentine nobility had been a feudal aristocracy whose wealth was based on land and whose profession was chivalry. By 1300, economic and social changes were making them obsolescent. As a cavalry force they were already obsolete, for the battle of Campaldino in 1289 "was the last in which the Florentine nobles were the deciding factor."²⁴ Economically, they were being replaced by the middle classes whose wealth was based on commerce and banking. Socially, their prestige was also on the wane. The first *nouveaux riches* had sought to assimilate themselves to the old nobility by adopting their ideals and way of life. Rusticucci was one of these who became noble in all but birth.²⁵ But as the new plutocrats grew in numbers and power, they were

²² F. Schevill, *History of Florence* (New York, 1936; facsimile reprints in 1961 and 1963 under the title *Medieval and Renaissance Florence*), 128-132. Two of the trio, Guido Guerra and Tegghiaio Aldobrandi degli Adimari, play leading roles in G. Villani's account of the deliberations preceding the battle: *Cronica* vi. 77; 78-81 for the engagement and its aftermath.

²³ On the Guelf restoration of Easter 1267, see Schevill, 138-139, 144; G. Villani, *Cronica* vii. 13-15.

²⁴ C. W. Previté-Orton, *A History of Europe from 1198 to 1378*, 3rd ed. (London, 1951), 100. Schevill, 157-160; G. Villani, *Cronica* vii. 131-132, viii. 1, linking Campaldino to the Ordinances; C. C. Bayley, *War and Society in Renaissance Florence* (Toronto, 1961), 3-4.

²⁵ Rusticucci complained that his proud wife was the principal cause of his damnation: "e certo/

less inclined to ape the aristocrats, for the military obsolescence of the noble knight stripped chivalry of its function, leaving nothing but the social graces. Some new men still did seek to acquire noble manners, but in Dante's generation they distinguished themselves as courtiers like Guglielmo Borsiere (70) rather than as soldiers and statesmen like Rusticucci. In short, by 1300 the old aristocratic values of *cortesia e valor* were no longer the road to political leadership in Florence. In their stead, *hubris* prevailed because the élite had failed to resist the temptations occasioned by an influx of population and wealth.

La gente nova e i subiti guadagni
orgoglio e dismisura han generata,
Fiorenza, in te, sì che tu già ten piagni. (xvi. 73-75)

The nobles themselves were to blame. Had they remained loyal to their traditional moral and political values, the greed of the ignoble would have been restrained by the emperor and his natural allies, the local nobility. Instead, the Guelf nobles had allied with the people and brought about the destruction of both the authority of the emperor and of their own class. What led them to upset the natural hierarchy of authority wherein the emperor rules the nobles and the nobles rule the people? Precisely that hunger for fame which obsessed the three Florentine statesmen. Leadership of the Guelf party offered them scope for their political and military talents; partisanship endowed them with an importance they would not have enjoyed had the Florentine nobility remained united. Florence, too, gained fame as an independent political entity, which she would not have enjoyed as a constituent part of the empire. To gain distinction for themselves and their city, the Guelf nobles had perverted the natural political structure, which for Dante was the foundation of human peace, justice, virtue, and happiness. The result was the disordered Florence of Dante's generation,²⁶ which they themselves deplored in their first words to the traveller from "our perverse country — *nostra terra prava*" (9). In Hell they are still enslaved by their false values; they do not appear to realize that they themselves had precipitated the ruin of their class and its way of life. At this point in the poem, the character Dante also fails to comprehend their crime, for the true principles of natural polity are not to be learned in Hell.

la fiera moglie più ch'altro mi nuoce" (xvi. 44-45). She was, I take it, a social climber whose pride pressed him forward in the career which led to his damnation.'

²⁶ The foregoing is not objective history but an *expositio ad mentem Dantis*. For a perceptive analysis of Dante's civic milieu, see M. B. Becker, "Dante and his Literary Contemporaries as Political Men," *Speculum*, 41 (1966), 665-680; "A Study in Political Failure: The Florentine Magnates, 1280-1343," *Mediaeval Studies*, 27 (1965), 246-308.

When we turn back to Canto xv, its stress on individual and personal values is at once apparent in contrast to the societal values of the nobles. Dante speaks to only one scholar, to Ser Brunetto Latini, who is portrayed in individual detail. The intensely personal character of their interview contrasts significantly with the impersonal politeness of the three Florentines, who, after the manner of politicians, had regarded Dante as a fellow citizen, a presumed admirer, a source of information; in a word, as a type but not as an individual. Brunetto, however, recognizes Dante not as a Florentine but as himself (xv. 23-24). What he seeks is news of Dante, not of their city, for the greater part of the conversation concerns Dante's future (46-99).

Like Rusticucci, Brunetto begins by asking "what fortune or destiny — *qual fortuna o destino*" (46) brings Dante to Hell while still he lives. By putting the question in terms of Dante's fortune or destiny, he focuses our attention on the part this journey will play in the pilgrim's later life. Dante replies that he had gone astray in a valley, and that when he failed to find his way out, Virgil had appeared and is now leading him back (*riducemi*, 49-54). Brunetto pointedly ignores Virgil and instead assures Dante that he will gain his goal if he but uses his own natural talents. All that another can do is supply comfort (*conforto*), which he himself would have done had not he died (55-60). Like Rusticucci, he has interpreted Dante's figurative description of his journey in accordance with his own preconceptions. The goal Brunetto has in mind can be reached by developing one's special talents. In his own words, "If you follow your star, you cannot fail to attain a glorious port — *Se tu segui tua stella, / non puoi fallire a glorioso porto*" (55-56). Now we know that Dante was born under the sign of the Gemini, which astrologers believed predisposed man to a life of study and letters.²⁷ In Paradise, Dante himself invoked the twin stars as the origin of his genius: "O glorious stars, O light impregnated with mighty power, from which I derive all my genius, such as it is — *O gloriose stelle, o lume pregno / di gran virtù, dal quale io riconosco / tutto, qual che si sia, il mio ingegno*" (*Par.* xxi. 112-114). By telling Dante to follow his star, then, Brunetto was urging him to apply his intellectual gifts, to live the life of letters as Brunetto himself had done. This life of work (*opera*, 60) is not all that Dante's fortune has in store for him, however. Prophetically, Brunetto adds that fortune has reserved such honor for Dante that he will become the envy of his fellow Florentines:

La tua fortuna tanto onor ti serba,
che l'una parte e l'altra avranno fame
di te.... (xv. 70-72)

²⁷ Sapegno, ed. cit., and Scartazzini-Vandelli¹⁹, both at *Inf.* xv. 55; Pézard, 126-127; and H. Wieruszowski, "Brunetto Latini als Lehrer Dantes und der Florentiner," *Archivio italiano per la storia della pietà*, 2 (1959), 171-198, at 173, 185.

He has been so richly endowed by nature that he can expect to achieve great things, for which fame shall be his reward. Once again the theme of fame is sounded, faintly but distinctly suggesting that Brunetto no less than the noble trio works for applause.

Brunetto imagines that Dante's goal in life is to win fame through intellectual achievement, and by the close of the episode, he has made it clear that the ideals he imputes to Dante are in fact his own. When he is forced to break off the interview in great haste, he condenses his advice to Dante into a single self-revealing sentence: "Let my *Tesoro*, in which I still live, be commended to you, and more I ask not."

sieti raccomandato il mio Tesoro
 nal qual io vivo ancora, e più non cheggio. (119-120)

His last and only wish is that his book shall continue to be an influence on future generations of scholars. The intellectual lives on in the works he leaves to posterity: they are his contribution to the community, but they are also his claim to fame. Brunetto's recommendation reveals that for him the stress lay on reputation rather than on contribution. He is content with neither the knowledge that he had done his best nor the satisfaction of a job well done: above all he must have recognition. Precisely because he placed his hope of immortality in his writings, he now fears they will be forgotten, and consequently that his *fama* among men will fade into oblivion. Like the three Florentines, his native talents were wholly dedicated to the pursuit of fame: he had worked for the greater glory, not of God, but of Brunetto.

The author of the *Trésor* sought to gain immortality in the natural rather than the spiritual order, and Divine Justice does not deny him his due, for in his book he lives on as an influence on its readers. This passionate desire to exert an intellectual influence on future generations is given essential expression in his parting reference to his book, but it pervades his whole character. In Canto xv, it finds its fullest expression in the scholar's concern for Dante's career, which he regards as the offspring of his own.²⁸ At the beginning of their conversation, Brunetto twice calls Dante his son

²⁸ Helene Wieruszowski argues persuasively (186-189) from the evidence of Brunetto's *Sommatta*, a small collection of Italian epistolary forms which she has identified and edited (193-198), that he lectured publicly at Florence on rhetoric and politics. This removes the traditional objection to a literal interpretation of Dante's indications (*Inf.* xv. 84-85, 97) that Brunetto was his teacher, which now can be understood to refer either to public lectures or private tuition (172-173). Pézard lists Brunetto's older biographers; most recent is Bianca Ceva, *Brunetto Latini; l'uomo e l'opera* (Milan-Naples, 1965). Charles T. Davis, in his recent and perceptive study of "Brunetto Latini and Dante," argues that the relationship was informal but the influence nonetheless profound: *Studi medievalesi*, 3rd ser., 8 (1967), i, 421-450, esp. 441 ff.

(*figliuol*, 31, 37), emphasizing by this repetition the paternalistic spirit in which he counsels the younger man in the long passage that follows (55-78). Moreover, his advice is not altogether objective. As is often the case with advisors who seek to live through their advisees, Brunetto tends to maximize his own influence on Dante and to exclude that of all others. Brunetto would himself have been the best guide in Dante's work, he seems to say, but since he is no longer available, Dante should follow his star to the goal Brunetto had foreseen, and in default of the master himself, the *Trésor* will guide him. There is the faint but distinct suggestion that Virgil's intervention was not altogether necessary, as indeed it was not to achieve the goal Brunetto had in mind. The more Dante's greatness is the product of Brunetto's, the better the *maestro* will like it.

Dante is quick to acknowledge his indebtedness to Brunetto in the most touching terms: "Were my desire all fulfilled ... you had not yet been banished from human nature: for in my memory is fixed, and now goes to my heart, the dear and kind, paternal image of you, when in the world, hour by hour, you taught me how man makes himself eternal; and while I live, it is proper that my tongue should show what gratitude I have for it."

"Se fosse tutto pieno il mio dimando"
 rispuosi lui, "voi non sareste ancora
 de l'umana natura posto in bando;
 ché 'n la mente m'è fitta, e or m'accora,
 la cara e buona imagine paterna
 di voi quando nel mondo ad ora ad ora
 m'insegnavate come l'uom s'eterna:
 e quant'io l'abbia in grado, mentr'io vivo
 convien che ne la mia lingua si scerna." (79-87)

With this speech, Dante confirms the interpretation we have put upon Brunetto's career, for the poet testifies that for the pilgrim, Brunetto had provided the very model of the dedicated intellectual. The crucial phrase is the statement that hourly Brunetto taught him *come l'uom s'eterna*, literally "how man eternizes himself" (85). Obviously, this does not refer to the eternal life of the soul after death, since man does not attain happiness in the spiritual order through his natural powers alone but only with the assistance of grace. Man can be the cause of his own immortality only in the natural order, where his own powers suffice to attain his ends. On earth, then, man can make himself immortal through his works which live on after him.²⁹ This was the lesson which Dante acknowledged, and as we shall see, it was written in Brunetto's life as well as in his doctrine.

²⁹ Sapegno, ed. cit., at *Inf.* xv. 85.

But was this dedication to a lifework of scholarship the sin for which Brunetto was damned? A comparison with the case of the three statesmen suggests that the ideal is not in itself bad. Rather, it was the desire for fame that led them to turn their talents to unnatural ends. The sin itself was evident only after we turned from the text to examine their role in history, and then judged it in the light of Dante's concept of natural political order. Let us follow a similar procedure to determine the sin of Brunetto against philosophy. If our hypothesis is correct, his writings should pervert the true place of philosophy in the natural order. Dante himself has pointed the way, for he has the departing scholar recommend one of his writings above all others as his enduring claim to fame, and we may suspect that ironically it constitutes his claim to infamy as well.

The work entitled *Li Livres dou Trésor* is an encyclopedia written between 1260 and 1266, when Brunetto was in France as an exile. It is a relatively compact work, filling only 422 octavo pages in its modern edition.³⁰ The general character of the *Trésor* may be illustrated by comparing it with two famous encyclopedias compiled about the same time. One, the *Speculum naturale* prepared by a team of Dominicans under the direction of Vincent of Beauvais, was meant to be a comprehensive work of reference; the other, the *Opus maius* of Roger Bacon, was one individual's original reinterpretation of the scientific knowledge of his day. Brunetto's work occupies a position between these two, for it is the work of one man, as was Bacon's, but the *Trésor* reproduces its sources almost verbatim without any pretense at originality. In contrast to the *Speculum*, it is a summary of knowledge that was meant to be read from cover to cover and not merely consulted. Unlike either of its companions, the *Trésor* was for laymen rather than clerics, and accordingly was written in the vernacular rather than in Latin. In the introductory chapter, Brunetto explains that he used French instead of his native Italian for two reasons: because he was in France when he wrote, and because French "is the most charming and most commonly known of all languages — *est plus delitable et plus commune a tous langages*" (I. i. 7).

Carmody has shown that the book is not original either in content or in plan, for both are derived from recognized sources.³¹ If Brunetto committed an intellectual sin in preparing such a derivative work, it could only be an error of judgment in his selection of materials.³² A brief description

³⁰ *Li livres dou Trésor*, ed. F. J. Carmody, Univ. of Calif. Pubs. in Modern Philology, 22 (Berkeley, 1948).

³¹ Carmody, ed. *Trésor*, xxii-xxxii.

³² Or in his decision to write in French, for him an alien vernacular, as Pézard maintains: 94; elaborated in two chs. on "La question de la langue," 92-130.

of its contents will suffice to reveal that fault. The *Trésor* is divided into three books. The first is devoted to the theoretical sciences and the last two to the practical sciences. The stress is accordingly on practical knowledge, to which half the pages of the book are devoted. Only two forms of practical knowledge are in fact treated: ethics in Book II and politics in Book III. Brunetto repeatedly explains that the highest of all the sciences is the art of government, which is the end to which all other knowledge is directed. It is the goal and conclusion of his *Trésor* as well. For the layman who wished to learn the art of government from the ground up, Brunetto's treasury would provide all the knowledge necessary for the practice of his political art. The first book lays the theoretical foundations, the second teaches the ruler how to govern himself and his household, and the final book expounds the art of governing others. Book III is subdivided into two parts: rhetoric and political science. The inclusion of rhetoric among the arts of the ruler is, of course, suggested by its importance in the political life of the ancient city-state, and it is duly justified with a citation of Cicero (III. i. 2) and buttressed by a false etymology and spelling — *rectorique* — the art of the rector or ruler. In a manual for the instruction of a medieval monarch, this stress on rhetoric for the ruler might seem to be a strange anachronism, but when we turn to the culminating treatise on political science proper, we discover that rhetoric is in fact essential to the ruler for whom Brunetto wrote. The head of state he had in mind was not a feudal monarch but the elected ruler of a thirteenth-century Italian city-state, the official known as the *podestà*.

Brunetto introduces his discussion of politics by distinguishing between various forms of government. He will treat just one of them, for only that one concerns him and the friend for whom the book was composed. This type of government, he explains, is that found "in Italy, where the citizens and the burgesses and the community of the city elect as their *podestà* and their lord (*signour*) whomever they think will be most profitable to the common welfare (*preu*) of the city and of all their subjects."³³ The treatise that follows is a manual on how to be a *podestà*, probably derived from one composed early in the thirteenth century.³⁴ Rhetoric, it develops, is a necessary administrative art for the preparation of documents, forms for which are given in the manual. This was the notarial art in which Brunet-

³³ *Trésor* III. 73. 6, ed. Carmody, 392: "l'autre est en Ytaile, que li citain et li borgois et li communauté des viles eslisent lor poesté et lor signour tel comme il quident qu'il soit plus proufitables au commun preu de la vile et de tous lor subtés." Cf. Ceva, 155-156.

³⁴ Thus Carmody, ed. *Trésor*, xxxi-xxxii. Ceva, after an extended analysis (161-183) of the three comparable manuals extant, reluctantly agrees (185). On the office of *podestà*, see Schevill, 91, and monographs cited by Ceva.

to himself excelled and which he put to the service of the Florentine Guelfs as chancellor of the republic in the years after his return from France. For he, like the three Florentines, was a leading Guelf who was exiled after Montaperti and returned to share in the ultimate triumph of his party over the Ghibellines. He was not an aristocratic statesman but an intellectual who not only made his career in the civil service but also taught others how to do so. Contemporaries acknowledged the value of his professional services, but they remembered him primarily as the political philosopher of the autonomous Florentine city-state. His obituary by the chronicler Giovanni Villani leaves no doubt that Book III of the *Trésor*, with its double emphasis on rhetoric and politics Italian style, quite literally epitomized his contribution to Florentine culture.³⁵

In the said year 1294 there died in Florence a worthy citizen who was named Ser Brunetto Latini, who was a great philosopher, and was a perfect master in rhetoric, understanding both how to speak well and how to write well. And he was the one who expounded Cicero's *Rhetoric*, and made the good and useful book called *Tesoro*, and the *Tesoretto*, and the *Chiave del Tesoro*, and still other books on philosophy and concerning vices and virtues. And he was secretary (*dittatore*) of our commune. He was a worldly man, but we have made mention of him because he was the beginner and master in refining the Florentines, and in making them clever at speaking well and at understanding how to guide and rule our republic in accordance with the art of politics.

In a word, Brunetto placed philosophy at the service of the Florentine commune. For Dante, of course, this was a perversion of the natural order, in which philosophy was to provide the intellectual justification of the universal authority of the emperor, as he himself did in the *Monarchia*. Philosophy should teach men to be subject to the empire, not how to live in municipal autonomy. To instruct the ruler was a legitimate function of philosophy, but that ruler should be the emperor and not the podestà. This, then, was the sin of Brunetto Latini, that he subverted the natural

³⁵ *Cronica* VIII. 10: "Nel detto anno 1294 mori in Firenze uno velente cittadion il quale ebbe nome ser Brunetto Latini, il quale fu gran filosofo, e fu sommo maestro in rettorica, tanto in bene sapere dire come in bene dittare. E fu quegli che spuose la Rettorica di Tullio, e fece il buono e utile libro detto Tesoro, e il Tesoretto, e la chiave del Tesoro, e più altri libri in filosofia, e de'vizi e di virtù, e fu dittatore del nostro comune. Fu mondano uomo, ma di lui avemo fatta menzione, perocch'egli fu cominciatore e maestro in digrossare i Fiorentini, e farli scorti in bene parlare, e in sapere guidare e reggere la nostra repubblica secondo la politica." Text in *Cronica di Giovanni Villani*, ed. F. G. Dragomanni, Collezione di storici e cronisti italiani editi ed inediti, 1-4 (Florence, 1844-45), II, 17; trans. (here revised) in *Villani's Chronicle* by R. E. Selfe, ed. P. H. Wicksteed, 2nd ed. (London, 1906), 312-313. Earlier, Villani describes him as "ser Brunetto Latini, uomo di grande senno e authoritate" (vi. 73) and lists him among the Guelf exiles of 1260 (vi. 79).

order by forcing philosophy into the service of the unnaturally insubordinate and autonomous Italian republics.

Brunetto emerges as the intellectual counterpart of the three Florentines. Between them, they have led Florence into political and moral disorder, impelled by their desire for fame. Their presence in Hell must have been calculated to shock the contemporary reader and urge him to reflect deeply on the cause of their damnation, since he presumably knew their reputation to be spotless. The Florentine regarded these men as the highest fulfillment of the political and intellectual ideals of his society. He was right, and that was precisely the point. They were truly the product of the society in which they lived, for they valued the good opinion of their fellow citizens above all else. To achieve the fame for which they longed, they listened to public opinion rather than to nature. Thus they became the slaves of the society which by nature they were destined to lead. In the context of that corrupt society, their vices were honored as virtues, since only in the true perspective of a society obedient to natural law would their sins be evident. Their presence in Hell was an invitation to every Florentine to reconsider the values of the society in which he lived and rediscover the true principles of the natural order.

To turn the reader's thought in this direction, the poet placed a warning against the Florentines at the center of Canto xv, as the conclusion to Brunetto's prophecy of Dante's future (61-78). The words, although addressed to Dante, stand as a general warning against the dangers of society for the man of intellectual genius. The naturally base part of society will hate him for his good deeds, and with good reason, for the sweet fig cannot bear fruit among the bitter sorb trees. "An old saying (*fama*) on earth calls them blind; they are a people avaricious, envious, and proud: be sure to cleanse yourself of their customs."

Vecchia fama nel mondo li chiama orbi;
gente avara, invidiosa e superba:
dai lor costumi fa che tu ti forbi. (xv. 67-69)

Dante, having grown up in corrupt Florence, has himself been tainted and must be purged. Brunetto prophesies that Dante will achieve such honor that both parties will seek to destroy him, but he will be beyond their reach — a veiled allusion to his proud exile. Brunetto concludes with a striking metaphor based on the legend that the Florentine people were a mixture of noble Romans and ignoble folk from Fiesole: Let the beasts of Fiesole forage for themselves and not touch the plant which springs from the holy seed of the Romans, if indeed such a plant can still grow up in their manure.

Faccian le bestie fiesolane strame
 di lor medesme, e non tocchin la pianta,
 s'alcuna surge ancora in lor letame
 in cui riviva la sementa santa
 di que' Roman che vi rimaser quando
 fu fatto il nido di malizia tanta. (xv. 73-78)

With the discovery of the sin of Brunetto Latini, we have attained our main objective. Dante's conception of the twofold role of philosophy and the emperor in leading man to his natural beatitude on earth has provided a key to Cantos xv and xvi. With it we have been able to explain the damnation of the principal characters of the twin cantos. Brunetto and the three statesmen now appear respectively as intellectual and political leaders who had established a political order contrary to nature. As far as I know, the sins of the runners have not been explained before with reference to the terminal chapter of the *Monarchia*; and if I have convinced others that this yields a more satisfying interpretation than the traditional one, I have achieved my purpose. To hope for more would be rash: the implications of such a proposal, like any other reading of so closely integrated a work as the *Comedy*, require long and careful consideration. One critic is unlikely to see them all, and each critic will view them in his own perspective; but from the ceaseless dialogue of critics, a consensus may at length emerge. My hope is that this paper may introduce a new topic into that scholarly conversation. Since my intent is to be suggestive rather than definitive, I may close with a prospect rather than a conclusion. Of the many questions which shall here be left unresolved, the most pressing is the problem of Brunetto's fellow clerks. Can Priscian the grammarian, d'Accorso the civilian, and Mozzi the bishop each be interpreted as an intellectual who violated nature in the practice of his profession? Because the answer in each case requires an investigation of Dante's views on the profession in question, the argument could easily double the length of this essay and consequently must be developed separately. That investigation will complete and complement the present exploration of the literal-historical meaning of these cantos; the allegory and imagery deserve yet another. These questions I mean to treat elsewhere, and doubtlessly other readers will detect implications that have escaped me, for did not Benvenuto da Imola long ago blaze for us the trail through the *selva oscura* of Dantology with perhaps the wisest single sentence ever written in explanation of the *Commedia*: "It is rather great wit than great learning that is needed for the understanding of this book."

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Four Commentaries on the *De Consolatione Philosophiae* in MS Heiligenkreuz 130

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WHILE it is well known that for many centuries the *De Consolatione Philosophiae* of Boethius was a book which every educated man of the Latin world had read and studied, students of learning and education in the Middle Ages have done relatively little to explore the admittedly enormous influence exerted by Boethius on the mind of Western man.¹

Especially if read with the help of a good commentary, the book was apt to impart a deeper knowledge and understanding not only of the role of divine providence and free will in man's life but also of the significance of physics, cosmology, astronomy, mathematics, music, and history in their relation to the structure of the universe as conceived by Christian scholars whose secular learning rested on the foundations laid by the sages of ancient Greece. If to the *Consolation of Philosophy* we add the works on music, mathematics, logic, and the *Opuscula sacra*, all written by or at least attributed to Boethius, it is no exaggeration to state that for many generations no single author dominated and shaped the Latin mind so comprehensively as did Boethius.

His golden age, no doubt, was the twelfth century with its revival of classical studies, its creation of universities, and its novel approach to theology, law, architecture, and numerous other branches of human

¹ A comprehensive bibliography will be found in P. Courcelle, *La Consolation de la Philosophie dans la tradition littéraire* (Paris, 1967), 383-402. Special use has been made here of H. F. Stewart, "A Commentary by Remigius Autissiodorensis of the *De Consolatione Philosophiae* of Boethius," *Journal of Theol. Studies*, 17 (1915/16), 22-42. Edmund Taite Silk, *Saeculi noni auctoris in Boetii consolationem philosophiae commentarius*, in: *Papers and Monographs of the Am. Acad. in Rome*, 9 (Rome, 1935). H. Silvester, "Le commentaire inédit de Jean Scot Érigène au mètre ix du livre iii du *De consolatione philosophiae*," *Revue d'hist. eccl.*, 47 (1953), 44-122; R. B. Huygens, "Mittelalt. Kommentare zu O qui perpetua," *Sacris Erudiri*, 6 (1954), 373-427; E. T. Silk, "Pseudo-Johannes Scottus, Adalbold of Utrecht, and the Early Commentaries on Boethius," *Mediaeval and Ren. Studies*, 3 (1954), 1-40; G. Mathon, "Le commentaire du pseudo-Érigène sur la *Consolatio philosophiae* de Boèce," *Rech. théol. anc. et médiévale*, 22 (1955), 213-257; E. Jeaneau, "Un commentaire inédit sur le chant O qui perpetua de Boèce," *Riv. critica di storia della filos.*, 14 (1959), 60-80.

activities without which the course of Western civilization could not be explained intelligently. At least in the first half of the twelfth century the works of Boethius formed an integral part of the scholastic curriculum, including theology, and were commented on in the class room. Many a master put his comments or glosses down in writing and thus took up a tradition which had been inaugurated by Carolingian scholars in the ninth century.

The manuscript analyzed in this paper is an eloquent testimony to the geographical range of Boethius' influence and to his almost unexpected popularity in a remote Cistercian community whose early members must have been largely of French origin and educated in France. Its analysis should prove to be a welcome contribution to the exploration of a field which is too vast to be the task of a single historian.

Not satisfied, it seems, with one commentary on the *Consolation of Philosophy* the Cistercian abbot of Heiligenkreuz near Vienna in Austria procured no fewer than four different commentaries on the same work. Part of the material thus collected found its way to the library of Zwettl (Austria) before the end of the twelfth century.²

The catalogue³ of the Stiftsbibliothek of Heiligenkreuz rightly ascribes the manuscript with the pressmark 130 to the twelfth century and provides a summary of its contents. It escaped the librarian's attention that the volume actually contains not only three but four distinct commentaries. On f. 1v there is a drawing of a Wheel of Fortune which shows Boethius rising to fame and falling into disgrace.⁴ Then follows the treatise on the Boethian metres (f. 2-4) written by Abbot Lupus of Ferrières (d. 863).⁵ A short *accessus ad auctorem*, found on f. 4, is not without interest:

In exponendis auctoribus hec consideranda sunt: poete uita, titulus operis, qualitas carminis, scribentis intentio, numerus librorum, ordo librorum, explanatio quis quid ubi quibus auxiliis cur quomodo quando. Tria sunt que in principiis singulorum librorum apud gramaticos requiri solent i.e. locus tempus persona. Locus ubi editus fuerit liber, tempus quo uel quibus regum

² MS Zwettl, Stiftsbibl. 363, f. 136-139. *Xenia Bernardina* II, 1 (Wien, 1891), 427. It contains a fragment of a commentary which belongs to the family of the so-called *Anonymus Erfurtensis* Q 5 (f. 136: *Carmina qui quondam*. Sensus: Ego quondam letus poteram esse...) followed by the prologue written by William of Conches (f. 136v). This prologue is followed by the prologue of the *Anonymus Erfurtensis* Q 5 and the tract on the Boethian metres by Lupus of Ferrières. The prologue is repeated on f. 140. The commentary following it (f. 140-166) is incomplete. The same MS contains a fragment of a commentary on Macrobius, *Comm. in somn. Scipionis* (f. 132v-135).

³ *Xenia Bernardina* II, 1 (Wien, 1891), 154.

⁴ A good reproduction is found in P. Courcelle, *La Consolation*, plate 67.

⁵ Cf. M. Manitius, *Gesch. der lat. Lit. des Mittelalters*, 1 (Munich, 1911), 34 and 490.

uel principum temporibus, persona quis ediderit librum. Et de persona quidem in titulo patet Boetium huius libri auctorem fuisse. Qui ideo quadri-nomius in titulo inuenitur quia nobilissimi Romanorum quorum unus ille fuit prenomina nomina cognomina et agnomina solebant habere.

The *accessus* is followed by a brief description (f. 4-4v) of the nine Muses. On f. 5 there is a drawing of Boethius reclining on a couch and listening to a woman (Philosophy) above whom there is a figure of Christ the Teacher. The nine Muses stand at the foot of the couch. Under the drawing are the words: "Anicii Manlii Suerini Boetii ex consulari ordine patrum philosophice consolationis incipit liber primus." Twenty-two lines of poetry, found on f. 4v, are dedicated to the nine Muses, divine Wisdom, and the seven liberal arts. The first poem reads:

Clio gesta canens transactis tempora reddit
Dulciloquos calamos Euterpe flatibus urget
Comica lasciuio gaudet sermone Thalia
Melpomene tragico proclamat mesta boatu
Terpsicore affectus citharis mouet imperat auget
Plectra gerens Heratho saltat pede carmine uultu
Urania poli motus scrutatur et astra
Carmina Calliope libris heroyca mandat
Signa cuncta manu loquitur Polimnia gestu
Mentis apollinee uis has mouet undique Musas
In medio residens complectitur omnia Phebus.⁶

The next poem is an address to the eternal *Sophia*:

Chere salus cosmoy splendens super ethra sophya
Queque theologie caput est amarungmata pandens
Chronos perpetuum dynamys preclara theosy
Tu Christi logothetha manes. Tu cuncta creasti.

⁶ I owe the identification of the two poems to the courtesy of Prof. Bernhard Bischoff. The first poem is published in No. 664 of the *Anthologia Latina* edited by A. Riese. The second poem has been published by Karl Strecker, *Die Tegernseer Briefsammlung (Froumund)*, MGH Epp, selectae, 3 (Berlin, 1925), p. xii. W. Wattenbach, *Das Schriftwesen im Mittelalter* (Leipzig, 1896). 540, writes: "Froumund schrieb in Cöln für Tegernsee Boethius de consolatione mit dem Commentar des Lupus ab." This copy, later Cod. I, 2 (lat.), 4^o.3 of the Fürstliche Oettingen-Walensteinische Bibliothek in Maihingen, has been lost since the Second World War, as was pointed out to me by Prof. Bischoff. According to K. Strecker (p. xi) the MS contained the *De Consolatione* with many *scholia* in addition to the tract on the Boethian metres by Lupus. A comparison with the detailed description given by G. Schepss, *Handschriftl. Studien zu Boethius De Consolatione philosophiae* (Würzburg, 1881), 3-47, shows that our manuscript is very closely related to the former Tegernsee manuscript which seems to have contained only the first two commentaries of the Heiligenkreuz collection. G. Schepss does not mention the poem on the nine Muses ("Clio gesta canens"). But the poem on the eternal *Sophia* ("Chere salus cosmoy"), transcribed by Schepss (p. 15), was contained in it together with the poem on the seven liberal arts as transcribed by Schepss and in this paper.

These verses are followed by a poem on the liberal arts which should be read backwards to establish the proper sequence. The numerous Greek words that occur in it are interpreted by interlinear Latin terms. It is believed to date back to the Benedictine poet, Froumund of Tegernsee (d. 1108?), and reads:

Celestem mathesyn percurrit et astronomia
Musica perpulcrum profert sistemate cantum
Practica multa refert sibimet geometrica pulsans
Ruminat adprime uerborum arithmetica carpos
Lepidulis uerbis dominam dialectica fatur
Posthanc rethorice panduntur limmata clare
Primus gramatice titulus reseratur ydalme.⁷

To the right of these verses we find a short poem on Boethius probably composed by the same poet:

Mallius Anicius residet Boetius. Idem
Threnon elegiacum Seuerinus personat istud
Ypatos et consul Rome tum preluit iste
Moribus egregiis summis excelluit odis.

The text of the *De Consolatione Philosophiae*, which covers f. 5v-76, is carefully written in large characters with only 23 lines to a folio. The scribe left ample space for interlinear and marginal notes or glosses. With a few exceptions all interlinear and marginal entries seem to have been written by the same hand.⁸ The interlinear glosses are fairly numerous and, as a rule, consist of individual words rather than sentences. The marginal glosses on both sides of the text are preceded either by a letter of the alphabet or some arbitrary sign. These letters or signs are also found in the text above the word to which the gloss is related. Although written by the same hand, the glosses themselves do not seem to date back to one and the same author.

The first interlinear gloss found in the first line above the words *studio florente* reads: "i.e. disciplina crescente leto opere." Above *flebilis* in

⁷ The interlinear notes differ very little from those noted by K. Strecker and G. Schepss. They are: "(chere) aue, (cosmoy) mundi, (theologie) diuini sermonis, (amarungmata) que sunt amara intellectu, (chronos) tempus, (dynamys) uirtus, (theosy) diuinitatis, (Christi logothetha) compositrix sermonis Christi, (mathesyn) doctrinam, (astronomiam) astrorum lex, (sistemate) cum constitutione, (practica) res, (geometrica) mensura terre, (carpos) fructus, (limmata) i.e. solutiones, (ydalme) scripture." Prof. Bischoff mentions in his letter that the rare word *idalmata* occurs in *Ioannis Scotti Carmina* (ed. L. Traube, in: MGH Poet. lat. medii aevi, 3, 532, verse 45). Some of John's poems are composed in Greek, others contain passages in Greek, and others have numerous Greek words within the Latin text.

⁸ The text agrees with the transcription published by G. Schepss (p. 16).

the second line we encounter the letter *a* indicating the first marginal gloss. After the letter *a* in the margin we read: "Quia aliis deflendus sum siue fletu dignus."

The metrical parts of the *Consolation* are headed by brief remarks concerning the kind of metre used by the author. The prose sections are preceded by titles summarizing their contents. Within the prose parts the reader will rather frequently find himself faced with Greek words which do not belong to the original work as it is known today. Such insertions, written in Greek, as *physika* (f. 24v), *epilogos* (f. 25), *paradigma* (f. 25v), *synkrisis* (f. 25v), *aitiologia* (f. 26), *yronia* (f. 30v), *parenthesis* (f. 35), *axioma* (f. 45v), and others are easy to read and identify. Others are much more difficult to decipher. Most of the Greek insertions are accompanied by superscript Latin translations. This is also the case with regard to the Greek passages quoted by Boethius. In some instances (f. 18; f. 20) Greek words even occur as interlinear explanations of Latin words. Hence it comes as no surprise that in the marginal notes Greek terms are likewise fairly frequent.

We are obviously confronted with a commentator who was very familiar with the Greek language. Such a commentator was John the Scot who is known to have commented on the *Consolation of Philosophy*. But up to date only his commentary on the chant *O qui perpetua* may have been discovered.⁹

Apart from insertions of Greek words the reader will also find the names B(oethius) and Ph(ilosophia) in the dialogues to identify the speaker. Down to the beginning of the third book the marginal notes are linked with the text by letters or signs. On f. 28v for the first time a *lemma* is added to the previous device.¹⁰ On the succeeding folios *lemmata* become more and more numerous. At the same time glosses without such *lemmata* continue to accompany the text. Beginning with f. 30 the reader will encounter an entirely new technical terminology such as *a simili uel a maiori* or *a repugnanti* or *a parte* or *probat a contrario* or *probat a partibus*. Other examples are *probat a toto*, *probat ducendo ad inconueniens*, *probat a pari*, *ab effectu infert*, *infert a descriptionibus*, *illatio a simili*, *probatio ab immediato*, *illatio a causa*.

This terminology is very common in the logical writings of Peter

⁹ H. Silvestre, "Le commentaire inédit," 44-122.

¹⁰ In the gloss on *De Cons.* III, 2, 50; ed. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand (London, Loeb Library, 1953), 230: "*Quod cetera. Quia isti confiniunt...*" All references in this paper to the text of the *De Consolatione* are to the Stewart-Rand edition.

Abelard¹¹ who explains these terms at great length in his *Dialectica*.¹² Such *loci* are also very frequent in the (unpublished) commentary on Cicero's *De inventione* written by Thierry of Chartres.¹³ They also occur in his theological works. In his *Commentum*, for instance, he inserts such remarks as *argumentum a contrariis sumptum* or *argumentum a similibus sumptum* or *ab inductis est illatio*.¹⁴ In his *Lectiones* similar insertions are made: *argumentum ab indifferentia, a contrariis, a simili per contrarium illatio, a simili in aliis illatio*.¹⁵

We shall see later that this novel nomenclature in our marginal glosses is due to the use of another commentary. In our manuscript the inter-linear notes end on f. 71v, the marginal glosses on f. 75, the text of the *Consolation*¹⁶ on f. 76. Folio 76v is blank.

Another commentary, written by a different scribe, begins on f. 77. It is not an interlinear or marginal gloss but a continuous text explaining *lemmata* chosen by the author.¹⁷ Its prologue¹⁸ offers a brief life of Boethius, sings the praises of wisdom, and blames the followers of a *magister M.* for introducing too many distinctions into the *accessus ad auctorem*. The prologue begins and ends as follows:

Tempore illo quo Gothorum rex Theo(dericus) Romanam r(em) p(ublicam) armis inuasit Boetius Rome multum claruit eique plus omnibus in multis restitit. Cumque ille rex perfidus r(em) p(ublicam) ui optineret atque inanem et intollerandam tyrannidem in eam exerceret doluit ualde Boetius ... ostentationem fatuorum hominum talibus studiis immorantium friuolum decreuimus (f. 77).

In the commentary¹⁹ which now begins, the first few *lemmata* are marked by underlining:

Carmina qui quondam. Sensus: Ego qui quondam letus poteram esse, nulla miseria interrumpente, modo cogor ab ipso dolore meo ea que ad miseriam pertinent scribere. Carmina accipe quecumque prius scribebat que sine

¹¹ See B. Geyer, *Peter Abaelards phlos. Schriften*, in: *Beiträge*, 21, 1-4 (1919-1933).

¹² *Dialectica* III, 1-2; ed. L. M. de Rijk (Assen, 1956), 253-466. See also Martianus Capella, *De Nuptiis Philol.*, V, 474; ed. A. Dick (Leipzig, 1925), 237. Isidore, *Etymol.* II, 30, 1-18 (Lindsay).

¹³ MS Brussels, Bibl. Royale 10057, f. 1-29.

¹⁴ *Commentum*; ed. N. Haring, in: *Arch. d'hist. doctr. et litt. du moyen âge*, 27 (1960), 90; 107; 113.

¹⁵ *Lectiones*; ed. N. Haring, *ibid.*, 23 (1958), 139; 140; 145; 147; 171.

¹⁶ The six marginal notes found on f. 76 are later additions and apparently not related to the text.

¹⁷ On an average there are 44 lines to a folio. Since f. 77 has been counted twice, the folio numbers after the first 77 are here quoted as they should read. Having missed f. 119, the librarian's f. 120-121 need no such rectification.

¹⁸ The prologue is also found in MS Zwettl, Stiftsb. 363, f. 136v.

¹⁹ See also MS Zwettl, Stiftsb. 363, f. 135v.

miseria et lamentatione erant quamuis carmina non proprie dicantur ni(s)i metricre scripta. Quod dicit *studio florente* metaphora ab arboribus siue herbis...

Judging by the prologue and the *incipit* of the commentary we are faced here with a copy which belongs to a group of commentaries known as *Anonymus*²⁰ *Erfurtensis* Q 5. The author of this second commentary likewise uses the sort of terminology we met in the second half of the marginal gloss. He makes such insertions as: *probatio a simili*, *probat a simili*, *ostendit a parte*, *probat per partes*, *ab immediatis*, *a repugnanti*, *a toto*, *a pari*, *a contrario*, *a minori*, *illatio a partibus*, and others.²¹ On f. 86 this commentary breaks off in the comment on the *De Consolatione philosophiae* III, 2, 60: "*Neque enim uile. Probat a contrario ... habere uel esse uoluptatem cum etiam in minimis et terrenis rebus uideamus inesse uoluptatem?*" Then follows the remark: "Require retro."

The reader will not fail to notice that this second commentary breaks off where, as we have seen, a new type of marginal glosses appears in the first commentary. This leads us to the conclusion that the missing part of the second commentary was used to provide additional²² marginal glosses for the first commentary. The conclusion is supported by the sudden appearance of *lemmata* and the technical terminology described above.

Instead of selecting glosses²³ on the famous chant *O qui perpetua* the glossator decided to transfer the entire rather lengthy comment from the second commentary²⁴ to the marginal gloss (f. 37-39v). It begins as follows: "Sciendum est quod quicumque de constitutione mundi digne tractant tam catholici quam ethnici duos mundos asserunt: unum archetipum i.e. intelligibilem mundum, alterum sensibilem uel imaginarium..." It may be impossible ever to determine whether or not this long digression was substituted in the gloss for a similar but perhaps less satisfactory comment of an earlier period.

It is quite obvious that, beginning with *De Consolatione philosophiae* III, 3, the first commentary is a conflation of two works. In view of

²⁰ The text is closely related to that of the commentary published by E. T. Silk as *Saeculi noni auctoris ... commentarius* (pp. 3-304), now generally referred to as Pseudo-John the Scot.

²¹ These topics or *loci* are equally numerous in Pseudo-John the Scot.

²² Further research may be able to decide to what extent earlier glosses are mixed with passages copied or adapted from our second commentary.

²³ Some initial marginal glosses on *O qui perpetua* are found on f. 37. They are not continued.

²⁴ Despite the identical beginning, the text does not fully agree with the corresponding parts in Silk's edition. In fact, variants are so considerable that an edition of the entire text seems well justified to promote further research.

the rather prolific use of additional Greek words within the text of the *Consolatio* and the use of Greek terms in the glosses, the first commentary in its original form may prove to be the work of John the Scot. The second commentary originated in the early twelfth century as is evidenced by such characteristics as the references to the topics from which according to the glossator the arguments were drawn. It was not copied in its entirety because, as we have seen, part of it was used to provide marginal glosses for the first commentary. Such a fusion²⁵ of a ninth-century gloss with a twelfth-century commentary would undoubtedly cause considerable literary problems. In our case the question has been greatly simplified by the remark *Require retro* at the point where the second commentary ends (f. 85v).

In the next line begins a third commentary written by the same hand. It belongs to the family of commentaries that date back to Remigius of Auxerre.²⁶ The prologue reads (f. 85v): "Nobiles Romani auspicato nomina et prenomina suis filiis imponebant ut in ipsis nominibus origo eorum agnosceretur et quales futuri essent in ipsis nobis pretenderetur... Patricius dicebatur quod more patrum rem publicam regebat ac amore magis quam timore..." The commentary itself begins with the words: "*Carmina qui quondam. Carmen dicitur eo quod carptim pronuntietur. Unde lanam hodie quam discerpunt purgantes carminare dicimus. Flebilis aptus fletu...*" Like the second work, the Remigius commentary is not complete. It breaks off on f. 92 after the comment on *De Consolatione* II, 7, 31 with the words: "Caucasus mons est Scithie altissimus ab India usque ad montem Taurum." The manner in which these final words are written and arranged shows that the scribe had come to the end of his exemplar. It appears that the writing was done by two scribes, for a change of hands is clearly noticeable on f. 89v. Folio 92v is blank.

On f. 93-121 a fourth commentary on the *De Consolatione* is found. It is written by another apparently somewhat later hand and in substance dates back to William of Conches. The prologue is missing.²⁷ The title

²⁵ The conflation was hardly made at Heiligenkreuz, for the first commentary was written by a different scribe who seems to have copied a text in which the combination had already taken place.

²⁶ See P. Courcelle, *La Consolation*, 405. A comparison with the partial edition published by H. F. Stewart, "A Commentary by Remigius," 22-42, shows many substantial variants. The Remigius-commentary on *O qui perpetua* has been edited by both E. T. Silk, *Saeculi noni ... commentarius*, 312-342, and H. Silvestre, "Le commentaire inédit," 51-65. The present edition of the commentary on the same chant as found in our manuscript (f. 37-39v) provides sufficient evidence to show the close relationship between these commentaries.

²⁷ The fact that the prologue is found in MS Zwettl, Stiftsb. 363, f. 135, strongly suggests that it was not unknown at Heiligenkreuz.

reads: "Incipiunt glose in Boetium." The opening of the commentary does not agree with the commonly known *incipit*. It reads: "*Carmina qui. Carmen est scriptum de aliquo delectabili cum metro. Studio florente. Studium est uehemens animi applicatio ad aliquid agendum.*" William's commonly known comment reads: "*Carmina. Boetius tractaturus de philosophica consolatione prinitus ostendit se talem qui indigeat consolatione...*"²⁸ Definitely part of William's work is the commentary on *O qui perpetua* which begins on f. 104v: "Phylosophia ostensura B(oetio) in quo sit situm summum bonum et qualiter perueniatur ad ipsum, diuinum inuocat auxilium..."²⁹

The *explicit* of the fourth commentary confirms the conclusion that William is its author. Our commentary ends as follows (f. 121): "Non necesse est euenire uelut in hoc exemplo: si ambulat, necesse est moueri; sed ambulat, ergo mouetur. Non ergo necesse est moueri quia hoc falsum est. Sed nunquam falsum sequitur ex uero." William concludes his commentary with these words.³⁰

Thus the volume examined here contains no fewer than four commentaries on the *De Consolatione Philosophiae* of Boethius. The third of them is incomplete whereas the second has been partly incorporated into the first. Concerning their authors it can be said that:

- (1) the first commentary (f. 6-76), an interlinear and marginal gloss, may be the work of John the Scot enriched with later additions;
- (2) the second work (f. 77-85v), a continuous commentary, belongs to the family of the so-called *Anonymus Erfurtensis Q 5* and dates back to the early twelfth century. It ends abruptly with the comment on *De Consolatione* III, 2, 68. The rest of the original text was used to add marginal glosses to the first commentary;
- (3) the third commentary (f. 85v-92) is a redaction, it seems, of the gloss written by Remigius of Auxerre;³¹
- (4) the fourth commentary (f. 93-121) dates back to William of Conches. But there are indications that it does not fully coincide with the commonly known text of William's work.

The texts transcribed below are a small selection of marginal glosses found in the first commentary (f. 5v-76). No attempt has been made

²⁸ Cf. P. Courcelle, *La Consolation*, 408.

²⁹ Excerpts from the comment on *O qui perpetua* are found in J. M. Parent, *La doctrine de la création dans l'école de Chartres*, in: *Publ. de l'Inst. d'études méd. d'Ottawa*, 8 (Paris, 1938), 124-130.

³⁰ Cf. P. Courcelle, *La Consolation*, 409.

³¹ Cf. P. Courcelle, *La Consolation*, 406.

to correct scribal errors. *Lemmata* are italicized. We have seen that a distinction should be made between glosses preceding and following *De Cons.* III, 2. Down to this dividing line the glosses are not mixed with those taken from the *Anonymus Erfurtensis Q 5*. In view of its importance the entire comment on the chant *O qui perpetua* follows the transcription of the glosses with suggestions of sources used by the glossator.

TEXTS

(I, 1, 12; p. 130): Propter astrologiam dictum est altius quoddam sapientie sacramentum quod nullus mortalium penetrare ualet (f. 6).

(I, 1, 14; p. 130): Firma ueritate de qua omnis sapientia procedit; per indissolubilem materiam uestium probatissimas repertiones intellege ut in arithmetica numerorum ratione claret (f. 6).

(I, 1, 18; p. 130): Pragmatica i.e. actiua. Practicen i.e. actualem. Pragma est causa. Pragmaticus Grece negotiator Latine actiuam significat uitam. Theologia contemplatiua. Theorica Grece L(atine) contemplatiuum. Unde theos ut quorundam habet opinio a spectando uel omnia prospiciendo contemplando dicitur. Theoritis in contemplationum et actuum nostrorum theologia genealogia dicitur. Theorica intellectualis (f. 6).

(I, 1, 29; p. 132): Scena est proprie locus uel habitatio meretricum. Inde scenicas ipsas musas appellat quia sepe scenica acta mouent. Scena dicebatur apud antiquos locus quo plebs ad spectaculum confluebat. Ibi enim ludos exercebant diuersos sed et mulieres inter alia stuprauerunt. Quapropter scenice dicebantur ille que ad hoc uenerunt ut concubitus uolentibus adhiberent. Scena uero Grece scia i.e. umbra dicitur. Unde et illud: Omnis qui agit male, odit lucem (*John* 3:20). Scena autem erat locus infra theatrum in modum domus constructa pro pulpito qui pulpitus orchestra uocabatur. Ibi cantabant comici traici istriones et mimi. Dicitur autem scena Greca apellatione eo quod in specie domus erat constructa. Unde et apud Hebreos tabernaculorum dedicatio a similitudine domiciliorum cxenophegya (= scenopegia) appellatur. Ibi enim Grecis pudor mulierum infelicium publicabatur et ludibrio habebantur et hi qui faciebant et qui paterentur (f. 6v).

(I, 3, 22; p. 138): Epicurei sunt qui principalem rem in corpore esse asserunt. Et Epicurei dicti ab Epicuro quodam philosopho amatore uanitatis, non sapientie. Quem etiam ipsi philosophi porcum nominauerunt quasi uolutantes in sceno carnali corporis uoluptatem summum bonum asserentes. Epicurus primitus homo dicebatur, postea Epicurei

philosophi qui dicebant summam felicitatem esse uoluptatibus incubere (f. 8v).

(I, 3, 31; p. 140): Anaxagora philosophus propter sapientiam fugatus est a patria et diu exulauit qui inimicorum insecutionibus innocens fugatus est. Socrates per anserem iurabat et canem. Unde accusatur. Offerente carnifice uenenum bibit. Quod quidem libentissime hausit tanquam non mortis sed immortalitatis sibi esset poculum propinatum. Cui insonti ueneni potio propinata est. Zenon cum deprehensus ac tortus esset ut coniurationis sue conscios nominaret ... cum eloqui posset linguam sibi contra oris claustra morsibus amputauit. Seneca fuit magister Neronis inuentorque notarum (f. 9).

(I, 4, 10; p. 142): Armarium uel copiosus numerus librorum bibliotheca repositio uel custodia librorum sed melius librorum mandatum nam theca Grece, Latine mandatum dicitur. Duo sunt apud Grecos que significant Latine mendatium uel mandatum entole et tece. Entole siquidem mandatum de precepto, Tece uero de commendatione significat. Inde bibliotheca ubi libri commendantur uel reponuntur (f. 10).

(I, 4, 14; p. 142): Cursus cum uirga discernens ueluti cum radio, astrologiam tangit uel theologiam. Virga philosophorum quia apertius cum illa potuerunt indicare quam digito (f. 10).

(I, 4, 19; p. 142): Plato dicitur a latitudine humerorum. Platonis sententiam dicit cum doceres nos secundum uoluntatem dei uiuere ad cuius imaginem conditi sumus uel similes esse quibus in ratione utimur (f. 10).

(I, 4, 44; p. 144): Tempore famis cum regis horrea ac principum plena essent indicta est iniusta coemptio grauissima a rege. Que res cum nimium campaniam profligaret periculo se obponens ne id fieret euicit. Forte imminente fame frumenta regis per totam campaniam iniusta coemptio a prefecto pretorum uendita sunt (f. 11).

(I, 5, 40; p. 160): Ostendit fatigatum aliquem ex morbo non statim posse fortiora medicamina sumere sed primum molliora ut morbus faciliorem aditum prestet medicamentis. Haut aliter qui corruptionem animi patiebatur non statim ualidiori disciplina esse sanandum sed primum lenibus et suauibus sermocinationibus resipiscat et postea ualidiori disciplina se corrigat. Metaforam facit ab animali ad inanimale quia quod manus medici facere solet hoc ipsum promittit eam facere (f. 15v).

(II, 1, 21; p. 174): Rethorica est bene dicendi scientia ciuilibus questionibus ad persuadendum iusta et bona in rerum personarumque negotio causa. Dicta autem rethorica Greca appellatione a potu retho i.e. copia locutionis. Rethores similiter aliquando pro iniustis uti pro iustis rationem sumunt (f. 17v).

(II, 1, 23; p. 174): Nam rethorice prosam, musice uero carmen

composuit. Musica est modulationis pericia sono cantuque consistens. Tria enim sunt genera musice: chromaticum, diatonicum, enarmonicum quod est dulcissimum (f. 17v).

(II, 2, 38; p. 180): Tragedie sunt carmina que constant ex preliis mortuorum et deflent miserias hominum (f. 18v).

(II, 3, 30; p. 184): Sciendum sellam curulem a curru dictam quod hii tantum ea utebantur qui triumphali curru inuecti fuissent curules magistratus appellati sunt (f. 19v).

(II, 3, 1 m; p. 186): Stelle dicte sunt a stando quia fixe stant semper in celo ne cadant. Nam quando uidemus a celo quasi stellas labi non sunt stelle sed igniculi ab ethere lapsi qui fiunt dum uentus altiora petens ethereum ignem secum trahit qui tractu suo imitatur stellas cadentes. Nam stelle cadere non possunt. Inmobiles enim sunt et cum celo fixe perpetuo motu feruntur (f. 20).

(II, 4, 101; p. 202): Iuuenalis (*Sat.* 10, 22) dicit: Cantabit uacuu coram latrone uiator (f. 23v).

(II, 6, 20; p. 206): Muscula diminutiuum a musca quo nomine parua animalia uenenifera comprehendit: araneas crabrones quorum morsu homines perire solent et pro omni uerme nociuo ponitur (f. 24).

(II, 6, 31; p. 208): Materia est unde aliquid fit uel in quo formatum est. Item materia est facultas. Materies uero est artificiorum, materia consiliorum (f. 24v).

(II, 6, 36; p. 208): Regulus dux Romanorum trecentos captiuorum Cartaginensium cepit et ipse postea captus est a Lacedemoniis qui auxilium Cartaginensibus ferebant. Regulum coegerunt iurare ut Romam proficisceretur et de reddendis captiuis ageret. Iurauit se reuersurum. Iuit autem et ne redderentur captiui suasit. Reuersus hoc cruciatu affectus est resectis palpebris in machina illigatus. Vigilando necatus est quem Cicero necatum negat supplicio affectum dicens fortune tela fuisse non culpe (f. 24v).

(II, 7, 15; p. 212): Nam Tholomeus philosophus docebat quartam partem inhabitari terre ab hominibus et bestiis (f. 25v).

(II, 7, 30; p. 214): Marcus hoc est prenomen. Tullius est proprium nomen. Cicero uocatur ab habitu faciei sue quod scilicet rotundam faciem haberet instar ciceris qui est rotundus et pallidam eo quod studeret nimis sapientie (f. 25v).

(II, 7, 16; p. 218): Brutus qui primus consul Romanorum fuit qui audita uictoria Cesaris cladeque suarum partium nil cunctatus ut in sapiente dignum erat mortem etiam letus acciuit. Nam priusquam filium comitesque ab amplexu dimisit in nocte lecto ad lucernam Platonis libro qui immortalitatem anime docet Paulum qui eum tum circa primam uigiliam stricto gladio reuelatum manu pectus semel iterumque percussit:

interueniente filio ausi post hoc uirum medici uiolare. Illo etiam patiente dum ascenderent rescidit pectus plagasque secutaque est uis sanguinis moribundas maculas in ipso uulnere reliquit anno uite etatis xlviii (f. 26v).

(II, 8, 15; p. 222): Amor dicitur deus quia res que propria natura in semetipsis discordant in ipso concordant. Oblique ipsum Boetium tangit pro terrenis opibus cum aduersariis discordantem. Qui talem concordiam ceteris facit rebus et maxime celestibus incolis etiam homines pro terrenis opibus discordantes ab inmoderata rerum cupiditate illorum animos regendo compescit i.e. ne pro terrenis inuicem discordent mitigando (f. 27v).

(III, 2, 50; p. 230): *Quod cetera*. Quia isti confiniunt uoluptatem. Si aliquit ex istis deerit statim uoluptas desistit (f. 28v).

(III, 2, 8; p. 234): Virga dicitur uel a uirtute quia in se multum habeat uel a uiriditate uel quia pacis indicium est quia uim regat. Unde hac utuntur magistri ad placandos inter se serpentes. Hac etiam philosophi, hac etiam magistri et regum nuntii et legati utuntur (f. 29v).

(III, 3, 35; p. 236): Forum dicitur a fando uel etiam locus ubi iudices conueniunt. Forum sex modis intelligitur. Primo negotiationis locus. Alio in quo iudicia fieri solent. De quo nunc in isto loco dixit. Tercio cum is qui prouintie preest forum agere dicitur cum ciuitates uocat et de controuersiis earum cognoscit. Quarto cum id forum antiqui appellabant quod nunc uestibulum sepulchri dici solet. Quintus locus in nauis. Sed tunc masculini generis est plurale. Sexto fori sed genitiuus et circennia spectacula ex quibus etiam minores forules uocamus. Unde et forare et foras dare et foras et foros et forecule dicuntur (f. 30).

(III, 5, 30; p. 244): Papianus scriptor legis fuit. Hinc lex papiana dicitur (f. 32).

(III, 5, 33; p. 244): *Seneca opes etiam v. i.* Hoc Suetonius refert. Seneca magister fuit Neronis qui notas adinuenit. Factus autem imperator fingeat se quasi magistrum ita illum timere ueluti in puericia. Unde nacta occasione mandauit ut sibi genus mortis eligeret eo quod non posset uiuere. Ille cibo potuque se satians uenam utriusque brachii incidi fecit et de anulo bibens interiit. Antiqui enim potentes et nobiles sub gemma anuli uenenum gestabant ut si quid contigisset ad mortem confugerent. Hinc Iuuenalis (*Sat.* 9, 100): Ut nunquam careas annona ueneni (f. 32).

(III, 5, 2; p. 246): Animus et anima idem est i.e. substantia qua uiuimus. Sed hanc faciunt differentiam: Anima est qua uiuimus, animus quo sapimus... Anbrotonos dicitur homo quia brotos Grece cibus. Non ergo antropos dictus est quod solus inter omnes creaturas rationali uescitur cibo. Aut antropon legendum est. Antropos dicitur quasi anatropos i.e. sursum uersus. Pronis enim omnibus animalibus terram spectantibus

solus homo suspicit celum erectus. Hinc Ovidius (*Met.* 1, 84): Prona conspicient animalia terram. Deus homini sublime dedit celumque uidere. Iussit et erectos ad sidera tollere uultus (f. 32v).

(III, 6, 2: p. 246): Tragici poete tragedias scribentes quod carmen ab hirco tractum est qui Grece tragos dicitur qui pro mercede poetis dabatur. Tragicus i.e. luctus. Tragedia compositio fabulosa uel cum asperitate uel luctuose relationes uel bellica cantatio uel fabulatio (f. 32v).

(III, 8, 23: p. 254): Linx est animal quod fertur posse hominis interiora uisu penetrare. Alcibiadis est nomen mulieris famose pulchritudinis quam dicunt matrem fuisse Herculis. Unde Alcideneum uocatum. Sed hoc falsum est. Nam Alcides dictus est quasi Alceidos quoniam fortis et pulcher fuit. Alce enim uirtus, idea forma uocatur (f. 34).

(III, 8, 16; p. 252): Elaios mons dicitur. Hinc elephas dicitur quod instar montis a longe uidetur. Dicimus autem elephantus, elefanti et elephans, elephantis. Sed in plurali numero semper est secunde declinationis. Tygris animal est uelocissimum adeo ut si insequi ceperit nichil euadat, si uero fugere nichil insequatur. Unde et habet nomen. Tygris enim lingua parthica dicitur sagitta quia ut sagitta uelociter currit. Hinc enim fluuius Tygris uocatur ab impetu cursus. Declinatur autem Tygris tigris et tygris tigridis (f. 34).

(III, 9, 15; p. 257): *Nam si quid.* Probat a pari sic: uere indigens est potens. Nam si non est potens, est indigens (f. 35).

(III, 9, 17; p. 257): *Igitur.* A pari est illatio. Quando quidem omnis sufficiens est potens, ergo una natura est sufficientie et potentie. Simili modo probat quod quisquis est potens est sufficiens et dignus et celebris et uoluptate habundans. Hec ergo nomina tantum diuersa sunt, substantia eadem (f. 35).

(III, 9, 99; p. 262): In quodam libro qui sic uocatur thimeo. Time dicitur Grece animo a potu timui i.e. precioso. Hinc et thimiama dicitur. Plato namque librum de qualitate anime composuit quem thimeum uocauit ubi precipit etiam in rebus minimis diuinum implorare auxilium... (f. 36v).

(III, 9, 9 metrum; p. 264): Id est Christum qui perfectus erat quia omnia per ipsum facta sunt ut ille imperfectas partes distribueret uel perficeret uel opus quod cum illo iam fuit perfectum licet indistributum quia omnia futura apud illum iam preterita uidentur iussit imperfectas partes distribui (f. 37).

(III, 10, 19; p. 266): *Quod si uti.* Illatio est a toto. Communis conceptio. Due conceptiones sunt animi quas Greci ebdomades uocant. Ebdo per b i.e. concipio. Hinc ebdomadas dicitur conceptio. Altera communis, altera specialis est. Communis est que a sapientibus et insipientibus accipitur ut: si iungantur equalia equalibus par numerus pari

duo duobus. Quod enim quatuor sunt notissimum est. Specialis est que a paucis et tantum peritis cognoscitur ut uoluere celum non omnibus notum est, septem quoque planetas (f. 39v).

(III, 10, 20; p. 270): *Super hec*. Quia beatitudo et diuinitas sunt idem. Ergo dabo quasi collarium i.e. quoddam ornamentum corporale torqui aureo quod inferam a superioribus sicut geometre ex quibusdam propositis et ostensis solent inferre quedam que uocantur porismata sicut si ostensa longitudine in aliquo inferent ex his altitudinem uel aliquid tale quod ad auctoritatem ipsius illationis adpositum est. Collarium uocat hoc quod... (f. 41).

(III, 11, 32; p. 278): Anima dicta est propter quod uiuit, spiritus autem uel spiritualis natura uel pro eo quia spiret in corpore. Item animus esse quod animam. Sed anima uite est, animus autem consilii. Animalia autem siue animantia dicta sunt quia animentur uita et moueantur spiritu. Corpus autem dicitur eo quod corruptum perit. Solubile enim atque mortale est (f. 43v).

(III, 11, 82; p. 282): Aer est inanitas lumen plurimum habens admixtum raritati. Dictus est autem ab eo quod ferat terram et ab ea feratur. Hic autem partim ad terram, partim ad celestem materiam pertinet. Nam ille subtilis ubi uentosi ac procellosi motus non possunt existere ad celestem pertinet partem. Iste uero turbulentior qui exhalationibus humidis corpori et terre deputatur (f. 44v).

(III, 11, 85; p. 282): *Ignis uero*. In hoc dicitur ignis refugere omnem sectionem quia quicquid acceperit in sui materiem conuertit. Si enim lignum aliquod igni credamus in sui elementum illud transfundit. Quod si lapidem uel tale quid quod non sit cremandum sumpserit, in candorem sue qualitatis transiuit et conuertit (f. 44v).

(III, 12, 26; p. 288): *Deum nomino*. Deus hebreum nomen est. Latine dicitur timor. Omnibus enim iure timendus est. Timor quippe primum deos reperit. Unde Statius: Primus in orbe timor fecit inesse deos (*Theb.* III, 361). Cum enim Ninus rex patris sui Beli symulachrum fecisset aureum, rei quoque ad illud confugierunt. Quos cum ille in honorem patris absolueret, aucta est uana religio in deos. Grece autem theos quia theoro dicitur uideo. Et deus cuncta uidet. Theo quoque Grece dicitur curro. Hinc et deus dici potest quod cuncta percurrit uel procreat. Ipse tamen semper stabilis est et immobilis (f. 46).

(IV, 3, 15; p. 320): Ut Solinus refert, uirtus leonis in dentibus et tygris in unguibus constat quia quibusdam capsulis includuntur in eundo ne amittant acumen (f. 53v).

(IV, 6, 56; p. 342): *Immobilem simplicemque*. Simplex dicitur prouidentia dei quoniam quecumque facta sunt per genera et diuersas species et tempora simul in eo cuncta manserunt. Unde legitur: Qui uiuit

in eternum creauit omnia simul (*Eccli* 18:1), scilicet per prouidentiam (f. 58v).

(IV, 6, 78; p. 342): *Igitur uti est*. Illatio a simili sic: quia aliquid quanto uicinius accedit diuinitati tanto magis cum ea conuenit ... quia lineam habet qua illud caret (f. 59).

(IV, 6, 83; p. 344): Elementum quidam uolunt a Greco diriuari yles quod transfertur in Latinam linguam i.e. siluas. Quod si ita est necesse fit ut elementum scribatur et sit Grecum cuius interpretatio erit materies. Rectius tamen intelligi uidetur Latinum uero a uerbo elimo i.e. formo. Quod uerbum nascitur a nomine lima. Nam elementa Grece stochia uocantur et si ita est ab e prepositione inchoat (f. 59v).

(IV, 6, 19; p. 354): *Hec concordia*. Ostendit elementorum concordiam que sic temperat ea ut quamuis pugnantia sint tamen cedant sibi in uicibus i.e. locis suis ita quod humida i.e. aer et aqua iungant fidem i.e. concordiam siccis (f. 62v).

(V, 3, 55; p. 376): *Postremo*. Item alia probatio quod illud futurum quod prescitur necessario qualiter prescitur eueniat quia aliter scientia de ipso non esset scientia sed fallax opinio. Diffinit enim Boetius ita: Scientia est rerum ueritatis comprehensio que sunt queque sui essentiam immutabilem sortiuntur (f. 67v).

(V, 3, 20 metrum; p. 382): *An cum*. Hic philosophorum sententiam tangit qui dicunt quod humane anime priusquam ad corpora descendant in conpari stella superposite omnem scientiam habeant, cum uero ad corpora descendant parum scientiam illam admittant. Considerandum est quod dicit summam tenens singula. Reminiscitur enim anima concarcerata corpori scientie prius habite summam quia scit bonum esse et malum et prouidentiam et libertatem simpliciter sed singula perdidit quia namque partes boni et mali cognoscit (f. 69).

(V, 4, 84-89; p. 388): Nam sensus est uis anime que figuram i.e. linimenta humani corporis per aliquem quinque sensibus corporis discernit. Imaginatio est uis que eandem figuram absente corpore sine exteriori sensu dinoscit. Ratio uero uniuersalem ac specialem proprietatem hominis que omnibus indiuiduis conuenit perpendit. Intelligentia uero ideam ipsius que in mente diuina eternaliter est perspicit (f. 70v).

(V, 4, 104; p. 388): Sciendum quod ratio dicitur multis modis. Est enim ratio nature quod similia scilicet ex similibus procreentur. Est et ratio substantie, diffinitio scilicet. Est quoque ratio que uocatur argumentum. Est et ratio boni et mali discretio. Est quoque ratio uniuersalitis comprehensio. Iuxta quem modum hic dicitur... (f. 71).

(V, 4, 115; p. 390): *Videsne igitur*. Infert ab exemplis. Quandam hic sententiam Stoycorum tangit qui dixerunt quod anima nichil per se consideraret sed cum extrinsecus motu aliquo corporis incitaretur ipsa anima

per aliquem corporeum sensum tunc primum in se quasdam rerum notas ad modum cere in qua prius nichil esset et ueluti speculum in se cassas imagines ipsarum rerum presentaret. Quam sententiam ideo inducit ut illam falsificando conprobet quod uidebatur per hanc destrui sententiam scilicet quod quisque iudicans non ex aliena ui iudicet sed ex propria potestate. Quod proxime dictum est (f. 71).

(V, 4, 1 metrum; p. 390): Porticum uocat stoam portam Athenis in qua Stoyci philosophantur (f. 71).

(V, 6, 25: p. 400): *Quod igitur*. Infert ab immediato per temporalia ab eterno remota. Sciendum quodque tempus secundum quod diffinitio hic accipitur sic diffinitur: Tempus est transitorie rei fluxum uel fluitantis temporis eum. Queritur cum eternitas uere in deo sit tempus autem minime in deo esse possit quomodo Tullius in rethoricis (*Tusc.* I, 39) tempus dicit partem eternitatis. Videtur enim quod si eternitas in deo est tempus autem proprie pars eternitatis est quod et tempus in deo sit. Quod esse non potest. Soluitur autem hec questio. Tullius non dicit tempus partem eternitatis quod proprie pars eius sit. Sed quia quedam pars dicit designat quoddam spacium scilicet quod cum mundo cepit et cum mundo est. Quod uidetur falso ab eternitate concludi... (f. 73v).

(V, 6, 31; p. 400): *Unde non recte*. Infert a causa ex eo quod dixit illud solum modo quod non haberet preteritum nec futurum esse eternum. Plato dixit mundum semper fuisse per ylen que semper fuit et quam eius esse materiam dixit nec unquam finem habiturum. Quod est sine dubio uerum. Quod quidam erronei audientes putauerunt quod Plato diceret mundum deo coeternum. Quod ratione caret (f. 73v).

COMMENTARY ON *DE CONSOLATIONE* III METRUM 9

I O QUI PERPETUA MUNDUM.

Sciendum¹ est quod quicumque de constitutione mundi digne tractant tam catholici quam ethnici duos mundos esse asserunt: unum archetipum i.e. intelligibilem mundum, alterum sensibilem uel imaginarium. Archetipum uero mundum uocat principalem mundum scilicet conceptionem huius uisibilis mundi eternaliter existentem in mente diuina. Imaginarium autem dicunt hunc mundum sensibus subiacentem qui uideri scilicet et aliis sensibus percipi potest ad illius eterni imaginem tempo-

¹ *Anonymus Erfurtensis*; ed. Silk, "Pseudo-Johannes," 33-34. Cf. Silk, *Saeculi noni*, 155 ff.

ralem constitutionem habentem. Et huius temporarii dicunt eum duo principia primitus fecisse, terram scilicet et ignem quasi ceterarum fundamenta quibus ad exempla primorum cubicorum solidam dedit compositionem.

2 Quod sic considerandum est. Primi cubici numeri, scilicet qui a duobus primis numeris quorum alter est par alter impar, scilicet a binario et ternario surgunt.² Hoc modo arithmetici dicunt quod omnis numerus aduerbialiter per se prolatus longitudinem significat, semel inductus in se latitudinem, secundo ductus altitudinem.

3 Ergo si dixerimus aduerbialiter bis, lineam significat i.e. duo puncta cum interposita longitudine. Si semel reducamus in se ut dicamus bis bini, quatuor puncta significat interposita longitudine. Si item dicamus bis bini bis, addimus altitudinem, scilicet aliam parem latitudinem priori in altum superpositam.

4 Et he tres dimensiones uocantur unus solidus numerus uel mathematicum i.e. doctrinale corpus quia ad similitudinem ueri mathematici et solidi corporis quantitativi tribus dimensionibus constituitur. Dicitur etiam cubicus quia equali longitudine per equalem latitudinem ad equalem surgit altitudinem³ ut dicamus ter terni ter.⁴ Et constat hic numerus in suis dimensionibus xxvii punctis, prior uero octo. Differunt autem hi duo cubici numeri inter se dimensione, scilicet longitudine latitudine altitudine quia si respicimus ad numerum primus in omni parte pares numeros habet, scilicet sicut alter impares numeros habet.

5 Ad horum duorum numerorum exemplar immo exemplum fecit deus prima elementa predicta, scilicet terram et ignem sic ut singulum similiter inter se tribus proprietatibus constituentibus se differrent. Est enim harum trium proprietatum ignis acutus subtilis mobilis, terra autem e contra obtusa corpulenta immobilis.⁵ Que tres proprietates ita hic et ibi differunt inter se sicut tres predictorum numerorum dimensiones. Quapropter rationabiliter Conditori placuit hec duo proponere in constitutione elementa que a se dissident omni qualitate. Ex quorum proprietatibus duo postea creauit media, scilicet aquam et aerem: item ad numeri proportionem. Quod suo loco inferius ostendetur. Nunc ad litteram redeamus:

² Macrobius, *Comm. in somnium Scipionis*, I, 6, 1; ed. Iac. Willis (Leipzig, 1963), 18.

³ The following sentences are missing: "Et hic est cubicus numerus. Secundus qui est a secundo numero similiter constituitur." Cf. Silk, "Pseudo-Johannes," 34.

⁴ Macrobius, *Comm.* I, 6, 3; ed. Willis, 13. Cf. Jeaneau, "Un commentaire inédit," 69.

⁵ Calcidius, *In Timaeum Platonis*, 22; ed. J. H. Waszink, in: *Corpus platonium medii aevi: Plato Latinus*, 4 (London, 1962), 72. Cf. Silk, *Saeculi noni*, 162.

6 O QUI PERPETUA MUNDUM RATIONE.

In hac inuocatione ideo philosophia diuinam potentiam per terram et celum et ignem primum declarat quia ut prediximus hec prima sunt elementa. TERRARUM pluraliter ideo posuit quia quinque sunt zone habitabilis terre et inhabitabilis uel quia pars terre quam nos inhabitamus diuisa est in tres partes:⁶ Asiam Europam Lybiam uel quia terra nostra regio est et ideo res ipsa et eius diuersitates magis quam in igne nobis sunt note. Aut simpliciter per celum et terram quatuor elementa uult accipi quibus omnia constant. Aut per celum angelos, per terram uero homines qui in ea habitant.⁷

7 Satorem autem potius quam creatorem deum iuxta platoniam sententiam uocauit eo quod Plato et plures alii philosophi dixerunt non ex nichilo, ut fides nostra habet, deum summum i.e. *tagaton* fecisse elementa sed fuisse eternaliter duo principia ex quibus creata sint omnia: *ylen* scilicet et *ideas*. *Ylen* quidem uocauerunt quoddam *chaos* i.e. quandam rudem materiam et confusam quam dixerunt fuisse principium mundi constitutione, *ideas* uero formas rerum constituendarum positas in mente diuina.⁸ Vel satorem dicimus metaphorice ab animali ad creatorem. Per MUNDUM accipimus hic uisibilem mundum, non archetipum i.e. intelligibilem, quem deus gubernat regit et disponit.

8 RATIONE non humana et cito transitoria sed PERPETUA i.e. stabili. Perpetuam dicit rationem non respectu dei iuxta quod eius ratio eterna est sicut et ipse eternus est sed secundum hunc temporalem mundum. Nam cum ratio semper affinis sit rebus de quibus habetur iure uocat rationem perpetuam quam habet deus in mundo i.e. qui perpetuus est i.e. ortum debet tempori sed fine caret. Differt⁹ enim inter eternum et perpetuum quod eternum est illud quod ante mundum cum mundo post mundum est: perpetuum uero quod ortum tempori debet sed fine caret. Vel aliter dicit sapientiam dei per quem omnia creata sunt et gubernantur. Ipse enim Verbum dei filius dei sermo dei et sapientia. Vel perpetuam dicit rationem eternam dei dispositionem secundum quam omnia constant et creata sunt.

9 QUI TEMPUS AB EUO (f. 37v)

TEMPUS uocat spatium quod cepit cum mundo et cum ipso est. Et tempus diffinitur per fuit et est et erit. Quod tempus dicit sumptum AB

⁶ Cf. Silk, *Saeculi noni*, 174.

⁷ Stewart, "A Commentary," 30.

⁸ Cf. Silk, *Saeculi noni*, 157-158.

⁹ Cf. Silk, *Saeculi noni*, 158; Jeauneau, "Un commentaire inédit," 66.

EUO i.e. ab eterno quod cum archetipo mundo in mente diuina est quia quemcumque locum in rebus secundum conceptionem illud eum obtinet i.e. tempus hic secundum essentiam quia quasi imago eui dicitur esse. Nam ut eum semper et eternaliter est et in uno statu immobile ita tempus quoque perpetuo est fluitans. Et hoc modo procedit AB EUO.

10 Quod TEMPUS deus iubet IRE i.e. ita fluere per annos et cetera tempora ut tantum maneat. Sicut enim eum illic stando manet ita hic tempus fluendo manet. In quo etiam potest dici sumptum AB EUO. Vel aliter AB EUO i.e. ex quo dixisti *fiat lux* quia tunc cepit reuolutio temporis esse. Nam ante non erat tempus sed eum i.e. perpetuitas quedam cum eum Greci dicunt perpetuum. Et IRE est currere uniformiter.

11 DAS i.e. facis CUNCTA MOUERI i.e. cuncta que das facis loco uel tempore moueri. Nam omnia corporalia loco similiter et tempore mouentur. Spiritualia uero ut anima tempore tantum non autem loco mouentur.¹⁰ Deus uero neque loco neque tempore mouetur sed omnem locum maiestatem suam complet et omnia simul in eo sunt tempora. Per CUNCTA que mouentur accipiemus omnia mundana mutabilia. Et bene dixit MOUERI et non destrui quia ut dicunt philosophi¹¹ nichil destruetur in mundo penitus sed per confectionem et recontextionem fit uariatio rerum ut terra attenuata transit in aquam et aqua attenuata transit in aerem, et aer attenuatus in ignem. Item e conuerso per refectionem ignis spissatus redit in aerem, aer spissatus in aquam, aqua spissata in terram. Similiter potest considerari in aliis mundanis.

12 QUEM NON EXTERNE.

Hoc est: te non coegerunt CAUSE tibi extrinsecus accidentes ul fingeres mundum sed ipsa tua beniuolentia naturaliter tibi INSITA non inuidens creature tue ad imaginem et similitudinem tuam formate.¹² Externas autem uocat causas necessitates nobis sepe imminentes atque plura nos facere cogentes que in deum cadere non congruunt cum ipse sit bonum conceptum.

13 Per OPUS FLUITANTIS MATERIE aut hanc machinam mundanam si transitue dicatur possumus accipere aut si transitue fluitantem materiam possumus accipere *chaos*¹³ quod suo modo fluitabat quia informe

¹⁰ Cf. Silk, *Saeculi noni*, 176.

¹¹ Calcidius, *In Tim. Platonis*, 293; ed. Waszink, 296: "Philosophorum omnium commune dogma est neque quid fieri ex nihilo nec in nihilum interire."

¹² Cf. Silk, *Saeculi noni*, 177.

¹³ Macrobius, *Sat. I*, 8, 7; ed. Willis, 35.

erat et confusum. Et¹⁴ bene fluitantem materiam uocat illam informem que in mente dei in primordio fuit antequam mundus fieret quoniam omnia fluitabant. Neque enim facies terre uel aeris apparebat. Terra namque operta erat aqua licet tenui uelut nebula aeris. Que claritas non apparebat quia nec erat lux qua illustraretur. Siue fluitantem materiam mundi uocat creationem que semper fluit et labitur.

14 Formam SUMMI BONI uocat filium dei qui est sapientia dei patris per quem omnia facta sunt. Vnde scriptum est: *Qui cum sit splendor glorie et figura*. Vel etiam formam dicit illud exemplum et rationem que erat in mente diuina ad cuius similitudinem postea mundus factus est. Et ipsam rationem uocat Plato *ydeas* i.e. formas.¹⁵ Sicut¹⁶ enim artifex archam et domum factururus prius figuram illius in mente preuidet ad cuius similitudinem post opus faciat ita formam huius mundi deus semper in ratione sua habuit antequam illum faceret ad eandem similitudinem.

15 Beatus¹⁷ uero Iohannes ipsam rationem et dispositionem quam Plato *ydeas* uocat uitam nominat. Antequam mundus fieret in mente dei erat. Et antequam celum crearetur in arte uidebatur. In deo autem ipsa ratio uita uocatur quia semper uixerat. Vel formam SUMMI BONI uocat proprietatem ipsius boni quod est in deo que ualet nos facere bonos. Que forma est ei INSITA quia bonum quod nobis accidentale est hoc ei substantiale est quoniam non inuidit creature sue faciendo eam ad similitudinem suam.

16 Vel LIUORE CARENS cum dicit innuit quod perfectum sit quod fecit. Que enim homines operantur partim propter ignorantiam imperfecte fiunt, partim uero propter inuidiam que utraque a deo absunt.¹⁸ Sciendum est quod omne opus aut opus est dei aut nature aut artificis imitantis naturam. Opus dei non subiacet tempori quia in deo semper inuariabile manet. PULCHRUM MUNDUM quem deus gerit in MENTE uocat archetipum mundum qui pulcher i.e. eternus est.

17 A quo SUPERNO EXEMPLO i.e. ab illo mundo deus ducit CUNCTA in hunc mundum singula quantum res potest pati perfecte hic faciendo sicut in illo sunt. Vnde subsequenter hunc uocat imaginem illius cum dicit: TU FORMANS HUNC MUNDUM IN IMAGINE SIMILI i.e. ita ut sit imago similis

¹⁴ H. Silvestre, "Le commentaire," 113.

¹⁵ Macrobius, *Comm.* I, 2, 14; ed. Willis, 6.

¹⁶ Silvestre, "Le commentaire," 109.

¹⁷ Silk, *Saeculi noni*, 156 and 178.

¹⁸ Silk *Saeculi noni*, 157.

illi alii. Et tu IUBENS PERFECTAS i.e. integras PARTES scilicet quatuor elementa non diminuta sed integre accepta ABSOLUERE i.e. perficere.

18 LIGAS ELEMENTA NUMERIS. Notandum quod dicit PERFECTAS. Dicit enim Plato ita hunc mundum a deo quatuor elementis¹⁹ esse compositum ut nichil ex aliquo illorum extra relictum sit sed integre ea esse appositae ne per accessionem et recessionem aliquam mundus ipse corrumpi possit sicut humanum corpus quod constat ex quatuor humoribus quia si alicui illorum aliquid accedit uel demitur infirmatur.

19 Dicit enim Plato quia cum vii motus²⁰ sint uel ante uel retro uel ad dextram uel ad sinistram uel sursum uel deorsum uel in circuitu deum septimum tantum motum dedisse mundo i.e. circularem propter sui perfectionem nec oportuerit ut ei daret pedes ad aliquid fugiendum aut manus ad aliquid petendum aut oculos ad inspiciendum cum omnia in se haberet. Item dicit mundum foraminibus non indigere per que aliqua indigeret cum quicquid oritur ex ipso iterum redit in ipsum per quem omnia apparet ipsum esse perfectum. Vel SIMILI IMAGINE i.e. per filium qui est imago et similitudo patris. Vel IMAGINE sicut in tua dispositione cuncta imaginata erant.

20 Sciendum quoque est quomodo dicit deum ligare ELEMENTA predicta, scilicet terram et ignem, NUMERIS. Quod ad similitudinem dictum est. Sicut²¹ enim duo cubici numeri et solidi numeri dimensione inter se distantes uno medio firmo et eadem proportionem non possunt copulari sed indigent duobus mediis ex se confectis ad suam copulationem sic deus elementa media ex qualitatibus supradictorum que prorsus inter se differunt fecit ad ipsorum firmam copulationem.

21 Quod²² ut planius duos supradictos cubicos numeros ad quorum similitudinem uel planorum se hec duo extrema habent repetamus, scilicet octo et xxvii qui sunt primi cubici numeri nec inter se uno medio copulantur. Nam siue accipias ab octo duas dimensiones, scilicet bis bini, et a xxvii unam, scilicet ter, et constituas medium ita bis bini ter non copulantur per illud aliqua proportionem. Nam bis bini ter est xii. Bene habet se ad octo sesquialtera proportionem quia continet ipsum totum et eius alteram partem i.e. medietatem. Ad xx et vii uero nulla se habet proportionem. Et ideo non ualet una copula ad hec duo copulanda.

¹⁹ Macrobius, *Comm.* II, 12, 14; ed. Willis, 132.

²⁰ Macrobius, *Comm.* I, 6, 88; ed. Willis, 33: "Septem motibus omne corpus agitur."

²¹ Macrobius, *Comm.* I, 6, 3; ed. Willis, 18.

²² Macrobius, *Comm.* I, 6, 3; ed. Willis, 19.

22 Similiter²³ quoque si a xx et vii duas dimensiones accipiamus, scilicet ter terni, et ab octonario unam, scilicet bis, et dicamus ter terni bis facit x et viii et habet se ad xx et vii sesquialtera proportionem ad octo uero minime et ideo non ualet solum ea copulare. Si autem utrumque medium inter illa duo ponatur tunc bene eadem proportionem copulatur. Nam sicut uiginti et vii se habent ad x et viii sesquialtera proportionem sic decem et octo ad xii et item xii ad octo. Vnde firma est conexio.

23 Sic²⁴ quoque fecit deus aerem et aquam inter terram et ignem que opposita sunt ex qualitatibus illorum, aque scilicet duas qualitates dando (f. 38) a terra, scilicet obtunsum et corpulentum, et terciam ab igne, scilicet mobile. Aer uero duas ab igne i.e. subtilis et mobilis, terciam a terra i.e. obtunsum per que similiter copulatur. Nam sicuti terra duas qualitates habet communes cum aqua et in tercia differt, scilicet in mobili, sic aqua cum aere et item aer cum igne. Et ideo firma est copulatio que per alteram tantum, scilicet per aquam et per aerem, nequaquam fieri posset. Et ideo necessarium fuit et congruum ut quatuor tantum deus faceret elementa et non plura quia si pauciora essent perfecte non copularentur. Si uero plura, superfluerent.

24 Potest quoque alia similitudine dici ELEMENTA ligata esse NUMERIS, scilicet ad modum planorum numerorum. Plani numeri dicuntur qui tantum habent duas dimensiones, scilicet longitudinem et latitudinem, ut bis bini et ter terni. Hic uero uno medio possunt coniungi sic: Accipiamus ab uno bis et ab alio ter et constituamus ei medium dicendo bis ter firma est copulatio.²⁵ Nam sicut ter terni et nouem habet se ad bis ter i.e. ad sesquialteram proportionem sic habet se ter bis ad bis bini i.e. ad sesquialteram proportionem sic et in elementis. Nam si demus igni siccum et calidum et aque humidum et frigidum poterunt hec duo copulari per aerem qui ab igne calidum recipit et ab aqua humidum. Et per terram similiter que ab aqua frigidum et ab igne recipit siccum firma copulatione.

25 Vel²⁶ sic: TU NUMERIS ELEMENTA LIGAS i.e. coniungis NUMERIS i.e. quatuor monadibus. Nam quatuor sunt elementa quorum coniunctiones sunt sex quas Greci *zinzuas*²⁷ uocant. Quorum quatuor sunt immediate

²³ Jeauneau, "Un comm. inédit," 69; Silk, *Saeculi noni*, 163-164.

²⁴ Calcidius, *In Tim. Plat.*, 22 and 317; ed. Waszink, 72 and 313.; Macrobius, *Comm.* I, 6, 25-28; ed. Willis, 22-23; Jeauneau, "Un comm. inédit," 70.

²⁵ Jeauneau, "Un comm. inédit," 69.

²⁶ Stewart, "A Commentary," 31-32.

²⁷ G. Mathon, "Le commentaire," 218; Silk, *Saeculi noni*, 170; Courcelle, *La Consolation*, 291; Silvestre, "Le commentaire inédit," 79.

et due mediate. Immediate sunt iste. Aer humidus et calidus est. Huius caliditas coniungitur caliditati ignis qui est calidus et siccus. Ignis autem est calidus et siccus. Huius caliditas aeris caliditati iungitur. Siccitas autem terre copulatur que est frigida et sicca. Terra frigida est et sicca. Huius siccitas ignis siccitati iungitur. Frigiditas uero aque frigiditati nectitur. Aqua frigida est et humida. Eius frigiditas terre frigiditati copulatur. Humiditas autem aeris humiditati sociatur. Mediate autem *sinziue* he sunt i.e. que contraria sunt et non possunt coniungi sine aliqua medietate.

26 Ignis et aqua contraria sunt elementa quia ignis calidus et siccus, aqua frigida est et humida.²⁸ Nam ut frigiditas aque ignis conueniat caliditati terre frigiditas est media. Ut autem aque humiditas siccitati ignis aptetur aeris humiditas media interuenit.

27 UT FRIGORA FLAMMIS.

Terra frigida coniungitur igni ex ea parte qua siccus est. Vel ita quasi dicat: ideo sic ELEMENTA LIGAS UT que diuerse nature sunt inter se CONUENIANT, scilicet frigida i.e. aqua et terra, conueniant FLAMMIS i.e. aeri et igni que calida sunt: et item ARIDA i.e. ignis et terra conueniat LIQUIDIS i.e. aeri et aque que utraque liquida sunt quantum humida sunt. Que conuenire necessarium est ideo NE IGNIS EUOLET i.e. disiungatur a ceteris. Qui semper alta petit quia PURIOR est. Et ne terra deorsum precipitetur que suo pondere semper ima petit.²⁹ Nam utrum hoc fieret mundus stare non posset. Et bene dicit puritatem ignis euolare cum omnis ignis ascendat sed ne uolet ultra ipsum firmamentum ubi quedam inanitas esse uidetur et sic ne usque in infinitum tendat duobus crassioribus elementis, aqua scilicet et aere, tenetur. Sed et terre ponderositas ne penitus subsidat duobus leuoribus elementis, aqua scilicet et aere, tenetur. Sed et terre ponderositas ne penitus subsidat duobus leuoribus elementis aqua scilicet et aere tenetur et sustentatur.

28 TU TRIPLICIS.

Hic loquitur³⁰ de mundana anima que TRIPLICIS NATURE est uel quia est uegetabilis in arboribus, sensibilis in animalibus, rationabilis in hominibus uel quia rationabilis est in discernendo bona a malis, concupiscibilis in appetendis bonis, irascibilis in malis. Vel alio modo TRIPLICIS NATURE est. Dicit enim Plato³¹ quod *dagaton* i.e. summus deus fecit ex se *noyn* i.e. uerbum consubstantiale sibi et coeternum.

²⁸ Macrobius, *Comm.* I, 6, 26; ed. Willis, 23.

²⁹ Macrobius, *Comm.* I, 22, 4 and 13; ed. Willis, 92 and 93.

³⁰ Silk, *Saeculi noni*, 180-181.

³¹ Macrobius, *Comm.* I, 2, 14; ed. Willis, 6.

29 *Noys* uero fecit animam mundi (f. 38v) ex tribus essentiis sic: accipit *noys* essentiam tantum eandem et essentiam tantum diuersam et essentiam non tantum eandem nec tantum diuersam sed ex utraque confectam. Et has tres essentias in cratere quodam simul contriuit. Dehinc³² septem partes ad modum A littere ex confectione illa constituit: primum in summo ponendo quasi unitatem in primam partem, deinde in uno latere ponendo binarium et post illum quaternarium et sub his duobus octonarium.

30 In altero uero latere posuit contra binarium ternarium, contra quaternarium nouenarium, contra octo xxvii. Deinde quia he partes hiantes erant in utroque latere et a se distabant, musicas consonantias quibus coniungerentur interposuit. Postea utraque latera coniunxit et ad modum cere in longum produxit. Deinde illud i.e. longum in duas partes diuisit et ad modum X littere ipsas in simul composuit et unam partem flexit ab oriente per occidentem reducendo in orientem eam in circulo. Item alteram flexit ab occidente per orientem reducendo in occidentem simili in circulo qui continetur infra priorem circulum.

31 Quod totum per quedam inuolucra et integumenta i.e. allegorice dictum est. Quod enim *noys* ex tribus essentiis supra dicto modo animam fecisse dicitur, propter has tres potentias fingitur quas habet anima, uidelicet quia per intellectum considerat ea que tantum sunt eiusdem essentie, scilicet celestia que non mutantur sed semper sunt eadem et quia per sensus corporis considerat ea que tantum diuerse sunt essentie i.e. indiuidua corpora que semper in mutatione sunt, et quia ratione considerat ea que nec tantum sunt diuersa nec tantum eadem i.e. universalialia specialia et generalia que nec ascendunt ad dignitatem celestium nec descendunt ad uarietatem indiuiduorum quamquam per ipsa indiuidua ascendamus ad ipsa.

32 Item³³ quod partes eius produxit usque ad septenarium numerum et taliter eas posuit ut in uno latere esset cubicus numerus et in altero alius quorum alter femina est qui surgit a binario, alter masculus, ille scilicet qui surgit a ternario, ideo dicitur ut per hoc notetur illius perfectio quod inde generatur, scilicet ipsius anime. Nam quod ex masculo et femina generatur perfectum est.

33 Cubicus numerus surgens a ternario ideo mas dicitur quia et ipse totus et eius partes informantur ab unitate. Nam omnis impar numerus

³² Calcidius, *In Tim. Plat.*, 32; ed. Waszink, 82; Jeauneau, "Un commentaire inédit," 74.

³³ Macrobius, *Comm.* I, 6, 7; II, 2, 17; ed. Willis, 19 and 102; Silk, *Saeculi noni*, 182.

informatur ab unitate.³⁴ Que unitas tante dignitatis est ut tantumdem reducatur in se. Nam si dicamus "semel unus" semel nunquam uariatur sed semper unitas tantum manet. In quo tenet formam diuine essentie. Vnde et Virgilius ait: Numero deus impare gaudet.³⁵

34 Cubicus numerus qui surgit a binario ideo femina dicitur quia sicut femina uariabilis et inconstans res est ita in binario prima uarietas paritatis est. Musicas consonantias ideo deus in anime mundi compositione dicitur posuisse quia musica naturalis armonia anime est.

35 Sic quoque dicitur illas partes coniunctas in longum extendisse ut per hoc primum interuallum, scilicet per longitudinem, notetur quod quamuis *noys* ipsam animam creasset tantum multo inferiorem quam sit ipse uel eius pater. Quod uero dicitur illud longum in duas partes diuisisse *noys* et alteram partem per occidentem in orientem circumduxisse *noys* alteram uero per orientem in occidentem propter rationabilem et irrationabilem motum quem dedit anime dicitur.

36 Nunc ad litteram redeamus. *MEDIAM* ideo dicit *ANIMAM* quia ut dicunt philosophi deus animam ipsam in mundi medio ut mundus ipse equiremus esset collocauit i.e. ut equaliter moueretur ipsum firmamentum in omni parte sui et dein diuisit eum *PER CONSONA MEMBRA* in quibus uim suam exerceret.

37 *CONSONA*³⁶ *MEMBRA* uocat celestia corpora rotunda ut solem et lunam et alia que circularem motum sicut ipsa anima habent in quo sunt ei consona. Que corpora dicitur ipsa anima fabricasse quia maiorem uim suam in eis exercet. Hec autem inferiora corpora sicut homines dicuntur ipsi angeli quos deus pater creauit fecisse in quibus secundum quod magis accedunt ad similitudinem celestium corporum ut in hominibus qui in capitis rotunditate celestibus accedunt corporibus maiorem uim exercet suam, in aliis uero minorem.

38 Vel³⁷ aliter *TRIPLICIS NATURE*. Vis anime omnem molem corporis regit. Philosophi animam mundi solem esse dixerunt quia sicut calefacit et unificat anima corpus ita solis calore uiuificantur omnia eiusque calor diffusus per creaturas facit eas gignere. Et reuera ut philosophi dicunt calore illius omnia gignunt et gignuntur pariter cum humore, deo ita disponente. Hinc Ouidius: Fecunda rerum semina uocat.³⁸

³⁴ Macrobius, *Comm.* II, 2, 12; ed. Willis, 101.

³⁵ *Eclogae*, 8, 75.

³⁶ Silk, *Saeculi noni*, 184.

³⁷ Stewart, "A Commentary," 32-33.

³⁸ *Met.* I, 419.

39 Hic itaque sol TRIPLICIS NATURE est. Habet enim esse, habet calere, habet splendere. Sol enim medius inter planetas. Primus enim saturnus deinde iuppiter inde mars. Hi sunt superiores. Et quartus est sol. Sub eo uero reliqui tres: uenus mercurius et luna. MEDIAM ANIMAM dicit non quod a meditullio corporis i.e. ab umbilico sit porrecta sed quia in corde sedes illius sit proprie ubi est pontificium uite.

40 Aut certe media dicitur quod sit anima rationalis media inter (f. 39) animam pecudum et spiritum angelorum. Omnis autem spiritus aut cum carne tegitur aut cum carne moritur aut cum carne tegitur sed cum carne non moritur aut nec carne tegitur nec moritur. Prudentioribus autem uidetur hoc loco animam rationabilem debere intelligi. Que magnam concordiam habet cum mundo. Anima³⁹ et homo grece *microcosmus* dicitur i.e. minor mundus. Sicut enim mundus quatuor elementis et quatuor temporibus constat ita et homo quatuor humoribus et quatuor temporibus.

41 Videamus ergo et hominis concordiam. Quatuor sunt elementa aer ignis aqua terra. Aer calidus et humidus est et uer calidum et humidum similiter. Et in puero sanguis est calidus et humidus. Puericia calida et humida.

Ignis calidus est et siccus. Estas⁴⁰ calida est et sicca. Colera rubea que habundat in adolescentibus calida est et sicca. Terra frigida et sicca. Autumnus frigidus et siccus. Melancolia i.e. nigra colera que est in iunenibus frigida est et sicca. Iuuentus frigida et sicca.

Aqua frigida est et humida. Hiemps frigida et humida. Flegma que habundat in senibus frigida et humida. Senectus frigida et humida.

42 Iste igitur mundus habet ANIMAM TRIPLICIS NATURE ut dictum est. Est enim rationabilis concupiscibilis irascibilis. Que tria si rationabiliter fuerint custodita, iungunt creaturam creatori. Si uero fuerint permutata, mentem debilem reddunt. Si illa pars fuerit corrupta que irascibilis dicitur fit homo tristis rancidus felle amaritudinis plenus. Si autem ea pars fuerit uiciata que concupiscibilis dicitur fit homo ebriosus libidinosus et uoluptatum seruus. Si autem illa pars anime corrumpitur que uocatur rationabilis fit homo superbus hereticus omnibus uiciis subiectus.

43 PER CONSONA MEMBRA.

Armonica enim disciplina corpus humanum compositum est. Hinc Sedulius: Et reuocata suis adtemperat organa neruos.⁴¹ Dum enim

³⁹ Silvestre, "Le commentaire," 119.

⁴⁰ Macrobius, *Sat.* VII, 5, 20; ed. Willis, 417.

⁴¹ *Carmen paschale* III, 256; PL 19, 660A.

sanum est corpus illa consona est armonia. Statim autem ut dissentit egrotat corpus. RESOLUIS inmittis infundis. QUE CUM SECTA. Non⁴² est anima in sui natura diuisa sed actus ipsius in duos extendit oculos ad aliquid contemplandum. Sicque dicitur glomerare suum motum IN duos ORBES et reuertitur IN SEMET ipsam.

44 Dicunt auctores quod per intuitum oculorum uis anime egrediatur ad conspicienda exteriora. Ita tantum se extendit ut statim reuertatur per profundam meditationem in se reuoluens agensque SIMILI IMAGINE que foris uidet sicut illud uidit exterius uolui. Ita est de aliis rebus intelligendum que prius uidet ac dein meditat.

45 Nam cum unus sit sol radios uidetur in diuersam partem diuidere cum per rimulas et fenestras ingreditur in ortum et occasum. Vnde Salemon dicit: *Oritur sol et occidit et reuertitur ad ortum suum. Gyrat per meridiem et flectitur ad aquilonem.*⁴³ IN SEMET REDITURA MEAT MENTEMQUE PROFUNDAM CIRCUIT i.e. eternam dei et profundam dispositionem peragit.

46 SIMILI CONUERTIT IMAGINE CELUM i.e. equali modo simili semper cursu. Vel SIMILI IMAGINE ut subaudiatur: qualis fuit illa in qua creatus est uidelicet in equinoctiali ortu et occasu. CONUERTIT i.e. conuerti facit. Nam dicunt quod impetu solis uoluentis contra mundum retineatur spera celestis semper uoluens ne labatur et pessum ruat. Vel ita: IN SEMET REDITURA MEAT in semet ipsam reditura mouetur circulari motu et in hoc CIRCUIT PROFUNDAM MENTEM dei patris i.e. imitatur *noyn* creatorem suum quia sicut ipse idem manet eodem modo ipsa anima quantum ad se inuariabilis est suo modo. Et CONUERTIT ipsa anima CELUM in SIMILI IMAGINE i.e. circulariter.

47 TU CAUSIS ANIMAS PARIBUS.

Hic loquitur separatim de humanis animabus. Non quod intoto i.e. anima mundi non sit superius locutus de eis sed quia digniores sunt aliis animabus terrenorum corporum. Et loquitur inde philosophice. Namque dicunt philosophi quod postquam *noys* animam mundi ex confectione predicta creauit, ex reliquiis humanas animas creauit. Quod deo dicitur quia maiorem uim anima in hominibus quam in corporibus illis que si non sunt in regione sua conuenit exercet.

48 Dicunt etiam quod ipsas singulas humanas animas singulis stellis quasi curribus superposuisset ut ibi cum ipsis circumferrentur et omnem uirtutem atque perfectionem ibi discerent. Dicunt etiam quasi duas

⁴² Cf. Silk, "Pseudo-Johannes," 35.

⁴³ *Eccle.* 1, 6.

portas esse in celo, scilicet cancrum et capricornum, per quarum alteram, scilicet per cancrum, cum incorporari debent descendunt: primum adtingendo leonem deinde per singulos circulos planetarum descendendo, paulatim puritatem suam deponunt et quandam idoneitatem conmiscendo terreno corpori recipiuntur quo usque tantum in ipsum descendant totius iam oblite perfectionis.

49 Si autem hoc terreno carcere doctrine se dederunt et ardentes in sui amore Creatoris semper fuerint ab hoc carcere resolute per eosdem circulos planetarum ascendentes et paulatim perfectionem prius depositam recipientes per carpicornum tandem ad conparem stellam redeunt. Si uero hic posite terrenis inhiant nec Creatorem intente respiciunt resolute non illuc redeunt sed secundum rei ueritatem ad inferna descendunt. Secundum uero philosophos in inferiora corpora mutantur.

50 Que omnia in libro ordine tanguntur cum dicit: TU PARIBUS CAUSIS. Causas pares uocat reliquias predictas. Leues currus uocat stellas. CELUM uocat circulos planetarum in quos prius descendunt. Benignam legem dicit quod ad priorem perfectionem redeunt. Reducem ignem uocat seruationem diuinorum preceptorum.

51 DA PATER.

Huc tota series predicta intendit. SEDEM AUGUSTAM et FORTEM BONI uocat deum. CONSPICUOS UISUS etiam rationem dicit et intellectum. NEBULAS ET PONDERA TERRENE MOLIS uocat terrenas curas que mentem cecant et aggrauant. CERNERE deum est FINIS quia qui per ipsum cernit nil ultra eum querit. Et est deus principium ueniendi ad se occulta cordis inspiratione: UECTOR ministrando uirtutes, DUX exemplum ministrando: SEMITA precepta per que tendamus largiendo. TERMINUS IDEM quia est primum se petentibus.

52 Vel⁴⁴ aliter: TU CAUSIS ANIMAS PARIBUS. Ordo uerborum est: TU PROUEHIS ANIMAS UITASQUE MINORES PARIBUS CAUSIS ET SERIS IN CELUM ET TERRAM APTANS SUBLIMES CURRIBUS LEUIBUS. Diuersi diuerso modo in hoc sentiunt. Quidam intelligunt ita ut ANIMAS dicat angelicos spiritus, UITAS uero minores homines quo PARIBUS CAUSIS produxit dum eos rationabiles condidit. Seritque inmittit angelos IN CELUM, homines IN TERRAM, APTANS SUBLIMES ANIMAS LEUIORIBUS CURRIBUS i.e. subtili contemplationi ad considerata celestia.

53 Alii ANIMAS doctos intelligunt et sapientes, UITAS uero MINORES stul-

⁴⁴ Stewart, "A Commentary," 34-35; Silvestre, "Le commentaire," 64; Courcelle, *La Consolation*, 291.

tos ut serat IN CELUM sapientes, in TERRAM stultos, et sublimes animas sapientium LEUIORIBUS CURRIBUS aptet i.e. subtili intellectui. At tantum prudentioribus aliter uidetur quia ANIMAS rationabiles hominum spiritus intelligunt, UITAS uero MINORES pecudum animas. Due⁴⁵ enim sunt anime: una rationalis que est hominum et uitalis que est animalium. Vnde quia tantum ad usum uite animam habent Grece *zoa* dicuntur. *Zoe* enim (f. 39v) Grece, Latine dicitur uita.

54 Hinc⁴⁶ quidam uolunt zodiacum circulum signiferum dici quod animalia habeat leonem thaurum etc. PROUEHIT ergo deus ANIMAS et UITAS PARIBUS CAUSIS i.e. equali potentia. Et hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem suam condidit et animalibus uitalem tribuit animam. Has ergo SUBLIMES ANIMAS rationabilitate aptat LEUIORIBUS CURRIBUS i.e. subtili contemplationi et intelligentie. Eosque serit IN CELUM i.e. ad celestem instituit conuersationem. VITAS uero MINORES serit IN TERRAM quia animalia tantum terris sunt dedita et, cum moriuntur corpore, moriuntur et anima.

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⁴⁵ Cf. Courcelle, *La Consolation*, 250.

⁴⁶ Cf. Courcelle, *La Consolation*, 250.

Patientia in the B-Text of "Piers Plowman"

ELISABETH M. ORSTEN

I

DURING the past few decades, an ever-increasing number of scholars have tried to discover the spiritual meaning of Langland's *Piers Plowman*. Whatever their interpretation, all recognised that *caritas* plays a central role in the poem, and concentrated very largely on this particular virtue. Hence so far, relatively little work has been done on *patientia*, a curious omission when one considers what importance Langland himself attached to it. Most frequently, this virtue has been discussed only in relation to the allegorical figure who appears in the *vita de DoWel*.¹ Though Will the dreamer, with his initial arrogance and impatience, provides for a wider study of *patientia*, every analysis of Will's development has been considered primarily as a growth in *caritas*. Only Morton W. Bloomfield, who argues that *Piers Plowman* is concerned with perfection rather than with salvation, suggests in his conclusion that *patientia* is a fundamental issue in each of the three lives, essential to the poem as a whole, and relevant to his own theme of perfection.² Unfortunately, Prof. Bloomfield's summary is all too brief, and he yokes together patience, humility and moderation, as if they were one and the same virtue. The present paper therefore, seeks to throw more light on the role that *patientia* plays in *Piers Plowman*. Not only is this subject of interest in itself, but it will also further understanding of the structural unity that underlies Langland's complex poem.

¹ Although not specifically intended for a scholarly audience, the best discussion of the figure of Patience is to be found in J. F. Goodridge's translation entitled *Piers The Ploughman*, Penguin Books, 1959. Besides an admirable introduction to the poem as a whole, Goodridge deals with "The Riddle of Patience" in his Appendix C. The most recent treatment of Patience, concerned only with Patience's teaching on charity, is to be found in Ben H. Smith, *Traditional Imagery of Charity in "Piers Plowman"* (The Hague, 1966), 41-55.

² "In Do-wel patient poverty is the most desirable virtue, and in Do-bet, in the passion and Harrowing of Hell part, patience was united with majesty and power in Christ, and now in Do-best temperance in the broadest sense of the word, is offered as the root of all virtue, of an ordered society, and of an ordered universe. Patience or humility is the first step towards perfection." *Piers Plowman as a Fourteenth Century Apocalypse* (New Jersey, 1961), 140.

There are three obvious reasons why *patientia* should receive so much attention throughout *Piers Plowman*. Firstly, Langland is prophet and reformer as well as poet, and prophets have ever needed to possess their souls in patience when seeing the world around them rush blindly to its own destruction. Secondly, Will the dreamer, who connects the two parts of the poem and is particularly important in the *vitae* of the second part, only gains knowledge and understanding as he progresses in humility and patience. Thirdly, throughout *Piers Plowman*, Langland is deeply concerned with the poor. Obviously, these will find their hard lot more bearable, if they endure it with a measure of patient resignation. But a far more fundamental question arises here. The misery of the poor on earth does not automatically guarantee them compensation in the after-life. They too must work for their salvation. Following Patristic teaching, Langland repeatedly reminds the poor that the specific demand their state makes on them is to be patient in a positive, Christian sense. Moreover, he calls on them to seek spiritual perfection through the fullest exercise of this virtue.

With all this emphasis on patience, does Langland contribute anything new to our understanding of it? Certainly not in the realm of theological speculation. A great deal, however, in that area of human understanding where hearts and minds are stirred by living example. Therefore, after considering briefly what orthodox Christian teaching underlies Langland's thinking, the present paper will concentrate on Will's dream-visions, through which he gains understanding and grows in patience.

Patience, when understood in specifically Christian terms, is not a stoic virtue. It is neither negative nor passive. Its ultimate goal is God; and it is prepared to persevere towards this end, encouraged by the example of Christ on earth, and the fortitude of the early Christian martyrs. Innumerable Scriptural injunctions commend the practice of patience, and St. Paul lists it among the fruits of the Spirit, in close proximity to charity, joy and peace. "Fructus autem spiritus est caritas, gaudium, pax, patientia..." (Gal. V: 22). Augustine's commonly accepted definition states that human patience can only then be called a virtue when, by its means "qua aequo animo mala toleramus, ne animo iniquo bona deseramus, per quae ad meliora perveniamus."³ Gregory the Great reminds us that no one ever reached heaven without patience, "nemo sanctorum ad coelestem gloriam nisi patientiam servando pervenit"⁴ and calls patience the root and guardian of all the other virtues:

³ *De Patientia*, Cap. II, 2; PL 40, 611.

⁴ *Homiliarum in Ezechielem*, Lib. I, Homilia VII, 12; PL 76, 846.

Ait ergo martyribus suis:... In patientia vestra possidebitis animas vestras. Idcirco possessio animae in virtute patientiae ponitur, quia radix omnium custosque virtutum patientia est. Per patientiam vero possidemus animas nostras.⁵

In the famous "ladder of humility" which the Rule of St. Benedict establishes, patience is placed on the fourth rung and described in considerable detail. Again, the stress falls on positive elements. Patience is to be embraced with gladness — the Latin verb "amplecto" implies this — and the monk is encouraged to persevere by the reminder that this will lead him finally to eternal life:

Quartus humilitatis gradus est, si in ipsa obedientia duris et contrariis rebus, vel etiam quibuslibet irrogatis injuriis, tacita conscientia patientiam amplectatur, et sustinens non lassescat, vel discedat, dicente Scriptura: Qui perseveraverit usque in finem, hic salvus erit.⁶

Langland is obviously familiar with all these ideas, and very probably with the actual quotations which I have cited. Though seldom expressed explicitly, they form part of his whole climate of thought. Insofar as he deals with patience in any abstract, systematic fashion, he appears to be — directly or indirectly — most influenced by Augustine. This is noticeable, for instance, in the place which he assigns to this virtue. Drawing on earlier tradition, Augustine had distinguished between the four cardinal virtues of prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice, and had described patience as one of the component parts of fortitude:

Fortitudo est considerata periculorum susceptio et laborum perpessio. Ejus partes, magnificentia, fidentia, patientia, perseverantia.⁷

Langland uses this same classification. In Passus XIX, after Christ has established his Church and taught her DoBest, Grace instructs Piers to sow four seeds. These represent the cardinal virtues. The third seed is fortitude and enables him who eats of it to endure all things patiently (XIX, 284-90):

The thridde seed þat Pieres sewe was *spiritus fortitudinis*.
And who so eet of þat seed hardy was eue.
To suffre al þat god sent sykenesse & angres;
Myzte no lesynge ne lyere ne losse of worldely catel
Maken hym for any mournynge þat he nas merye in soule,
And bolde & abydyng bismere to suffre
And playeth al with pacyence & *parce michi, domine*.

⁵ *Homiliarum in Evangelia*, Lib. II, Homilia XXXV, 4; PL 76, 1261.

⁶ *Regula Monachorum*, VII; PL 66, 373, B.

⁷ *De Diversis Quaestionibus*, Quaestio XXXI, 1; PL 40, 21.

By the late Middle Ages, such classification is common, of course, and Langland's contemporaries, writing in the vernacular, also speak of the four cardinal virtues, though not necessarily considering so carefully their components parts. Dan Michel, for example, the author of the *Ayenbite of Inwit*, mentions patience specifically in a section concerned with "þe to-delinege of uirtues", or what seven qualities the Christian needs to do battle against the world. Under this scheme, he describes patience as "þe uerþe stape of Prouesse".⁸ Since the *Ayenbite* is a manual which provides systematic analysis of Christian doctrine for the laity, Dan Michel has already dealt with the four cardinal virtues in an earlier section. There he never explicitly classifies patience under *fortitudo*. Nevertheless, the detailed description of this virtue, which Dan Michel calls "strengþe", suggests that patience also has its place there.⁹

Possibly then, Langland's method of classification merely follows an established pattern. A much more direct Augustinian influence seems discernable in what he has to say about grace and about its relation to virtue. Flowing from his anti-Pelagian controversies, Augustine had continually stressed man's dependence on grace, which he sees as the free gift of God, the "donum Spiritus Sancti".¹⁰ This notion, implicit throughout *Piers Plowman*, is twice stated explicitly by the figure of Imagynatif, when he appears to warn the dreamer against intellectual pride (XII, 62-65):

Ac grace ne groweth nouȝte but amonges lowe;
 Pacience and pouerte þe place is þere it groweth,
 And in lele lyuyng men and in lyf holy,
 And þorough þe gyfte of þe holygoste...

Human knowledge and understanding can be accounted for, Imagynatif explains. Not so grace. Ultimately, no man knows how and why it appears, but only that it is "a gyft of god/and of gret loue spryngeth" (XII, 70). Later, when in Passus XIX the cardinal virtues are being planted in the field, Grace supplies the seed (XIX, 269-70):

And grace gaue greynes þe cardynales vertues,
 And sewe [hem] in mannes soule...

This image suggests that the exercise of virtue itself depends on God's

⁸ Dan Michel, *The Ayenbite of Inwit*, Richard Morris, ed. (London, 1866), Early English Text Society, OS 23, 167.

⁹ "þe uirtue of strengþe/ heþ alsuo þri offices. Vor huo þet þise uirtue heþ: he him a-erereþ an heȝ a-boue þe perils þet byeþ ine þe wordle. No þing him ne dret/ bote vileynie. Aduerseté/ and prosperité/ he berþ/ and poleþ wyþ-oute wepinge. ne ariȝthalf ne alefthalf." *loc. cit.*, 125.

¹⁰ *De Spiritu et Littera*, Cap. III, 5; PL 44, 203.

initiative, rather than on man's. Here too, Langland follows Augustine who had chided the Stoic for pride in his own perfection:

Est virtus animi res laudabilis... sed dic, Unde habes? Non virtus animi tui te facit beatum, sed qui tibi virtutem dedit, qui tibi velle inspiravit, et posse donavit.¹¹

Augustine's treatise on patience applies this general principle specifically to patience with the statement that "Patientia non venit ex liberi arbitrii viribus, sed ex divino adiutorio".¹²

These preliminary remarks must conclude with the assertion that *Piers Plowman* is not a theological treatise, not even an unsystematic one. It handles images and ideas of Patristic writers almost casually and unconsciously, and such usage suggests considerable familiarity. Hence Langland's theological indebtedness should never be ignored. However, in itself, the exploration of this area contributes little to any fundamental understanding of his work. *Piers Plowman* is essentially a poem, and what matters within the framework of the poem is that Langland gives life to abstract ideas by placing them in a context that involves activity. Thus, for example, in the instance just quoted, we see grace in concrete terms of ploughman, field and seed. The imagery of organic growth which appears here, runs like a *leitmotif* throughout *Piers Plowman*, from the field of folk that becomes Piers' half-acre, to the barn of unity in which all are to be finally gathered. In passing, one might note that not every detail is carefully allegorised and that the allegory itself shifts. Hence, somewhere there remains the reality of an English field. Yet even when the imagery is not so clearly linked to the main theme, it is still characterised by Langland's stress on activity. Sin does harm, virtue does good, and we see each primarily in the doing. The fact that both come equally to life is in itself a remarkable feat, since wickedness appears to lend itself to much easier dramatic portrayal than goodness. Yet next to Piers himself, no character exercises greater appeal than the personification of patience in Passus XIII and XIV. Since whatever Langland has to say about this virtue is most clearly exemplified here, our study should begin with this attractive figure.

II

Patience only appears on the scene in person, after the dreamer has learnt to recognise his own need for this virtue. From the very beginning, various characters have pointed to his deficiencies, but Will has paid scant heed. Then, in Passus XI, after a long discourse from Loyalty, he con-

¹¹ Sermo GL, Cap. VIII, 9; PL 38, 812.

¹² *De Patientia*, Cep. XV, 12; PL 40, 617.

templates the world about him and expresses dissatisfaction with its basic arrangements. Thereupon Reason appears and tries to teach him to recognise and accept the inscrutability of God's will. Despite his argumentativeness, the dreamer finally grows ashamed of himself, and at that moment he awakens. Immediately, he falls into another sleep-vision, in which he learns that his own impatience had cut short the previous dream and deprived him of further instruction from Reason. Ruefully, he admits that this lesson has brought him a step nearer his quest, for now at least he knows that the first of the three lives demands patience (XI, 402):

"To se moche and suffre more certes," quod I, "is dowel!"

His momentary insight leads him to an intermediary vision, which is followed by a period of wandering "many a zere after" (XIII, 3), musing on what he has seen. Only after this long preparation can he sit down at the banquet with Patience.

In this dream-vision, which occurs in Passus XIII, Conscience invites Will to dine with Clergy. On their way, they see Patience waiting outside in pilgrim's attire, begging food in the name of charity "for a pore heremyte" (XIII, 30). He is invited inside, but seated below the salt, at a lesser table, next to Will. The meal tends to be somewhat allegorical, and at Patience's board includes a great many dishes of scriptural quotations related to penitence. Once again, however, the allegory is not perfectly sustained, and so at the same time we enjoy a real banquet at which the doctor of divinity, flushed with wine, stuffs himself with

... sondry metes mortrewes and puddynges,
Wombe-cloutes and wyldre braune & egges yfrved with grece

(XIII, 62-63), until Will angrily wishes (XIII, 81-82):

þat disshes a[nd] doblers bifor þis ilke doctour
Were [molten] led in his maw.

Patience, sitting beside Will, is content with his meagre portion and "made hym muirth with his mete" (XIII, 60). Yet such ready acceptance of his own lot does not blind him to the doctor's obvious faults. Will, of course, only sees these in terms of the unfair treatment which he himself has received and bitterly resents. Patience, on the other hand, can look at the doctor objectively, and laughs at the discrepancy between his words and his works (XIII, 86-87, 89-92):

... "þow shal se þus sone whan he may no more,
He shal haue a penaunce in his paunche and puffe at eche a worde...
For now he hath dronken so depe he wil deuyne sone,
And preuen it by her pocalips and passioun of seynt Auereys,
þat neither bacoun ne braune blan[c] mangere ne mortrewes
Is noither fisshe [ne] flesshe but fode for a penaunte.

True to expectation, the doctor is readily drawn out, but Will attacks him so heatedly that Conscience begs Patience to quiet him. The discussion then resumes, and Patience is asked for his definition of the three lives. He states his opinions modestly but with self-assurance, and claims to have gained his knowledge from "a lemman pat I loued / loue was hir name" (XIII, 139). Furthermore, he admits to carrying DoWell on his own person. Though the doctor of divinity questions the veracity of Patience's words, Conscience is so moved by them that he suddenly decides to accompany Patience. Deliberately, he rejects the book-learning and wealth proffered him by his erst-while friend, Clergy, but mollifies the angry doctor when he points out that all earthly troubles could be solved "If pacience be owre partyng felawe / and pryue with vs bothe" (XIII, 206). Consequently, their leave-taking is cordial, and the doctor promises the support of learning to the cause of truth, while Conscience goes on pilgrimage "tyl pacience haue preued þe / and parfite maked" (XIII, 214). The dreamer, who has ceased to be a participant in the action, watches as the two companions set out, carrying "Sobrete, and symple speche / and sothfaste byleue" (XIII, 217) in Patience's pack for the journey. According to Langland's magnificent and succinct phrase, these will sustain the travellers, if they pass through" ... vnkyndenesse and coueytise ... hungrye contrees bothe" (XIII, 219).

In this brief outline of some hundred closely packed lines, a great many aspects of patience, applicable equally to the person and to the virtue, are revealed. Patience is cheerful and humble, but never obsequious. Though he accepts a lowly position with complete lack of self-regard, he can poke gentle fun at his social betters and does not gloss over human failings. His words, no less than his person, carry authority. In fact, only he can control the impetuous Will. Brief acquaintance with Patience suffices to persuade Conscience to join him in his hard journey and even moves the self-important doctor of divinity. A little later, he will have a similarly powerful effect on Haukyn, the active man. Patience is closely associated with poverty for reasons which will become obvious when we consider what Langland has to say about the poor. In the present context, his impecunious state befits his profession of pilgrim. Unlike Will, who is also journeying, Patience seems to know where he is going, and is well acquainted with the three lives. In his own definition of them, he picks up the all-important reference to *caritas*, made earlier by Clergy (XIII, 124), and identifies it with the life of DoBest. Modestly, he himself claims to possess only the first of the three lives (XIII, 152). Yet he offers the bundle containing DoWell with the assurance that nothing else is needful, citing "*caritas nichil timet*" to support his claim (XIII, 157-63*). This quotation could suggest that Patience has actually reached DoBest. A

more likely explanation seems to be that *caritas* is already present in DoWell, as indeed it ought to be, if the three lives are inextricably bound up with one another.¹³ Obviously, Patience possesses what is essential to all three lives, regardless of which particular one he claims to be living. Even within the terms of his own definition, he goes beyond the limits of DoWell, since he embraces DoBet in his function of teacher, and manifests DoBest by his obvious familiarity with *caritas*, whose lover he has professed himself to be. His definitions are not the fruit of learning, but spring from personal experience. Close fellowship with him will lead a man to perfection.

III

The second half of Passus XIII and all of Passus XIV are concerned with Haukyn, the wafer-seller, and with his soiled "cote of crystendome" (XIII, 274). In Passus XIII, his sinfulness is exposed; in Passus XIV, the remedies are propounded. The first suggestion that Haukyn should mend his ways comes from Conscience, but when Haukyn protests the difficulties, Patience takes him in hand and proceeds to instruct him at great length. He begins by suggesting a life of moderation, bringing forth from his sack "vitailles of grete vertues" (XIV, 37) to sustain the reluctant penitent. Will, watching the scene, notes that the food being offered to Haukyn is "fiat voluntas tua", that clause of the Paternoster in which the suppliant attempts to accept patiently whatever Providence might send (XIV, 48). Patience presents it with the guarantee that whoever has this food can bear any affliction, and adds "Pacientes vincunt", the same phrase with which, in the previous passus, he had summarised his definition of the three lives (XIII, 171*). But his words have no immediate effect on Haukyn. He ignores Patience's advice concerning confession and contrition.— we recall at this point the penitential food at the banquet — and asks instead where charity is to be found.

"pere parfit treuthe and pouere herte is and pacience of tonge,
pere is charitee, þe chief chaumbrere for god hymselfue!"

Patience replies (XIV, 99-100). This leads Haukyn to enquire about "paciente pouerte" (XIV, 101), a subject on which Patience waxes elo-

¹³ Clergy, whose theory is better than his practice, rightly suggests that the three lives fit together. He explains that according to Pier's teaching (XIII, 27-29):

"... dowel and dobet aren two infinites,
Whiche infinites, with a feith fynden oute dobest,
Which shal saue mannes soule."

quent for over two hundred lines. His words finally bear fruit, for Haukyn repents and (XIV, 326-28):

Swowed and sobbed and syked ful ofte
þat euere he hadde londe or lordeship lasse other more,
Or maystrye ouer any man mo þan of hym-self.

Belatedly, Haukyn realises that love of worldly possessions has misled him into sin and weeps so boisterously, that he awakens the dreamer. The beginning of Passus XV describes how Will then meditates on all he has seen, and is so absorbed in these thoughts, that everyone considers him mad.

Patience's instruction on poverty is noteworthy because it contains one of Langland's most moving poetic passages — the one in which he gives an eloquent account of what the poor endure all year long, especially in winter-time, and which concludes with a moving plea on their behalf, calling for human and divine compassion (XIV, 157-80). Furthermore, Patience's discourse contains a defence of voluntary poverty, undertaken for love of God. This seems to be the state Haukyn finally intends to embrace, rather than the life of moderation, first suggested to him by Patience. In Haukyn's case, such a choice seems desirable, since he needs to repent of all his excesses, and appears unable to exercise due restraint in the use of worldly goods. For the majority of mankind, however, poverty does not come about through free choice, but is an unavoidable economic condition. Langland envisages an audience primarily composed of people who are in this latter state, and identifies himself with them. The questions raised on their behalf recur throughout *Piers Plowman*. The answers, basically always the same, gain in force partly through sheer repetition, but largely because each new setting adds a further dimension. Thus, Patience's contribution is enhanced by his own personality and by his persuasive effect on the various characters in that particular dramatic situation. His teaching, however, largely repeats what Loyalty had already said in an earlier passus.¹⁴ Therefore, we must turn now from any specific setting to summarise the general reasons why Langland considers the virtue of patience so necessary to the poor.

Christianity commends the practice of voluntary poverty, but does not regard this way of life as essential to spiritual perfection. Neither does

¹⁴ Patience's words are addressed not only to Haukyn, but to all mankind. For Haukyn plays a double role. As a character in his own right, he is the sinful wafer-seller who eventually relinquishes worldly goods *in toto*. As the allegorical figure of *activa vita*, he represents all men who are engaged in worldly commerce and must learn the proper use of *temporalia*. Hence the long confession of every possible kind of sin, so inappropriate to one single person. Once again, we have an allegory in which the various levels do not completely overlap.

Langland. Primarily, he is concerned about the right use of *temporalia*, be the amount great or small. Repeatedly, he recommends a life of moderation, arguing that every man is entitled to a just reward for his labour and to a fair consideration of his actual needs. While presenting us with this ideal, he also recognises that many people eke out a miserable existence, on the one hand exposed to fraudulent merchants, conniving lawyers and ever-rising food prices, and on the other, only too ready themselves to advance by cheating their neighbour. Though Langland cares as much about their economic state as he does about their spiritual welfare, only the second question concerns us here. It occupies a prominent place in the poem. For while *Piers Plowman* deals with the problem of salvation as it pertains to every man, the poor are particularly singled out for attention. Not only does Langland sympathise with them, but he also identifies himself with them through his *persona* of dreamer.¹⁵ Will belongs among the lowly. True, his rebellious attitude to authority springs more from his intellectual questionings than from his poverty. Yet at the same time, he speaks very much for the poor, and voices what they feel but are unable to express. As we already know, he lacks patience. The painful progress which he makes, serves as example and encouragement to others. Furthermore, throughout the poem, Langland frequently addresses the poor directly, and urges them to be patient. Placing himself on their level has given him this right.

The bitterness of poverty, Langland claims, can only be made sweet through the exercise of patience. Here is how Loyalty explains this matter to the dreamer (XI, 251-54):

As on a walnot with-oute is a bitter barke
And after þat bitter barke (be þe shelle aweye),
Is a kinnelle of conforte kynde to restore;
So is, after, pouerte or penaunce pacientlyche ytake.

Patient resignation enables the poor to endure their hard lot without giving in to despair and stifles any temptation to seek relief through dishonest means. Above all, when such patient resignation becomes transformed into patient and positive *acceptance*, then a burdensome economic condition suddenly becomes the road to sanctity. Here we reach the heart of the

¹⁵ Will's biography is only given to us in casual snatches, usually while he is "awake". Within the dream-framework, he argues about poverty in a theoretical fashion that precludes any explicitly personal note. Only in one instance does Will identify himself so directly with the poor that we seem to hear the voice of Langland himself. This occurs at the banquet scene, when Will accuses the gluttonous doctor of lacking charity, and cries out that he "Hath no pyte on vs pore" (XIII, 78).

matter, for the conviction that ultimately, every man is called to perfection, underlies the dreamer's whole search after the three lives. Clearly, one must start where one finds oneself. Therefore, in their respective discourses, both Loyalty and Patience put forward a host of arguments in favour of poverty. Some of this reasoning is purely pragmatic, as for example Loyalty's point that the poor are less burdened with responsibilities and can sleep more soundly at night (XI, 258-60). This attempt to make a virtue out of necessity suggests that Langland expects to find all kinds of people among his audience, including some who are not yet motivated by any spiritual aims. While appealing to them in terms they can accept, he points already to what lies ahead. Presumably this is a well-established approach, for John of Bromyard's lengthy exposition on poverty refers the indigent to the scriptural examples set by Job and Tobias, with the same end in view:

Primum exemplo ostenditur Iob et Tobias, & multorum aliorum; qui necessitate in paupertatem ceciderunt: et tamen ex patientia, quae necessitatem sequebatur, de necessitate uirtutem fecerunt.¹⁶

Presumably Langland knew this argument, either directly from Bromyard's encyclopaedic reference work for the mediaeval preacher, or via contemporary sermons which relied on such handbooks and used a similar approach.

When reminding his audience of Job and Tobias, Bromyard ignores the fact that eventually both reaped an earthly reward for their meek acceptance of adversities. For such expectation is not really part of the Christian ethos. The only promised reward is an eternal one. Consequently, Langland fears that if the poor do not accept patiently their present misery, then all their sufferings will prove vain, and they will lose the joys of heaven as well as the benefits of earth. The anonymous writer of the *Liber De Duodecim Abusionum Gradibus* comments on this fact when inveighing against lack of humility among the poor:

Cavendum ergo pauperibus est, ne dum per egestatem et necessitatem terrenum regnum perdunt, per mentis etiam imprudentiam coelorum regna amittant.¹⁷

Quite possibly this warning is aimed primarily at those who have given up the world and pride themselves on their renunciation, but it can apply equally well to the more mundane self-seeking found among Langland's drunken beggars and idle labourers. A great many of the failings confessed

¹⁶ *Summa Praedicatorum* (Nuremberg, 1485), P. III, "Paupertas", Cap. III, Art. 7.

¹⁷ *Liber De Duodecim Abusionum Gradibus*, Gradus VIII; PL 40, 1084-85. During the Middle Ages, this work was attributed to Bernard of Clairvaux, and hence stamped with the seal of his authority.

by the Seven Deadly Sins and found spotting Haukyn's coat are clearly the sins of the less fortunate, for despite all his sympathy for them, Langland never idealises the poor. Though encouraging them to realise that their state enjoys special divine approbation, he never praises poverty without a reminder that only patience raises it to these spiritual heights. The two words occur in frequent conjunction throughout *Piers Plowman*. Thus for example, after arguing that all Christians are blood brethren and therefore equal, Loyalty opts for poverty and points out that (XI, 247-48):

And alle þe wyse þat euere were by auȝte I can aspye,
Preysen pouerte for best lyf if pacience it folwe.

Similarly, Patience reminds Haukyn that since Christ lived on earth in the likeness of a poor man, the patient poor have a special claim on him (XIV, 259-60):

... al pore þat pacience is may claymen and asken
After her endynge here heuene-riche blisse.

The next question Haukyn asks shows that he is beginning to understand this essential link. Since you praise poverty so greatly, he replies, tell me now "What is Pouerte with pacience ... properly to mene?" (XIV, 274). Thereupon Patience draws up a systematic list of all the benefits that flow from being unencumbered by riches, and concludes with the assertion that patience is the sustenance, the very bread of poverty (XIV, 313-14):

For pacyence is payn for pouerte hym-selue
And sobrete swete drynke and good leche in sykenesse.

All this throws a slightly different light on Langland, the poet who is noted for his social conscience. True, he is deeply disturbed by the misery of his fellow men, and on their behalf addresses many impassioned pleas to the wealthy. True, he seems to know through personal experience just how hard poverty can be. But he never holds out any hope to the needy that they might improve their material condition and is only concerned with spiritualising it. Whenever he addresses himself directly to the poor, he calls on them to exercise patience; when dealing with the rich, he reminds them of their duty of alms-giving. The attitude of mind this suggests is most clearly expressed in a sermon attributed to Augustine. Here, the two activities are characterised as proper to the two different states and of equal merit in the sight of God:

Potuit enim Deus omnes homines divites facere; sed nobis per pauperum miseriam voluit subvenire: ut et pauper per patientiam, et dives per elemosynam possint Dei gratiam promereri.¹⁸

¹⁸ Sermo CCCV, 2; PL 39, 2330-31.

The argument that the poor exist for the sake of the rich sounds strange to modern ears, and I quote the passage mainly to illustrate the importance attached to patience. Not only is this virtue particularly linked with the state of poverty, but it gains weight through being equated with alms-giving, an activity which the Middle Ages held in unusually high esteem and came close to regarding as a universal panacea.

The patience which Langland recommends to the poor, however, must not be confused with that submissiveness which Victorian hymns enjoin on the less fortunate. In *Piers Plowman*, *patientia* is an active force, both on the human and on the divine level. When Will complains about disorder in the universe, the only answer Reason gives him is that God the Creator deliberately exercises patience. Will, Reason suggests, should learn from that model (XI, 370-73):

"Suffraunce is a souereygne vertue and a swyfte veniaunce.
Who suffreth more þan god? ... no gome, as I leue!
He miȝte amende in a Minute while al þat mys standeth,
Ac he suffreth for somme mannes good and so is owre bettre."

Similarly, throughout *Piers Plowman*, Christ never appears as passive victim, but always as conquering hero, who freely chooses his course. This portrayal explains why at the end of the poem, Langland describes his whole earthly life as a deliberate exercise in patience, and sums it up in the one phrase "willen & suffren" (XIX, 64). The same positive choice is open to men. We see this in Passus XIII, when Conscience sets out on his journey with Patience, and explains that "þe wille of þe wye / and the wille [of] folke here" (XIII, 190) have stirred his own will. Conscience's decision is deliberate — the word "will" occurs repeatedly in his brief *apologia* — and indicates that to recognise and fulfill one's vocation as pilgrim on this earth involves more than passive acceptance. The same is true of the patience Langland demands from the poor.

IV

To conclude this study, we must turn now to another pilgrim, namely to Will, the dreamer. Since his journey occupies the whole of *Piers Plowman*, Langland can show how a very real personal development takes place in him. In fact, whatever clear progression can be found in the poem, is associated with Will's understanding and increased willingness to learn, and the dream-visions which flow from this process. When we consider his reactions to each new situation, we will find that slowly, but genuinely, he grows in patience. Furthermore, this growth seems to follow the classic pattern described by ascetic theology.

Professor Vansteenbergh, who briefly summarises the three-fold development of the virtue of patience, connects it with the three stages of the spiritual life:

La patience peut, en effet, être pénétrée soit de résignation, soit de volonté positive, soit d'amour. De là trois degrés qui correspondent, en somme, avec trois voies de la vie spirituelle.

Au premier degré, l'âme se soumet, elle accepte sans murmure le calice qu'elle voudrait cependant voir s'éloigner d'elle. Au second, elle fait sienne la volonté divine et veut réellement l'épreuve qui la fait souffrir. Au troisième, elle s'attache avec joie à la volonté de Dieu, elle l'aime et se porte en quelque sorte au devant d'elle, soutenue par un ardent désir.¹⁹

While this three-fold framework does not really apply to any of the abstract definitions of Langland's *vitae*, the dreamer's personal development largely corresponds to the suggested pattern. When we first meet him, in the *visio*, he is masquerading as a false hermit, curious about spiritual matters but detached from any direct involvement or effort. Once he has embarked upon his search in the *vitae*, he asks for advice, but lacks the humility to accept what he is offered. Contemptuously, he dismisses the teaching of the friars whom he encounters in Passus VIII, and frankly admits that he enjoys "jangling" for its own sake (VIII, 118-20):

I dorste meue no matere to make hym to iangle
But as I bad þouȝt þo be mene bitwene,
And put forth somme purpos to prouen his wittes.

Only in Passus XI, when Reason has reproved him for questioning God's ways, does he begin to understand what patience means, and says sadly that this experience has taught him that Dowel is "To se moche and suffre more" (XI, 402). This statement, an improvement on his previous argumentativeness, occurs in the middle of the *vita de DoWell* and suggest a modicum of resignation, albeit no great enthusiasm. It suffices, however, to prepare Will for the actual meeting with Patience, a scene which we have already considered in some detail.

The new way of life which Conscience and Haukyn embrace with such readiness in Passus XIII and XIV might well be described as the second degree in the practice of the virtue of patience. Will appears to be only a passive witness of their conversion, but in Passus XV, which begins the *vita de DoBet*, he shows that he has personally profited from this lesson. To begin with, he meditates at great length on all he has just seen. Then, when he falls asleep again and meets Anima in his next dream-vision, he asks where he may find true charity. Anima offers him a description,

¹⁹ *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, XI, 2250.

couched largely in terms of humility and patience, and notes that charity is sustained by exactly that same "fiat-voluntas-tua" which Patience had previously offered to Haukyn. Will's eager response, "By cryst, I wolde þat I knewe hym... no creature leuere !" (XV, 189), is rewarded with the great visions of Piers and of Piers-Christ which are contained in Passus XVI-XVIII of the life of DoBet. Through these, the dreamer becomes so firmly established in love, that not even the assault of anti-Christ can make him abandon what he has set out to seek. In the beginning, he had thought that the answer lay in three neat little formulae, provided that someone could give him the right ones. Gradually, he learned that these formulae were really summed up in one person. For the sake of this person — Piers-Christ — he is prepared to persevere alone and to spend the rest of his life in pilgrimage. Here, where patient perseverance and love meet, is to be found that third and highest degree of patience which Professor Van-steenberghé has described.

At the beginning of this paper, I suggested that Christian patience attempts to model itself on the heroism of the early martyrs, expects to be perfected through perseverance in the midst of tribulations, and looks towards heaven as its ultimate goal.²⁰ This triumph of patience is quietly expressed by the figure of Patience himself, with his twice-repeated affirmation "Patientes vincunt".²¹ Langland, of course, can show no such final victory, for his concern is with man's earthly pilgrimage, and therefore he must limit himself to the Christian experiences of *this* life. Yet even if no final certainty can be achieved here, *Piers Plowman* concludes with the assurance that all will be well in the end. The casual reader sees only the destruction of the Barn of Unity, a catastrophe which seems to be a denial of all that the previous visions had promised. However, when the whole poem is seen in perspective and understood in terms of a personal search, we realise that only the perseverance of the individual pilgrim, surmounting all surrounding assaults, ultimately matters. Despite his profound concern with it, Langland is not very hopeful about society as a whole. Like the

²⁰ As the Gloss comments on the Epistle of St. James I, 3: 4 (*Glossa* VI, 1265): "Patientia enim operatur probationem, quia cuius patientia per tribulationes non vincitur, perfectus probatur, quae sententia hic quoque dicitur: Patientia opus perfectum habet, & probatio operatur patientiam, quod est, tribulatio quae datur ad probationem fidei, facit per patientiam exerceri, per quod fides perfecta probatur." This way of stating that patience leads to perfection is almost formulaic. The *Ayenbite of Inwit*, for example, follows precisely the same line of argument. Dan Michel notes that no one is patient to begin with, but only acquires this virtue through tribulation. He concludes that without such trial, and subsequent development of patience, perfection is not possible.

²¹ At the banquet scene, XIII, 171, and when instructing Haukyn, XIV, 52.

prophets of old, he knows that Israel will forever seek to return to her idols, regardless of the mercies which the Lord continues to shower upon her. Nevertheless, for the individual soul, faithfulness is possible, and can be achieved even in the midst of apocalyptic disaster.

Though in Passus XX all about him prove faithless, Conscience conquers despair, refuses to give up, and becomes all the more firmly fixed to his goal. His endurance stems from his great love for Piers-Christ and is the greatest victory patience can sustain in this world.²² Here, our neat distinctions must be abandoned. For while theoretically we can discuss *patientia* as a virtue in its own right, in practice of course it can not be separated from *caritas*. This holds true even on the natural level, as Prof. Vansteenberghe pounts out:

La patience, au fond, est affaire d'amour; quand on aime un bien plus qu'un autre, on supporte avec patience la privation du second pour obtenir le premier.²³

Applied to the supernatural plane, the choice leads to *caritas*:

Pour que l'homme préfère à tous les biens de ce monde, dont la perte peut l'attrister, le bien de la grâce, il faut qu'il ait la charité.²⁴

Langland suggests the same interrelationship between the two virtues when he shows us a tree planted in man's heart and explains:

Patience hatte þe pure tre and pore symple of herte,
And so, þorw god and þorw good men groweth þe frute charite.²⁵

²² Though at this point I have turned from Will to Conscience, by the end of the poem the two are no longer completely distinct characters. Both share the same intense love for Piers-Christ, and both become pilgrims. Are we not, after all, ultimately talking about Will's Conscience?

²³ DTC, XI, 2248.

²⁴ DTC, XI, 2249. Innumerable Patristic writers make the same link between *patientia* and *caritas*. Ambrose, for instance, sums up the relationship between love, patience and perfection with the simple assertion that "*Patientia vero perfectio est charitatis*" (*Expositio Evang. Sed. Luc.*, Lib. V, 1370; PL 15, 1652). Augustine talks about the common source of love and patience when he writes, "*Proinde ab illo est patientia iustorum, per quem diffunditur charitas eorum... Quanto ergo major est in sanctis charitas Deo, tanto magis pro eo quod diligitur ... omnia tolerantur*" (*De Patientia*, Cap. XVII; PL 40, 619).

²⁵ B XVI, 8-9. In the C-Text, which for many reasons I find inferior, this passage is considerably altered to read (C XIX, 9-14):

The tree hihte Trewe-loue... the trinite hit sette,
Thorgh louely lokynge hit lyueth and launceth vp blossemes,
The whiche blosmes burnes Benygne-speche callen,
And ther-of cometh a good frut the which men callen Werkes
Of holynesse, of hendynesse of help-hym-that neodeth,
The whiche is callid Caritas Cristes owen fode.

Far more importantly, however, he embodies this theory in living characters. Hence we remember Langland's emblematic tree with its varied fruit much less clearly than we recall Conscience, the faithful pilgrim, in whom all the patience of which love is capable, becomes personified. General knowledge, practical experience and personal insight are all welded together to create this figure. But only the poet's craft can account for our emotional response to Conscience's final outcry (XX, 378-80):

Bi cryste... I wil bicom a pilgryme
And walken as wyde as al þe [worlde] lasteth
To seken Piers þe plowman...

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Mediaevalia

CAEDMON: A TRADITIONAL CHRISTIAN POET

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What strikes me as extraordinary about Bede's story of the poet Caedmon and his craft is not its account of a miracle but its record of the most commonplace and traditional concepts of mediaeval poetry. For any of these Bede could have easily found authority in Isidore's *Etymologiae*, a volume we know he read and used.¹ Therein were the theories on poetry which were copied and passed on through the Middle Ages by both Rabanus Maurus and Vincent of Beauvais. Or if any of the early Christian-Latin poets ever came to the attention of Bede, he would have found in their careers and poems striking parallels with the art and life of Caedmon.

Whether Bede saw any connections between the Caedmon legend and the theories on poetry in Isidore's *Etymologiae* or in the poetry of Christian-Latin poets, we cannot, of course, say. That they exist, however, is a fact and a very important one. For they demonstrate how commonplace and believable all aspects of the Caedmon legend would have been to anyone of the Middle Ages. Bede's account is, finally and undoubtedly quite accidentally, a remarkable piece of early descriptive literary criticism.

Bede reports that when Caedmon was commanded by the voice to sing, he began "*cantare in laudem Dei Conditoris uersus.*"² What he sang is this: "*Nunc laudare debemus auctorem regni caelestis, potentiam Creatoris et consilium illius, facta Patris gloriae. Quomodo ille, cum sit aeternus Deus, omnium miraculorum auctor extitit, qui primo filiis hominum caelum pro culmine tecti, dehinc terram custos humani generis omnipotens creauit.*"³ That Caedmon's first poem should be a hymn of praise is not at all surprising. It places him immediately within the tradition of Christian-Latin poets beginning with Commodian in the third century. As F. J. E. Raby more than adequately demonstrates, the Christian poets turned again and again in hymns of verse to praise God and His creation⁴. One instance is that of Prudentius, who, looking back over his life and realizing the vanity of most things, decides that before he dies he will praise God at least in song, if he cannot please Him by virtuous deeds: "*Hymnis continuet dies / nec nox ulla uacet quin dominum canat.*"⁵ In singing the praise of the beauty of the creation and the

¹ See J. W. H. Atkins, *English Literary Criticism: The Medieval Phase* (Cambridge, 1943), 46-47, for Bede's debt to Isidore's *Etymologiae*.

² *Historiam Ecclesiasticam Gentis Anglorum, Historiam Abbatum, Epistolam ad Ecgbertum, una cum Historia Abbatum Auctore Anonymo*, ed. Carolus Plummer, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1896), I, 259.

³ *Ibi d.*, 259-260.

⁴ *A History of Christian-Latin Poetry From the Beginnings to the Close of the Middle Ages*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1953).

⁵ *Carmina*, ed. Mavricii P. Cunningham, *Corpus Christianorum [Series Latina]*, 126 (Turnhout, 1966), 2.

power of God, Caedmon, Prudentius, and all the other Christian poets were no different from the very first poets, if we are to believe Isidore's citation from Tranquillus. For they too, when they first emerged from a savage age and began to worship their gods, brought forth "*ita eloquio etiam quasi augustiore honorandos putaverunt, laudesque eorum et verbis inlustrioribus et iucundioribus numeris extulerunt.*"⁶

The essence of Bede's story is, needless to say, the miracle. Caedmon learned his craft "*non ab hominibus, neque per hominem institutus, ... sed diuinitus adiutus gratis canendi donum accepit.*"⁷ As Curtius has observed: "The theory of the poet's divine frenzy is, of course, set forth in Plato's *Phaedrus* (which the Middle Ages did not know), but in diluted form it was to be found throughout late Antiquity and it passed to the Middle Ages as a commonplace, like other elements of antique mythology."⁸ Divine inspiration was commonly associated throughout the medieval period not only with poets but also with artists in general. Much like the account of Caedmon's experience is a ninth-century legend that Gregory the Great "received the chant from the Holy Ghost who in the form of a dove whispered the melodies into his ears."⁹ And Otto von Simson reports that "The Abbot Suger was convinced that the design of his church had been inspired by a celestial vision."¹⁰ Finally, Boccaccio, whose *De genealogiis deorum gentilium* became a standard handbook for poets and painters, was reasserting the doctrine of divine inspiration for the late Middle Ages.¹¹

Isidore, on whom Boccaccio drew, gives support to the doctrine of divinely inspired poetry. In his account of *vates* in "*De poetis*," he says: "*Vates a vi mentis appellatos Varro auctor est; vel a viendis carminibus, id est flectendis, hoc est modulandis; et proinde poetae Latine vates olim, scripta eorum vaticinia dicebantur, quod vi quadam et quasi vesania in scribendo commoverentur; vel quod modis verba conecterent, viere antiquis pro vincere ponentibus. Etiam per furorem divini eodem erant nomine, quia et ipsi quoque pleraque versibus efferebant.*"¹² It is worth recalling a fact already pointed out by Curtius: "Isidore — or rather his source — derives *carmen* from *carere mente* (I, 39, 4)."¹³ Elsewhere in the *Etymologiae* Isidore sets forth the significance of the *vates*: "*Vates a vi mentis appellatos, cuius significatio multiplex est. Nam modo sacerdotem, modo prophetam significat, modo poetam.*"¹⁴ In a sense, Caedmon is a priest as well as a poet, if not also a prophet. Certainly it would not be entirely inappropriate to refer to him as a *vates*.

The subjects of his poems certainly reflect his kinship with both priest and prophet, but then they were the very traditional subjects of all the Christian-Latin poets. He wrote, as Bede says, about the creation of the world, the origin of the race of mankind, the history of Genesis, the exodus from Egypt, the incarnation of God, the pas-

⁶ *Etymologiarum sive originum*, ed. W. M. Lindsay, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1911), VIII, vii, 2.

⁷ Bede, 259.

⁸ Ernst Robert Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York and Evanston, 1953), 474.

⁹ Manfred F. Bukofzer, "Speculative Thinking in Medieval Music," *Speculum*, 17 (1942), 169.

¹⁰ *The Gothic Cathedral: Origins of Gothic Architecture and the Medieval Concept of Order* (New York, 1956), xvii.

¹¹ D. W. Robertson, Jr., *A Preface to Chaucer: Studies in Medieval Perspectives* (Princeton and London, 1963), 63.

¹² Isidore, VIII, vii, 3.

¹³ Curtius, 474.

¹⁴ Isidore, VII, xii, 15.

sion and the resurrection, the advent of the Holy Ghost, and the doctrine of the Apostles. The list of subjects is a long one, and I am inclined to suspect that it is not necessarily a particularly accurate list of the poet's works, but rather a list of possible topics any Christian poet might have seen as fit topics for verse. These are at any rate the topics one finds appearing again and again in the poetry of Commodian and all subsequent medieval Christian poets. They are the topics common to the poet-theologians, the category of poets to which we ought to assign Caedmon, Commodian, Paulinus, Ambrose, and Prudentius and an endless number of others, for as Isidore observes: "*Quidam autem poetae Theologici dicti sunt, quoniam de diis carmina faciebant.*"¹⁵

As a poet-theologian Commodian wrote *Carmen Apologeticum* (c. 250 A. D.), "the earliest example of Latin verse which was intended for and, we must assume, appreciated by uncultured members of the Church."¹⁶ The aim of the poem was to instruct, and it set out to do so by "a kind of exposition of Christian doctrine, describing the creation, God's revelation of Himself to man, the coming of Antichrist, and the end of the world."¹⁷ We see immediately that Commodian was drawing on topics similar to those Caedmon used. We do not know what Commodian's verse was able to achieve among the "uncultured members of the Church." But we might fairly assume, I think, that Caedmon's aim was very similar to Commodian's and that perhaps the poems of both had a like effect. The poetry of Caedmon, at least, had a profound influence, if Bede's report is true: "*Cuius carminibus multorum saepe animi ad contentum saeculi, et appetitum sunt uitae caelestis accensi.*"¹⁸ That in general was the aim of all religious art throughout the Middle Ages; the sermons, glass windows, images and carvings, bestiaries, hymns, all were meant to lead the mind to a contemplation of the spiritual world.

There remains one aspect of the Caedmon story that may well be a part of an established tradition too. At least there is a striking parallel to it recorded by Isidore. We recall that Caedmon left the banquet hall when the cithara was passed to him for he could not sing. Here is Bede's description of the event: "*Siquidem in habitu saeculari usque ad tempora prouectionis aetatis constitutus, nil carminum aliquando didicerat. Unde nonnumquam in conuiuio, cum esset laetitiae causa decretum, ut omnes per ordinem cantare deberent, ille, ubi adpropinquare sibi citharam cernebat, surgebat a media caena, et egressus ad suam domum repedabat.*"¹⁹ The kernel of Caedmon's dilemma and also its solution has a very interesting and striking parallel in Isidore's discussion of the origins of music, an art discovered, he alleges, either by the Hebrew or by the Greeks. He draws a very decisive contrast between sacred hymns sung *in veneratione divina* and secular songs customarily sung *in convitiis* when the cithara was passed around the banquet table to each man. This is what he records: "*Moyse dicit repertorem musicae artis fuisse Tubal, qui fuit de stirpe Cain ante diluvium. Graeci vero Pythagoram dicunt huius artis inuenisse primordia ex malleorum sonitu et cordarum extensione percussa.... Post quos paulatim directa est praecipue haec disciplina et aucta multis modis, eratque tam turpe Musicam nescire quam litteras. Interponebatur autem non modo sacris, sed et omnibus sollempnibus, omnibusque*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, VIII, vii, 9.

¹⁶ Raby, 13.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Bede, 259.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

laetis vel tristioribus rebus. Vt enim in veneratione divina hymni, ita in nuptiis Hymenaei, et in funeribus threni, et lamenta ad tibias canebantur. In conviviiis vero lyra vel cithara circumferebatur, et accubantibus singulis ordinabatur conviviale genus canticorum."²⁰ Caedmon never served the secular Muses; indeed he turned his back on the conviviality and singing of the banquet hall and sought refuge in his stable quarters. There he was called into the service of God to compose songs *in veneratione divina*.

In turning away from the scene of the secular music and devoting himself to the art of sacred songs, Caedmon is like Paulinus of Nola, who was born at Bordeaux in 353 A. D. Before his conversion to Christianity, Paulinus amused himself in the service of pagan gods. But afterwards, he writes in a song, "*negant Camenis nec patent Apollini / dicata Christo pectora.*"²¹ Now, he continues, his heart is fixed on the invisible and eternal things, not the visible and temporal:

*namque caduca patent nostris, aeterna negantur
uisibus, et nunc spe sequimur quod mente uidemus,
spementes uarias, rerum spectacula, formas
et male corporeos bona sollicitantia uisus.*²²

His whole career as a poet is summarized in these words by Raby: "But for his conversion, he would have employed his poetical gifts upon trifling subjects and rhetorical themes; now that he had devoted himself to religion, he used his talent to express those ideas and emotions which had really mastered his life. In short, he became a true poet."²³ Caedmon, according to Bede, never employed his poetical gifts on trifling subjects and rhetorical themes. But through his miraculous gift he did become a true poet, and until his death his heart was always fixed on things which are invisible and eternal.

Bede's account of Caedmon is charming and tender. But more important, this engaging legend is also a brief bit of medieval literary criticism. For it embodies some of the essential and traditional views of the poet and his craft which were held throughout the Middle Ages. Caedmon is in a sense an exemplum of the true Christian poet who celebrates the praises of God in verse, draws on Scripture and Church dogma for his themes, is divinely inspired by God, keeps his heart fixed on things invisible and eternal, and aims constantly to lift the minds of his readers to those spiritual objects also.

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²⁰ Isidore, III, xvi, 1-3.

²¹ *Carmina*, ed. Gvilelmvs de Hartel, CSEL, 30 (Prague, Vienna, Leipzig, 1894), 25.

²² *Ibid.*, 32.

²³ Raby, 104.

THE OINTMENT IN CHRÉTIEN'S *YVAIN*

ROBERT G. COOK

One of the most inexplicable scenes in what remains, even in the 1960's, a largely unexplained romance is the scene in Chrétien's *Yvain* where two damsels and their lady discover the naked and witless hero asleep in a forest.¹ When one of the damsels identifies the naked Yvain by a scar on his face and reminds the lady of their need for a bold knight to defend them against the Count Aliers, the lady (later identified as the Dame de Noroison) recalls that she has at home an ointment given her by Morgan, who claimed for it that "there is no madness which it will not remove."² The three women return to their castle, where the lady takes the box of ointment out of a coffer and gives it to one of the damsels, telling her to be sparing in its use: she is to apply it only to Yvain's temples and then to bring back the unused portion. The Dame de Noroison makes it abundantly clear that to apply the ointment anywhere on the body other than the temples would be needless waste (ll.2969-73). The damsel then returns alone to the sleeping Yvain, carrying the ointment and clothes. Disobeying her mistress' orders, she applies the ointment to Yvain's entire body, using up the whole box. She discreetly retires while Yvain wakes up, recovers his sanity, and puts on the clothes which she left for him. Then she joins him and persuades him to return to her lady's castle for recuperation. As they cross a bridge over a swift-running stream, the damsel deliberately drops the empty box into the water. When her lady later asks her for the unused ointment, the damsel tells a prepared lie: that her horse slipped on the bridge, causing the box to fall into the water. The lady is upset at the loss of her most valuable possession, but consoles herself with the inevitability of the loss and the reflection that things don't always turn out as desired. Nonetheless she asks the damsel to give Yvain every service.

The romance goes on to tell of Yvain's recovery and his victory over Count Aliers, and recounts for nearly four thousand lines a series of episodes culminating in his re-union with Laudine; but nothing more is said of the ointment or the damsel who applied it too liberally and lied to her lady. Certainly a magic ointment is a convenient and typical means of curing the hero, but why the additional story of the damsel and her method of using the ointment? In this we have what is probably the most inconsequential detail in the whole romance, and unless we are content to take it as an indication of Chrétien's love of story for its own sake, we should attempt to explain its presence.

Surprisingly little effort has been made in this direction. Foerster suggests that Chrétien got the idea for the magic ointment from the ointment given to Jason by Medea in the *Roman de Troie*, but this source would account at most for the ointment itself, not for the remarkable method of its use or the fact that it is used to restore

¹ Lines 2888-3130. I have used the text of Wendelin Foerster, reproduced photographically in T. B. W. Reid's French Classics edition (Manchester, 1942).

² "nul rage/N'est an teste, que il n'an ost" (2954-55).

sanity.³ R. S. Loomis devoted very little space to this passage in his large book on Chrétien, and directed his attention not toward the ointment but toward Morgan and her ultimate identification with the Dame de Noroison.⁴ Since Morgan is not mentioned again in the course of the romance, I suggest that her introduction in this episode is a casual conventionality — something like, but even less meaningful than the ascription of the Green Knight's mission to Morgan in *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*⁵ (with the difference that in the English poem Morgan does make a personal appearance, in a minor role). The *Gawain*-poet makes use of Morgan's traditional hostility to Arthur; Chrétien in the *Yvain* draws upon another tradition, that of her healing abilities — in her first appearance in literature, in the *Vita Merlini*, Morgan heals Arthur's wounds in Avalon.⁶

No one has seen fit to deal with what clearly are the salient features of this episode: (1) the use of an ointment over the whole body rather than just on the temples, and (2) the lie by which the damsel accounts for her failure to bring back the box. Of these, the more striking is the first, for a servant who gets the better of her mistress (or his master) by deceit is a common literary figure — one has already appeared in *Yvain* (i. e. Lunete).⁷ The motif of the excessive application of the ointment, on the other hand, is a rare one; a survey of the major motif-indexes fails to reveal any parallels.⁸ Though it is not essential to my thesis, I would venture a guess that, because it is the more exceptional and because it comes first in a work whose genre bears marks of sequential composition, the discrepancy between the intended and the actual use of the ointment came first in Chrétien's mind, and that secondarily he hit upon the deceitful damsel as an appropriate way of fitting this into his story.

It is this motif of the application of the ointment, then, that calls for our attention.

³ Cf. Reid's note to 11. 2952 ff., "The magic ointment was perhaps suggested by the ointment given to Jason by Medea (*Roman de Troie* 1671 ff.)," which derives from Foerster's straightforward announcement that "Die Wundersalbe (2592) stammt auch aus Troja 1652" (Kristian von Troyes, *Yvain*, Textausgabe, 4. Auflage [Halle. 1912], p. xlviii).

⁴ *Arthurian Tradition and Chrétien de Troyes* (New York, 1949), 309-11.

⁵ Ed. by J. R. R. Tolkien and E. V. Gordon (Oxford, 1925), 11. 2446 ff.

⁶ See Lucy Allen Paton, *Studies in the Fairy Mythology of Arthurian Romance* (New York, repr. 1960), 13, 25 ff.

⁷ Chrétien seems to have a pronounced habit of doubling or repeating in *Yvain*. Besides the two deceitful mistresses just indicated, one might notice the following: (1) both Lunete and the disinherited younger sister have a period of forty days in which to find a champion; (2) Yvain twice performs an adventure (the slaying of Harpin de la Montagne and the Chastel de la Pesme Avanture) which presents itself after he has committed himself to another adventure, yet before he has been able to carry out that original adventure (in turn, the defense of Lunete and the defense of the younger sister); (3) Yvain is twice offered marriage (to the Dame de Noroison and to the daughter at the Chastel de la Pesme Avanture) and of course twice refuses; (4) Yvain fights twice with fellow members of Arthur's court (Kay and Gawain) and in both cases he is unrecognized by his opponent (in the fight with Gawain, both knights are incognito).

⁸ In Sith Thompson, *Motif-Index of Folk Literature*, rev. ed., 6 vols. (Bloomington, 1955-58) and Tom Peete Cross, *Motif-Index of Early Irish Literature* (Bloomington, 1952), item D1244 has to do with magic salve or ointment, but none of the references provides a counterpart to the situation in *Yvain*. D. P. Rotunda, *Motif-Index of the Italian Novella in Prose* (Bloomington, 1942), has no item D1244. Gerald Bordman, *Motif-Index of the English Metrical Romances* (Helsinki, 1963), adds a new item, D1508.5 (Magic ointment cures madness), but the single reference is to *Yvain and Gawain*, a romance based on Chrétien's *Yvain*.

In the rest of this note I wish to suggest a possible source for this ointment which was to be applied to the temples only, but instead is applied liberally to the whole body. In doing so, I am turning to an area not generally regarded as likely source material for romance motifs: Scriptural commentary in the form of sermons. In particular, I will point to several places in St. Bernard's sermons on Canticles where Chrétien might have got the suggestion. I repeat that I am not claiming to point to Chrétien's precise source; it is enough, since the *celtisants* have left the door wide open, to establish the likelihood that a romance writer could draw on this other kind of material. The *a priori* possibility is strong: Chrétien was a learned Christian (if the redundancy be permitted), not much separated from St. Bernard in time (the monk died in 1153), nor from Clairvaux in space (Troyes is 30 miles distant). Count Henry the Liberal of Champagne, Chrétien's patron, had the sermons of Bernard in his library at Troyes.⁹

My first passage is from Bernard's twelfth sermon on Canticles, where he is commenting on "Thy name is as oil poured out" (Cant. 1, 2). I cite his comments in full:

Let us turn to the Gospels and examine something there which is perhaps relevant to these ointments. "Mary Magdalene and Mary the mother of James and Salome bought sweet spices, that coming, they might anoint Jesus" [Mark 16, 1]. What were these ointments that were so precious that they were bought and collected for the body of Christ, that were plentiful enough for the whole body? Neither of the two preceding ointments was bought or made especially for the service of the Lord; nor does it say that they were poured over the whole body. But suddenly a woman is brought in, who in one place [Luke 7, 38] kisses his feet and anoints them with ointment, and in another place [Matt. 26, 7; Mark 14, 3] either she or another woman brings an alabaster box of ointment and pours it on his head. But in this place [Mark 16, 1] it says "They bought sweet spices, that coming, they might anoint Jesus." They did not buy ointments, but sweet spices; the ointment for the service of the Lord is not prepared beforehand, it is freshly blended; nor is it for the anointing of only one part of His body, such as the head or the feet, but, as it is written: "That coming, they might anoint Jesus," which is to say His whole body, not just part.

Now you, if you put on mercy and show yourself generous and kind not only to parents and relatives and those who have aided you or you hope will aid you — for even the heathen do this — but if, following the counsel of Paul, you strive to do good to all men, so that you do not consider that humane deeds ought to be denied even to an enemy, it is certain that you possess abundantly the finest ointments and that you have undertaken to anoint, not just the head or the feet of the Lord, but, as much as you are able, the whole body, which is the Church.¹⁰

⁹ Cf. Urban T. Holmes, Jr., and Sister M. Amelia Klenke, *Chrétien, Troyes, and the Grail* (Chapel Hill, 1959), 16.

¹⁰ "Sed recurramus ad Evangelium, atque aliquid quod forte spectet et ad haec unguenta requiramus. MARIA MAGDALENE, ET MARIA IACOBI, ET SALOME EMERUNT AROMATA, UT VENIENTES UNGERENT IESUM. Quenam ista unguenta tam pretiosa ut Christi corpori parentur et comparentur, tam copiosa ut toti sufficiant? Neutrum quippe duorum praecedentium aut emptum aut factum specialiter ad opus Domini, aut toto in corpore legitur fuisse diffusum. Sed de subito introducitur mulier, uno quidem in loco osculans pedes et unguento ungens, in altero vero vel ipsa, vel altera, habens alabastrum unguenti et illud mittens in caput. Ceterum nunc: EMERUNT, ait, AROMATA, UT VENIENTES UNGERENT IESUM. Emunt non unguenta, sed aromata; et unctio in obsequium Domini non facta assumitur, sed nova

The very absence of Christ's body when the two Marys came to anoint it, Bernard goes on, teaches us that the ointment should be used for his living body, i. e. the Church. Spiritually then, the ointment signifies acts of pity (*pietas*): "In this, therefore, the master of pity saved the finest ointments of pity, which he wished to be used entirely for his needy members, for both their physical and their spiritual needs."¹¹

Later in the same sermon, after an excursus on the waste which is necessarily involved in the service of the Lord, Bernard returns to his association of the ointment of Mark 16, 1 with pity. In doing so, he reiterates a threefold association that he had made in the tenth sermon, namely, of the ointment used on Christ's feet with contrition, that used on His head with devotion, and that intended for His whole body with pity. Concerning the last he says:

The unction of pity, which comes from a concern for those who are wretched and is poured over the entire body of Christ, is superior to both of the other ointments. I mean by His body not that which was crucified, but that which was acquired by His passion.¹²

In his fourteenth sermon on Canticles, Bernard again develops the same contrast, this time with reference to Psalm 132 which compares unity among men to the "precious ointment on the head that ran down upon the beard, the beard of Aaron, which ran down to the skirt of his garment...."

conficitur; nec ad ungendam tantum aliquam corporis partem, verbi gratia pedes aut caput, sed, sicut scriptum est: UT VENIENTES UNGERENT IESUM, quod est totius corporis complexio, non partis distinctio.

"Tu quoque si te induas viscera misericordiae, liberalem benignumque exhibeas non tantum parentibus sive cognatis tuis, aut quos tibi vel benefactores tenes vel benefacturos speras, — nam et ethnici hoc faciunt —, sed, iuxta Pauli consilium, studeas operari bonum ad omnes, ita ut propter Deum nec inimico officium humanitatis corporale seu spirituale negandum subtrahendumve existimes, constat te quoque abundare unguentis optimis, ne caput aut pedes Domini tantum, sed passim, quantum in te est, ungere suscepisse totum corpus, quod est Ecclesia." Sancti Bernardi, *Opera*, Vol. I: *Sermones super Cantica Canticorum* 1-35, ed. by J. Leclercq, C. H. Talbot, and H. M. Rochais (Rome, 1957), 64. That Chrétien had the ointment of Mark 16, 1 in mind when writing the episode of Yvain's cure by a magic ointment appears more likely when we observe that in his *Lancelot* he designates a similar ointment as "l'oignemant as trois Maries" (line 3374 in the edition of Wendelin Foerster: Christian von Troyes, *Sämtliche erhaltene Werke*, vol. 4 [Halle, 1899]). The three Marys, as Foerster's note tells us, must refer to the Mary Magdalene, Mary the mother of Jesus, and (Mary) Salome of Mark 16, 1. The three Marys' ointment is again mentioned in *La Mort Aymeri de Narbonne*, ed. J. Couraye du Parc, S. A. T. F. (Paris, 1884), 11. 1993-2001. See also Jean Frappier's note on page 220 of his modern French translation of *Le Chevalier de la Charrette* (Paris, 1962): "D'après une croyance populaire attestée diversement dans des textes médiévaux assez nombreux, entre autres la *Mort Aimeri de Narbonne*, *Fierabras*, *La Continuation de Perceval* par Gerbert de Montreuil, les aromates achetés par 'les trois Maries', Marie-Madelcine, Marie, mère de Jacques le Mineur, et Marie Salomé, pour embaumer le corps de Jésus (*Évangile selon saint Marc*, 16, 1) auraient fait partie des reliques de la Passion et constitué un remède miraculeux." This may also account for the fact that there are *three* women — the Dame de Noroison and her two damsels — who discover the sleeping Yvain.

¹¹ "In isto ergo pepercit Magister pietatis unguentis optimis pietatis, quae membris suis indigentibus tam corporaliter quam spiritualiter omnino cuperet exhiberi." *Ibid.*, 65.

¹² "Porro utrumque vincit unctio pietatis, quae de respectu miserorum fit, et per universum Christi corpus diffunditur. Corpus dico, non illud crucifixum, sed quod illius acquisitum est passione." *Ibid.*, 67.

For what reason should the unction of salvation be restricted to the beard of Aaron, as the ungenerous Jew [Moses, who anoints Aaron in Lev. 8, 12 and Eccles. 45, 18] wishes? It is not for the beard, but for the head. The head moreover is not for the sake of the beard alone, but the whole body. Let it [the head] receive first, but not alone. Let that which it has received from above be poured out on the lower members. Let the celestial liquor descend, descend on the breasts of the Church.... Let it overflow even more, I ask, and reach the edge of the garment, namely me — certainly the last and unworthiest of all, yet belonging to the garment [of the Church].¹³

Both these sermons, then, make the distinction between ointment placed on the head and ointment spread over the whole body which we found to be such a striking narrative detail in *Yvain*. In addition, these passages have a spiritual significance which is directly relevant to Chrétien's romance, for is not Yvain at the moment he receives the ointment a totally wretched and reduced member of the Church who benefits from an act of pity of the precise kind that Bernard is preaching? It is at least tempting to picture the poet recalling Bernard's association of certain Biblical ointments with acts of pity and, by means of his storyteller's art, expanding the monk's static distinction into a curiously lively episode exactly at the point in his narrative where his hero is helplessly dependent on outside aid.

In his thirty-second sermon on Canticles, Bernard again treats the significance of ointments. Here, to be sure, he does not make the distinction between areas of application which has concerned us in this note; but he does talk of the healing power of ointments in a way which parallels the total *sens* of *Yvain*. Bernard talks of souls which are not yet ready to receive Christ in the form of a bridegroom, but are first in need of a physician.

For he who is not yet so disposed [to be a bride of the Lord], but rather is full of sorrow because of the memory of his sins, speaking in the bitterness of his soul says to God, "Do not condemn me" [Job, 10, 2]. Or perhaps he is still dangerously tempted, seduced and snared by his own concupiscence. Such a soul needs a physician, not a bridegroom, and therefore receives not kisses and embraces but remedies for his wounds: oil and ointments.¹⁴

Bernard goes on to cite Psalm 146, 3, calling this ointment the medicine given by Jesus to those of contrite heart. In Chrétien's poem, Yvain is at this point contrite, both literally and spiritually, and he will soon begin a long series of adventures which are clearly a kind of penance for his crime against Laudine. In Bernard's terms, Yvain is "full of sorrow because of the memory of his sins." And the progress of the romance is such that at the end, no longer in need of a physician, Yvain re-enters the marriage state — that state which for Bernard figured the highest beatitude of the soul.

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¹³ "Quo pacto, ut vult Iudaeus ingratus, tota in barba Aaron remaneat unctio salutaris? Non barbae, sed capitis est. Caput autem non barbae solius, sed et totius est corporis. Capiat sane prima, non sola. Refundat et inferioribus membris quod accepit ipsa desuper. Descendat, descendat et in ubera Ecclesiae supernus liquor.... Sed exuberet, quaeso, adhuc, et perveniat usque in oram vestimenti, in me utique omnium novissimo atque indignissimo, de vestimento tamen." *Ibid.*, 77.

¹⁴ "Qui enim nondum invenitur ita affectus, sed compunctus magis actuum recordatione suorum, loquens in amaritudine animae suae dicit Deo: NOLI ME CONDEMNARE, aut forte etiam adhuc periculose tentatur a propria concupiscentia abstractus et illectus, hic talis non sponsum requirit, sed medicum; ac per hoc non oscula quidem vel amplexus, sed tantum remedia vulneribus accipiet suis, in oleo utique et unguentis." *Ibid.*, 227-8.

THE SOUND OF LAUGHTER IN *SIR GAWAIN AND THE GREEN KNIGHT*

EDWARD TROSTLE JONES

Although it has been years since J. S. P. Tatlock assured us the Middle Ages could and did laugh,¹ interpreters of medieval literature frequently seem unusually dour even in the presence of texts and situations of humorous intent. An example of the reluctance of critics to explore medieval comic possibilities is the relative neglect of the laughter which greets the returning Gawain to Camelot in *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*. That the Arthurian court, upon learning of Gawain's experience and shame, "laȝen loude þer-at"² would appear to represent a slightly unexpected turn in the narrative. Yet the two most important critical approaches to the poem, broadly labelled the mythological and allegorical,³ have been strangely mute on the significance of the concluding levity. If laughter, however, traditionally reduces and comedy is often enough skeptical of not only myths but also, on occasion, divinities, then proponents of the grave import of *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* may be well advised not to acknowledge too specifically the laughter in the poem.

In the present examination of this crux from *Gawain*, I propose to look to the end of the poem to suggest that finally its spirit, if not satirical, is closer to what a later age might term a comedy of manners than Christian allegory. The objective of the essay is seminal rather than final, even speculative. It is offered as an alternative to an interpretation like Charles Moorman's "Myth and Medieval Literature: *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*"⁴ which finds the laughter indicative of spiritual error and incipient tragedy for the court. My view is nearer to Larry D. Benson's account in *Art and Tradition in "Sir Gawain and the Green Knight"*⁵ which explains the laughter as a modification of the high chivalric ideal and the fame of the Round Table achieved through the court's recognition of human limitation.

Comedy is based on the social at the expense of the individual, as Henri Bergson among others has pointed out.⁶ So it is with the courtiers' laughter at the end of *Gawain*. The laughter does not brutally detract from the excellence of Gawain, as man or knight; but it limits his claim to exclusiveness, or worse his potential for priggishness, the like of which is suggested by Alan M. Markman's assertion that "the primary purpose of this poem is to show what a splendid man Gawain is."⁷

¹ "Mediaeval Laughter," *Speculum*, 21 (1946), 289-294.

² Line 2514 in *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*, ed. Sir Israel Gollancz, with introductory essays. by M. Day and M. S. Serjeantson, Early English Text Society, OS, No. 210 (London, 1940), 94.

³ See the comprehensive survey of research of and prolegomenon to *Gawain* in Morton W. Bloomfield, "Sir Gawain and the Green Knight" *PMLA*, 76 (1961), 7-19.

⁴ "Myth and Mediaeval Literature: *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*", *Mediaeval Studies*, 18 (1956), 158-172.

⁵ "The Return to Camelot" in *Art and Tradition in "Sir Gawain and the Green Knight"* (New Brunswick, N. J., 1965), 240-248.

⁶ "The Comic in General," see Chapter I, *Laughter*, in *Comedy*, ed. Wylie Sypher (Garden City, N. Y., 1956), 62-103.

⁷ "The Meaning of *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*" *PMLA*, 72 (1957), 574-586. See also Hans Schnyder, "*Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*: An Essay in Interpretation," *The Cooper Monographs*,

Doubtless at work in most laughter is a process of *reductio*, extending to what Bergson has termed "a species of degradation."⁸ But the degree of "degradation" can vary according to the quality of the laughter. The jesting laughter the Green Knight hurls at Arthur's court and manifests throughout the poem, for example, seems to be more consistently "a species of degradation" than the courtiers' more humane laughter at the end. But their laughter likewise is informed by a little mockery at the expense of the perfect knight who is funny because he acts as if his position were completely serious and plays his role accordingly. Gawain's failure to laugh with his fellow courtiers separates him from them and ironically makes him funnier by situation. Louis Kronenberger provides some insight into such an effect: "Comedy is always jarring us with the evidence that we are no better than other people, and always comforting us with the knowledge that most other people are no better than we are. It makes us more critical but it leaves us more tolerant; and to that extent it performs a very notable social function."⁹ Admittedly Kronenberger is writing about the comedy of manners, yet in spite of the anachronism his quotation may help to explain the source and quality of medieval laughter in *Gawain* as a timeless response to incongruity.

The laughter at Arthur's court need not betoken a sudden sense of superiority on the part of the courtiers, as it does earlier for Bercilak, but this response may indicate a measure of sophistication among them which hitherto has been concealed. If the meaning of *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* is engendered, as many scholars assume, in Gawain's mythical journey from innocence to experience, then the role of the courtiers and their laughter can be assessed in terms of Gawain's "coming of age." What to Gawain denotes the mark of his shame, the green baldric, becomes immediately adopted for everyone's fashion. Gawain is not alone in having sustained a *rite de passage*: each courtier, by wearing the baldric, holds himself as humorously accountable for error as Gawain seriously judges himself. The courtiers' laughter resounds with both a sophisticated detachment and a charitable identification of which the laughter and the baldric are respectively emblematic. Everyone present has come through his own *rite de passage*, joyously now except for Gawain, but surely not unscathed. Arthur's community is more than ever intact at Camelot.

Without the assertion of the court through laughter, the poem might be weighted towards the tragedy of Gawain's loss of his own ideal and the decadence of the court that it adumbrates. Whereas, in truth, the effect of a happy-ending complete with laughter assures the process of comedy. *Gawain* follows the logic of the comic pattern as set forth by Suzanne Langer: "In comedy, therefore, there is a general trivialization of the human battle. Its dangers are not real disasters, but embarrassment and the loss of face. That is why comedy is 'light' compared to tragedy, which exhibits an exactly opposite tendency to general exaggeration of issues and personalities."¹⁰

ed. H. Lüdeke (Bern, 1961). Schnyder's provocative examination of the poem as criticism of Arthur and his court does not mention the laughter that greets Gawain.

⁸ "The Comic Element in Words," *Laughter*, 141.

⁹ *The Thread of Laughter: Chapters on English Stage Comedy from Jonson to Maugham* (New York, 1952), 6.

¹⁰ Chapter 18, "The Great Dramatic Forms: The Comic Rhythm," *Feeling and Form* (New York, 1953), 349. Along the same lines see also George Kane, *Middle English Literature: A Critical Study of the Romances, the Religious Lyrics, Piers Plowman* (London, 1951). Kane disparages the seriousness of Gawain's quest: "Gawain is a brave knight and a true one, but his stature in the romance that belongs to him is less than that in the larger work [Alliterative *Morte Arthur*] where he must share

The courtiers function to keep the predicament of Gawain in comic perspective; in their laughter and finally sympathy can be found the rhythm of "felt life" which Mrs. Langer identifies as the substance of comedy. The return to the matter-of-fact world of laughter gives reality even to romance.

The moral significance of Gawain's lesson on *trawþe* endures amid the laughter; nevertheless, critics who stress the moral import at the total neglect of the contrasting mood fail to do justice to the transforming power of levity. It should be remembered that Gawain himself first impaired his knightly dignity by sacrificing loyalty and honor to preserve his own life. Still, as the laughter of the courtiers implies, the ideal of knightly perfection is probably unattainable, and the Round Table restores Gawain's dignity by welcoming him back to the more typical and manageable world of human limitation. The court is pleased Gawain took up the challenge, came through as well as he did, and now he is greeted with good humor, tinged ever so slightly with mockery, directed both at him and themselves.

Readers of *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* must be aware that they apprehend most details of the narrative from what is essentially Gawain's point of view. At the end of the poem, however, there is a marked shift, for the courtiers provide a new kind of objectivity. The effect is less a reversal in point of view than an expansion, bringing the reader the gregarious as well as the single eye. This double focus contributes exactly the right note. "No society is in good health," writes Wylie Sypher, "without laughing at itself quietly and privately; no character is sound without self-scrutiny, without turning inward to see where it may have overreached itself.... This kind of awareness is an initiation into the civilized condition; it lightens the burden of selfishness, cools the heat of ego, makes us impressionable by others."¹¹ The loud response of the courtiers forcefully reminds us that all men fall short, and fortunate is he who does not fall down. Laughter saves Gawain from the dark corner of guilt, anxiety, and fear. That Gawain does not understand the benison he has received from his fellows should not interfere with the reader's shock of recognition.

The ambiguity of Gawain's "perfection" is introduced by the courtiers' laughter. On the other hand, such ambiguity helps to place the individual in a fresh relationship to society, as in the standard comedy of manners where the social norm proves more powerful than the individual standard of moral absolutes. If society seems to endorse duplicity as a mode of behavior, Gawain has been exposed throughout his adventures to discrepancies which provoke laughter and reflect the comic. In retrospect Gawain may have the last laugh. My doctrine of comic "eschatology" is predicated on the doubleness of vision generated by the courtiers' laughter. The comic perception "comes only when we take a double view — that is, a human view — of ourselves, a perspective of incongruity. Then we take part in the ancient rite that is a Debate and a Carnival, a Sacrifice and a Feast."¹² Whether or not the laughter of *Gawain* attains to the quality of a rite, it serves some thematic purpose by affirming a credible social response at the end. Whatever else this remarkably rich poem may be, it is finally a comedy, less than divine, but quintessentially human.

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the room. His adventures with the Green Knight are essentially of no great moment, both because little more than his own life could hang upon the outcome and also because that outcome can never really be in doubt; even the simplest fourteenth-century listener must have known that Gawain could not actually lose his head in *this* affair." (73-74).

¹¹ "The Meaning of Comedy," appendix to *Comedy*, *Op. cit.*, 252.

¹² *Ibid.*, 255.

A PROVISIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ORESME'S WRITINGS A SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE

ALBERT D. MENUT

To keep our "Provisional Bibliography of Oresme's Writings" (cf. *Medieval Studies* 28, 1966, 279-299) abreast of these prolifically productive times, we offer the following additions and emendations for the information of Oresmians everywhere.

(1) P. 290, Section B, "Original Works in French," Item 2; Hector Estrup, "Oresme and Monetary Theory," *Scandinavian Economic History Review* 14 (1966), 97-116. This excellent *mise-au-point* of recent studies seeks to reconcile major points still at issue concerning the important *Traictié de la monnoie* and the congeneric Latin *De mutationibus monetarum*. Of both these works a new critical edition is long overdue; almost alone of all Oresme's writings, these two parallel works kept his name alive throughout the nineteenth century.

(2) P. 283, Section A, "Mathematics," Item 6, *Quaestiones de sphaera*. Professor Garrett Droppers of Alfred University, Alfred, N. Y., reports the discovery of a considerable fragment of the *Quaestiones de sphaera* in Venice, Marc. Lat. VIII, 74 (Valentinelli, XI, 107), ff. 1^r-8^v. He has very kindly sent along corrections in the foliation of three other manuscripts containing the *Quaestiones de sphaera* listed in our tabulation; well aware of the need for accuracy of foliation when ordering films from foreign sources especially, we are deeply grateful to Professor Droppers for his welcome assistance in purging our unpremeditated errors, as follows: Florence, Riccardiana, MS 117, should read ff. 125^r-135^r. Rome, Vatican Lat. 2185, should read ff. 71^r-77^v. Seville, Bibl. Colombina, MS 7-7-13, should read ff. 93^r-101^v.

With regard to the Erfurt MS Amplon. Q. 299, ff. 113-126, Professor Droppers writes: "The manuscript refers in the incipit to a *tractatus de spera*; in the explicit, to a *quaestiones de spera* of Nicole Oresme. While working on my thesis, I looked at photographs of it. It is not the same work as the *Quaestiones* I have edited; but whether or not it is really by Nicole Oresme is something that I have not yet investigated. Nor does it appear to be a Latin counterpart of Lillian McCarthy's *Traictié de l'espere*." We await Professor Dropper's solution of this enigma and hope we may report his conclusions in some future Oresmiana.

We are happy to be able to report here the appearance in print of three significant items in the series Publications in Medieval Science, sponsored by the University of Wisconsin Press. The first edition of Oresme's *De proportionibus proportionum* together with his *Ad pauca respicientes*, with parallel English translations by Professor Edward Grant, became available in the fall of 1966. These are perhaps Oresme's most advanced works in the field of pure mathematics. *Ad pauca respicientes* deals with the kinetics of circular motion, especially with the motions of celestial bodies. It sprang from Oresme's opposition to judicial astrology; it attempts to demonstrate the impossibility of astrological predictions in view of the probable incommensurability of the motions of heavenly bodies.

Marshall Clagett's edition (with English translation) of Oresme's most original contribution to medieval science appeared early this year in the same series; the full-length descriptive title is: *Nicole Oresme and the Medieval Geometry of Qualities and*

Motions: a Treatise on the Uniformity and Difformity of Intensities, known as Tractatus de configurationibus qualitum et motuum. Dr. Clagett, general editor of the series, has produced this 800-page first and definitive edition of the full text of this significant and influential work from his painstaking collation of the fourteen extant manuscripts.

The third item to report is the publication (Spring, 1968) in the same series of our edition of Oresme's *Livre du ciel et du monde* with parallel English translation. In this work, Oresme's running commentary is of particular interest, affording as it does a clear and cogent synthesis of later medieval ideas in natural philosophy.

After a relatively quiescent period of many years, the search for documentary and circumstantial evidence upon which to identify beyond reasonable doubt the author of the *Songe du vergier* was reactivated by the late distinguished French medievalist, Robert Bossuat. In his intensive examination of the problem in "Nicole Oresme et le *Songe du vergier*" in *Le Moyen Age* 53 (1947), 83-130, Bossuat produced an interpretation of the available documents slanted in favor of Oresme as the probable author; he adduced stylistic proofs skilfully presented but impermissible in evidence, for most of the *Songe* is a tissue of quoted passages from not only Oresme, but from several other contemporary writers, while the personality revealed behind the style is most like that which we sense in reading Philippe de Mézières' *Songe du vieil pèlerin* or his *Sustance de la Chevalerie de la Passion*, recently edited by the late Professor Abdel Hamid Hamdy, in the *Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts*, Alexandria University Press, vol. 17, 18, (1964-65), 105 pp. In 1896, Nicolas Iorga attributed the *Songe du vergier* provisionally to Philippe in his extensive and definitive work, *P. de Mézières, 1327-1405, et la Croisade au xiv^e Siècle*, and we incline to support Iorga's conclusions — at least, for the present. We await the judgment of the foremost living authority on Philippe de Mézières, Professor George W. Coopland, whose two-volume edition of *Le Songe du vieil pèlerin* is now in press at the Cambridge University Press; after many years of close familiarity with Philippe's life and works, Professor Coopland opines that, although Oresme and Philippe were closely associated as intimate friends in common with King Charles V of France, whom they both served at the same time, perhaps even under the same roof at the Hotel Saint-Pol, between 1373-1376, it was Philippe who wrote for Charles V the famous "disputaison entre un clerc et un chevalier," very shortly after Nicole Oresme had completed his third and final public redaction of his commented translation of Aristotle's *Politics*. Preferring this interpretation of events, we omitted any reference to the *Songe du vergier* in our recent "Provisional Bibliography." In the Introduction to our critical edition of Oresme's *Livre de Politiques*, now ready for publication, we have explained at length our continuing support of Iorga's provisional attribution to Philippe de Mézières.

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